REVERSE
MORTGAGES
FHA Needs to
Improve Monitoring
and Oversight of
Loan Outcomes
and Servicing
Report to Congressional Requesters
September 2019
GAO-19-702
United States Government Accountability Office
______________________________________ United States Government Accountability Office
September 2019
REVERSE MORTGAGES
FHA
Needs to Improve Monitoring and Oversight of
Loan
Outcomes and Servicing
What GAO Found
The vast majority of reverse mortgages are made under the Federal Housing
Administration’s (FHA) Home Equity Conversion Mortgage (HECM) program. In
recent years, a growing percentage of HECMs insured by FHA have ended
because borrowers defaulted on their loans. While death of the borrower is the
most commonly reported reason why HECMs terminate, the percentage of
terminations due to borrower defaults increased from 2 percent in fiscal year
2014 to 18 percent in fiscal year 2018 (see figure). Most HECM defaults are due
to borrowers not meeting occupancy requirements or failing to pay property
charges, such as property taxes or homeowners insurance. Since 2015, FHA has
allowed HECM servicers to put borrowers who are behind on property charges
onto repayment plans to help prevent foreclosures, but as of fiscal year-end
2018, only about 22 percent of these borrowers had received this option.
Reported Home Equity Conversion Mortgage Termination Reasons, Fiscal Years 2014–2018
FHA’s monitoring, performance assessment, and reporting for the HECM
program have weaknesses. FHA loan data do not currently capture the reason
for about 30 percent of HECM terminations (see figure). FHA also has not
established comprehensive performance indicators for the HECM portfolio and
has not regularly tracked key performance metrics, such as reasons for HECM
terminations and the number of distressed borrowers who have received
foreclosure prevention options. Additionally, FHA has not developed internal
reports to comprehensively monitor patterns and trends in loan outcomes. As a
result, FHA does not know how well the HECM program is serving its purpose of
helping meet the financial needs of elderly homeowners.
FHA has not conducted on-site reviews of HECM servicers since fiscal year 2013
and has not benefited from oversight efforts by the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau (CFPB). FHA officials said they planned to resume the reviews
in fiscal year 2020, starting with three servicers that account for most of the
market. However, as of August 2019, FHA had not developed updated review
procedures and did not have a risk-based method for prioritizing reviews. CFPB
conducts examinations of reverse mortgage servicers but does not provide the
results to FHA because the agencies do not have an agreement for sharing
confidential supervisory information. Without better oversight and information
sharing, FHA lacks assurance that servicers are following requirements,
including those designed to help protect borrowers.
Why GAO Did This Study
Reverse mortgages allow seniors to
convert part of their home equity into
payments from a lender while still living
in their homes. Most reverse mortgages
are made under FHA’s HECM program,
which insures lenders against losses on
these loans. HECMs terminate when a
borrower repays or refinances the loan
or the loan becomes due because the
borrower died, moved, or defaulted.
Defaults occur when borrowers fail to
meet mortgage conditions such as
paying property taxes. These borrowers
risk foreclosure and loss of their homes.
FHA allows HECM servicers to offer
borrowers foreclosure prevention
options. Most HECM servicers are
supervised by CFPB.
GAO was asked to review HECM loan
outcomes and servicing and related
federal oversight efforts. Among other
objectives, this report examines (1) what
FHA data show about HECM
terminations and the use of foreclosure
prevention options, (2) the extent to
which FHA assesses and monitors the
HECM portfolio, and (3) the extent to
which FHA and CFPB oversee HECM
servicers. GAO analyzed FHA loan data
and FHA and CFPB documents on
HECM servicer oversight. GAO also
interviewed agency officials, the five
largest HECM servicers (representing
99 percent of the market), and legal aid
groups representing HECM borrowers.
What GAO Recommends
GAO makes eight recommendations to
FHA to, among other things, improve its
monitoring and assessment of the
HECM portfolio and oversight of HECM
servicers, and one recommendation to
CFPB to share HECM servicer
examination information with FHA. FHA
and CFPB generally agreed with the
recommendations.
View GAO-19-702. For more information,
contact
Alicia Puente Cackley at (202) 512-8678
or
Highlights of GAO-19-702, a report to
congressional requesters
Page i GAO-19-702 Reverse Mortgages
Letter 1
Background 5
HECM Defaults Have Increased, and Use of Foreclosure
Prevention Options Is Limited or Unknown 18
Weaknesses Exist in HECM Termination Data, Performance
Assessment, and Portfolio Monitoring 28
FHA’s Oversight of Servicers and Collaboration on Oversight
between FHA and CFPB Are Limited 37
CFPB Collects and Analyzes Consumer Complaints on Reverse
Mortgages, but FHA Does Not Use All Available Data 45
Housing Market Conditions, Exit of Large Bank Lenders, and
Policy Changes Help Explain the Decline in Reverse Mortgages
since 2010 54
Conclusions 60
Recommendations for Executive Action 61
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 63
Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 66
Appendix II Description of and Results for GAO’s Econometric
Model of Home Equity Conversion Mortgage Take-Up Rates 77
Appendix III Reported Home Equity Conversion Mortgage
Termination Reasons 92
Appendix IV Reported Home Equity Conversion Mortgage
Terminations and Defaults 93
Appendix V Comments from the Department of Housing
and Urban Development 95
Contents
Page ii GAO-19-702 Reverse Mortgages
Appendix VI Comments from the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 99
Appendix VII GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 100
Tables
Table 1: Summary of Selected Federal Housing Administration
(FHA) Foreclosure Prevention Options for Home Equity
Conversion Mortgage (HECM) Borrowers 23
Table 2: Summary of Mortgagee Optional Election Assignments,
Fiscal Years 20152018 24
Table 3: Number of FHA On-Site Reviews of Home Equity
Conversion Mortgage Servicers, Fiscal Years 20102018 38
Table 4: Number of Reverse Mortgage Complaints Received by
the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB),
Calendar Years 20152018 47
Table 5: Reported Home Equity Conversion Mortgage
Terminations, Fiscal Years 20142018 68
Table 6: Descriptive Statistics, List of Variables Used in
Regression Analysis, 20042016 86
Table 7: Fixed-Effects Regression Estimates of HECM Take-Up
Rates, 20042016 87
Table 8: Reported Home Equity Conversion Mortgage (HECM)
Termination Reasons, Number and Percentage of Loans,
Fiscal Years 20142018 92
Table 9: Reported Home Equity Conversion Mortgage
Terminations and Defaults, by State, Number and
Percentage of Loans, Fiscal Years 20142018 93
Figures
Figure 1: Difference between Forward and Reverse Mortgages 6
Figure 2: Home Equity Conversion Mortgage Termination
Reasons and Repayment Alternatives 9
Figure 3: Status of Home Equity Conversion Mortgages, Fiscal
Years 19892018 10
Figure 4: Reported Home Equity Conversion Mortgage
Termination Reasons, Fiscal Years 20142018 19
Page iii GAO-19-702 Reverse Mortgages
Figure 5: Total Reported Servicer Advances for Terminated Home
Equity Conversion Mortgages, Fiscal Years 20142018 22
Figure 6: Types of Reverse Mortgage Complaints Received by the
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Calendar Years
20152018 49
Figure 7: Home Equity Conversion Mortgage (HECM) Originations
and Take-up Rates, Calendar Years 19892018 55
Abbreviations
CFPB Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
Fannie Mae Federal National Mortgage Association
FHA Federal Housing Administration
HECM Home Equity Conversion Mortgage
HERMIT Home Equity Reverse Mortgage Information
Technology
HUD Department of Housing and Urban Development
IPUMS NHGIS Integrated Public Use Microdata Series National
Historical Geographic Information System
OMB Office of Management and Budget
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Page 1 GAO-19-702 Reverse Mortgages
441 G St. N.W.
Washington, DC 20548
September 25, 2019
The Honorable Maxine Waters
Chairwoman
Committee on Financial Services
House of Representatives
The Honorable Denny Heck
House of Representatives
The aging of the U.S. population, the large share of seniorswealth held
in home equity, and the preference of many older adults to age in place
underscore the importance of knowing more about reverse mortgages
and the role they play for some senior homeowners. A reverse mortgage
is a type of loan that allows eligible seniors to convert part of their home
equity into payments from a lender while still living in their homes.
Congress authorized the Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD) to insure reverse mortgages to help meet the financial needs of
elderly homeowners.
1
The vast majority of reverse mortgages are made
under the Home Equity Conversion Mortgage (HECM) program
administered by HUDs Federal Housing Administration (FHA).
2
HECMs
are originated and serviced by private FHA-approved lenders and
servicers. FHA insures these entities against losses on the loans and
charges borrowers premiums to help cover the potential cost of insurance
claims. While not involved in administering the HECM program, the
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) collects consumer
complaints about reverse mortgages and supervises nonbank
(nondepository institution) reverse mortgage lenders and servicers for
compliance with, and enforces violations of, federal consumer financial
protection laws.
3
1
Congress authorized the Home Equity Conversion Mortgage (HECM) program in 1988 by
adding Section 255 to Title II of the National Housing Act. See Housing and Community
Development Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-242, § 417 (1988) (codified as amended at 12
U.S.C. § 1715z-20).
2
The reverse mortgage market includes some proprietary (non-FHA) products but is
currently dominated by HECMs. Proprietary reverse mortgages were outside the scope of
our review.
3
As discussed later in this report, the HECM market is currently dominated by nonbank
lenders and servicers.
Letter
Page 2 GAO-19-702 Reverse Mortgages
Reverse mortgage servicing involves a range of activities, such as
making payments to borrowers, providing monthly account statements,
monitoring loan balances, and responding to borrower inquiries. If a
borrower falls behind on property charges (for example, taxes and
homeowners insurance), servicers must generally temporarily pay them
on the borrowers behalf (referred to in this report as servicer advances)
but may ultimately initiate foreclosure proceedings if the borrower does
not catch up.
4
In recent years, FHA has made program changes allowing
servicers to offer foreclosure prevention optionsoptions for distressed
HECM borrowers to help delay or avoid foreclosure.
HECMs terminatethat is, the loan balance is paid off and the loan
endsfor a variety of reasons. For example, borrowers may choose to
repay the loan or refinance into a new HECM. Additionally, events such
as the borrower dying, moving, or defaultingthat is, not meeting
mortgage conditionsresult in the loan becoming due and payable.In
some cases, generally when a borrower defaults, the lender may
foreclose on the borrower to obtain title to the property and sell the home
to satisfy the debt.
5
In these circumstances, the borrower may end up
being displaced from his or her home. Consumer advocacy organizations
have expressed concerns about an observed increase in HECM
foreclosures and servicing problems.
6
You asked us to review HECM loan outcomes and servicing and related
federal oversight efforts. This report examines (1) what FHA data show
about HECM terminations, servicer advances, and the use of foreclosure
prevention options; (2) FHAs assessment and monitoring of HECM
portfolio performance, servicer advances, and foreclosure prevention
4
In addition to property taxes and homeowners insurance premiums, borrowers must pay
other property charges such as homeownersassociation or condominium fees and any
other special assessments that may be levied by municipalities or state law on the
property. See 24 C.F.R. § 206.205. As discussed later in this report, servicers offer some
borrowers repayment plans to help pay unpaid property charges. According to FHA policy,
no borrower may be given more than 60 months to repay the servicer advances. See
Department of Housing and Urban Development, Mortgagee Letter 2015-11 (Apr. 23,
2015).
5
In some cases, the borrower may be able to deed the property to the servicer to satisfy
the debt and avoid foreclosure, known as a deed-in-lieu of foreclosure.
6
Center for NYC Neighborhoods, Protecting Senior Homeowners from Reverse Mortgage
Foreclosure: Policy Brief (August 2017) and National Consumer Law Center, Examples of
Senior Homeowners Struggling with Ineffective and Inconsistent Servicing of HECM
Loans (October 2017).
Page 3 GAO-19-702 Reverse Mortgages
options; (3) FHAs and CFPBs oversight of HECM servicers; (4) how
FHA and CFPB collect, analyze, and respond to consumer complaints
about HECMs; and (5) how and why the market for HECMs has changed
in recent years.
To address the first and second objectives, we analyzed FHA data to
determine the number of and reasons for HECM terminations in fiscal
years 2014 through 2018.
7
We also analyzed FHA data on servicer
advances for unpaid property charges and other costs for HECMs in a
due and payable status. Additionally, we analyzed information from FHA
on HECM borrowers approved for selected foreclosure prevention
options. To assess the reliability of FHAs data, we reviewed FHA
documentation, performed electronic testing on the data to check for
missing values and obvious errors, corroborated the data with other
available sources (such as published FHA reports), and interviewed
agency officials and FHAs data system contractor about interpreting data
fields. We determined the data were sufficiently reliable for characterizing
loan terminations, servicer advances, and use of foreclosure prevention
options in the HECM program. We also reviewed FHA data and reports
and interviewed FHA officials to determine how the agency monitors and
analyzes the HECM portfolio, including the use of any performance
indicators or program evaluations. We compared FHAs practices against
leading practices for assessing program performance, federal internal
control standards, and Office of Management and Budget (OMB) policies
and procedures on managing federal credit programs (OMB Circular A-
129).
8
To address the third objective, we reviewed FHA and CFPB policies and
procedures for overseeing HECM servicers and interviewed agency
officials with oversight responsibilities. We reviewed completed
examinations of HECM servicers to determine the extent to which the
7
The federal fiscal year begins on October 1 and ends on September 30 of each year.
8
We have previously identified performance goals and measures as important
management tools that can serve as leading practices for planning at lower levels within
federal agencies, such as individual programs or initiatives. For example, see GAO,
Veterans Justice Outreach Program: VA Could Improve Management by Establishing
Performance Measures and More Fully Assessing Risks, GAO-16-393 (Washington, D.C.:
Apr. 28, 2016); Performance Measurement and Evaluation: Definitions and Relationships,
GAO-11-646SP (Washington, D.C.: May 2, 2011). See also Standards for Internal Control
in the Federal Government, GAO-14-704G (Washington, D.C.: September 2014). See
also Office of Management and Budget, Policies for Federal Credit Programs and Non-
Tax Receivables, OMB Circular No. A-129 (revised January 2013).
Page 4 GAO-19-702 Reverse Mortgages
agencies have assessed and taken steps to enforce compliance with
servicing and consumer protection requirements. We compared FHA’s
oversight of HECM servicers to relevant parts of OMB Circular A-129.
Additionally, we interviewed FHA and CFPB officials to determine the
extent to which the agencies collaborate and share information on
oversight of HECM servicers. We compared their efforts to approaches
federal agencies use to enhance collaboration toward joint goals that we
identified in prior work.
9
To address the fourth objective, we analyzed all reverse mortgage
consumer complaints received by CFPB through its Consumer Complaint
Database from calendar years 2015 through 2018 to determine the
number of complaints by year, state, submission method (for example,
internet, phone, or email), and company. We also analyzed a random
generalizable sample of 100 reverse mortgage consumer complaints to
identify patterns in consumer-described issues about reverse mortgages.
We determined the CFPB data were sufficiently reliable for the analysis
we conducted by reviewing CFPB documentation, performing electronic
testing of the data, and interviewing CFPB officials about our
interpretation of data fields. To determine the extent to which FHA
collects and analyzes complaints, we reviewed the nearly 105,000
HECM-related calls received by the National Servicing Center from
calendar years 2015 through 2018. We also reviewed the 147 HECM-
related calls received by the FHA Resource Center during the same time.
However, we did not perform an analysis on these data similar to that
conducted on the CFPB data because of limitations in how the data were
collected. For example, data did not include information on whether the
call was a complaint or inquiry, and a large majority of the data did not
include information on who the caller was (e.g., a borrower, servicer, or
lender). Additionally, we reviewed CFPB and FHA policies and
procedures for collecting and addressing consumer complaints and for
incorporating consumer complaints into their oversight of HECM
servicers. Further, we interviewed officials from both agencies to better
understand their complaint processes. We compared CFPBs and FHAs
efforts against federal internal control standards and against criteria we
developed previously on leveraging related agency resources.
10
9
GAO, Managing for Results: Key Considerations for Implementing Interagency
Collaborative Mechanisms, GAO-12-1022, (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 27, 2012).
10
GAO-14-704G and GAO-12-1022.
Page 5 GAO-19-702 Reverse Mortgages
To address the fifth objective, we analyzed FHA data from calendar years
1989 (the start of the HECM program) through 2018 to identify trends in
the volume of HECM originations. Additionally, using FHA and Census
Bureau data, we calculated HECM take-up ratesthe ratio of new HECM
originations to senior homeownersfrom calendar years 2000 through
2017 to measure the extent to which senior homeowners participate in
the program. We also developed an econometric model using FHA,
Census Bureau, and other data to examine the relationship between
HECM take-up rates and a number of explanatory variables. We also
reviewed relevant research and interviewed academic and HUD
economists about other factors (for example, consumersperception of
reverse mortgages) that are difficult to directly include in the model but
that may influence HECM take-up rates. Appendix I contains a more
detailed description of our objectives, scope, and methodology. Appendix
II contains a description and results of our econometric model of factors
associated with HECM take-up rates.
We conducted this performance audit from July 2018 to September 2019
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives.
A reverse mortgage is a nonrecourse loan against home equity that does
not require mortgage payments as long as the borrower meets certain
conditions. In contrast to traditional forward mortgages, reverse
mortgages typically are rising debt, falling equityloans (see fig. 1). As
the borrower receives payments from the lender, the lender adds the
principal and interest to the loan balance, reducing the borrowers home
equity. Also unlike traditional forward mortgages, reverse mortgages have
no fixed term.
Background
HECM Program
Page 6 GAO-19-702 Reverse Mortgages
Figure 1: Difference between Forward and Reverse Mortgages
Page 7 GAO-19-702 Reverse Mortgages
Prospective borrowers must meet a number of requirements to be eligible
for a HECM (see sidebar). The amount of money a borrower can receive
from a HECMcalled the principal limitdepends on three things: (1) the
age of the youngest borrower or eligible nonborrowing spouse, (2) the
lesser of the appraised value of the home or the FHA mortgage limit as of
the date of loan closing (for calendar year 2019, $726,525), and (3) the
expected average interest rate.
11
The borrower can receive funds in a variety of waysfor example, as
monthly payments, a line of credit, a combination of the two, or a single
lump sum.
12
A large majority of borrowers choose the line of credit option.
The interest rate lenders charge is typically an adjustable rate, although
the lump sum option can be chosen at a fixed interest rate.
HECMs can terminate for a variety of reasons. For example, a borrower
may choose to repay the loan, refinance into a new HECM, or be required
to satisfy the debt because the loan has become due and payable. A
HECM becomes due and payable when a borrower dies, fails to retain
ownership of the home, or does not meet his or her mortgage obligations
such as paying property charges, meeting occupancy requirements, or
maintaining the home.
13
In these cases, the borrowers or heirs must
satisfy the debt or correct the condition that resulted in the due and
payable loan status.
14
In this report, we use the term default to refer to
11
According to Mortgagee Letter 2014-07, a nonborrowing spouse is defined as the
spouse, as determined by the law of the state in which the borrower and spouse reside or
the state of celebration, at the time of closing and who is not listed on the mortgage as a
borrower. In the case of a HECM for Purchase, the principal limit is based on the lesser of
the appraised value of the home or the sale price of the property being purchased. HECM
for Purchase is a program in which seniors may use a HECM to buy a new home. Unlike a
traditional HECM, a HECM for purchase is made against the value of the home to be
purchased, rather than against the value of a home the borrower already owns.
