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National Transportation Safety Board
Aviation Accident Final Report
Location:
Blanco, TX
Accident Number:
CEN13FA010
Date & Time:
10/11/2012, 1958 CDT
Registration:
N474FA
Aircraft:
ROBINSON HELICOPTER COMPANY
R44 II
Aircraft Damage:
Substantial
Defining Event:
Loss of control in flight
Injuries:
3 Fatal
Flight Conducted Under:
Part 91: General Aviation - Other Work Use
Analysis
According to track data recovered from a handheld GPS receiver found in the wreckage, the
helicopter was on the final leg of a cross-country flight that had originated earlier in the day.
According to fueling documentation, the helicopter was refueled, and the flight departed and
proceeded on a southeast course toward the intended destination. According to the plotted
GPS data, while enroute, about 600 feet above ground level (agl), the helicopter entered a
descending left turn to an east-northeast course. About 30 seconds later, after descending
about 100 feet, the helicopter entered a climb while on a northeast heading. During the climb,
the helicopter’s groundspeed decreased from 73 knots to 27 knots. The final GPS data point,
recorded about 1 minute after the initial turn from the intended course, showed the helicopter
about 800 feet agl at 27 knots groundspeed and about 0.2 mile north-northwest of the accident
site. The helicopter wreckage was located in a sparsely populated area with hilly terrain. The
debris path was orientated on a south-southeast heading, and the length and distribution of the
debris path were consistent with the helicopter impacting rising terrain at cruise speed.
Postaccident examination of the helicopter revealed no evidence of a preimpact failure or
malfunction that would have precluded normal operation.
A postaccident review of meteorological data established that marginal visual flight rules
conditions likely existed in the vicinity of the accident site at the time of the accident. The
weather data supported increasing low-level cloud development and scattered light rain
showers. No strong outflow winds or severe storm signatures were associated with the
observed rain showers. The accident flight was conducted in dark nighttime conditions with
minimal illumination from ground light sources. The helicopter’s flight path during the last
minute of GPS data was consistent with the pilot becoming spatially disoriented due to the lack
of a discernible horizon that he could use to maintain control of the helicopter. Although the
helicopter was equipped with basic attitude instrumentation and avionics, it was not certified
for flight under instrument flight rules (IFR). Additionally, although the pilot held an
instrument rating for helicopters, his IFR currency could not be verified from available logbook
data.
Page 2 of 12 CEN13FA010
According to FAA correspondence, about 5 months before the accident, the FAA had notified
the pilot that he was ineligible to hold any class of medical certificate because of his multiple
alcohol-related offenses. Although he had been advised multiple times of his ineligibility to
hold a medical certificate, flight documentation established that the pilot continued to exercise
the privileges of his commercial and flight instructor certificates. Toxicological test results for
the pilot were negative for carbon monoxide, cyanide, ethanol, and all drugs and medications.
The helicopter operator reported that the accident occurred during an instructional flight;
however, a review of available evidence did not support that the front-seat passenger was
receiving flight instruction on the accident flight. According to FAA records, the front-seat
passenger had never applied for a student pilot certificate or an aviation medical certificate.
Additionally, a pilot logbook was not recovered during the investigation for the front-seat
passenger. According to a business associate of both passengers, the front-seat passenger had
coordinated the flight to attend a business appointment. According to photographs recovered
from the front-seat passenger’s mobile phone, on earlier flight legs, he had been seated in the
left front seat. According to the helicopter manufacturer, the flying pilot typically would be
seated in the right front seat, especially during initial flight instruction. Additionally, a review
of the front-seat passenger’s mobile phone established that he had been exchanging text
messages with a business colleague in the minutes preceding the accident. Specifically, the final
outgoing text message was sent about 26 seconds before the helicopter deviated from the direct
course toward the intended destination. Therefore, it is unlikely that the passenger was
operating the helicopter at the time of the accident.