12
The monthly payments can be for as long as the borrower has the loan (tenure
payments) or for a fixed period (term payments). Borrowers cannot receive more than the
greater of 60 percent of the principal limit amount or the sum of mandatory obligations
plus 10 percent of the principal limit in the first year of the loan.
13
See 24 C.F.R. § 206.27(c). An example of failing to retain ownership of the home is
when one individual conveys title to the home to another individual, such as an aging
parent transferring ownership to an adult child.
14
According to FHA, servicers are required to obtain HUD approval prior to calling loans
due and payable for certain reasons, such as failure to meet occupancy requirements and
property charge defaults.
Home Equity Conversion Mortgage (HECM)
Eligibility Requirements
Key borrower requirements
Be 62 years of age or older
Own your home outright or have sufficient
equity in your home to secure the HECM
Occupy the property as your principal
residence
Participate in a consumer information
session given by a HECM counselor
approved by the Department of Housing
and Urban Development (HUD)
Key financial requirements
Have financial resources to continue to
make timely payment of ongoing property
charges (e.g., taxes and insurance)
Verification of income, assets, financial
obligations, and credit history
Source: GAO analysis of HUD information. | GAO-19-702
Page 8 GAO-19-702 Reverse Mortgages
HECMs that are due and payable because the borrower has not paid
property charges, met occupancy requirements, or maintained the home.
HECM borrowers (or their heirs) satisfy the debt by (1) paying the loan
balance using their own funds, (2) selling the home and using the
proceeds to pay off the loan balance, (3) providing a deed-in-lieu of
foreclosure (which transfers title for the property to the lender to satisfy
the debt), or (4) selling the home for at least the lesser of the loan
balance or 95 percent of the propertys appraised value (also known as a
short sale). According to FHA regulations, the borrowers or their heirs
generally have 30 days after being notified that the loan is due and
payable to satisfy the debt or bring the loan out of due and payable
status.
15
Servicers generally have 6 months to take first legal action to
initiate foreclosure from the date that they, as applicable, notified, should
have notified, or received approval from FHA that the HECM is due and
payable. According to FHA regulations, the borrower is generally allowed
to correct the condition that resulted in the due and payable loan status
and reinstate the loan, even after foreclosure proceedings have begun.
16
Figure 2 illustrates the reasons why HECMs terminate and how borrowers
typically satisfy the debt under various termination scenarios.
15
See 24 C.F.R. § 206.125(a)(2). If a loan becomes due and payable due to a reason
other than the death of the borrower, such as if a mortgage condition has not been met,
the lender has 30 days to notify FHA. In the case of borrower death, the lender has 60
days to notify FHA. After notifying and receiving approval (as applicable) from FHA that
the HECM can be called due and payable, the lender has 30 days to notify the borrower
(or their heirs). The borrower (or the heirs) has 30 days from the date of notice to engage
in one of the options noted or the lender may proceed with foreclosure.
16
24 C.F.R. § 206.125(a)(3).
Page 9 GAO-19-702 Reverse Mortgages
Figure 2: Home Equity Conversion Mortgage Termination Reasons and Repayment Alternatives
If the servicer experiences a loss because the loan balance exceeds the
recovery from selling the property, the lender can file a claim with FHA for
the difference. Additionally, when the loan balance reaches 98 percent of
the maximum claim amount (the lesser of the appraised value of the
home at origination or FHAs loan limit), the lender can assign the loan
to FHA and file a claim for the full amount of the loan balance, up to the
maximum claim amount. Lenders can only assign HECMs in good
standing to FHA (that is, assignments can only be for HECMs not in a due
and payable status). FHA continues to service the assigned loans using a
contractor until the loans become due, either due to the death of the
borrower or for other reasons. Additionally, the FHA insurance
guarantees borrowers will be able to access their loan funds, even if the
loan balance exceeds the current value of the home or if the lender
experiences financial difficulty. Further, if the borrower or heir sells the
Page 10 GAO-19-702 Reverse Mortgages
home to repay the loan, he or she will not be responsible for any loan
amount above the value of the home.
As of the end of fiscal year 2018, FHA had insured over 1 million HECMs.
According to FHA data, these include an active HECM portfolio of
approximately 551,000 loans serviced by various FHA-approved
servicers, 79,000 FHA-assigned loans serviced by an FHA contractor,
and about 468,000 terminated loans (see fig. 3). HECM terminations have
exceeded new originations every year since fiscal year 2016, and the
number of HECMs assigned to FHA has grown substantially since fiscal
year 2014.
17
Figure 3: Status of Home Equity Conversion Mortgages, Fiscal Years 19892018
17
Throughout this report, we use the term originationsto refer to HECMs originated by
lenders and subsequently approved for mortgage insurance (endorsed) by FHA.
Page 11 GAO-19-702 Reverse Mortgages
Note: The active Home Equity Conversion Mortgage portfolio consists of both privately owned and
FHA-assigned loans.
As of the end of fiscal year 2018, FHAs total insurance-in-force for
HECMs (total insured mortgage balances outstanding) was roughly $100
billion. HECMs are held in two FHA insurance funds. HECMs originated
prior to fiscal year 2009 are in the General Insurance and Special Risk
Insurance Fund (roughly 27 percent of all HECMs), and those originated
in fiscal year 2009 and later are in the Mutual Mortgage Insurance Fund
(roughly 73 percent of all HECMs).
18
When the post-2008 HECM portfolio
became part of FHAs Mutual Mortgage Insurance Fund, it also was
included in the funds capital ratio assessment and became subject to
annual actuarial reviews.
19
As we found in a November 2017 report,
subjecting HECMs to the annual actuarial review requirements has
improved the transparency of the programs financial condition and has
highlighted the financial risks of the HECM portfolio to FHA.
20
According to FHA, the financial performance of the HECM portfolio has
been historically volatile, largely due to uncertainty in future home prices,
interest rates, and other factors. In recent years, FHA has responded with
several policy changes to help strengthen the portfolios financial
performance and mitigate risks. Because FHAs projected losses on
HECMs depend on factors such as maximum claim amount, the length of
time the borrower stays in the home, changes in home prices, and
interest rates, most of FHAs policy changes have been aimed at better
aligning expected revenues (charging borrowers premiums) with
expected costs (cash outflows due to paying insurance claims). For
example, FHA has made changes to insurance premiums and principal
18
Beginning with the fiscal year 2009 loan cohort, the Housing and Economic Recovery
Act of 2008 placed new HECMs in FHAs Mutual Mortgage Insurance Fund.
19
The capital ratio is the funds economic value divided by the amortized insurance-in-
force. The National Housing Act requires an annual independent actuarial review of the
funds financial position. See 12 U.S.C. § 1708(a)(4). Each year, an independent actuarial
contractor conducts two separate actuarial reviewsone for forward mortgages and one
for HECMsto estimate the economic value of the two portfolios. In a separate annual
report to Congress, FHA combines the findings of the forward mortgage and HECM
actuarial reviews to determine the capital ratio for the fund as a whole.
20
For additional information, see GAO, Federal Housing Administration: Capital
Requirements and Stress Testing Practices Need Strengthening, GAO-18-92
(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 9, 2017).
Page 12 GAO-19-702 Reverse Mortgages
limits, the most recent of which took effect in fiscal year 2018.
21
Effective
in fiscal year 2019, FHA also revised property appraisal practices for new
HECMs to guard against inflated property valuations.
22
According to
agency officials, FHA made this change to address appraisal bias
concerns identified in research by an economist in HUD’s Office of Policy
Development and Research.
23
The HECM market includes various participants. After a lender originates
a HECM, the loan must be serviced until it terminates. HECM lenders and
servicers must be FHA-approved and can be the same entity but often
are not. HECM lenders often sell the mortgage to another entity, which
FHA refers to as an investor, and this entity has the right to enforce the
mortgage agreement.
24
HECM servicers are typically third parties that
contract with lenders or investors but do not have ownership in the loans
they service. As previously discussed, HECM servicers perform a number
of functions, such as making payments to the borrowers and providing
monthly account statements. Servicers also must monitor borrower
compliance with various mortgage conditions and, if necessary,
21
For new HECMs, FHA currently charges an initial mortgage insurance premium of 2
percent at loan closing and, over the life of the loan, an annual mortgage insurance
premium of 0.5 percent of the outstanding mortgage balance. See Mortgagee Letter 2017-
12. Prior to that mortgagee letter, the initial mortgage insurance premium was 0.5 percent
and the annual insurance premium was 1.25 percent for amounts 60 percent or less of the
principal limit, and the initial mortgage insurance premium was 2.5 percent for amounts
greater than 60 percent of the principal limit.
22
Inflated property appraisals can negatively affect the financial performance of the HECM
program because the appraised value is used in determining the amount of home equity
available to the borrower and the amount of any insurance claim paid to a lender. Since
October 1, 2018, FHA has performed a property appraisal risk assessment on all HECMs
submitted for approval of insurance. Lenders are required to provide a second
independent property appraisal in cases where FHA determines there may be inflated
property valuations. See Department of Housing and Urban Development, Mortgagee
Letter 2018-06 (Sept. 28, 2018).
23
Kevin Park, “Reverse Mortgage Collateral: Undermaintenance or Overappraisal?”
Cityscape: A Journal of Policy Development and Research, vol. 19, no. 1 (2017): pp.7-28.
24
Servicing accompanies all mortgages, but the right to service a mortgage becomes a
distinct asset when contractually separated from the loan when the loan is sold or
securitized. Originators can service mortgages that they originate or purchase, or they can
sell the mortgages but retain the mortgage servicing rights. Servicers other than the
originator may also purchase mortgage servicing rights on securitized loans or may be
hired to service loans for others. For more information on nonbank mortgage servicers,
see GAO, Nonbank Mortgage Servicers: Existing Regulatory Oversight Could Be
Strengthened, GAO-16-278 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 10, 2016).
HECM Market Participants
Page 13 GAO-19-702 Reverse Mortgages
communicate with borrowers about any violation of these conditions
(defaults) and, as appropriate, ways they can avoid being foreclosed on.
HECM servicers also transfer up-front and annual insurance premiums to
FHA each month and file claims with FHA for losses on insured HECMs.
In carrying out these duties, servicers are responsible for complying with
various requirements, including FHA regulations, policies, and
procedures, as well as federal consumer financial laws.
Historically, commercial banks, thrifts, and credit unions were the primary
lenders and servicers of mortgage loans. Following the 20072009
financial crisis and subsequent revisions to regulatory bank capital
requirements, banks reevaluated the benefits and costs of being in the
mortgage lending market, as well as retaining mortgages and the right to
service them. Since the financial crisis, some banks have exited or
reduced their mortgage lending and servicing businesses. This
development, among others, created an opportunity for nonbank
servicers to increase their presence in the mortgage market. Nonbank
issuers such as mortgage originators and servicers are not subject to the
same comprehensive federal safety and soundness standards as banks.
While banks offer a variety of financial products to consumers, nonbank
servicers are generally involved only in mortgage-related activities and do
not take deposits from consumers.
Almost all HECMs are originated, owned, and serviced by nonbank
entities:
Lenders. According to FHA, in fiscal year 2018, 54 lenders originated
HECMs, including 49 nonbank entities and five banks.
Investors. As of the end of fiscal year 2018, six investors (all nonbank
entities) and the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae)
owned roughly 92 percent of the privately owned (non-FHA-assigned)
HECM portfolio, while the remaining 8 percent was owned by a
mixture of bank and nonbank entities.
25
Servicers. Five nonbank entities serviced over 99 percent of the
privately owned HECM portfolio as of the end of fiscal year 2018. As
25
Fannie Mae is a government-sponsored enterprise that purchases mortgages from
lenders and either pools the loans into securities or holds them in its portfolio.
Page 14 GAO-19-702 Reverse Mortgages
previously noted, FHA has a contractor (also a nonbank entity) that
services FHA-assigned HECMs.
A number of federal agencies have roles in overseeing the reverse
mortgage market, including the following:
FHA. Insures HECMs and administers the HECM program, including
issuing program regulations and enforcing program requirements.
FHA supplements regulations through additional policies, procedures,
and other written communications for the HECM program. For
example, FHA officials said the agency utilizes its Single Family
Housing Handbook, HECM handbook, and mortgagee letters to
communicate changes about the HECM program.
26
In 2013,
Congress enacted a law that allowed FHA to make changes to HECM
program requirements by notice or mortgagee letter in addition to
regulation.
27
Since then, FHA has made several policy changes to the
HECM program through mortgagee letters.
CFPB. Supervises nonbank reverse mortgage lenders and servicers
for compliance with, and enforces violations of, federal consumer
financial protection laws.
28
CFPB can also issue regulations under the
federal consumer protection laws addressed specifically to protecting
consumers considering reverse mortgages.
29
Additionally, CFPB
examines entities for compliance with federal consumer financial laws
to obtain information about an institutions compliance management
systems and procedures and to detect and assess risks to consumers
26
A mortgagee letter is a written communication to lenders and servicers about changes in
FHA operations, policies, and procedures. Mortgagee letters for the HECM program are
accessible at https://www.hud.gov/program_offices/housing/sfh/hecm/hecmml.
27
The Reverse Mortgage Stabilization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-29, § 2, 127 Stat. 509
(2013) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1715z-20(h)). According to the act, the HUD Secretary has
the discretion to make any additional or alternative requirements that are necessary to
improve the fiscal safety and soundness of the HECM program.
28
CFPB also has supervisory authority over insured depository institutions and credit
unions with more than $10 billion in assets for compliance with requirements of federal
consumer financial law. See 12 U.S.C. § 5515(a).
29
CFPB was created by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
and has rulemaking authority to implement provisions of federal consumer financial law
and enforcement authority to assess servicers’ compliance with various mortgage
servicing rules. See Consumer Financial Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §§
1021, 1024, 124 Stat. 1376, 1979, 1987 (2010) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§
5511, 5514).
Federal Entities Involved
in Reverse Mortgage
Oversight
Page 15 GAO-19-702 Reverse Mortgages
and markets. Further, CFPB collects consumer complaints regarding
consumer financial products or services (including reverse mortgages)
and educates consumers about their rights under federal consumer
financial protection laws.
Federal depository institution regulators. These regulators monitor
compliance with relevant laws and regulations, such as provisions of
the Federal Trade Commission Act and the Truth in Lending Act,
primarily through periodic examinations, for federally regulated
lenders that originate HECMs.
30
Several features and requirements of the HECM program provide
consumer protections to borrowers. For example, borrowers must
undergo preloan counseling, the program limits costs and fees lenders
can charge, and lenders must provide certain disclosures. In addition,
FHA has made several changes to the HECM program in recent years to
help borrowers who have defaulted due to unpaid property charges. As
previously discussed, if a HECM borrower does not pay his or her
property charges, FHA regulations generally require the servicer to pay
the property charges on the borrowers behalf to help avoid a tax
foreclosure by the local authority and protect the investors and FHA’s
interest in the home. FHA regulations also allow servicers to charge
certain fees once a loan is called due and payable. These are typically
amounts related to attorney or trustee fees, property preservation, and
appraisal fees during the foreclosure process. The payments and fees
that servicers make on behalf of borrowersreferred to as servicer
advances in this reportare added to the loan balance and accrue
interest.
In 2010, HUDs Office of Inspector General reported that HUD was not
tracking borrower defaults or servicer advances for the HECM program
30
Depository institutions include institutions chartered as commercial banks, savings
associations (or thrifts), or credit unions. The federal depository institution regulators are
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and National Credit Union
Administration.
Consumer Protections and
Foreclosure Prevention
Options
Page 16 GAO-19-702 Reverse Mortgages
and made several recommendations to FHA.
31
To address these
recommendations, FHA took several steps. For example, in 2011, FHA
stopped the practice of allowing servicers to defer foreclosing on loans
that were in default due to unpaid property changes and issued a
mortgagee letter addressing how to handle these loans.
32
Additionally, in
September 2012, FHA announced the launch of a new data system for
the HECM program, the Home Equity Reverse Mortgage Information
Technology (HERMIT) system which would be used starting in October
2012.
33
With this new system, FHA combined former legacy systems that
had been used to collect insurance premiums, service FHA-assigned
loans, and process claims. According to FHA, adopting the HERMIT
system allowed FHA to better monitor and track the HECM portfolio in
real time and to automate insurance claim processing.
Finally, FHA modified program features to help minimize potential
borrower defaults and help strengthen borrower eligibility requirements.
For example, in 2013, FHA reduced the amount of equity borrowers could
generally withdraw during the first year from 100 to 60 percent of the
principal limit.
34
According to FHA, this change was designed to
encourage borrowers to access their equity slowly over time rather than
all at once to reduce risks to borrowers and FHA’s insurance fund. In
2015, the financial requirements for HECMs changed to include a
financial assessment of the prospective borrower prior to loan approval.
35
31
Department of Housing and Urban Development, Office of the Inspector General, HUD
Was Not Tracking Almost 13,000 Defaulted HECM Loans With Maximum Claim Amounts
of Potentially More Than $2.5 Billion, 2010-FW-0003 (Aug. 25, 2010). The report
recommended that FHA (1) discontinue the practice of allowing servicers to defer
foreclosure on loans in default due to nonpayment of taxes and insurance; (2) issue formal
guidance to servicers regarding loans in default due to nonpayment of taxes and
insurance; (3) develop and implement a plan to minimize the risk of future defaults due to
nonpayment of taxes and insurance; and (4) develop a data system to better track
defaults and amounts.
32
See Department of Housing and Urban Development, Mortgagee Letter 2011-01 (Jan.
3, 2011). Mortgagee Letter 2011-01 was rescinded and replaced by Mortgagee Letter
2015-11 (Apr. 23, 2015).
33
See Department of Housing and Urban Development, Mortgagee Letter 2012-17 (Sept.
11, 2012).
34
See Department of Housing and Urban Development Mortgagee Letter 2013-27 (Sept.
3, 2013).
35
See Department of Housing and Urban Development, Mortgagee Letter 2014-21 (Nov.
10, 2014) and Mortgagee Letter 2014-22 (Nov. 14, 2014). The financial assessment
requirements in these letters were effective as of April 27, 2015.
Page 17 GAO-19-702 Reverse Mortgages
FHA began requiring HECM lenders to look at the prospective borrower’s
credit history, income, assets, and financial obligations. Based on the
results of the financial assessment, the lender may require a set-aside for
the payment of property charges.
36
Additionally, FHA made several program changes to help distressed
HECM borrowers by allowing servicers to offer options to help borrowers
delay or in some cases avoid foreclosure if they are behind on paying
property charges. These foreclosure prevention options include
repayment plans, at-risk extensions, and extensions for low-balance
arrearage, as described later in this report.
37
FHA also has taken steps to
help nonborrowing spouses stay in their homes after a borrowing spouse
dies by deferring repayment of the HECM as long as the nonborrowing
spouse fulfills certain conditions.
38
In these cases, the servicer can assign
36
According to FHA regulations, HECM lenders may require what is referred to as a life
expectancy set-asidefor the payment of certain property charges. See 24 C.F.R. §
206.205.
37
See Department of Housing and Urban Development Mortgagee, Letter 2015-11 (Apr.
23, 2015) and Mortgagee Letter 2016-07 (Mar. 30, 2016). According to Mortgagee Letter
2015-11, servicers may offer borrowers in default due to unpaid property charges
repayment plans to satisfy outstanding servicer advances made for unpaid property
charges or an extension of foreclosure time frames due to a borrower being at-risk.
According to the mortgagee letter, the servicer must determine if the borrower is eligible
for a repayment plan under FHAs requirements. If a repayment plan is insufficient or
unsuccessful, borrowers may request an at-riskextension if the youngest living borrower
is at least 80 years old and has critical circumstances such as a terminal illness,
substantiated long-term physical disability, or a uniqueoccupancy need (e.g., terminal
illness of family member receiving care in the residence). According to Mortgagee Letter
2016-07, servicers may delay submitting a due and payable request (and proceeding with
foreclosure) if the borrower owes less than $2,000 in unpaid taxes and insurance.
According to the letter, servicers must document either that (1) they contacted the
borrower, the borrower has expressed a willingness to repay, and the borrower is currently
attempting to make payments or (2) they were unable to contact the borrower but the
borrower is current on occupancy requirements and there is no indication the borrower
has vacated the property.
38
In 2013, a federal district court found that HUD had interpreted the HECM authorizing
statute incorrectly when it required loans to be due and payable upon a borrowers death
even when a nonborrowing spouse was present in the home. See Bennett v. Donovan, 4
F.Supp. 3d 5 (D.D.C. 2013). Following the court decision, HUD has issued various
mortgagee letters establishing a process known as the mortgagee optional election
assignment, which allows nonborrowing spouses to avoid foreclosure and defer paying off
the loan balance.
Page 18 GAO-19-702 Reverse Mortgages
the HECM to FHA under what FHA refers to as the mortgagee optional
election assignment process.
39
Our analysis of FHA data found that about 272,155 HECMs terminated
from fiscal years 2014 through 2018.
40
Over that period, the number of
terminations rose from about 24,000 in fiscal year 2014 to a peak of
roughly 82,000 in fiscal year 2016, before declining to about 60,000 in
fiscal year 2018, as previously shown in figure 3.
41
As shown in figure 4, death of the borrower was the most common
reported reason for HECM terminations, followed by borrower defaults.
42
39
See Department of Housing and Urban Development, Mortgagee Letter 2015-15 (June
12, 2015). The mortgagee letter established the process, as well as time frames, for when
servicers need to submit information to FHA in order for the loan to be assigned to FHA.
The time frames were extended for certain assignments in an additional mortgagee letter.
See Department of Housing and Urban Development, Mortgagee Letter 2016-05 (Feb. 12,
2016).
40
See fig.3 for a comparison of active and terminated HECMs during this period.
41
We report on data starting in fiscal year 2014 because, as previously discussed, FHA
adopted a new system of record (HERMIT) for the HECM program in fiscal year 2013.
Unless otherwise noted, we analyzed data for the HECM program for the 5-year period
spanning fiscal years 20142018.
42
The HERMIT system records borrower death and conveyed title as a type of default for
administrative reasons related to the claims filing process. We did not categorize borrower
deaths or conveyed titles as defaults in order to differentiate those cases from loan
terminations resulting from living borrowers not meeting their mortgage obligations. We
treated them as separate loan termination reasons. We removed HECMs that had
previously been assigned to FHA and that terminated in fiscal years 2014 through 2018
from our termination analysis. We did not include them because, as discussed later in this
report, FHAs practice is to not foreclose on FHA-assigned HECMs that default.
Accordingly, the denominator for our terminations analysis was 256,147 loans. For more
information on our termination analysis methodology, see app. I. For detailed information
on the number of loans and percentages by termination reason for fiscal years 2014
2018, see app. III.
HECM Defaults Have
Increased, and Use of
Foreclosure
Prevention Options Is
Limited or Unknown
Death of the Borrower Is
the Most Common Reason
for HECM Terminations,
but Defaults Have
Increased in Recent Years
Page 19 GAO-19-702 Reverse Mortgages
The relative size of each termination category varied from fiscal years
2014 through 2018, with borrower defaults accounting for an increasing
proportion of terminations in recent years. In fiscal year 2018, borrower
defaults made up 18 percent of terminations.
Figure 4: Reported Home Equity Conversion Mortgage Termination Reasons, Fiscal Years 2014–2018
Note: Due to rounding, figures may not sum to 100 percent.
Specific results for all major termination categories over the 5-year period
were as follows:
Death. About 34 percent of terminations (approximately 87,000 loans)
were due to the death of the borrower. Borrower deaths ranged from
roughly 29 percent to 40 percent of annual terminations over the 5-
year period.
Default. About 15 percent of terminations (approximately 40,000
loans) were due to borrower defaults. As discussed in appendix IV,
this percentage varied widely by location and was highest in Michigan
(36 percent) and lowest in the District of Columbia (1 percent). About
29,000 defaults were for noncompliance with occupancy or residency
requirements, about 11,000 were for nonpayment of property charges,
Page 20 GAO-19-702 Reverse Mortgages
and about 200 were for not keeping the property in good repair. The
borrowers of these loans likely lost their homes through foreclosure or
a deed-in-lieu of foreclosure.
43
However, it is possible that some of
these borrowers would have ultimately lost their homes even if they
had not taken out a HECM. For example, as noted in CFPBs 2012
report to Congress on reverse mortgages, some borrowers may have
taken out a HECM to help pay off their traditional mortgage rather
than as a way to pay for everyday expenses. In these cases, the
money borrowers received from their HECMs may have helped them
temporarily but may ultimately have been prolonging an unsustainable
financial situation.
44
In addition, some borrowers who did not meet
occupancy or residency requirements may have permanently moved
out of their homesfor example, to assisted living or nursing home
facilities.
45
Borrower defaults as a percentage of annual HECM terminations grew
from 2 percent of terminations in fiscal year 2014 to 18 percent in
fiscal year 2018. Noncompliance with occupancy requirements was
the primary cause of defaults each year, but unpaid property charges
represented a growing share. From fiscal years 2014 through 2018,
property charge defaults as a percentage of all defaults grew from 26
percent to 45 percent, and property charge defaults as a percentage
of all terminations grew from less than 1 percent to 8 percent.
Loan balance repaid. About 9 percent of terminations (approximately
23,000 loans) were due to the borrower repaying the loan balance.
This category accounted for a declining share of terminations over the
5-year period, falling from 24 percent in fiscal year 2014 to 4 percent
in 2018.
43
Due to limitations in how short sales are coded in the HERMIT system, we could not
readily distinguish between short sales used after a borrower default and those used after
a borrowers death. According to FHA, short sales are used in both circumstances.
44
See Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Reverse Mortgages: Report to Congress
(Washington, D.C.: June 28, 2012).
45
Representatives from some legal aid organizations have cited instances where HECM
borrowers were reportedly residing in their homes but were foreclosed on for not
completing and returning annual occupancy certificatesa task that might become more
difficult for some borrowers as they age. The five HECM servicers we spoke with
described methods they use in addition to occupancy certificates to remind borrowers
about or verify compliance with occupancy requirements. These include phone calls,
reminder letters, and property inspections. We did not attempt to independently verify
servicersuse of these methods or claims that borrowers residing in their homes were
foreclosed on for not returning occupancy certificates.
Page 21 GAO-19-702 Reverse Mortgages
Refinanced. About 8 percent of terminations (about 20,000 loans)
were due to the borrower refinancing into a new HECM. This category
remained relatively stable over the 5-year period, accounting for about
5 percent to 10 percent of terminations each year.
Borrower moved or conveyed title. About 3 percent of terminations
(approximately 8,000 loans) were due to the borrower either moving
or conveying title to the property to someone else. The percentage of
terminations in this category declined from 6 percent in fiscal year
2014 to 2 percent in fiscal year 2018.
Unknown. For about 30 percent of terminations (roughly 78,000
loans), we were unable to readily determine a termination reason from
FHAs data. Over the 5-year period, this category accounted for over
25 percent of terminations each year and reached a high of 39
percent in fiscal year 2018. We discuss challenges related to
determining termination reasons later in this report.
For HECMs that terminated in fiscal years 2014 through 2018, servicers
advanced almost $3 billion on behalf of borrowers for unpaid property
charges or various other costs that are charged once a loan becomes due
and payable.
46
The advances increased from $508 million in fiscal year
2014 to a peak of $731 million in fiscal year 2016, before declining to
$453 million in fiscal year 2018 (see fig. 5). This pattern aligns with the
overall trend in terminations, which also peaked in fiscal year 2016. Over
the 5-year period, advances for property charges made up 58 percent of
the total. The remaining 42 percent consisted of advances for other costs,
many of them foreclosure-related, such as attorney fees and appraisal
costs.
46
According to the HERMIT User Guide, corporate advances are any expense incurred by
the lender or servicer for any disbursement made on a borrowers behalf after the HECM
becomes due and payable. These include advances for taxes, insurance, or condominium
or homeownersassociation dues (property charges); attorney and trustee fees; title,
recording, or sheriff fees; state and other taxes on deeds; special assessment liens; bank
attorney fees for bankruptcy proceedings; and appraisal fees.
HECM Servicers
Advanced Almost $3
Billion on Behalf of
Borrowers for Unpaid
Property Charges or Other
Costs
Page 22 GAO-19-702 Reverse Mortgages
Figure 5: Total Reported Servicer Advances for Terminated Home Equity
Conversion Mortgages, Fiscal Years 20142018
From fiscal years 2014 through 2018, HECM servicers advanced a total
of $567 million on behalf of living borrowers who defaulted on their
HECMs due to unpaid property charges.
47
For these loans, the median
advance was $7,007.
48
47
FHA officials told us HECM servicers continue to pay property charges after a borrower
dies to avoid a tax foreclosure on the property.
48
Additionally, the mean advance was $12,653. We also found that the amount advanced
for these loans varied widely. For example, advances at the 25th and 75th percentiles
were approximately $2,923 and $15,445, respectively.
Page 23 GAO-19-702 Reverse Mortgages
From April 2015 (the effective date of FHAs current repayment plan
policy) through the end of fiscal year 2018, 22 percent of HECM
borrowers with overdue property charges had received repayment plans,
and FHAs information on the use of other foreclosure prevention options
was limited.
49
As previously noted, property charge defaults and issues
surrounding nonborrowing spouses not being included on the mortgage
have been long-standing problems in the HECM program.
50
Since 2015,
FHA has made program changes to allow servicers to offer different types
of foreclosure prevention options to distressed HECM borrowers and
nonborrowing spouses of deceased borrowers (see table 1). These
options can help delay and, in some cases, avoid foreclosure.
Table 1: Summary of Selected Federal Housing Administration (FHA) Foreclosure Prevention Options for Home Equity
Conversion Mortgage (HECM) Borrowers
Foreclosure prevention
option
Description
Effective date
Mortgagee optional
election assignment
Allows a HECM servicer to assign the loan to FHA so that an eligible nonborrowing
spouse can stay in the home after the borrowers death.
June 2015
Repayment plan
Allows a borrower in default due to unpaid property charges to repay them over a
maximum of 60 months, as long as the borrower meets certain financial criteria.
During this time, the HECM servicer delays foreclosure by requesting an extension of
foreclosure time frames from FHA.
April 2015
At-risk extension
Allows a HECM servicer to delay foreclosure for borrowers at least 80 years old who
are in default due to unpaid property charges and are experiencing a critical
circumstance such as a terminal illness or long-term disability. HECM servicers must
request from FHA an extension of foreclosure time frames, and supporting
documentation for extensions must be updated annually.
April 2015
Low-balance extension
Allows a HECM servicer to delay calling a loan due and payable when the borrower
owes less than $2,000 for unpaid property taxes or hazard insurance.
March 2016
Source: GAO analysis of FHA mortgagee letters. | GAO-19-702
According to officials from HUDs Office of General Counsel, HUD does
not have the statutory authority to require servicers to provide HECM
49
As described later in this report, we conducted this analysis using data from April 23,
2015the effective date of FHAs current policy on repayment plansto September 30,
2018.
50
See Department of Housing and Urban Development, Office of Inspector General, 2010-
FW-0003. See also Bennett v. Donovan, 4 F.Supp.3d 5 (D.D.C. 2013).
About One-Quarter of
HECM Borrowers with
Overdue Property
Charges Received
Repayment Plans, and
Use of Other Foreclosure
Prevention Options Is
Limited or Unknown
Page 24 GAO-19-702 Reverse Mortgages
borrowers foreclosure prevention options.
51
Our analysis of FHA data
found that servicersuse of selected foreclosure prevention options for
HECM borrowers was limited or that FHA did not have readily available
information to assess the extent of use, as follows:
Mortgagee optional election assignments. According to information
generated by FHA, HECM servicers submitted 1,445 requests for
mortgagee optional election assignments from June 2015 (when FHA
made this option available) through September 30, 2018 (see table 2). In
total, FHA approved roughly 70 percent (1,013) of the requests and
denied the remaining 30 percent (432).
Table 2: Summary of Mortgagee Optional Election Assignments, Fiscal Years 20152018
Mortgagee optional election
assignment status JuneSeptember 2015
2016
2017 2018
Total
Percentage
Requested
429
434
293
289
1,445
100
Approved
411
176
211
215
1,013
70
Denied
18
258
82
74
432
30
Source: Federal Housing Administration. | GAO-19-702
Note: The mortgagee optional election assignment process went into effect in June 2015.
According to FHA officials, the top two reasons for denying mortgagee
optional election assignments were HECM servicers not meeting the
deadline for electing to pursue the assignment and not meeting the
51
Officials from HUDs Office of General Counsel said that, in contrast, HUD does have
statutory authority to mandate foreclosure prevention options for forward mortgage
borrowers because the options mitigate financial losses to FHA. According to the officials,
section 230 of the National Housing Act provides FHA the statutory authority to require
loss mitigation activities for forward mortgages, such as forbearance or loan modification,
as an alternative to foreclosure. See 12 U.S.C. § 1710(a)(2); 12 U.S.C. § 1715u(a). The
officials said the difference in statutory authority stems partly from differences in how
forward and reverse mortgages work. Officials from HUDs Office of General Counsel
noted that traditional loss mitigation options focus on helping borrowers make payments to
lenders and continue paying down their loan balances, which helps mitigate losses to FHA
by reducing foreclosures, insured loan amounts, and claim payments. The officials said
that because reverse mortgage borrowers generally do not make payments to their lender
and have increasing loan balances, options that help HECM borrowers delay or avoid
foreclosure generally do not mitigate losses to FHA.
Page 25 GAO-19-702 Reverse Mortgages
deadline to initiate the assignment.
52
FHA officials told us the third most
common reason for denial was a nonborrowing spouse not submitting
evidence of marketable title to the property or the legal right to remain in
the property for life within required time frames.
53
With respect to the 432
denials, FHA provided information indicating that as of May 31, 2019, 79
percent (342) of the associated loans had not terminated; 14 percent (62
loans) terminated because the loan balance had been paid off; and the
remaining 7 percent ended in foreclosure (22 loans), deed-in-lieu of
foreclosure (four loans), or short sale (two loans).
Estimating the universe of HECMs potentially eligible for mortgagee
optional election assignments is difficult because nonborrowing spouses
were not listed on loan documentation for HECMs originated prior to
August 4, 2014.
54
As a result, FHA does not know how many eligible
nonborrowing spouses could have, but did not, apply for the mortgagee
optional election assignment, or how many are potentially eligible to apply
for it in the future. FHA officials told us they have relied on an industry
association and HECM servicers to estimate how many nonborrowing
spouses may be associated with pre-August 2014 HECMs.
55
52
Mortgagee Letter 2015-15 (effective June 12, 2015) details HECM servicer requirements
for the mortgagee optional election assignment process and specifies two main time
frames servicers must meet. First, HECM servicers must elect to pursue the assignment
within 120 days of the borrowers death. Second, if the servicer elects to pursue
assignment and determines that the nonborrowing spouse and the HECM meet eligibility
requirements, it must initiate the assignment to FHA within 120 days of the election
decision. Mortgagee Letter 2016-05 (effective Feb. 12, 2016) allows servicers to request a
60-day extension for the nonborrowing spouse to demonstrate that legal title or the legal
right to remain in the house has been secured and for the servicer to complete its
assessment.
53
Mortgagee Letter 2015-15 states that in order to be an eligible surviving nonborrowing
spouse, an individual, among other things, must have or obtain this information within 90
days following the death of the borrowing spouse.
54
According to officials, FHA has required lenders to collect nonborrowing spouse
information for HECMs originated on or after August 4, 2014. See Department of Housing
and Urban Development, Mortgagee Letter 2014-07 (Apr. 25, 2014).
55
In September 2018, representatives of the National Reverse Mortgage Lenders
Association told us the association estimated that there were about 8,600 outstanding
HECMs that potentially had an associated nonborrowing spouse not originally named on
the loan. The association estimated this number by asking its members to identify loans
originated before August 2014 that had only one borrower but reported being married at
the time of loan origination. The 8,600 figure is a rough estimate because, among other
things, it is not known whether the borrowers are still married and not all reverse mortgage
servicers are members of the association.
Page 26 GAO-19-702 Reverse Mortgages
FHA officials told us they sent letters to borrowers with FHA-assigned
HECMs that were originated prior to August 4, 2014, to inform them of the
mortgagee optional election process and ask them to self-identify whether
there was a nonborrowing spouse associated with their loan. FHA officials
also noted they were drafting a similar letter for servicers to send to
borrowers with HECMs not assigned to FHA. As of August 2019, the
servicer letter was still in draft form, pending completion of an ongoing
internal review of FHAs mortgagee optional election assignment
processes and the related time frames. FHA officials said once the
ongoing review is complete, they anticipated that FHA would issue a new
mortgagee letter with revised time frames that would afford both HECM
servicers and borrowers more time to meet FHA requirements for
mortgagee optional election assignments.
Repayment plans. Our analysis of FHA data showed that 22 percent of
borrowers with property charge defaults were granted a repayment plan
from April 2015 (the effective date of FHAs current repayment plan
policy) through the end of fiscal year 2018. All five legal aid organizations
we interviewed said the availability of repayment plans was a top
concern. For example, for some of their clients, repayment plans were
unavailable because the borrowers did not meet certain financial
requirements. In contrast, representatives of the top five HECM servicers
told us they generally do offer repayment plans when feasible to help
borrowers delay or avoid foreclosure. Servicers we interviewed noted that
while repayment plans can delay or avoid foreclosure, they are rarely
successful in the long-run and borrowers in such plans often miss
payments. Servicers said the same reasons that typically contribute to
initial defaults also explain why repayment plans are rarely successful.
For example, borrowers on limited incomes may struggle to pay
increasing property tax and insurance costs or may fall behind on
property charges when the death of a spouse reduces their income.
At-risk extensions. Our analysis of FHA data found that from April 2015
(the effective date of FHAs at-risk extension policy) through the end of
fiscal year 2018, about 2 percent of borrowers with property charge
defaults received an at-risk extension. To grant an at-risk extension, FHA
requires HECM servicers to provide valid documentation that the
youngest living borrower is at least 80 years of age and has critical
circumstances such as a terminal illness, long-term physical disability, or
a unique occupancy need (for example, terminal illness of family member
Page 27 GAO-19-702 Reverse Mortgages
living in the home).
56
Representatives from one legal aid organization told
us that some HECM servicers have straightforward requirements for the
documentation borrowers must submit to obtain an at-risk extension,
while others do not. Representatives from another legal aid organization
said that meeting FHAs annual renewal requirement for at-risk
extensions was challenging for some borrowers because they have to
submit documentation to HECM servicers every year as they age and
continue to struggle with serious health issues or disabilities.
Low-balance extensions. FHA officials told us they do not track how
often HECM servicers use the option to delay calling a loan due and
payable if the borrower has unpaid property charges of less than $2,000.
Our analysis of FHA data on servicer advances found that approximately
8,800 HECMs that terminated in fiscal years 2014 through 2018 had
unpaid property charges of less than $2,000 at the time of termination.