Probable Cause and Findings
The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident to be:
The pilot's loss of helicopter control as a result of spatial disorientation due to dark night
conditions and marginal visual flight rules weather conditions.
Findings
Personnel issues
Aircraft control - Pilot (Cause)
Spatial disorientation - Pilot (Cause)
Page 3 of 12 CEN13FA010
Factual Information
HISTORY OF FLIGHT
On October 11, 2012, about 1958 central daylight time, a Robinson Helicopter Company model
R44 II, N474FA, was substantially damaged when it collided with terrain during cruise flight
near Blanco, Texas. The pilot and two passengers were fatally injured. The helicopter was
operated by Veracity Aviation LLC, under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations
(CFR) Part 91 without a flight plan. Night visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the
flight that departed Gillespie County Airport (T82), Fredericksburg, Texas, about 1942, and
was en route to Huber Airpark Civic Club LLC Airport (E70), Seguin, Texas.
According to recovered GPS data, the roundtrip cross-country flight, from the operator's home
base at E70, located in Seguin, Texas, to Midland International Airport (MAF), in Midland,
Texas, originally departed at 1241. The helicopter landed at MAF about 1503. According to
fueling documentation, the accident helicopter was fueled with 37.7 gallons of 100 low-lead
aviation fuel before the return flight. The return flight departed MAF at 1735 and landed at T82
to refuel about 1936.
There were no witnesses to the helicopter arriving at T82 nor while it was being refueled at the
self-serve fueling stations. According to fueling documentation, at 1936, the accident helicopter
was fueled with 15.92 gallons of 100 low-lead aviation fuel.
According to GPS data, the flight departed T82 at 1942. A witness, who was also a helicopter
pilot, reported seeing a Robinson R44 helicopter depart toward the southeast; however, due to
the dark night conditions he was unable to discern the helicopter's registration number or
paint color. He noted that the helicopter had departed from the self-service fueling station near
the main airport building.
The plotted GPS data indicated that the flight proceeded on a southeast course toward the
intended destination (E70). According to the data, the helicopter maintained an average
ground speed of about 80 knots while in cruise flight. At 1956:50 (hhmm:ss), the helicopter
entered a descending left turn from a southeast course to an east-northeast course. The
helicopter was at 2,517 feet GPS altitude, about 610 feet above ground level, and had a ground
speed of 72 knots when it entered the descending left turn. At 1957:19, the recorded GPS
altitude was 2,396 feet, about 500 feet above ground level, and the helicopter's ground speed
was 73 knots. The helicopter then began to climb on a northeast heading. The GPS data
indicated that, during the climb, the helicopter's ground speed decreased from 73 knots to 27
knots. The final GPS data point associated with the accident flight was recorded at 1957:49 and
a GPS altitude of 2,643 feet, about 800 feet above the terrain, with a ground speed of 27 knots.
The final data point was located about 0.2 miles north-northwest of the accident site.
At 2006, the United States Air Force Rescue Coordination Center (AFRCC), located at Tyndall
Air Force Base, Florida, received a 406 MHz emergency locator transmitter (ELT) signal
assigned to the accident helicopter. About 18 minutes later, the AFRCC was received their first
of several triangulated positions for the active ELT signal. The accident site was subsequently
located, with the assistance of airborne and ground units, at 0824 the morning following the
accident. The wreckage was located in a sparsely populated area that was comprised of hilly
terrain.
PERSONNEL INFORMATION
Page 4 of 12 CEN13FA010
According to Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) records, the pilot, age 35, held a
commercial pilot certificate with helicopter and instrument helicopter ratings. He also held a
flight instructor certificate with helicopter and instrument helicopter ratings. His last aviation
medical examination was completed on March 31, 2011, when he was issued a second-class
medical certificate without limitations.