57
Some of these HECMs may have been eligible for a low-balance
extension when they terminated. Representatives from one legal aid
organization said they represented a HECM borrower who was at risk of
foreclosure for having 27 cents in unpaid property charges. HECM
servicers told us they use the low-balance extension option to varying
degrees. For example, representatives from one servicer said the servicer
follows instructions from the entity that owns the HECM and, in some
cases, the owners of the loan do not want to offer the low-balance
extension to the borrower. In these cases the servicer calls the loan due
and payable for any amount in unpaid property charges and initiates the
foreclosure process in accordance with FHA regulations. Another HECM
servicer told us it tries to use the low-balance extension every time a
borrower owes less than $2,000 in unpaid property charges.
56
See Department of Housing and Urban Development, Mortgagee Letter 2015-11 (Apr.
23, 2015).
57
To conduct this analysis we requested data on total advances, including data on unpaid
property charges, from FHAs contractor that administers the HERMIT system.
Additionally, we requested borrower death dates to determine unpaid property charges
before and after HECM borrowersdeaths. We calculated the total number of loans with
unpaid property charges of less than $2,000 for living borrowers by removing any loans for
which the borrower had died.
Page 28 GAO-19-702 Reverse Mortgages
Since fiscal year 2013, FHA has used the HERMIT system to collect data
on the servicing of HECMs, but the system does not contain
comprehensive and accurate data about the reasons why HECMs
terminate, a key servicing event. According to the HERMIT User Guide,
servicers should provide a reason in HERMIT when they terminate a
HECM.
58
However, as noted previously in figure 4, for about 30 percent of
HECM terminations from fiscal years 2014 through 2018 (roughly 78,000
loans), we were unable to determine the reason for termination.
59
Specifically, for these loans we could not identify in HERMIT any
associated borrower death or default, or evidence that the borrower
repaid, refinanced, moved, or conveyed title. Instead, these loans were
coded as terminating for other reasonsor coded based on how the debt
was satisfied rather than an actual termination reason.
The HERMIT User Guide provides a list of termination codes available in
the system, but the list and guide have shortcomings that limit analysis of
HECM terminations. First, the list includes codes servicers can use to
indicate that a loan terminated for other reasons,but the guide does not
specify what these other reasons are. However, servicers have been
using the other reasons code increasingly over the past 5 years. We
asked servicers how they used the other reasons code and found
inconsistency in and uncertainty about its use. For example, servicers
responses ranged from not using it at all, to using it when they did not
58
Home Equity Conversion Mortgage Servicer Provider HERMIT User Guide, Servicing
Module, version 2.17 (September 2018). The HERMIT User Guide refers to termination
transactions, and servicers are required to input a termination transaction when the loan
ends. For simplicity, we use the phrase termination codes in this report.
59
Of these approximately 78,000 loans, HECM servicers coded about 55,000 (71 percent)
as terminate-otherin HERMIT. For the remaining 23,000 loans (29 percent), HECM
servicers used codes that could be associated with more than one termination reason,
such as deed-in-lieu of foreclosure, foreclosure, or short saleactions which could apply
to terminations resulting from the borrower dying, defaulting, or moving. For more
information on our termination analysis methodology, see app. I.
Weaknesses Exist in
HECM Termination
Data, Performance
Assessment, and
Portfolio Monitoring
FHA Lacks
Comprehensive Data on
Reasons for HECM
Terminations
Page 29 GAO-19-702 Reverse Mortgages
intend to file an insurance claim with FHA, to not being sure under what
circumstances they used it.
60
Second, the list of termination codes consists of both reasons for
termination and descriptions of how the debt was satisfied.
61
As a result,
the final status code of some loans in HERMIT shows only the way in
which the debt was satisfiedfor instance, a deed-in-lieu of foreclosure,
foreclosure, or short sale. These codes could apply to terminations
resulting from the borrower dying, defaulting, or moving and do not
ultimately provide a specific reason for loan termination.
FHA officials were unaware of any proxy variables that we could use to
help identify the underlying termination reasons for these loans. The
officials said the termination reasons are available on an individual loan
basis in the HERMIT system but not in an extractable form.
62
As
discussed later in this report, FHA does not regularly track and report on
HECM termination reasons, due partly to this system limitation.
The limitations in FHAs data are inconsistent with federal internal control
standards, which require agencies to use quality information to achieve
their objectives.
63
To meet this internal control standard, agencies can
obtain relevant data that are reasonably free from error and bias and
evaluate sources of data for reliability. FHAs annual report to Congress
states that the HECM program helps seniors remain in their homes and
60
A servicer may not need to file an insurance claim for a terminated HECM if, for
example, the borrower or the heirs sell the home for an amount that fully pays off the loan
balance.
61
For example, the list includes termination codes for borrower deaths, moves,
repayments, and refinances. While there is no termination code for defaults, defaulted
loans have other identifiers and can be cross-matched to terminated loans. The list also
includes a terminate-othercode to be used when servicers initiate termination for other
reasons.Finally, the list includes codes for deed-in-lieu of foreclosure, foreclosure, and
short-sale, which indicate how the debt was satisfied and do not represent actual
termination reasons.
62
FHA officials told us that they do not believe these terminated HECMs were the result of
borrower defaults because defaults must be recorded in HERMIT. We used separate
default reports from HERMIT to identify all loans with a default as part of our termination
analysis; for more information see app. I.
63
GAO-14-704G.
Page 30 GAO-19-702 Reverse Mortgages
age in place.
64
However, without comprehensive and accurate data on
HECM terminations, FHA does not have a full understanding of loan
outcomesinformation FHA and Congress need in order to know how
well the HECM program and FHAs policies are working to help seniors
age in place.
While FHA has taken steps to improve the performance of the HECM
program in recent years, it has not incorporated key elements of
performance assessment into its management of the program. We have
previously reported that a program performance assessment contains
three key elements: program goals, performance metrics, and program
evaluations.
65
Performance assessment can provide important
information about whether, and why, a program is working well or not.
Additionally, OMB Circular A-129 states that agencies must establish
appropriate performance indicators for federal credit programs, such as
the HECM program, and that such indicators should be reviewed
periodically.
66
It states further that agency management structures should
clearly delineate accountability and responsibility for defining performance
indicators and monitoring and assessing program performance.
We found limitations in FHAs performance assessment of the HECM
program, specifically a lack of performance indicators and recent program
evaluations:
Lack of HECM performance indicators. According to HUDs strategic
plan for fiscal years 20182022 and the agencys most recent annual
performance report, the HECM program falls under the strategic goal of
advancing economic opportunity and the strategic objective of supporting
64
See Department of Housing and Urban Development, Annual Report to Congress
Regarding the Financial Status of the FHA Mutual Mortgage Insurance Fund, Fiscal Year
2018 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 15, 2018).
65
Program goals communicate what the agency proposes to accomplish and allow
agencies to assess or demonstrate the degree to which those desired results were
achieved. Performance metrics are concrete, objective, observable conditions that permit
the assessment of progress made toward the goals. Program evaluations are individual
systematic studies conducted periodically or on an ad hoc basis to assess how well a
program is working, typically relative to its objectives. For example, see GAO-16-393 and
GAO-11-646SP.
66
Office of Management and Budget, Policies for Federal Credit Programs and Non-Tax
Receivables, OMB Circular No. A-129 (revised January 2013).
FHAs Performance
Assessment Has
Limitations
Page 31 GAO-19-702 Reverse Mortgages
fair, sustainable homeownership and financial viability.
67
The strategic
plan and annual performance report include some strategies for achieving
this objective, such as modernizing FHA underwriting guidelines, lending
standards, and servicing protocols to serve the needs of borrowers,
protect taxpayers, and ensure the sustainability of FHAs program.
However, none of the six performance indicators associated with this
strategic objective and discussed in the strategic plan or corresponding
performance report are HECM-specific. Four of the indicators focus on
FHA-insured forward mortgages.
68
Another indicator focuses on
construction of manufactured housing.
69
The remaining indicator
maintaining a capital reserve ratio for FHAs Mutual Mortgage Insurance
Fund that meets or exceeds the statutory minimum requirement
encompasses both forward mortgages and HECMs but does not provide
specific information about HECM loan outcomes, risk factors, or loan
characteristics.
70
Additionally, FHA’s annual reports to Congress on the financial status of
the insurance fund contain multiple tables of HECM data but limited
information on loan outcomes. For example, among other things, the
fiscal year 2018 report provides the number of new HECM originations,
the average age of new borrowers, the amount of HECM insurance
67
See Department of Housing and Urban Development, Strategic Plan 20182022
(Washington, D.C.: May 2019) and Fiscal Year 2020 Annual Performance Plan and Fiscal
Year 2018 Annual Performance Report (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 22, 2019).
68
The four indicators are (1) early payment default rate, (2) percentage of new home-
purchase mortgages to first-time homebuyers, (3) FHAs market share of single-family
mortgage originations, and (4) percentage of mortgages with higher-risk features
(including cash-out refinance loans and home purchase loans with down-payment
assistance or debt-to-income ratios greater than 50 percent). According to FHA, an early
payment default occurs when a borrower becomes 90 days delinquent within the first six
mortgage payments. FHA considers the percentage of loans in early payment default
status to be an important indicator of the credit quality of new mortgage originations. The
debt-to-income ratio represents the percentage of a borrowers gross monthly income that
goes toward monthly debt payments.
69
The indicator is the number of alternative construction letters issued by HUDs Office of
Manufactured Housing Programs.
70
As previously noted, since 2009, HECMs have been subject to FHAs annual actuarial
review requirements and are included in estimates of the Mutual Mortgage Insurance
Funds capital ratio. The actuarial reviews provide estimates of the HECM portfolios
economic value and information on the programs financial condition. They do not provide
detailed information on HECM loan outcomes.
Page 32 GAO-19-702 Reverse Mortgages
claims paid, and estimates of the HECM portfolios capital position.
71
However, the report does not include other information that would provide
insight into loan outcomes, such as the percentage of HECM terminations
due to borrower defaults, the proportion of active HECMs with delinquent
property charges, or the percentage of distressed HECM borrowers who
have received foreclosure prevention options.
Limited program evaluations. The last comprehensive evaluations of
the HECM program were done in 2000 and 1995.
72
Officials said they
were in the planning phase for a new evaluation of the HECM program
but had not set a start date and did not expect the evaluation to include
an analysis of reasons for HECM terminations or the use of foreclosure
prevention options for borrowers in default. Instead, the officials told us
the evaluation would focus on the impact of an FHA policy change
implemented in 2015 that requires prospective HECM borrowers to
undergo a financial assessment to evaluate their ability to pay ongoing
property charges. While financial assessments could help reduce tax and
insurance defaults, and ultimately foreclosures, they only apply to new
HECMs issued on or after the effective date of the policy (April 27, 2015)
and are not relevant to other HECMs within the portfolio. Therefore, for
most of the HECM portfolio, an equally important consideration is the
impact of FHAs policy changes that created foreclosure prevention
options for distressed borrowers. As previously noted, borrower defaults
have accounted for an increasing proportion of terminations in recent
years, and in fiscal year 2018, borrower defaults made up 18 percent of
terminations. Expanding the program evaluation to include the impact of
foreclosure prevention options would provide a more complete picture of
how well FHA is reducing defaults in the HECM portfolio and helping
HECM borrowers.
FHA officials acknowledged the need for more performance assessment
of the HECM program. The officials said their recent focus has been on
71
See Department of Housing and Urban Development, Annual Report to Congress
Regarding the Financial Status of the FHA Mutual Mortgage Insurance Fund, Fiscal Year
2018 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 15, 2018).
72
See Abt Associates, Evaluation Report of FHAs Home Equity Conversion Mortgage
Insurance Demonstration, a report prepared for the Department of Housing and Urban
Development (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 31, 2000) and Department of Housing and Urban
Development, Office of Policy Development and Research, Evaluation of the Home Equity
Conversion Mortgage Insurance Demonstration: A Report to Congress (Washington, D.C.:
Mar. 15, 1995).
Page 33 GAO-19-702 Reverse Mortgages
financial aspects of the program, in particular losses associated with
insurance claims. According to the FHA Commissioner, a key challenge
for the HECM program is that FHA has historically administered it without
a designated program head. The 2000 program evaluation noted that
lenders and servicers found it frustrating that FHA did not have one
person with responsibility for the HECM program. Further, the 2000
program evaluation noted that the division of responsibility for the
program fell across many offices and that it was hard to find senior
managers with a sense of ownership for the HECM program. In January
2019, an economist from HUDs Office of Policy Development and
Research transferred to the Office of Housing (which includes FHA) to
serve as a Senior Advisor to the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Single
Family Programs, with a focus on the HECM program.
Without more comprehensive performance indicators and program
evaluations, FHA lacks information that could be useful for monitoring the
effects of recent policy changes and may be missing evidence of the
need for further program improvements. Additionally, in the absence of
performance indicators and reporting, FHA and Congress lack insight into
how well the HECM program is helping senior homeowners.
According to OMB Circular A-129, agencies must have monitoring,
analysis, and reporting mechanisms in place to provide a clear
understanding of a programs performance.
73
The circular says these
mechanisms should be sufficiently flexible to perform any analysis
needed to respond to developing issues in the loan portfolio. However,
we found shortcomings in FHAs internal reporting. We also found that
FHA had not analyzed the implications of its foreclosure prioritization
process for FHA-assigned loans.
Internal reporting for the HECM program is limited. Although FHA
adopted the HERMIT system to improve oversight of the HECM portfolio,
it has not used program data to regularly report key loan performance
informationfor example, HECM termination reasons, servicer advances,
73
Office of Management and Budget, Policies for Federal Credit Programs and Non-Tax
Receivables, OMB Circular No. A-129 (revised January 2013).
FHAs Internal Reporting
and Analysis for the
HECM Portfolio Have
Shortcomings
Page 34 GAO-19-702 Reverse Mortgages
and use of foreclosure prevention options.
74
FHA officials said they have
been more focused on the analysis and reporting of claims and other
financial data for the HECM program. However, according to OMB
Circular A-129, effective reporting provides accurate, timely information
on program performance, early warnings of issues that may arise, and
analytics to drive decision-making.
FHA has generated some reports from HERMIT to help oversee the
HECM portfolio, but it has been slow to develop regular and
comprehensive reporting mechanisms. FHA officials told us that while
data on defaults and use of foreclosure prevention options have generally
been available in HERMIT since 2015, FHA was unable to obtain reports
on these topics until the summer of 2018 because of contract funding
limitations. FHA officials said that starting in September 2018, FHA began
receiving regular reports from its HERMIT system contractor on issues
such as HECMs assigned to FHA; HECM origination, assignment, and
termination activity by month; summary information on the number and
dollar amount of HECMs originated each year; and HECMs with a default
date. Additionally, around the same time, FHA requested and received ad
hoc reports (one-time reports created for specific purposes) from the
contractor that included spreadsheets of all active HECMs with a
repayment plan and all active HECMs for which there was an identified
nonborrowing spouse.
FHA officials said the purpose of the reports generated from HERMIT is
to help FHA better manage HECM program performance. However, our
review of these regular and ad hoc reports found that many are lists of
loans that meet certain criteria and do not provide summary statistics that
could be used to readily identify patterns or trends in metrics, such as the
number of or reasons for HECM terminations or use of different
foreclosure prevention options. The reports require additional analysis to
generate meaningful management information. According to OMB
Circular A-129, graphics, tables, and trend analysis that compare
performance over time and against expectations and other information
can provide critical context for understanding program performance.
74
FHA implemented the HERMIT system, which captures data on defaults and advances,
partly in response to a 2010 Office of Inspector General recommendation, but it has not
regularly tracked and reported this information. Tracking defaults and servicer advances is
critical to understanding how many borrowers are unable to meet their mortgage
obligations and how far behind they are on property charges, both of which can affect the
amount of insurance claims FHA may need to pay in the future.
Page 35 GAO-19-702 Reverse Mortgages
Further, the circular says dashboards (easy-to-comprehend summaries of
key quantitative and qualitative information) and watch lists are tools that
can help all levels of the organization receive appropriate information to
inform proactive portfolio management and ensure program decisions are
informed by robust analytics.
FHAs lack of analysis and internal reporting on HECM termination
reasons hampered the agencys ability to respond to a 2017 Freedom of
Information Act request about the number of and reasons for HECM
foreclosures.
75
FHAs response contained data showing that over 99
percent of HECM foreclosures occurring from April 2009 through
December 2016 resulted from the death of the borrower. However, FHA
officials told us they subsequently looked more closely into the issue and
redid the analysis using more reliable and updated information from
January 2013 through December 2017. The revised analysis showed that
61 percent of foreclosures over that period were due to borrower deaths,
37 percent were due to borrower defaults, and 2 percent were due to
conveyance of title. If FHA had regular and meaningful management
information about HECM terminations, it could have initially responded to
the 2017 request with more reliable information.
FHA officials told us that HERMIT is an accounting system to process
HECM claims and has limitations as a broader portfolio monitoring tool.
However, our analysis of HERMIT data and reports generated by FHA’s
HERMIT contractor suggest that the system can be used for this broader
purpose. Without more robust program analysis and internal reporting,
FHA is not well positioned to detect and respond to any emerging issues
and trends in the HECM portfolio. As previously discussed, these trends
include growing numbers of HECMs entering default and an increasing
number of loans being assigned to FHA.
FHA has not evaluated its foreclosure prioritization process for FHA-
assigned HECMs. As previously noted, FHA-assigned loans are a
growing part of the HECM portfolio. According to FHA officials, the
agency generally does not foreclose on borrowers whose HECMs have
been assigned to FHA and who are in default due to unpaid property
75
The 2017 request came from a consumer group and a legal aid organization. The
Freedom of Information Act was enacted in 1966 and requires federal agencies to provide
the public with access to government records and information to facilitate an informed
public and accountable government. See 5 U.S.C. § 552.
Page 36 GAO-19-702 Reverse Mortgages
charges.
76
According to FHA, the properties associated with these loans
are typically occupied. FHA officials said the agency prioritizes processing
foreclosures on assigned HECMs for which the property is vacant
(because the borrower passed away, for example). FHA officials said that
prioritizing foreclosure processing for those loans and delays by the
Department of Justice in completing those foreclosures has effectively
resulted in few foreclosures on assigned loans with property charge
defaults. However, FHA regulations state that servicers generally must
initiate foreclosure within 6 months of calling a loan due and payable due
to a death or default (if the borrower or heirs have not yet paid the debt
off).
77
FHAs prioritization of processing vacant properties for foreclosure and
generally not foreclosing on FHA-assigned HECMs with a property
charge default raises issues and potential risks that FHA has not fully
analyzed. First, defaulted borrowers whose loans are privately owned
(that is, have not been assigned to FHA) face a greater risk of foreclosure
than defaulted borrowers with FHA-assigned loans. According to a
representative from one HECM servicer we interviewed, FHAs practice is
unfair because it treats HECM borrowers inconsistently. Second, FHA’s
foreclosure prioritization processing may create a financial incentive for
HECM borrowers with assigned loans to not pay their property charges,
which, in turn, can have negative financial consequences for FHA,
localities, and taxpayers. For example, because FHA does not foreclose
on assigned loans in tax and insurance default, FHA advances tax and
insurance payments on behalf of the borrower and adds them to the loan
balance to secure and maintain its first-lien position on the mortgaged
property.
78
This makes it more likely that the loan balance will increase to
a point that it exceeds the value of the home. When the borrower dies or
vacates such a property, FHA may not be able to recoup the loan balance
in a foreclosure sale, resulting in a loss to the insurance fund.
76
The 2017 actuarial review of FHAs Mutual Mortgage Insurance Fund noted this as well.
The actuarys report states that FHA does not foreclose on assigned HECMs in tax and
insurance default. See Pinnacle Actuarial Resources, Fiscal Year 2017 Independent
Actuarial Review of the Mutual Mortgage Insurance Fund, a report prepared for the
Department of Housing and Urban Development (Bloomington, Ill.: Nov. 10, 2017).
77
See 24 C.F.R. § 206.125(d).
78
See Pinnacle Actuarial Resources, Fiscal Year 2017 Independent Actuarial Review of
the Mutual Mortgage Insurance Fund.
Page 37 GAO-19-702 Reverse Mortgages
As of August 2019, FHA had not evaluated the various risks of generally
not foreclosing on assigned HECMs with property charge defaults. As a
result, FHA does not know how its process for prioritizing foreclosures for
assigned loans affects the HECM portfolio, HECM borrowers,
neighborhoods, and FHAs insurance fund.
FHAs oversight of HECM servicers is limited. FHA requires HECM
servicers, among other things, to inform borrowers of their loan status,
including any conditions resulting in a loan becoming due and payable; to
notify struggling borrowers of the availability of housing counseling and
foreclosure prevention options; to inform surviving nonborrowing spouses
of conditions and requirements for the deferral period; and to manage the
transfer of loan servicing from one entity to another. These requirements
are identified in FHA regulations, handbooks, and mortgagee letters.
79
If
properly implemented, these requirements can help ensure that HECM
borrowers and nonborrowing spouses are aware of their mortgage
responsibilities, options for resolving situations that can result in
foreclosure, and who to contact with loan servicing questions. FHA
officials said they maintain communication with HECM servicers,
including through an industry working group, about their compliance with
FHA requirements. The officials also noted that FHA conducts reviews of
due and payable requests and insurance claims, which can include
checks for some of the requirements discussed above. However, FHA
has not performed comprehensive on-site reviews of HECM servicers
compliance with program requirements since fiscal year 2013 and does
not have current procedures for conducting these reviews.
79
See e.g. 24 C.F.R. § 206.125(a). Other servicing requirements can be found in HUD
Handbook 4000.1 (FHAs Single Family Housing Policy Handbook), HUD Housing
Handbook 4235.1 (the HECM Handbook), and various mortgagee letters accessible at
https://www.hud.gov/program_offices/housing/sfh/hecm/hecmml.
FHAs Oversight of
Servicers and
Collaboration on
Oversight between
FHA and CFPB Are
Limited
FHA Has Not Performed
On-Site Reviews of HECM
Servicers for More Than 5
Years and Lacks Current
Review Procedures
Page 38 GAO-19-702 Reverse Mortgages
The lack of on-site reviews of HECM servicers is inconsistent with OMB
requirements for managing federal credit programs.
80
OMB Circular A-
129 states that agencies should conduct on-site lender and servicer
reviews biennially where possible and annually for lenders and servicers
with substantial loan volumes or those with other risk indicators such as
deterioration in their credit portfolio, default rates above acceptable levels,
or an abnormally high number of reduced or rejected claims. The purpose
of these reviews is to evaluate and enforce lender and servicer
performance and identify any noncompliance with program requirements.
The circular encourages agencies to develop a risk-rating system for
lenders and servicers to help establish priorities for on-site reviews and to
monitor the effectiveness of required corrective actions. The circular also
says that agencies should summarize review findings in written reports
with recommended corrective actions.
FHA previously conducted on-site reviews of HECM servicers. However,
according to agency data, FHA has not performed on-site reviews since
fiscal year 2013. From fiscal years 2010 through 2013, FHAs Quality
Assurance Division (a component of the Office of Lender Activities and
Program Compliance) conducted 14 on-site reviews of HECM servicers
(see table 3). These reviews examined compliance with FHA servicing
requirements and included detailed reviews of samples of loans.
Table 3: Number of FHA On-Site Reviews of Home Equity Conversion Mortgage
Servicers, Fiscal Years 20102018
Fiscal year
2010
2011
2012
2013
20142018
Total
Number of reviews
2
1
4
7
0
14
Source: Federal Housing Administration (FHA). | GAO-19-702
80
Office of Management and Budget, Policies for Federal Credit Programs and Non-Tax
Receivables, OMB Circular No. A-129 (revised January 2013).
Page 39 GAO-19-702 Reverse Mortgages
FHA provided us three examples of HECM servicing reviews conducted
in fiscal year 2013. While not representative of all reviews, the three
reviews identified multiple violations of FHA requirements, as follows:
Quality control plans. Two of the three reviews found that the
servicersquality control plansan internal control mechanism to help
ensure compliance with FHA requirementswere missing required
elements. For example, one review found that the servicer’s plan
lacked 13 required elements, including those intended to ensure
compliance with fair lending laws and immediate reporting of fraud or
other serious violations. Another review found deficiencies with the
servicers plan, including in the areas of customer service, servicing
transfers, and fees and charges.
Communication with borrowers. In these same two reviews, FHA
found that the servicers did not always provide borrowers with a
designated contact person or timely and accurate information about
their loan status. For both servicers, FHAs reviews of files for a
sample of active loans found no evidence that the servicer had
provided the borrower a contact person to handle inquiries. FHA
requires servicers to designate for borrowers a contact person
knowledgeable about servicing and provide the name of the person
annually and whenever the contact person changes. Additionally, both
reviews found that the servicersannual loan statements to borrowers
were missing critical information, such as the net principal limit (total
loan funds available), and that the servicers did not provide borrowers
with statements after every loan disbursement, as required.
Filing claims. In two of the three reviews, FHA found deficiencies in
the servicersfiling of insurance claims. For example, in one review,
FHA identified multiple cases where the servicer submitted claims that
were greater than the amounts warranted, including excess attorney
and appraisal fees, property preservation and protection expenses,
and interest costs. In another review, FHA found numerous instances
where the servicer missed various deadlinesincluding for submitting
claims, commencing foreclosure, and obtaining appraisalsand
therefore was not entitled to the full claim amounts it received.
Loan disbursements. One of the three reviews found numerous
instances in which the servicer did not respond to borrowersrequests
for payment plan changes within the required time frame of 5
business days, and therefore did not make timely loan disbursements
to borrowers.
Page 40 GAO-19-702 Reverse Mortgages
FHA required these servicers to take corrective actions, including
updating quality control plans, revising policies and procedures,
reimbursing FHA for unwarranted claim amounts, indemnifying FHA for
losses on a loan, and paying late charges to borrowers who did not
receive timely loan disbursements.
81
FHA has the option of referring
violations of FHA requirements to HUDs Mortgagee Review Board, which
can take administrative actions such as issuing letters of reprimand,
suspending or withdrawing approval to participate in FHA programs,
entering into settlement agreements to bring an entity into compliance,
and imposing civil money penalties.
82
FHA officials said they had not
referred any HECM servicers to the board as a result of findings from on-
site reviews.
According to FHAs current Director of the Quality Assurance Division,
under previous leadership, the division suspended on-site reviews of
HECM servicers after fiscal year 2016 because of servicersconcerns
about the clarity and consistency with which FHA was conducting the
reviews and applying enforcement remedies.
83
He said the Quality
Assurance Division had intended to revise its guidance for conducting the
reviews and then resume them, but the effort had stalled during a change
in leadership. The current Director said he was not aware that HECM
servicing reviews had been suspended until the fall of 2017, when the
division began targeting on-site reviews for fiscal year 2018, and noticed
that HECM servicers were not included in the prior years targeting
methodology.
The lack of recent HECM servicer reviews is problematic for a number of
reasons. First, as previously noted, the number of HECM borrowers
81
In some circumstances, the lender or servicer must indemnifyor repayFHA for
losses that it incurs after a loan has gone into default and the property has been sold.
82
Officials from HUDs Office of General Counsel said that enforcement actions against
HECM lenders and servicers have been rare, but they noted False Claims Act settlements
against two companies that service HECMs. In 2017 and 2018, HUDs Office of General
Counsel and Office of Inspector General worked with the Department of Justice to
coordinate investigations into and settlements with the servicers. According to the
Department of Justice officials, in both cases, the servicers allegedly did not disclose
noncompliance with various deadlinessuch as for property appraisals and
commencement of foreclosure proceedingsin order to claim interest payments from
FHA they were not entitled to receive. One servicer agreed to pay $89 million to resolve
the allegations, and the other agreed to pay $4.25 million.
83
The current Director said he was in an acting position starting in July 2017 and became
permanent in January 2018.
Page 41 GAO-19-702 Reverse Mortgages
defaulting on their loans has grown in recent years. As a result, knowing
whether servicers are providing borrowers with accurate and timely
communications about their mortgage obligations and the status of their
loans has become increasingly critical. Second, FHA has recently made
program changes and implemented foreclosure prevention options, such
as at-risk extensions and mortgagee optional election assignments, to
help struggling borrowers and nonborrowing spouses delay or avoid
foreclosure. But FHA does not know how effectively servicers inform
borrowers of these options and use these tools due to its lack of
oversight. Third, as discussed earlier, the majority of HECM servicers are
nonbank entities that may pose risks because they are not subject to the
same comprehensive federal safety and soundness regulations as banks
and rely on funding sources, such as lines of credit, that may be less
stable than deposits.
The Director of the Quality Assurance Division said FHA plans to begin
conducting HECM servicer reviews in fiscal year 2020 but will first need to
revise its procedures for reviewing HECM servicers, which were last
updated in 2009. However, the Director told us the division decided not to
develop criteria for selecting HECM servicers for review. Instead, he said
FHA plans to review all HECM servicers with significant portfolios at least
once every 3 years, starting with the three servicers that account for 96
percent of the HECM portfolio.
While FHAs plan to review HECM servicers with significant portfolios
captures one aspect of portfolio risk (loan volume), it does not account for
other risk indicators that OMB Circular A-129 says agencies should
consider.
84
The circular also encourages agencies to develop risk-rating
systems that incorporate these indicators. While the current HECM
servicing market is dominated by a small number of companies, the ability
to prioritize on-site reviews based on risk ratings will be important if the
market becomes less concentrated in the future. Additionally, some
HECM servicers may warrant review more frequently than once every 3
years if their business volume or performance poses substantial risks to
FHA or to borrowers. FHAs plans do not account for these contingencies.
84
In contrast, FHA uses risk-based criteria to prioritize on-site reviews for HECM lenders
and forward mortgage lenders and servicers.
Page 42 GAO-19-702 Reverse Mortgages
CFPB oversees reverse mortgage servicers through examinations
designed, among other things, to identify whether servicers engage in
acts or practices that violate federal consumer financial laws. CFPB
issued its Reverse Mortgage Examination Procedures in 2016 and began
conducting examinations in 2017.
85
CFPBs procedures include reviewing
servicerscompliance with the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act of
1974 and its implementing regulations (which, among other things,
contain requirements for notifying borrowers of servicing transfers,
responding to borrowerswritten information requests and notices of
error, and disclosures relating to force-placed insurance);
86
the Truth In
Lending Act and its implementing regulations (which impose requirements
on servicers governing the use of late fees and delinquency charges,
provisions for payoff statements, and disclosures regarding rate changes
for adjustable-rate mortgages); and other consumer protection laws.
87
Additionally, CFPBs procedures include a review of whether a HECM
servicer is following selected elements of FHAs HECM program
requirements. For example, CFPBs examiners are directed to determine
whether information provided to the borrowers about life expectancy set-
aside accounts (an FHA requirement) is clear, prominent, and readily
understandable, and whether the borrower incurred penalties or
unnecessary charges in the event the servicer failed to make
disbursements of set-aside funds for insurance, taxes, and other charges
with respect to the property in a timely manner. CFPB examiners also are
directed to determine whether the servicer referred a HECM to
foreclosure improperly after the death of a borrower, such as when an
eligible nonborrowing spouse still occupies the home. If CFPB’s reverse
mortgage examinations identify violations, CFPB may require the
85
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Reverse Mortgage Servicing Examination
Procedures (Washington, D.C.: October 2016). CFPBs oversight of reverse mortgage
servicers is not limited to those participating in the HECM program.
86
According to CFPB, loan requirements may include that borrowers have insurance on
their property. If the borrower fails to obtain insurance or lets the insurance lapse, the loan
contract may allow for the lender or servicer to provide insurance to cover the property
(force-placed insurance). CFPB notes that force-placed insurance protects only the lender
from losses, but the lender will charge the borrower for the insurance costs. Force-placed
insurance is usually more expensive than what borrowers could obtain by purchasing
policies themselves.
87
General servicing requirements regarding policies and procedures, early interventions,
continuity of contract, and loss mitigation procedures under the Real Estate Settlement
Procedures Act of 1974, as amended, are generally inapplicable to reverse mortgage
servicers. See 12 C.F.R. § 1024.30(b)(2).
CFPB Conducts Oversight
of Reverse Mortgage
Servicers, but It Has Not
Completed Steps to Share
Examination Results with
FHA
Page 43 GAO-19-702 Reverse Mortgages
examined entity to take corrective actions, which are recorded in the
examination results as matters requiring attention.
88
CFPB examinations of reverse mortgage servicers have found
deficiencies in monitoring of servicing actions, compliance with consumer
protection laws, and communications with consumers. For example,
CFPB reported in the March 2019 edition of its Supervisory Highlights
that one or more reverse mortgage servicing examinations found cases
where the servicer did not provide the heirs of deceased borrowers a
complete list of the documents needed to evaluate their case for a
foreclosure extension.
89
(Extensions can give heirs additional time to sell
or purchase the property and delay or avoid foreclosure.) As a result, in
some instances, one or more servicers foreclosed rather than seeking a
foreclosure extension from FHA. According to CFPB, in response to the
examinations, one or more servicers planned to improve communications
with borrowersheirs, including specifying the documents needed for a
foreclosure extension and the relevant deadlines. CFPB officials said they
plan to continue examining reverse mortgage servicers.
In addition to conducting examinations and issuing matters requiring
attention, CFPB officials said the bureau has other optionsincluding
issuing warning letters and taking enforcement actionsto stop unlawful
practices or promote future compliance by supervised entities. Warning
letters advise companies that certain practices may violate federal
consumer financial law.
90
Enforcement actions are legal actions against
an entity initiated through federal district court or by an administrative
88
CFPB matters requiring attention are corrective actions that result from examination
findings that require the attention of a supervised institutions board of directors or
principals and that are directly related to violations of consumer financial law, compliance
program deficiencies, or control weaknesses. CFPB also has the option to forward
examination findings to its Action Review Committee for further input and consideration.
According to CFPB officials, the Action Review Committee can take additional
enforcement action if the committee finds concerns about consumer protections.
89
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Supervisory Highlights, Winter 2019, Issue 18,
(Washington, D.C.: March 2019).
90
Warning letters are not accusations of wrongdoing, but instead are meant to help
recipients review certain practices to ensure that they comply with federal law. CFPB may
make aspects of these letters public without identifying the recipient if the bureau
determines that other entities might benefit from a reminder to review certain practices or
thinks the public should be aware of particular activities.
Page 44 GAO-19-702 Reverse Mortgages
adjudication proceeding.
91
CFPB officials told us the bureau had not
issued any warning letters or enforcement actions against HECM
servicers as of August 2019.
92
While CFPB has examined reverse mortgage servicers and plans to
continue doing so, CFPB officials said the bureau and FHA do not have
an agreement in place to share supervisory information, which inhibits
sharing of examination results. Information-sharing agreements may
address topics such as what and how information will be shared and
handling of sensitive information. CFPB officials said that an agreement
with FHA would be needed to ensure that supervisory information in the
bureaus examinations is kept confidential. Under the Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, CFPB must share results of
the examination of a supervised entity with another federal agency that
has jurisdiction over that entity, provided that CFPB received from the
agency reasonable assurances as to the confidentiality of the information
disclosed.
93
In addition, in previously issued work, we noted that interagency
collaboration can serve a number of purposes, including, among other
things, policy development, oversight and monitoring, and information
sharing and communication.
94
CFPB officials said CFPB and FHA had taken initial steps in 2017 toward
developing an information-sharing agreement. However, as of August
2019, an information-sharing agreement had not been completed. CFPB
officials told us there were existing ways for the two agencies to share
examination findings, but that an information-sharing agreement would
91
According to CFPB officials, CPFB enforcement actions are typically the result of formal
investigations that include hearings and subpoenas against companies, involve
settlements, and are typically time intensive for CFPB because of the investigative
process.
92
However, CFPB has issued warning letters and taken enforcement actions related to
reverse mortgage advertising.
93
See Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1022(c)(6)(C) (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5512(c)(6)(C)).
94
GAO-12-1022.
Page 45 GAO-19-702 Reverse Mortgages
facilitate the process.
95
CFPB officials said developing information-
sharing agreements can be a lengthy process and that both agencies had
other competing priorities. However, because of the limited information
sharing between CFPB and FHA, FHA is not benefiting from oversight
findings about servicers it could rely on to help implement the HECM
program. Having this information is particularly important given that FHA
does not comprehensively review HECM servicers itself and CFPB’s
examinations address a number of FHA requirements. Access to CFPB’s
examination results could enhance FHAs oversight of HECM servicers
and potentially help it respond to consumer protection issues facing
HECM borrowers.
CFPB collects, analyzes, and reports on consumer complaints related to
reverse mortgages. The bureau began collecting reverse mortgage
consumer complaints in December 2011 and has collected about 3,600
complaints since then.
96
CFPB collects complaints through an online
forum on its website called the Consumer Complaint Database, as well as
via email, mail, phone, fax, or referral from another agency.
97
CFPB’s
authority to collect complaints comes from the Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act, which states that one of the
95
FHA can request access to relevant CFPB examination results under 12 C.F.R. §
1070.43. Additionally, the agencies have the ability to have high-level conversations about
confidential supervisory information under 12 C.F.R. § 1070.45(a)(5). According to CFPB
officials, CFPBs Office of Enforcement has used both of these processes with FHA to
share information on reverse mortgage issues.
96
Of the 3,600 complaints, CFPB officials said about 3,000 were forwarded to companies
and were posted publicly on CFPBs website. The remaining 600 complaints were referred
to other agencies, such as federal regulators. CFPB officials said they do not publicly post
complaints that are referred to other agencies.
97
CFPB’s Consumer Complaint Database is available through its website at
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/data-research/consumer-complaints/.
CFPB Collects and
Analyzes Consumer
Complaints on
Reverse Mortgages,
but FHA Does Not
Use All Available Data
CFPB Has Received
About 3,600 Reverse
Mortgage Complaints
since 2011
Page 46 GAO-19-702 Reverse Mortgages
bureaus primary functions is collecting, investigating, and responding to
consumer complaints.
98
CFPB officials told us the bureau uses consumer complaints as part of its
criteria for selecting entities to examine, including reverse mortgage
servicers, and to inform its educational publications. For example, in June
2015, CFPB released a report on reverse mortgage advertising and
consumer risks.
99
In August 2017, CFPB released an issue brief on the
costs and risks of using a reverse mortgage to delay collecting Social
Security benefits.
100
In February 2015, CFPB issued a report on reverse mortgage consumer
complaints it received from December 2011 through December 2014.
101
CFPB found that consumer complaints indicated frustration and confusion
over the terms and requirements of reverse mortgages. CFPB also found
that many complaints were about problems with loan servicing. For
example, some consumers complained that they were at risk of
foreclosure due to nonpayment of property taxes or homeowners
insurance and that they faced obstacles when trying to prevent a
foreclosure. CFPB officials told us they did not currently have plans to
publish additional reports on reverse mortgage complaints, but that CFPB
would continue to produce educational materials on reverse mortgages
and internally review the data on a routine basis.
For this report, we performed a high-level analysis of roughly 2,500
reverse mortgage complaints received by CFPB from calendar years
2015 through 2018.
102
We analyzed patterns in the number of complaints
by year, state, submission method, and company.
98
Pub. L. No. 111-203, §1021(c)(2) (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5511(c)(2)).