The pilot's flight history was reconstructed using a partially completed pilot logbook, a
spreadsheet flight history that was provided by the pilot's employer, and GPS flight data that
was recorded on the day of the accident. A review of the pilot's flight logbook revealed that his
last recorded flight was completed on May 24, 2012. At that time, he had accumulated 1,410.9
hours total flight experience, of which 1,348.1 hours were listed as pilot-in-command. All of his
logged flight time had been completed in helicopters. He had accumulated 63.6 hours in
simulated instrument conditions and 109.5 hours at night. According the spreadsheet flight
history, the pilot had flown an additional 111.7 hours since his final logbook entry. According to
recovered GPS data, the pilot had flown 4.7 hours on the day of the accident. The pilot's total
flight experience was estimated to be about 1,527.3 hours, of which 543.7 hours were
completed in the same make/model as the accident helicopter. He had accumulated 1,464.5
hours as pilot-in-command and 644.4 hours as a flight instructor. He had accumulated 422.6
hours during the past year, 149.4 hours during the prior 6 months, 95.0 hours during previous
90 days, and 27.4 hours in the last 30 days. The pilot had flown 5.6 hours within the 24 hour
period before the accident.
The pilot's employer, Veracity Aviation LLC, provided flight instruction, local air tours, on-
demand air taxi services, and external load operations. The accident pilot was employed as a
flight instructor and assistant chief pilot for their 14 CFR Part 141 flight school. According to
FAA documentation, on November 7, 2011, the pilot demonstrated the skill and knowledge to
operate as pilot-in-command for external-load helicopter operations. On November 8, 2011,
the pilot passed a FAA regulatory checkride to become an assistant chief pilot for the 14 CFR
Part 141 flight school. The pilot was not authorized to act as pilot-in-command for Veracity
Aviation LLC's on-demand air taxi service under 14 CFR Part 135.
On March 15, 2012, the pilot received a letter from the FAA Aerospace Medical Certification
Division informing him that he was not eligible to hold any class of medical certificate because
of multiple alcohol related offenses. The pilot had two arrests that were associated with driving
while intoxicated (DWI). The first arrest, dated October 16, 2004, resulted in a DWI
conviction. The second arrest, dated November 18, 2011, was not prosecuted by the State of
Texas as a DWI offense. On March 19, 2012, the pilot replied to the FAA letter, stating that he
intended to work with the FAA to regain his eligibility to hold a medical certificate. The pilot
also wrote that he had included his current medical certificate with the correspondence;
however, FAA documentation indicated that the pilot had not included his medical certificate
with his response. On March 27, 2012, the FAA replied to the pilot in the form of another letter
that identified the specific regulations by which his eligibility to hold a medical had been
revoked. The FAA response also detailed what documentation was required to be sent to the
Aerospace Medical Certification Division for additional review before his eligibility could be
reconsidered. On June 25, 2012, the pilot replied to the FAA in the form of another letter in
which he described the circumstances of both alcohol related driving arrests. He wrote that he
continued to provide "ground instruction" to his former students. Additionally, the pilot wrote
that the State of Texas had declined to prosecute the November 2011 arrest for the charge of
driving while intoxicated; however, he had pleaded not-guilty to the charges of speeding and
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being in possession of an open alcoholic beverage while operating a motor vehicle. On October
9, 2012, the FAA sent another letter to the pilot that reiterated his ineligibility to hold a medical
certificate until all of the previously requested documentation had been received and reviewed
by the Aerospace Medical Certification Division. (The pilot had not received the latest
correspondence from the FAA Aerospace Medical Certification Division when the accident
occurred)
The owner of Veracity Aviation LLC told the NTSB investigator that although he knew of the
pilot's November 2011 arrest, he was unaware that the FAA had revoked his medical certificate.
Additionally, he was unaware that the pilot had been working with the FAA to reestablish his
eligibility to hold a medical certificate. According to flight documentation provided by Veracity
Aviation LLC and the pilot's personal logbook, the pilot had accumulated 218.1 hours since
March 15, 2012, when he received the initial letter from the FAA Aerospace Medical
Certification Division notifying him of his ineligibility to hold a medical certificate.