99
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Office for Older Americans, A Closer Look at
Reverse Mortgage Advertisements and Consumer Risks (Washington, D.C.: June 2015).
100
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Office for Older Americans, Issue Brief: The
Costs and Risks of Using A Reverse Mortgage to Delay Collecting Social Security
(Washington, D.C.: August 2017).
101
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Office for Older Americans, Snapshot of
Reverse Mortgage Complaints: December 2011December 2014 (Washington, D.C.:
February 2015).
102
We selected this period because, as previously mentioned, CFPBs February 2015
publication included summary findings on reverse mortgage complaints received prior to
2015.
Page 47 GAO-19-702 Reverse Mortgages
By year. Complaint volumes varied across the 4 years, with the most
complaints received in 2016 and the least received in 2018 (see table
4).
Table 4: Number of Reverse Mortgage Complaints Received by the Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), Calendar Years 20152018
Calendar year
2015
2016
2017
2018
Total
Number of complaints
628
741
594
509
2,472
Source: GAO analysis of CFPB Consumer Complaint Database. | GAO-19-702
By state. The states with the most complaints were California
(accounting for 16 percent of reverse mortgage complaints), Florida
(11 percent), New York (8 percent), and Texas (7 percent). These
states are among the most populous, and three of them (California,
Florida, and Texas) also had the greatest numbers of HECMs.
By submission method. A majority of reverse mortgage complaints
(56 percent) were submitted through CFPBs website. The remaining
complaints were submitted through referrals to CFPB from other
agencies (22 percent), by phone (12 percent), by postal mail (7
percent), and by fax (3 percent). Compared to the percentage of all
types of mortgage complaints filed during the 4-year period, the
percentage of reverse mortgage complaints filed through the website
(56 percent) was lower than the corresponding percentage for
complaints about all types of mortgages (67 percent). Representatives
from legal aid organizations representing HECM borrowers said that
reverse mortgage consumers may be less likely to file a complaint
through a website because of limitations sometimes related to aging
for example, lack of internet access or computer skills. Additionally,
representatives from three of the five organizations said seniors may
suffer from health or capacity issues, such as hearing, vision, or
memory loss, that may make it difficult for them to file or follow up on
a complaint. For these reasons, seniors may not be submitting
complaints through CFPBs website and seniorscomplaints about
reverse mortgages may be underreported in general.
Page 48 GAO-19-702 Reverse Mortgages
By company. Companies that were the subject of reverse mortgage
complaints included both lenders and servicers.
103
From 2015 through
2018, five companies were the subject of more than 100 complaints
each, ranging from a low of 116 to a high of 506. Together, these five
companies accounted for 61 percent (1,509) of the reverse mortgage
complaints CFPB received. Additionally, one company received the
most complaints in 4 out of the 5 years reviewed.
104
We also conducted a more detailed analysis of a random, generalizable
sample of 100 consumer complaint narratives from among the 2,472 total
reverse mortgage complaints CFPB received in calendar years 2015
through 2018. The purpose of this analysis was to identify patterns in
consumer-described issues about reverse mortgages. We created issue
categories by reading the consumer narratives. Figure 6 shows the
estimated percentage of reverse mortgage complaints received by CFPB
over the 4-year period by consumer-described issue categories, based on
our sample of 100 complaint narratives.
103
As previously noted, some companies originate reverse mortgages and then continue
to own and service them. However, in many instances, the reverse mortgage may be
originated by one company, owned by another, and serviced by yet another. This makes
analysis by company difficult because not all companies are either originating or servicing
reverse mortgages.
104
Making finer comparisons across companies would require a standardized measure
such as a complaint ratethat is, the number of complaints divided by a uniform indicator
of reverse mortgage business volume (number of loans originated or serviced by a
company). However, differences in the focus of the companies (for example, originating,
servicing, or owning reverse mortgages) and annual shifts in the size of the companies
reverse mortgage portfolios (for example, due to business decisions to exit the market or
increase market share) complicate development of such a measure.
Page 49 GAO-19-702 Reverse Mortgages
Figure 6: Types of Reverse Mortgage Complaints Received by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Calendar Years
20152018
Note: GAO created the complaint categories by reading a random generalizable sample of 100
consumer complaint narratives. Percentages add to more than 100 percent because some consumer
complaints included multiple issues and, as a result, were included in more than one complaint
category. Confidence intervals are rounded to the nearest whole number.
Among the largest consumer-described issue categories were
foreclosures; poor communication from lenders or servicers; problems at
loan origination; estate management; and unfair interest rates, fees, or
costs.
Being at risk of foreclosure or in foreclosure. The largest
consumer-described issue category (47 percent) involved consumers
(or someone complaining on behalf of the consumer) who said they
were at risk of foreclosure or in the foreclosure process.
105
For
example, some consumers said they or the borrower they represent
had received a notice of default, were in due and payable status, or
105
Our analysis of consumer complaint narratives found that a number of complaints were
submitted on behalf of the borrower by another party, such as family members, potentially
because of limitations from aging previously discussed.
Page 50 GAO-19-702 Reverse Mortgages
were at risk of foreclosure. Some consumers sought help in
preventing foreclosure or felt they were wrongly being foreclosed on.
In 16 of the 47 complaints about being at risk of or in foreclosure,
consumers also cited concerns about property taxes, insurance, or
other property charges.
Poor communication on a servicing or lending issue. The second
largest consumer-described issue category (42 percent) involved
complaints about poor communication on a reverse mortgage
servicing or lending issue. These complaints included concerns about
a lack of communication or communications that were unclear or
unresponsive to the consumers needs. Complaints in this category
often overlapped with those about being at risk of or in foreclosure.
For example, some of these complaints included consumers
concerns that they had not received information about the status of or
reason for a possible foreclosure from their servicer or did not get
responses to their inquiries.
Loan origination issues. The third largest complaint category
involved problems occurring at loan origination (29 percent). These
complaints included consumersconcerns that the amount of funds
available from their reverse mortgage was less than expected or that
interest rates or fees were not disclosed or explained to them. The
complaints also included cases where the adult children of borrowers
said they felt the lender took advantage of their parents.
Estate-management issues. Twenty-seven percent of consumer
complaints were about estate management issues. Complaints
involving estate-management were often submitted by deceased
borrowersfamilies or heirs. In some cases, heirs said that they were
unable to get information about the status of the reverse mortgage. In
other cases, the heirs said that because of the reverse mortgage, they
were at risk of losing the home, which was also their place of
residence.
Unfair interest rates, fees, or costs. Twenty-seven percent of
consumer complaints were about being charged higher-than-expected
costs, fees, or interest. For example, in a few complaints, consumers
said that their servicers required them to pay for insurance products
(for example, flood insurance) that they felt were not needed.
According to CFPB officials, the bureau (1) refers consumer complaints
about financial products and services to the companies the complaints
are about or other federal regulators with supervisory jurisdiction over
those companies or (2) makes complaint information available to other
federal agencies with jurisdiction over the relevant product or service.
Page 51 GAO-19-702 Reverse Mortgages
CFPB officials said the bureau does not currently refer reverse mortgage
complaints to FHA; however, they told us reverse mortgage complaints
are available to FHA through CFPBs public website and through a secure
portal FHA can access that has more data available than on the public
website.
FHA collects and records inquiries and complaints about HECMs and, as
previously mentioned, has access to CFPB data on reverse mortgage
complaints. However, FHA does not use its inquiry and complaint data to
help inform HECM program policies and oversight, and the way data are
collected does not produce quality information for these purposes.
Additionally, FHA has not leveraged CFPBs complaint data for HECM
program oversight. Federal internal control standards state that agencies
should use quality information to achieve the entitys objectives, including
using relevant data from reliable internal and external sources.
106
Additionally, in prior work we identified practices to enhance collaboration
across agencies, including leveraging agency resources.
107
According to agency officials, FHAs two main methods for collecting
customer inquiries and complaints are hotlines operated by the agency’s
National Servicing Center and the FHA Resource Center.
108
Historically,
the National Servicing Center was FHAs primary method for collecting
inquiries and complaints about the HECM program.
109
From calendar
years 2015 through 2018, the National Servicing Center received about
105,000 HECM-related calls. During this same period, the FHA Resource
Center received 147 HECM-related calls. In April 2019, the FHA
Resource Center became the primary entity for collecting, recording, and
responding to all HECM-related calls. FHA officials told us they
106
GAO-14-704G.
107
GAO-12-1022.
108
The National Servicing Center is a customer assistance center that works with FHA
homeowners and their lenders or servicers to avoid foreclosure. Customers can submit
their inquiries and complaints via telephone, email, postal mail, or fax. In addition to its two
main methods, FHA receives complaints and inquiries through congressional and White
House correspondence. FHA officials said complaints received through these channels
were less frequent than complaints received through other methods and sometimes
involved prospective borrowers who did not meet HECM eligibility requirements.
109
We use the term callsto refer to any inquiry or complaint submitted to FHA and
logged through its two main collection methods.
FHA Does Not Analyze
Data on Consumer
Complaints to Help Inform
HECM Program Policies
Page 52 GAO-19-702 Reverse Mortgages
transferred these responsibilities from the National Servicing Center to
the FHA Resource Center to help improve call management.
While this change could help improve customer service, it would not fully
resolve limitations we found in FHAs approach to collecting and
recording HECM inquiries and complaints that diminish the usefulness of
the information for program oversight. These limitations include the
following:
Information is not suitable for thematic analysis. Both the National
Servicing Center and the FHA Resource Center do not collect call
information in a way that would allow FHA to readily analyze the data
for themes. For example, both centers do not reliably differentiate
between inquiries and complaintsa potentially important distinction
for determining appropriate agency-level responses (for example,
creating informational materials to address frequently asked questions
from borrowers or investigating problematic servicing practices after
repeated complaints). Additionally, while both the centers collect data
on the reason for calls, neither did so in a systematic way that would
allow FHA to readily determine how frequently issues are being
raised. For example, neither centersdata systems contained
standardized categories or menus with options for recording reasons
for calls. As a result, the FHA Resource Centers data from 2015
through 2018 contained more than 100 separate reasons for 147
HECM-related calls. Some of the reasons the center recorded were
too specific (for example, a property address or a case number) to be
useful for identifying themes, while others were so similar that they do
not provide meaningful distinctions (but could be combined into fewer,
potentially more useful categories).
110
We noted similar limitations in
the National Servicing Centers data, which included ambiguous call
reasons such as historyand documents,and categories that could
be collapsed, which hinders thematic analysis.
111
Customer type is not recorded. The National Servicing Center,
which received the large majority of HECM-related calls to FHA, did
not record information on the type of customer that made the call.
National Servicing Center guidance for staff says customers include
110
For example, among the call reasons were 36 that included the name of the contractor
that services loans assigned to FHA, three of which consisted of the contractors name
and the word feedback,” “issue,” or “problem.
111
Because of these limitations, we did not analyze FHA customer calls in a manner
similar to our analysis of CFPB consumer complaint data and narratives.
Page 53 GAO-19-702 Reverse Mortgages
borrowers, nonprofit organizations, government entities, real estate
brokers and agents, title companies, attorneys, lenders and servicers,
and HUD employees, but its data system does not include these
categories.
112
Information on customer type could be useful in
identifying issues facing different populations of callers and could help
FHA tailor strategies for addressing their concerns. In contrast, the
FHA Resource Centers data system does include categories for
customer type for the smaller number of HECM-related inquiries and
complaints it received. Because the FHA Resource Centers system is
now FHAs primary repository for new HECM-related calls, information
on customer type should be available for future inquiries and
complaints. However, this information is not available for the bulk of
HECM-related calls FHA received in prior years.
FHA officials said the agency uses customer complaint and inquiry data
to improve customer service. For example, FHA officials said the National
Servicing Center monitors calls on a daily basis to ensure that prompt
responses are provided. Similarly, FHA officials said they review call data
monthly to identify training needs of servicers or contractors and potential
process changes to improve customer experience with the call process.
However, FHA does not analyze data for other purposes that could
enhance program oversight, such as determining which HECM servicers
and lenders receive the most complaints, targeting entities for on-site
reviews, or identifying topics that may need additional borrower
education.
FHA also does not use CFPBs consumer complaint data to inform
management and oversight of the HECM program, even though some of
the information could be useful to the agency. For example, according to
CFPBs complaint data for 2015 through 2018, approximately 6 percent of
reverse mortgage complaints were about FHAs servicing contractor. FHA
officials said they do not review CFPBs complaint data because they
believe the data are too limited to be useful and because they have
concerns about CFPBs controls over data integrity. However, as our
analysis shows, CFPBs data can be used to identify consumer
concernssuch as difficulties avoiding or navigating foreclosure or
problems communicating with servicersthat may merit additional
attention by FHA. Additionally, CFPBs Office of Inspector General
recently reviewed CFPBs management controls for the Consumer
112
Department of Housing and Urban Development, Expanded Customer Service National
Servicing Center Hotline Desk Guide (Oklahoma City, Okla.: 2013).
Page 54 GAO-19-702 Reverse Mortgages
Complaint Database and did not identify major data integrity issues that
would preclude use of the data for general oversight purposes.
113
Periodically analyzing CFPB consumer complaint data and internally
collected consumer complaint data could help FHA to detect and respond
to consumer protection issues regarding HECMs.
Since 2000, the take-up ratethe ratio of HECM originations to eligible
senior homeownershas been limited (see fig. 7).
114
This rate, which
provides an indication of how popular HECMs are among the population
of senior homeowners, has not reached 1 percent and has fallen in recent
years. In addition, since calendar year 2010, the volume of HECM
originations has declined and is about half of what originations had been
at their peak. For example, in calendar years 20072009, more than
100,000 new HECMs were originated each year, compared with roughly
42,000 in calendar year 2018.
113
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Office of Inspector General, Opportunities Exist
to Enhance Management Controls Over the CFPBs Consumer Complaint Database,
2015-FMIC-C-016, (Washington, D.C.: Sept.10, 2015); Bureau Efforts to Share Consumer
Complaint Data Internally Are Generally Effective; Improvements Can Be Made to
Enhance Training and Strengthen Access Approval, 2019-FMIC-C-008, (Washington,
D.C.: June 3, 2019); and Semiannual Report to Congress April 1, 2018September 30,
2018, (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 31, 2018).
114
For more information on how we calculated HECM take-up rates and the sources of
data used, see app. II.
Housing Market
Conditions, Exit of
Large Bank Lenders,
and Policy Changes
Help Explain the
Decline in Reverse
Mortgages since
2010
Page 55 GAO-19-702 Reverse Mortgages
Figure 7: Home Equity Conversion Mortgage (HECM) Originations and Take-Up Rates, Calendar Years 19892018
Note: We were unable to calculate a take-up rate for calendar year 2018 because Census Bureau
data were not yet available.
The relatively high homeownership rate and low retirement savings of
U.S. seniors suggest that reverse mortgages could be a way for many
older Americans to tap their home equity and supplement retirement
income.
115
However, the popularity of reverse mortgages has declined in
recent years for a number of possible reasons. We developed an
econometric model to examine the relationship between HECM take-up
115
According to the Census Bureaus 2016 American Community Survey data, the
homeownership rate for householders aged 65 and older is 78 percent, compared to 63
percent for all households. According to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
Systems 2016 Survey of Consumer Finances, 50 percent of American families with a
head of household age 65 to 74 have no retirement accounts. Additionally, we found that
the percentage of households headed by someone aged 55 or over that had no retirement
savings was about 48 percent in 2016. See GAO, Retirement Security: Most Households
Approaching Retirement Have Low Savings, an Update, GAO-19-442R (Washington,
D.C.: Mar. 26, 2019).
Page 56 GAO-19-702 Reverse Mortgages
rates and a number of explanatory variables.
116
For additional information
and detailed results from our econometric model of factors associated
with HECM take-up rates, see appendix II. Among other factors, our
model results indicate that house price changes, home equity, and prior
use of other home equity lending products were statistically significant (at
the 1 percent level) in explaining the decrease in HECM take-up rates
since 2010.
117
Changes in house prices. The decline in take-up rates may reflect
lower house prices, which have limited the number of households with
sufficient home equity (as a percentage of home value) to benefit from
a HECM. Our model estimated that, controlling for other factors, take-
up rates were higher when house price growth was large and there
was a history of house price volatility compared to either relatively low
house price appreciation or stable house prices. This result is
consistent with senior homeowners using reverse mortgages to insure
against house price declines.
118
For example, researchers have noted
that in states where house prices are volatile and the current level is
above the long-term norm, seniors anticipate future reductions in
house prices and lock in their home equity gains by obtaining a
reverse mortgage.
Home equity and prior home equity borrowing. Additionally, we
found that controlling for other factors, take-up rates were higher
where home equity (house value minus any mortgage debt) was high.
In these cases, senior homeowners tap into their high home equity to
help supplement income with proceeds from the HECM. Further, we
found that among seniors who had previously used other home equity
lending products, such as home equity loans, take-up rates were high.
116
We estimated a panel of state-year observations using fixed-effects estimation.
Because this estimation technique controls for both observable and unobservable factors
that vary across states but not over time, it estimates only the within-state variation in
take-up rates.
117
We were not able to include some factors that could affect HECM take-up rates,
including FHA program policy changes and behavioral and structural factors discussed
later in this report. However, the state fixed-effects and year fixed-effects that we used are
expected to control for some of these factors.
118
For similar results, see Donald Haurin, Chao Ma, Stephanie Moulton, Maximilian
Schmeiser, Jason Seligman, and Wei Shi, Spatial Variation in Reverse Mortgages
Usage: House Price Dynamics and Consumer Selection,Journal of Real Estate Finance
and Economics, vol. 53 (2016): pp. 392-417.
Page 57 GAO-19-702 Reverse Mortgages
This result is consistent with seniors using HECMs to pay off these
loans.
119
Academics and industry experts have also noted possible reasons why
the popularity of reverse mortgages is limited. For example, senior
homeowners can tap their home equity by other means, such as home
equity loans, home equity lines of credit, and cash-out refinancing.
120
Some of these options may be less expensive than reverse mortgages.
Seniors can also downsize––sell their current home and buy or rent a
less expensive oneand keep the difference to supplement retirement
savings. Seniors have other ways to supplement their retirement income
and age in placefor example, one academic noted that some seniors
rent out rooms in their homes, potentially using online marketplaces such
as Airbnb.
121
Additionally, our literature review and interviews with
academics identified other factors that have may have contributed to
limited interest in reverse mortgages, including the following:
Exit of large bank lenders. As previously noted, banks, thrifts, and
credit unions were historically the primary lenders and servicers of
mortgage loans. Following the 20072009 financial crisis and
subsequent revisions to regulatory bank capital requirements, banks
reevaluated the benefits and costs of being in the mortgage lending
market, as well as retaining mortgages and the right to service them.
Today, the reverse mortgage market is dominated by a relatively
small number of nonbank entities. The exit of large, well-known
lenders, such as Bank of America and Wells Fargo, from the HECM
market created opportunities for smaller nonbank lenders to enter the
market.
122
According to an academic we spoke with, in addition to
119
See Donald L. Redfoot, Ken Scholen, and S. Kathi Brown, Reverse Mortgages: Niche
Product or Mainstream Solution? A report on the 2006 AARP National Survey of Reverse
Mortgage Shoppers (Washington, D.C.: December 2007).
120
A cash-out refinance is when a mortgage borrower refinances into a new mortgage that
exceeds the existing loan balance. The difference between the two mortgages is given to
the borrower in cash.
121
For example, according to an Airbnb publication, the fastest-growing host demographic
is seniors, with more than 200,000 senior hosts. See 2019 Airbnb Statistics: User and
Market Growth Data, April 2019, accessed May 3, 2019,
https://ipropertymanagement.com/airbnb-statistics.