Additionally, the flight records indicated that the pilot continued to act as pilot-in-command
and as a flight instructor during the same time period. (Federal regulation 14 CFR Part 61.23
required a flight instructor to hold at least a third-class medical certificate if they acted as the
pilot-in-command of any instructional flight)
AIRCRAFT INFORMATION
The accident aircraft was Robinson Helicopter Company model R44 II, serial number (s/n)
12517. The helicopter was a four-seat, single-engine helicopter that was equipped with a skid
type landing gear. The FAA type certificate required one flight crew member (pilot) and
permitted operations under day or night visual flight rules (VFR). Although the cockpit was
equipped with flight attitude instrumentation and avionics, the accident helicopter was not
certified for flight under instrument flight rules. The helicopter was equipped with dual cyclic
controls and anti-torque pedals located at both the right and left cockpit positions. The
helicopter was powered by a 245-horsepower Lycoming model IO-540-AE1A5, s/n L-33161-
48E, reciprocating engine.
The helicopter was issued a Standard Airworthiness Certificate on October 14, 2008. A review
of the maintenance records revealed that the helicopter had undergone an annual inspection
on October 3, 2012, at 993.5 hours total time. At the time of the accident, the airframe and
engine had accumulated 1,003.0 hours in service. The helicopter had accumulated 9.5 hours
since the last maintenance inspection. A review of maintenance documentation did not reveal
any unresolved airworthiness issues.
According to maintenance documentation, the accident helicopter had a basic empty weight of
1,530.5 pounds (lbs), a center-of-gravity location of 106.9-inches, and a useful load of 969.5
lbs. According to autopsy data, the pilot weighed 200 lbs, the front seat passenger weighed 325
lbs, and the rear seat passenger weighed 200 lbs. According to the Robinson R44 II Pilot
Operating Handbook, the seats were limited to 300 lbs. According to GPS flight data and
refueling documentation, the accident helicopter had about 36 gallons of fuel onboard when it
departed on the accident flight. The additional personal property and cargo found onboard the
helicopter weighed about 30 lbs.
According to postaccident weight and balance calculations, the helicopter weighed about
2,501.5 lbs and had a center-of-gravity location of 91.85-inches when it departed on the
accident flight. As such, at the time of departure, the helicopter likely exceeded the maximum
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gross weight limitation of 2,500 lbs and had a center-of-gravity located forward of the
allowable limit.
METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION
At 1900, a National Weather Service (NWS) Surface Analysis Chart depicted a low pressure
system over eastern Kansas with a cold front extending southwest through Kansas and into the
Oklahoma panhandle. A warm front extended southeast from the low into eastern Oklahoma
and Arkansas. A high pressure region was located over Alabama. The resultant pressure
gradient resulted in a general southeasterly wind flow that supported a warm moist air mass
originating from the Gulf of Mexico.
At 2000, the NWS Weather Depiction Chart depicted a small area of marginal visual flight rule
(MVFR) conditions in the vicinity of the accident site. The observed conditions near the
accident site supported increasing low-level cloud development and scattered rain showers and
thunderstorms.
A review of weather radar data revealed that, between 1956 and 1958, the helicopter's recorded
GPS flight track bordered an area of very light intensity echoes. During the same time period,
there was an area of light radar echoes that had developed immediately south of the accident
site. The radar images revealed the potential of lower clouds and restricted visibility with light
rain. Following the accident, several small areas of moderate-to-strong rain showers developed
about 2 miles south of the accident site. These rain showers moved northward at 10 knots with
time. No strong outflow winds or severe storm signatures were associated with the observed
rain showers.
The closest weather observing station was located at the Gillespie County Airport (T82),
Fredericksburg, Texas, about 22 miles northwest of the accident site. At 1955, the automated
surface observing system reported: wind 140 degrees magnetic at 5 knots, visibility 10 miles,
scattered clouds at 1,900 feet above ground level, temperature 23 degrees Celsius, dew point 22
degrees Celsius, and an altimeter setting of 30.10 inches of mercury.
The United States Naval Observatory reported that the sunset and end of civil twilight at the
departure airport was at 1908 and 1932, respectively. At the time of the accident, the moon was
more than 15 degrees below the horizon and, as such, did not provide any illumination.
Additionally, the accident site was located in a sparsely populated area with minimal
illumination from ground light sources. As such, dark nighttime conditions existed at the time
of the accident.
The owner of the property where the accident occurred reported that it had been overcast a
majority of the day with a noticeable lower cloud layer at the time of the accident. Between
1910 and 1915, as he was driving east on Farm-To-Market Road, approximately 2 to 4 miles
west of his property and approximately 4 miles north of the accident site, he observed a dark
cloud to the south and southeast, which he thought was associated with an area of rain. He did
not recall seeing any lightning at that time. After arriving home, about 2030, it began to rain
lightly to the point where it was necessary to close his house windows.
WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION
The helicopter wreckage was located in a sparsely populated area that was comprised of hilly
terrain. The initial point-of-impact was identified by recently disturbed terrain near the
summit of a hill. A wreckage debris path originated from the initial point-of-impact and
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consisted of fragmented airframe and flight control components. The debris path was
orientated on a south-southeast heading. Portions of both landing gear skids were located
between the initial point-of-impact and the main wreckage. The main wreckage was located
about 160 feet from the initial point-of-impact. The engine, which had separated from the
airframe, was located about 300 feet from the initial point-of-impact.
A postaccident investigation confirmed that all airframe structural components were located at
the accident site. A majority of the airframe and flight control systems were fragmented during
the impact sequence. There was no evidence of an inflight or postimpact fire. Flight control
continuity could not be established due to multiple separations; however, all observed
separations were consistent with overstress fractures. The hydraulic control servos moved
freely when manipulated by hand. Examination of the four V-belts did not reveal any
preimpact separations. The entire circumference of the forward face of the upper sheave
exhibited scoring. Additionally, an upper fuselage frame tube exhibited scoring adjacent to the
forward face of the upper sheave in the direction of sheave rotation. The observed scoring was
consistent with the engine operating at the time of impact. The main rotor and tail rotor drive
systems exhibited impact damage and several overstress separations. The main rotor hub had
separated from the upper portion of the mast; however, the main rotor blades remained
attached to their respective blade grips. The main rotor blades exhibited spanwise bending,
fractures, and delamination consistent with ground impact. The main rotor gear box rotated
freely by hand without any anomalies. The tail rotor hub remained attached to the tail rotor
gearbox output shaft. The tail rotor blades remained attached their respective blade grips. One
tail rotor blade exhibited spanwise bending and was fractured near the tip. Both tail rotor
blades exhibited chordwise scratches. The tail rotor gear box rotated freely by hand without
any anomalies. Both fuel tanks had been damaged during impact and did not contain any
recoverable fuel. There were numerous separations within the fuel system; however, all
observed separations were consistent with overstress fractures. The fuel selector valve was
found in the "ON" position. The airframe examination did not reveal any evidence of a
preimpact failure or malfunction of the helicopter structure, drive train, flight controls,
hydraulic system, fuel system, and main and tail rotor systems that would have precluded
normal operation. All observed airframe fractures were consistent with overload forces that
were encountered during the impact sequence.
The engine had separated from the helicopter airframe during the impact sequence. The left
magneto, engine-driven fuel pump, and oil filter had separated from the engine. Internal
engine and valve train continuity was confirmed as the engine crankshaft was rotated.
Compression and suction were noted on all cylinders in conjunction with crankshaft rotation.
The upper spark plugs were removed and exhibited features consistent with normal engine
operation. A borescope inspection of the cylinders revealed no evidence of foreign object
ingestion or detonation. The ignition harness and both magnetos exhibited impact damage that
precluded a functional test of the ignition system. The fuel injection servo, induction system,
and exhaust were not obstructed. Fluid consistent with the appearance and odor of 100 low-
lead aviation fuel was observed in trace amounts at the fuel flow divider, engine-driven fuel
pump, and the fuel injection servo filter screen. The right side of the oil cooler exhibited
numerous impact marks adjacent to the starter ring gear. The left side cooling panels, adjacent
to the starter ring gear, also exhibited scuff marks. The postaccident examination revealed no
evidence of preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal
engine operation.