122
One study found that the exit of Bank of America and Wells Fargo was associated with
an 11 percent reduction in HECM volume. See Stephanie Moulton, Samuel Dodini,
Donald R. Haurin, and Maximilian Schmeiser, SeniorsHome Equity Extraction: Credit
Constraints and Borrowing Channels,available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2727204.
Page 58 GAO-19-702 Reverse Mortgages
new capital requirements, large banks may have exited the market
partly out of concern that they risked damage to their reputations if
they foreclosed on seniors who defaulted on their HECMs.
Additionally, a 2018 survey of lenders found a variety of reasons why
lenders have stopped originating HECMs, including potential
reputation risk and concerns about HECMs being a distraction from
their forward mortgage business.
123
Although the HECM market is
currently served by several nonbank lenders, their smaller scale,
limited access to capital, and limited name recognition may limit their
ability to reach more potential borrowers.
124
FHA policy changes to the HECM program. FHA has made several
policy changes in recent years to help stabilize the financial
performance of the HECM portfolio and strengthen financial criteria for
HECM borrowers. Although many of the HECM policy changes
introduced since 2010 were intended to minimize program losses,
they also may have reduced take-up rates. For example, in 2010 FHA
reduced the amount of money a borrower can get from a HECM.
125
Some academics we interviewed said reductions in the loan amounts
that borrowers can receive likely reduced demand for HECMs. In
2015, FHA changed financial requirements for HECMs to include a
financial assessment of the prospective borrower prior to loan
approval. Some academics said these changes made other home
equity extraction options that already had similar requirements more
competitive with HECMs.
Consumers’ misunderstanding and product complexity. A 2013
survey of U.S. homeowners aged 58 and older revealed a lack of
knowledge of reverse mortgages.
126
The survey found that awareness
123
Jim Cameron, Moving Forward in Reverse,STRATMOR Insights, vol. 3, no. 2
(February 2018).
124
Karan Kaul and Laurie Goodman, SeniorsAccess to Home Equity: Identifying Existing
Mechanisms and Impediments to Broader Adoption (Washington, D.C.: Urban Institute,
February 2017).
125
As of October 4, 2010, the amount of HECM loan proceeds available to borrowers was
reduced due the implementation of new principal limit factors. See Department of Housing
and Urban Development, Mortgagee Letter 2010-34 (Sept. 21, 2010). According to FHA
officials, the amount of HECM loan proceeds available to borrowers has been further
reduced since Mortgagee Letter 2010-34, and the most recent reduction was effective
October 2, 2017. See Department of Housing and Urban Development, Mortgagee Letter
2017-12 (Aug. 29, 2017).
126
Thomas Davidoff, Patrick Gerhard, and Thomas Post, Reverse Mortgages: What
Homeowners (Dont) Know and How It Matters (Oct. 24, 2016). Available at
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2528944.
Page 59 GAO-19-702 Reverse Mortgages
of reverse mortgages is high, but knowledge of mortgage terms is
limited. Additionally, the survey found that respondents perceived
reverse mortgages to be fairly complex.
Consumers’ perception of the product. Academics we spoke with
told us that consumersnegative perception of reverse mortgages
likely has a negative influence on take-up rates. For example, three
academics elaborated that consumers build their perception of the
product based on the industry’s marketing and advertising, which
includes television commercials with celebrity spokespeople that may
appeal to individuals facing economic hardship. Additionally, a 2016
survey of Americans aged 55 to 75 found that many respondents had
reservations about reverse mortgages, including that they are often
considered a financial tool of last resort.
127
For example, only 27
percent of survey respondents stated that, in general, it was better to
use a reverse mortgage earlier in retirement as opposed to using it as
a last resort.
Relatively high origination costs and fees. HECMs also may be
unpopular with borrowers because they can be more expensive than
other home equity lending products, such as home equity lines of
credit.
128
For example, HECM borrowers are charged various fees,
such as the up-front insurance premiums that FHA charges as
compensation for its insurance guarantee and origination fees lenders
charge. The up-front insurance premium is 2 percent of the
mortgages maximum claim amount. Also, for origination fees, lenders
can charge the greater of $2,500 or 2 percent of the first $200,000 of
the mortgages maximum claim amount plus 1 percent of the
maximum claim amount over $200,000. However, origination fees are
currently capped at $6,000. Further, because borrowers do not make
127
Hopkins, Jamie, The Effect of Low Reverse Mortgage Literacy on Usage of Home
Equity and Retirement Income Plans,Journal of Financial Planning (May 2017): pp. 44
52.
128
Deborah Lucas, Hacking Reverse Mortgages(Oct. 26, 2015), working paper
accessed on June 14, 2019,
http://mitsloan.mit.edu/shared/ods/documents/?DocumentID=4596. See also Hopkins.
Page 60 GAO-19-702 Reverse Mortgages
monthly payments on the loans, the interest will accumulate over time,
and compounding the interest, the loan balance can rise quickly.
129
Seniors’ attitudes toward debt and desire to leave a bequest.
Some academics have noted that seniors tend to be financially
conservative and avoid debt in old age––behavior driven by their
desire to leave a bequest or save for emergency expenses or long-
term care costs.
130
For example, academics have noted that some
impediments to home equity extraction are behavioral and have to do
with seniorslong-held values, beliefs, and attitudes, such as to
maximize wealth transfer to heirs by leaving a bequest. As a result,
they may be reluctant to take out a HECM, even if it could help pay for
some future expenses.
HECMs allow seniors to tap a portion of their home equity to supplement
their retirement income, but these loans can present risks to borrowers
and their spouses. The growing number of borrowers who have defaulted
on their HECMs and faced foreclosure in recent years highlights the
importance of monitoring loan outcomes and overseeing loan servicing
policies and practices in the HECM program. FHA has taken some steps
to enhance the data it receives from servicers and has created
foreclosure prevention options for distressed borrowers. However, FHA
could significantly improve its monitoring of loan outcomes and oversight
of servicing in the HECM program in the following areas:
FHAs lack of comprehensive termination data limits understanding of
the reasons why HECMs end, how the debt is satisfied, and how well
the program is helping seniors age in place. By, for example, updating
and providing more guidance to servicers on how to record
termination reasons, FHA could improve the completeness and
accuracy of HECM termination data.
FHA has not effectively assessed the performance of the HECM
program. By establishing performance indicators and periodically
assessing them, FHA could better oversee the program and
communicate information on program performance to Congress.
129
The interest rate on a HECM is agreed upon between the lender and the borrower and
can be either fixed for the life of the loan or adjustable, with adjustments occurring either
monthly or yearly. For such loans, the interest rate is based on an index such as the
LIBOR index (London Interbank Offer Rate) and a fixed premium charged by, and at the
discretion of, the lender (known as the lenders spread or margin).
130
Karan Kaul and Laurie Goodman, SeniorsAccess to Home Equity.
Conclusions
Page 61 GAO-19-702 Reverse Mortgages
Further, FHA could use the performance data to help make informed
decisions about any needed program changes in the future.
FHAs internal monitoring and reporting on loan outcomes has been
limited. Adopting analytic tools could better position FHA to evaluate
loan outcomes and help ensure senior officials have information
needed to make key decisions.
FHA has not fully analyzed the implications of how it prioritizes
foreclosures for assigned HECMs. FHAs current process generally
results in no foreclosures on assigned loans with property charge
defaults. Analyzing the implications of this process could help FHA
optimize how it services assigned loans.
Because FHA does not currently perform on-site reviews of HECM
servicers, it lacks assurance that servicers are complying with rules
and program requirements. While FHA plans to begin reviewing
HECM servicers in fiscal year 2020, its plan does not include
development of a risk-rating system to prioritize reviews and identify
servicers that should be reviewed more frequently.
CFPB does not share the results of its examinations of HECM
servicers with FHA, in part because the two agencies have not
completed a formal information-sharing agreement. Sharing these
results could aid FHAs oversight of HECM servicers by providing
additional information about the servicersperformance and
operations.
FHAs collection and use of consumer complaint data could be
improved. More organized collection of complaints and better
monitoring of internal and external complaint data could help FHA
detect and respond to emerging consumer protection issues regarding
HECMs.
By addressing these issues, FHA could help ensure that the HECM
program achieves program goals, effectively oversees servicers, and
provides appropriate borrower protections.
We are making a total of nine recommendations, eight to FHA and one to
CFPB:
The FHA Commissioner should take steps to improve the quality and
accuracy of HECM termination data. These steps may include updating
the termination reasons in the HERMIT system or updating the HERMIT
Recommendations for
Executive Action
Page 62 GAO-19-702 Reverse Mortgages
User Guide to more clearly instruct servicers how to record termination
reasons. (Recommendation 1)
The FHA Commissioner should establish, periodically review, and report
on performance indicators for the HECM programsuch as the
percentage of terminations due to borrower defaults, the proportion of
active HECMs with delinquent property charges, the amount of servicer
advances, and the percentage of distressed borrowers who have
received foreclosure prevention optionsand examine the impact of
foreclosure prevention options in the forthcoming HECM program
evaluation. (Recommendation 2)
The FHA Commissioner should develop analytic tools, such as
dashboards or watch lists, to better monitor outcomes for the HECM
portfolio, such as reasons for HECM terminations, defaults, use of
foreclosure prevention options, or advances paid by servicers on behalf of
HECM borrowers. (Recommendation 3)
The FHA Commissioner should evaluate FHAs foreclosure prioritization
process for FHA-assigned loans. Such an analysis should include the
implications that the process may have for HECM borrowers,
neighborhoods, and FHAs insurance fund. (Recommendation 4)
The FHA Commissioner should develop and implement procedures for
conducting on-site reviews of HECM servicers, including a risk-rating
system for prioritizing and determining the frequency of reviews.
(Recommendation 5)
The FHA Commissioner should work with CFPB to complete an
agreement for sharing the results of CFPB examinations of HECM
servicers with FHA. (Recommendation 6)
The CFPB Director should work with FHA to complete an agreement for
sharing the results of CFPB examinations of HECM servicers with FHA.
(Recommendation 7)
The FHA Commissioner should collect and record consumer inquiries and
complaints in a manner that facilitates analysis of the type and frequency
of the issues raised. (Recommendation 8)
The FHA Commissioner should periodically analyze available internal and
external consumer complaint data about reverse mortgages to help
Page 63 GAO-19-702 Reverse Mortgages
inform management and oversight of the HECM program.
(Recommendation 9)
We provided HUD and CFPB with a draft of this report for review and
comment. HUD provided written comments, which are reproduced in
appendix V, that communicate FHA’s response to the report. CFPB’s
written comments are reproduced in appendix VI.
CFPB said that it did not object to our recommendation to complete an
agreement for sharing the results of CFPB examinations of HECM
servicers with FHA (recommendation 7) and that it would work to
complete such an agreement with FHA.
FHA agreed with six of our eight recommendations and neither agreed
nor disagreed with the remaining two.
Recommendation 1. FHA agreed with our recommendation to
improve HECM termination data and said it would convene a working
group to update the HERMIT system and User Guide and develop
clear directions for HECM servicers to record termination reasons in
HERMIT.
Recommendation 2. Regarding our recommendation on HECM
performance indicators and program evaluation, FHA agreed that
periodic review and reporting of HECM performance indicators is
critically important and said it would work to expand its reporting to
include the level of foreclosure prevention activity. However, FHA
added that there were no HECM metrics for early default or
delinquency rates, as those measures are linked to the amortizing
nature of forward mortgages.
131
We agree that early default and
delinquency rates are not suitable metrics for HECMs, and our draft
report did not suggest that they are. Our report focuses on metrics
that would be pertinent to HECMs and that would provide additional
insight into HECM loan performance. These include the percentage of
HECM terminations due to borrower defaults, the proportion of active
HECMs with delinquent property charges, and the amount of funds
servicers have advanced on behalf of borrowers. We revised the
recommendation in our final report to more specifically describe the
types of performance indicators that FHA should establish and report
131
Early defaults or delinquencies occur when a borrower quickly falls behind on mortgage
paymentsfor example, within the first six mortgage payments.
Agency Comments
and Our Evaluation
Page 64 GAO-19-702 Reverse Mortgages
on. In addition, FHA disagreed with a statement in our draft report that
its evaluation of the HECM program has been limited. FHA said it
engages in robust HECM program evaluation and cited an example
that led to recent changes in FHA’s appraisal practices for HECMs.
While our draft report described the change in FHA’s appraisal
practices, we updated our final report to include reference to the FHA
study that prompted the appraisal change. However, we maintain that
FHA’s evaluation of the HECM program has been limited because the
last comprehensive program evaluation was completed 19 years ago
and FHA has not assessed the impact of HECM foreclosure
prevention options.
Recommendations 3 and 4. FHA agreed with our recommendations
to develop analytic tools for monitoring HECM loan outcomes and to
evaluate its foreclosure prioritization process for FHA-assigned loans.
Regarding the latter, FHA said that it is evaluating alternative
disposition options to reduce the number of loans that must go
through foreclosure and that it would take steps to evaluate the impact
of its prioritization process to assist in future decision-making.
Recommendation 5. FHA agreed with our recommendation to
develop and implement procedures for conducting on-site reviews of
HECM servicers, including a risk-rating system for prioritizing and
determining the frequency of reviews. As noted in our draft report,
FHA said it is in the process of updating procedures for on-site
reviews and plans to implement them in fiscal year 2020. FHA
disagreed with a statement in our draft report that FHA’s oversight of
HECM servicers is limited. FHA said the HECM servicing community
is small, which allows the agency to maintain regular communication
with HECM servicers, including through training sessions and industry
working group meetings. Our draft report acknowledged FHA’s
communications with servicers, but these activities are not a
substitute for in-depth compliance reviews of servicers’ operations. As
our draft report stated, FHA has not conducted on-site HECM servicer
reviews since fiscal year 2013. Given the 5-year lapse in FHA’s use of
this key oversight tool, we maintain that FHA’s oversight of HECM
servicers has been limited.
Recommendation 9. FHA agreed with our recommendation to
periodically analyze internal and external consumer complaint data
about reverse mortgages. FHA said it is expanding its data and
reporting capabilities as part of an information technology
modernization initiative. FHA also said that routing consumer inquiries
through the FHA Resource Center should improve data collection and
analysis.
Page 65 GAO-19-702 Reverse Mortgages
FHA did not explicitly agree or disagree with our recommendations to
work with CFPB to complete an agreement for sharing examination
results and to collect and record consumer inquiries and complaints in a
manner that facilitates analysis (recommendations 6 and 8, respectively).
FHA said it would explore opportunities to coordinate with CFPB where
appropriate. FHA also said that routing inquiries through the FHA
Resource Center would help identify common issues, track servicer
performance, and inform policy decisions. Fully implementing our
recommendations will help ensure that FHA has the information it needs
to effectively oversee the HECM program.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of the Department
of Housing and Urban Development, the Director of the Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau, appropriate congressional committees, and
other interested parties. In addition, the report is available at no charge on
the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact
me at (202) 512-8678 or CackleyA@gao.gov. Contact points for our
Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on
the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this
report are listed in appendix VII.
Alicia Puente Cackley
Director, Financial Markets and Community Investment
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and
Methodology
Page 66 GAO-19-702 Reverse Mortgages
This report examines issues related to reverse mortgages made under
the Home Equity Conversion Mortgage (HECM) program administered by
the Department of Housing and Urban Developments (HUD) Federal
Housing Administration (FHA). The Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau (CFPB) also plays a role in overseeing reverse mortgages,
including HECMs. Our objectives were to examine (1) what FHA data
show about HECM terminations, servicer advances, and the use of
foreclosure prevention options; (2) FHAs assessment and monitoring of
HECM portfolio performance, servicer advances, and foreclosure
prevention options; (3) FHAs and CFPBs oversight of HECM servicers;
(4) how FHA and CFPB collect, analyze, and respond to consumer
complaints about HECMs; and (5) how and why the market for HECMs
has changed in recent years.
To address all of our objectives, we reviewed relevant laws, regulations,
and requirements, such as HECM authorizing legislation, the Reverse
Mortgage Stabilization Act of 2013, FHA regulations, and mortgagee
letters governing the HECM program.
1
We also interviewed FHA and
CFPB officials and staff from other relevant HUD offices such as the
Office of Policy Development and Research and the Office of General
Counsel. We reviewed FHAs annual reports to Congress on the financial
status of the Mutual Mortgage Insurance Fund, actuarial reports on the
HECM portfolio, and FHAs annual management reports. We also
reviewed our prior reports and reports by HUDs Office of Inspector
General about the HECM program.
2
1
Congress authorized the HECM program in 1988 by adding Section 255 to Title II of the
National Housing Act. See Housing and Community Development Act of 1987, Pub. L. No.
100-242, § 417 (1988) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1715z-20). The Reverse
Mortgage Stabilization Act of 2013, Pub L. No. 113-29, 127 Stat. 509 (2013) (codified at
12 U.S.C. § 1715z-20(h)(3)), allows FHA to make changes to HECM program
requirements by notice or mortgagee letter in addition to regulation. FHAs regulations for
the HECM program can be found in 24 C.F.R. Part 206. A mortgagee letter is a written
communication to lenders and servicers about changes in FHA operations, policies, and
procedures.
2
For example, see GAO, Federal Housing Administration: Capital Requirements and
Stress Testing Practices Need Strengthening, GAO-18-92 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 9,
2017); GAO, Reverse Mortgages: Product Complexity and Consumer Protection Issues
Underscore Need for Improved Controls over Counseling for Borrowers, GAO-09-606
(Washington, D.C.: June 29, 2009); and Department of Housing and Urban Development
Office of Inspector General, HUD Was Not Tracking Almost 13,000 Defaulted HECM
Loans With Maximum Claim Amounts of Potentially More Than $2.5 Billion, 2010-FW-
0003 (Aug. 25, 2010).
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and
Methodology
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and
Methodology
Page 67 GAO-19-702 Reverse Mortgages
Additionally, we identified the largest HECM servicers using FHA data on
the number of loans serviced as of the end of fiscal year 2018. We found
that five companies serviced more than 99 percent of the HECM portfolio
(excluding loans assigned to FHA, which are serviced by an FHA
contractor) as of the end of fiscal year 2018. We developed a
questionnaire to solicit information applicable to our objectives from these
five servicers. We took steps to verify the information gathered in the
questionnaire. We reviewed responses for completeness and held
teleconferences with each HECM servicer to discuss, clarify, and amend
responses. Where possible, we corroborated servicersresponses with
information or analysis from other sources, such as our analysis of FHA
loan-level data or FHA documents. We use summary statements and
illustrative examples from these questionnaires and our interviews with
the five servicers throughout the report.
We also interviewed representatives from five legal aid organizations
representing HECM borrowers in the states of California, Florida, New
York, Texas, and Washington. We selected these states because they
had the highest number of HECM originations in the past decade and
because they provided some geographic diversity; the five states span
the West (California), Northwest (Washington), Northeast (New York),
Southeast (Florida), and South (Texas). We selected the specific legal aid
organizations within those states because they represented a large
number of HECM borrowers, according to organization representatives.
We conducted semistructured interviews with organization
representatives that included questions on the top consumer protection
issues facing HECM borrowers, how recent HECM program changes may
have helped borrowers delay or avoid foreclosure, and characteristics of
HECM borrowers that may affect their ability to file consumer complaints.
We use summary statements and illustrative examples from these
interviews throughout the report.