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Following the accident, a fuel sample was collected from the self-service fueling station that
was used to fuel the accident helicopter before the accident flight. The fuel sample was blue in
color, consistent with 100 low-lead aviation fuel. Additionally, the fuel sample did not contain
any particulate or water contamination.
MEDICAL AND PATHOLOGICAL INFORMATION
On October 13, 2012, an autopsy was performed on the pilot by the Bexar County Medical
Examiner's Office, located in San Antonio, Texas. The cause of death was attributed to multiple
blunt-force injuries that were sustained during the accident. The FAA's Civil Aerospace
Medical Institute (CAMI) located in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, performed toxicology tests on
samples obtained during the autopsy. The toxicological test results were negative for carbon
monoxide, cyanide, ethanol, and all drugs and medications.
ADDITIONAL DATA/INFORMATION
The two passengers were employed by Venture Energy Services. According to a company
representative, the purpose of the flight was to fly to Midland, Texas, so that the passengers
could interview a potential employee. Venture Energy Services owned and operated their own
airplane for business flights; however, on the day of the accident, the airplane was not available
because it was undergoing maintenance. The owner of the company had other personal aircraft
that were often used for business flights; however, those aircraft typically were not made
available unless the owner was also going on the business flight. As such, one of the passengers
had arranged the accident flight through Veracity Aviation LLC.
According to the owner of Veracity Aviation LLC, the passenger who arranged the accident
flight was an established customer who had previously obtained helicopter flight instruction.
According to invoices, dated between May 2012 and September 2012, the passenger had
completed 5 instructional flights in a Robinson R44 helicopter, totaling 7 hours of flight time.
The owner of Veracity Aviation LLC reported that the passenger did not have a logbook in
which the dual instruction had been recorded. Additionally, the passenger had reportedly paid
for two of his friends to have introductory helicopter flights.
According to FAA records, the passenger who arranged the accident flight had never applied
for a student pilot certificate or an aviation medical certificate. A pilot logbook was not
recovered during the investigation for the passenger. Beyond the 5 invoices for the
instructional flights with Veracity Aviation LLC, no additional information was recovered
during the investigation that indicated the passenger had been actively pursuing flight
instruction.
According to fueling documentation for the accident flight, the passenger who arranged the
flight had used his company credit card, issued by Venture Energy Services, to purchase fuel at
Midland International Airport (MAF) and Gillespie County Airport (T82). According to the
owner of Veracity Aviation LLC, the advertised rental rate for the accident helicopter included
the cost of fuel. He further stated that he did not know why the passenger would have paid for
the fuel, but that he would have credited any fuel that had been purchased by the passenger.
According to a Venture Energy Services company representative, the passenger who had
arranged the flight told him that Veracity Aviation LLC had discounted the hourly rental rate
for the helicopter if they agreed to purchase any required fuel.
The passenger who had arranged the accident flight had a mobile phone that contained several
text messages and photos which were aviation related. On September 22, 2012, the passenger
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and the owner of Veracity Aviation LLC discussed having a "charter" the following morning.
The passenger noted that he had an investor in town that wanted to go on an aerial observation
flight to "count his exotic animals." On September 23, 2012, the passenger sent a text message
to his investor that read "We're getting the doors off and fueling up. I'll text you when we take
off and I'll pick you up by the tennis court by the lodge." The passenger's mobile phone
contained several photos that were taken on September 23, 2012, during a helicopter flight.
Two of the photos established that the photographer was seated in the forward right seat of a
Robinson R44 helicopter. The photographer's feet were flat on the floor; they were not
positioned on the helicopter's anti-torque pedals. According to invoices provided by Veracity
Aviation LLC, the flight on September 23, 2012, was invoiced as an instructional flight and the
owner of Veracity Aviation LLC was listed as the flight instructor.
On October 9, 2012, the passenger and the owner of Veracity Aviation LLC exchanged multiple
text messages about another potential flight; however, the discussed flight was subsequently
canceled by the passenger due to a scheduling change.
On the day of the accident, the passenger's mobile phone had several text messages that were
associated with the accident flight. At 1016:47, the passenger mistakenly sent a text message to
an unintended recipient that read "Also I need your weight??? Lol its for fuel purposes." At
1034:41, the pilot sent the passenger a text message concerning a temporary airspace flight
restriction (TFR), which ultimately was determined not to be active on the day of the accident.
Between 1049:32 and 1050:28, the passenger and pilot exchanged 3 text messages about
meeting at the airport, and the final message from the passenger read "it will be me and 187 lbs
person." After landing in Midland, Texas, at 1529:08, the pilot sent a business related message
that indicated that they had landed at Midland. At 1859:38, the pilot sent a text message that
read "In helicopter headed back to Seguin from Midland I'm about 1 hr out." Between 1951:00
and 1956:24, the pilot and a colleague exchanged 5 text messages concerning a business related
topic. The final 2 text messages of that conversation were sent by the passenger at 1956:17 and
1956:24. According to the recovered GPS track data, which was obtained from another
handheld device, the passenger's final outgoing text message was sent about 26 seconds before
the helicopter began the left descending turn, and 1 minute 25 seconds before the final
recorded GPS data point.
The passenger's mobile phone also contained several photos that were taken at various times
on the day of the accident. At 1449:33, while the helicopter was en route to Midland, Texas, a
photo was taken looking forward from the front left seat of a Robinson R44 helicopter. At
1503:47, shortly after the helicopter had landed at Midland, Texas, a photo was taken of an
airport ramp, looking forward from the front left seat of the helicopter. At 1818:17, while the
helicopter was en route to Fredericksburg, Texas, a photo was taken looking forward from the
front left seat of the helicopter. At 1926:36, another photo was taken looking forward from the
front left seat of the helicopter. At 1926:52, another photo was taken from the front left seat of
the helicopter, and depicted the left edge of the instrument panel, the left cockpit floor, and the
left cyclic control stick. In the photo the photographer's feet were positioned on the helicopter's
anti-torque pedals, which were in a neutral position. Although the photo did not capture entire
length of left cyclic control stick, there were no hands visible on the upper 1/3 of the control
stick. At 1935:35 and 1935:44, two photos were taken of a dark airport ramp with runway and
taxiway lights illuminated. At 1940:05 and 1940:08, two photos were taken while the
photographer stood outside the helicopter. The photos were focused on the left side of a
Robinson R44 helicopter that was sitting on an airport ramp. Although the horizon was still
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discernible in the photos, the ramp area was already dark. The helicopter's red beacon lights
were illuminated and the main rotor was rotating at the time of the photographs.
According to the helicopter manufacturer, the flying-pilot typically would be seated in the right
cockpit position. Additionally, during flight instruction, the pilot-receiving-instruction typically
would be seated in the right cockpit position and the flight instructor in the left cockpit
position.
History of Flight
Enroute-cruise
Other weather encounter
Loss of visual reference
Loss of control in flight (Defining event)
Collision with terr/obj (non-CFIT)
Pilot Information
Certificate:
Flight Instructor; Commercial
Age:
35
Airplane Rating(s):
None
Seat Occupied:
Right
Other Aircraft Rating(s):
Helicopter
Restraint Used:
Seatbelt
Instrument Rating(s):
Helicopter
Second Pilot Present:
No
Instructor Rating(s):
Helicopter; Instrument Helicopter
Toxicology Performed:
Yes
Medical Certification:
None None
Last Medical Exam:
03/31/2011
Occupational Pilot:
Yes
Last Flight Review or Equivalent:
11/08/2011
Flight Time:
(Estimated) 1527.3 hours (Total, all aircraft), 543.7 hours (Total, this make and model), 1464.5
hours (Pilot In Command, all aircraft), 95 hours (Last 90 days, all aircraft), 27.4 hours (Last 30
days, all aircraft), 5.6 hours (Last 24 hours, all aircraft)
Page 11 of 12 CEN13FA010
Aircraft and Owner/Operator Information
Aircraft Manufacturer:
ROBINSON HELICOPTER
COMPANY
Registration:
N474FA
Model/Series:
R44 II
Aircraft Category:
Helicopter
Year of Manufacture:
Amateur Built:
No
Airworthiness Certificate:
Normal
Serial Number:
12517
Landing Gear Type:
Skid
Seats:
4
Date/Type of Last Inspection:
10/03/2012, Annual
Certified Max Gross Wt.:
2500 lbs
Time Since Last Inspection:
10 Hours
Engines:
1 Reciprocating
Airframe Total Time:
1003 Hours
Engine Manufacturer:
Lycoming
ELT:
C126 installed, activated,
aided in locating accident
Engine Model/Series:
IO-540-AE1A5
Registered Owner:
Eric A. Spitzer, LLC
Rated Power:
245 hp
Operator:
Veracity Aviation, LLC
Air Carrier Operating
Certificate:
Rotorcraft External Load
(133); On-demand Air Taxi
(135)
Meteorological Information and Flight Plan
Conditions at Accident Site:
Visual Conditions
Condition of Light:
Night/Dark
Observation Facility, Elevation:
T82, 1695 ft msl
Observation Time:
1955 CDT
Distance from Accident Site:
22 Nautical Miles
Direction from Accident Site:
300°
Lowest Cloud Condition:
Scattered / 1900 ft agl
Temperature/Dew Point:
23°C / 22°C
Lowest Ceiling:
None
Visibility
10 Miles
Wind Speed/Gusts, Direction:
5 knots, 140°
Visibility (RVR):
Altimeter Setting:
30.1 inches Hg
Visibility (RVV):
Precipitation and Obscuration:
No Obscuration; No Precipitation
Departure Point:
Fredericksburg, TX (T82)
Type of Flight Plan Filed:
None
Destination:
Seguin, TX (E70)
Type of Clearance:
None
Departure Time:
1942 CDT
Type of Airspace:
Class G
Wreckage and Impact Information
Crew Injuries:
1 Fatal
Aircraft Damage:
Substantial
Passenger Injuries:
2 Fatal
Aircraft Fire:
None
Ground Injuries:
N/A
Aircraft Explosion:
None
Total Injuries:
3 Fatal
Latitude, Longitude:
30.051944, -98.606667
Page 12 of 12
Administrative Information
Investigator In Charge (IIC):
Andrew T Fox
Adopted Date:
09/17/2015
Additional Participating Persons:
Jesse Sanchez; Federal Aviation Administration - San Antonio FSDO; San Antonio, TX
Thom Webster; Robinson Helicopter Company; Torrance, CA
Mark Platt; Lycoming Engines; Chandler, AZ
Publish Date:
09/17/2015
Note:
The NTSB traveled to the scene of this accident.
Investigation Docket:
http://dms.ntsb.gov/pubdms/search/dockList.cfm?mKey=85313
The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), established in 1967, is an independent federal agency mandated
by Congress through the Independent Safety Board Act of 1974 to investigate transportation accidents, determine
the probable causes of the accidents, issue safety recommendations, study transportation safety issues, and evaluate
the safety effectiveness of government agencies involved in transportation. The NTSB makes public its actions and
decisions through accident reports, safety studies, special investigation reports, safety recommendations, and
statistical reviews.
The Independent Safety Board Act, as codified at 49 U.S.C. Section 1154(b), precludes the admission into evidence
or use of any part of an NTSB report related to an incident or accident in a civil action for damages resulting from a
matter mentioned in the report.