To address the first objective, we analyzed FHA data to determine the
number of and reasons for HECM terminations, the amounts of servicer
advances, and the number of borrowers approved for selected
foreclosure prevention options (for example, repayment plans). We used
data from the Home Equity Reverse Mortgage Information Technology
(HERMIT) system, which FHA adopted in fiscal year 2013. FHA provided
us a HERMIT case detail table from its Single Family Data Warehouse
that contained loan-level information as of the end of fiscal year 2018. We
separately obtained several ad hoc HERMIT reports from FHAs HERMIT
system contractor, as described below. For some of our analyses, we
HECM Terminations,
Servicer Advances, and
Foreclosure Prevention
Options
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and
Methodology
Page 68 GAO-19-702 Reverse Mortgages
merged data from the ad hoc reports with data from the case detail table
using the unique FHA case number for each HECM. Unless otherwise
noted, we analyzed data for the 5-year period spanning fiscal years
20142018.
We assessed the reliability of data from the HERMIT system by reviewing
FHA documentation about the data system and data elements. For
example, we reviewed the HERMIT User Guide and notes on HERMIT
system updates.
3
Additionally, we interviewed FHA and contractor staff
knowledgeable about the HERMIT system and data to discuss
interpretations of data fields and trends we observed in our analyses. We
also conducted electronic testing, including checks for duplicate loans,
outliers, missing data fields, and erroneous values. Where appropriate,
we removed from our analyses any loans missing an endorsement
(insurance approval) date as well as cases with erroneous values. When
possible, we corroborated our analyses with external reports such as
FHAs annual reports to Congress, management reports, and production
reports. Based on these steps, we determined the data we used from the
HERMIT system were sufficiently reliable for summarizing trends and
generating descriptive statistics for HECM terminations, servicer
advances, and selected foreclosure prevention options over the 5-year
period.
We analyzed FHA loan-level data from the HERMIT system to determine
the total number of terminated HECMs and reasons for terminations by
fiscal year. We first identified terminations occurring in fiscal years 2014
2018 using data fields for case status and termination date (see table 5).
Table 5: Reported Home Equity Conversion Mortgage Terminations, Fiscal Years
20142018
Fiscal year
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
Total
Number of
loans
24,272
39,075
82,157
66,479
60,172
272,155
Source: GAO analysis of Federal Housing Administration data. | GAO-19-702
3
Home Equity Conversion Mortgage Servicer Provider HERMIT User Guide, Servicing
Module, version 2.17 (September 2018).
Termination Analysis
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and
Methodology
Page 69 GAO-19-702 Reverse Mortgages
We then removed any terminated loans that had previously been
assigned to FHA (16,008) using the data field that records the date FHA
accepted assignment of the loan. We removed these loans because FHA
officials told us the agency generally does not foreclose on FHA-assigned
HECMs that default and keeping them in the analysis would have resulted
in understating the proportion of terminations stemming from defaults.
Accordingly, the denominator for our terminations analysis was 256,147
loans (272,155 total terminations minus the 16,008 loans previously
assigned to FHA).
We then identified the reported termination reasons for the 256,147 loans.
We analyzed loan-level data from the HERMIT system to identify the
number of loans that fell into various termination reason categories. To
identify terminations stemming from a HECM becoming due and payable,
we used data from two reports that we obtained from FHAs HERMIT
system contractor: the Default Key Dates Report and the Due and
Payable Delinquency Report. From these reports, we identified the
number of terminations due to a borrowers death, conveyance of title,
default due to unpaid property charges, default due to failure to meet
occupancy or residency requirements, and default due to failure to keep
the home in good repair. To identify terminations stemming from
repayment, refinancing, moving, or other (undetermined) reasons, we
used information on case substatus from the HERMIT case detail table
from the Single Family Data Warehouse.
4
Our undetermined reasons
category included loans for which the case substatus either was labeled
terminate-otheror showed how the debt was satisfied (such as through
a deed-in-lieu of foreclosure, foreclosure, or short sale) rather than
providing a termination reason. For the full results of our terminations
analysis, see appendix III.
We analyzed servicer advances to HECM borrowers using data from an
ad hoc HERMIT report we requested from FHAs HERMIT system
contractor. We analyzed the data to determine the amounts and types of
servicer advances in fiscal years 2014 through 2018 for terminated
HECMs. We distinguished between servicer advances for unpaid property
4
Using this data table, we identified additional HECMs that had terminated because of a
borrowers death. We added these cases to the death cases from the Default Key Dates
report and present summary information for terminations due to borrower death. We also
identified in this data table additional cases of terminations due to borrowers moving. We
added these cases to the borrower conveyed title cases we had identified in the Default
Key Dates report and present summary information for terminations due to the borrower
conveying title or moving.
Servicer Advances Analysis
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and
Methodology
Page 70 GAO-19-702 Reverse Mortgages
charges and servicer advances for other costs. Examples of the latter are
attorney, trustee, and appraisal fees typically incurred during the
foreclosure process. For each year and for the 5-year period as a whole,
we calculated total servicer advances and the amount and percentage of
advances for property charges and for other costs.
Additionally, we distinguished between servicer advances for unpaid
property charges before and after a HECM borrowers death using the
date of death of the last surviving borrower in HERMIT.
5
This allowed us
to determine the amount of servicer advances for unpaid property
charges on behalf of living borrowers. We calculated the total amount of
these advances over the 5-year period as well as the mean, median, and
25th and 75th percentile values. We also calculated the number and
percentage of loans for which property charge advances on behalf of
living borrowers were less than $2,000 (the threshold for one of FHA’s
foreclosure prevention options).
We analyzed data from HERMIT on the use of selected foreclosure
prevention optionsrepayment plans and at-risk extensionsfor
borrowers who defaulted because of unpaid property charges. We
analyzed data from April 2015 (the effective date of FHAs current
repayment plan and at-risk extension policies) through fiscal year 2018.
To conduct the analysis of repayment plans, we used the HERMIT Due
and Payable Delinquency Report noted previously, which includes data
fields for loan default status and the dates borrowers were approved for a
repayment plan. We calculated the percentage of borrowers with property
charge defaults who were approved for repayment plans during the
period examined. To conduct the analysis of at-risk extensions, we
requested an ad hoc report from FHAs HERMIT system contractor
showing whether and when borrowers had been approved for at-risk
extensions and appended it to the default status within the Due and
Payable Delinquency Report using FHA case numbers. We calculated the
percentage of borrowers with property charge defaults who were
approved for at-risk extensions during the period examined.
We also reviewed and summarized information that FHA provided us
from HERMIT on nonborrowing spouses who applied for mortgagee
optional election assignments from June 2015 (the effective date of FHA’s
5
A servicer may make an advance for property charges after a borrower dies if, for
example, a property tax bill comes due before the HECM is paid off and the property is
sold to another party.
Foreclosure Prevention
Options Analysis
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and
Methodology
Page 71 GAO-19-702 Reverse Mortgages
mortgagee optional election assignment policy) through fiscal year 2018.
FHA provided information on the number of requested, approved, and
denied mortgagee optional election assignments during that period. We
also reviewed documentation from FHA and interviewed agency officials
about the mortgagee optional election assignment process and reasons
for denials. For the denied mortgagee optional election assignments, we
reviewed information that FHA provided us from HERMIT on the current
status of the associated loans as of May 31, 2019. For example, for the
denied mortgagee optional election assignments, FHA determined
whether the loan had been terminated as of that date. For those that had
terminated, we summarized whether the debt was paid off or whether the
debt was satisfied because of a foreclosure, deed-in-lieu of foreclosure,
or short sale.
To address the second objective, we reviewed agency reports and
interviewed agency officials to determine how the agency assesses the
performance of the HECM program, including the use of any performance
indicators or program evaluations. For example, we reviewed HUD’s
strategic plan for fiscal years 20182022 and its most recent annual
performance report to identify any goals and performance indicators
related to the HECM program.
6
Additionally, we reviewed program
evaluations completed for the HECM program.
7
We also interviewed FHA
and HUD Office of Policy Development and Research officials about
previous program evaluations and HUDs plans for forthcoming
evaluations of the HECM program. We compared FHAs practices against
leading practices identified in our previous work on assessing program
performance and against Office of Management and Budget (OMB)
6
See Department of Housing and Urban Development, Strategic Plan 20182022
(Washington, D.C.: May 2019) and Fiscal Year 2020 Annual Performance Plan and Fiscal
Year 2018 Annual Performance Report (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 22, 2019).
7
See Abt Associates, Evaluation Report of FHAs Home Equity Conversion Mortgage
Insurance Demonstration, a report prepared for the Department of Housing and Urban
Development (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 31, 2000) and Department of Housing and Urban
Development, Office of Policy Development and Research, Evaluation of the Home Equity
Conversion Mortgage Insurance Demonstration: A Report to Congress (Washington, D.C.:
Mar. 15, 1995).
Performance Assessment
and HECM Portfolio
Monitoring
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and
Methodology
Page 72 GAO-19-702 Reverse Mortgages
policies and procedures on managing federal credit programs (OMB
Circular A-129).
8
Additionally, we reviewed FHA documents and interviewed FHA officials
concerning the agencys internal reporting and analysis of the HECM
portfolio. For example, we reviewed examples of regular and ad hoc
reports FHA received from its HERMIT system contractor. These internal
reports contained information on HECM origination, assignment, and
termination activity and HECM defaults. We interviewed FHA officials to
understand the purpose of the reports, when they were developed, and
how agency management uses them. We compared FHAs internal
reporting practices to OMB Circular A-129 on reporting mechanisms and
formats for federal credit programs.
To address the third objective, we reviewed FHA and CFPB policies and
procedures for overseeing HECM servicers and interviewed agency staff
with oversight responsibilities.
9
To assess the extent to which FHA
oversees HECM servicerscompliance with servicing requirements, we
requested information on the number of on-site monitoring reviews of
HECM servicers that FHA completed from fiscal years 2010 through
2019. We also reviewed corrective actions FHA can take to address
noncompliance. We reviewed and summarized a nongeneralizable
sample of three reports from on-site servicer reviews FHA conducted in
fiscal year 2013, the most recent year in which FHA had completed a
review. Additionally, we interviewed the director of FHAs Quality
Assurance Division, which is responsible for conducting on-site reviews of
FHA-approved lenders and servicers, about the divisions past practices
for reviewing HECM servicers and plans for future reviews. We compared
FHAs practices and plans to criteria in OMB Circular A-129 regarding the
frequency, targeting methodology, and other aspects of on-site lender
8
Our previous work identified performance goals, indicators, and program evaluations as
important management tools that can serve as leading practices for planning at lower
levels within federal agencies, such as individual programs or initiatives. For example, see
GAO, Performance Measurement and Evaluation: Definitions and Relationships,
GAO-11-646SP (Washington, D.C.: May 2, 2011). See also Office of Management and
Budget, Policies for Federal Credit Programs and Non-Tax Receivables, OMB Circular
No. A-129 (revised January 2013).
9
See ex. 24 C.F.R. § 206.125(a). Other servicing requirements can be found in HUD
Handbook 4000.1 (FHAs Single Family Housing Policy Handbook), HUD Housing
Handbook 4235.1 (the HECM Handbook), and various mortgagee letters accessible at
https://www.hud.gov/program_offices/housing/sfh/hecm/hecmml.
FHAs and CFPBs
Oversight of Servicers
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and
Methodology
Page 73 GAO-19-702 Reverse Mortgages
and servicer reviews. Further, we interviewed FHA officials about the
extent of information sharing between FHA and CFPB on HECM servicer
oversight.
To examine CFPBs oversight of HECM servicers, we reviewed CFPB’s
reverse mortgage examination procedures and the examinations
completed under those procedures as of fiscal year 2018.
10
We also
reviewed CFPBs methodology for selecting reverse mortgage servicers
for examination and documentation on its plans for future examinations.
We reviewed CFPBs examination findings and corrective actions as of
August 2019. We interviewed CFPB officials about the examination
process and agency efforts to share examination results with FHA. We
reviewed statutes and regulations related to CFPBs authority to share the
results of its examinations, and we compared CFPBs information-sharing
efforts with FHA against practices for interagency collaboration we
identified in previous work.
11
To address our fourth objective, we analyzed CFPB data on reverse
mortgage consumer complaints from the bureaus online website, called
the Consumer Complaint Database. The database includes information
provided by consumers on their location (state), the company they are
complaining about, and the nature of their complaint. For example,
consumers can submit narratives describing their complaints about
reverse mortgage lenders or servicers. Because CFPB had published an
analysis of reverse mortgage consumer complaints using data from
calendar years 2011 through 2014, we analyzed reverse mortgage
complaints and narratives received by the bureau from calendar years
2015 through 2018.
12
We analyzed all 2,472 complaints filed in those 4 years to determine the
number of complaints by year, state, submission method (for example,
10
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Reverse Mortgage Servicing Examination
Procedures (Washington, D.C.: October 2016).
11
GAO, Managing for Results: Key Considerations for Implementing Interagency
Collaborative Mechanisms, GAO-12-1022 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 27, 2012).
12
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Snapshot of Reverse Mortgage Complaints:
December 2011December 2014 (Washington, D.C.: February 2015).
Consumer Complaints
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and
Methodology
Page 74 GAO-19-702 Reverse Mortgages
internet, phone, or email), and company.
13
For the analysis by submission
method, we compared the results to those for complaints about all types
of mortgages filed during the same period.
To identify patterns in consumer-described issues about reverse
mortgages, we reviewed a generalizable sample of 100 complaint
narratives and categorized these complaints by topic.
14
For this analysis,
two independent reviewers read the complaints and categorized them into
predetermined topics based on their content. We used nine complaint
issue topics, including complaints where the consumer (or someone
complaining on behalf of the consumer) said he or she (1) was at risk of
foreclosure or in foreclosure; (2) was charged unfair interest rates, fees,
or costs; (3) experienced problems after the loan was transferred to a
new servicer; (4) had issues with, or defaulted as a result of, property
taxes, insurance, or other property charges; (5) experienced poor
communication on a servicing or lending issue; (6) had an issue involving
occupancy requirements; (7) had concerns or issues involving the
management of the estate after the borrower died or left the property; (8)
had difficulties gaining approval for a mortgagee optional election
assignment or recognition of a nonborrowing spouse; or (9) experienced
problems during loan origination. If a complaint narrative in our sample
did not contain enough information or was not clear enough to determine
a complaint topic, we replaced it with another randomly selected
complaint narrative. In cases where the two reviewers categorized a
complaint differently, a third independent analyst read the complaint
narrative and adjudicated the difference to place the complaint in a topic
category. We calculated confidence intervals for these categories at the
95 percent confidence level.
We determined that the CFPB data were sufficiently reliable for the
purposes described above by reviewing CFPB documentation and reports
from CFPBs Office of Inspector General on CFPBs consumer complaint
database and by interviewing CFPB officials about our interpretation of
13
CFPBs consumer complaint system captures information on reverse mortgage
complaints, which include but are not limited to HECM complaints. However, HECMs
make up the vast majority of products available to consumers, and very few proprietary
reverse mortgages are available.
14
When submitting a complaint, consumers are asked whether CFPB may publish their
narratives. Consumers must opt in to have their narratives published and, for this reason,
not all narratives are public. For our analysis, we reviewed published and unpublished
complaint narratives.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and
Methodology
Page 75 GAO-19-702 Reverse Mortgages
data fields. Also, we interviewed CFPB officials about their collection,
analysis, and use of the consumer complaint data.
To determine the extent to which FHA collects consumer inquiries and
complaints about HECMs, we reviewed the HECM-related calls received
by FHAs National Servicing Center and the FHA Resource Center from
calendar years 2015 through 2018.
15
We calculated the total number of
HECM-related calls each center received over that period. The data from
both centers included fields to capture a description of the issue raised by
the caller. However, unlike CFPBs consumer complaint data, the
information in the issue description was recorded by FHA customer
service staff (rather than the complainants themselves) and did not
differentiate between inquiries and complaints. We determined there was
not enough information in these descriptions to perform an analysis
similar to the one we performed on CFPBs consumer complaints. Both
the National Servicing Center and the FHA Resource Center record the
reasons for calls. However, neither entity records this information in a
consistent or standardized way that would allow for analysis. For
example, the data we reviewed from the National Servicing Center
included about 100 reasons.
Additionally, we reviewed CFPB and FHA policies and procedures for
collecting and addressing consumer complaints and interviewed officials
on how consumer complaints were incorporated into their oversight of
HECM servicers. We interviewed officials from both agencies about their
collection and use of customer complaint data. We also interviewed
CFPB and FHA officials about the extent to which they share consumer
complaint data or access and use the other agencys data. Finally, we
compared CFPBs and FHAs efforts against federal internal control
standards for using quality information and against approaches we
identified in prior work for enhancing collaboration across agencies.
16
15
FHA allows customers to submit inquiries or complaints via telephone hotline, email,
postal mail, and fax. We use the term callto refer to any inquiry or complaint submitted
to the two FHA centers by any of these methods.
16
GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, GAO-14-704G
(Washington, D.C.: September 2014) and GAO-12-1022.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and
Methodology
Page 76 GAO-19-702 Reverse Mortgages
To address our fifth objective, we analyzed FHA data on HECM
originations from calendar years 1989 through 2018 to identify any trends
in HECM program activity. Additionally, using FHA and Census Bureau
data, we calculated HECM take-up ratesthe ratio of HECM originations
to eligible senior homeownersfrom calendar years 2000 through
2017.
17
We also developed an econometric model to examine, to the
extent possible, factors affecting HECM take-up rates from calendar
years 2000 through 2016 (the last year we could include in the model due
to data constraints). Following the existing research literature, we
hypothesized that HECM loan originations could be affected by several
demand- and supply-related factors that could be represented by
demographic and socioeconomic characteristics, housing market
conditions, and product features. Accordingly, our model used a variety of
data from FHA, the Census Bureau, the Federal Housing Finance
Agency, and other sources. For a detailed description of our econometric
modelincluding the model specification, factors used, data sources, and
resultsand a list of selected studies we consulted to develop the model,
see appendix II.
We also reviewed relevant literature and interviewed academic and HUD
economists about FHA policy changes and behavioral and structural
factors (for example, consumersperception of reverse mortgages) that
we could not account for in our econometric model but that may influence
HECM take-up rates. These individuals included three academic
economists who have conducted extensive research on reverse
mortgages and economists from FHA and HUD’s Office of Policy
Development and Research. We present summary information about
these factors in this report.
We conducted this performance audit from July 2018 to September 2019
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives.
17
We were unable to calculate a HECM take-up rate for calendar year 2018 due to
limitations in the availability of Census data. We calculated take-up rates beginning in
calendar year 2000 because a relatively small number of HECMs were originated prior to
that time.
HECM Market,
Originations, and Take-Up
Rates
Appendix II: Description of and Results for
GAO’s Econometric Model of Home Equity
Conversion Mortgage Take-Up Rates
Page 77 GAO-19-702 Reverse Mortgages
We developed an econometric model to examine, to the extent possible,
factors associated with Home Equity Conversion Mortgage (HECM) take-
up ratesthe ratio of HECM originations to eligible senior homeowners
using data from calendar year 2000 through 2016. Take-up rates provide
an indication of how popular HECMs are among the population of senior
homeowners. A number of factors may have affected the take-up rates
over this period. For instance, it has been asserted that demand for
HECMs would be high for elderly people that are house-rich but cash-
poor, but behavioral factors such as their desire to leave a bequest could
limit demand. Also, the limited number of large, well-known lenders could
constrain supply of HECMs. Furthermore, several FHA policy changes to
the HECM program may have affected the number of loan originations.
Following the existing literature, we hypothesized that HECM loan
originations could be affected by several demand- and supply-related
factors that could be represented by demographic and socioeconomic
characteristics, housing market conditions, product features, program
policy changes, and behavioral and structural factors.
1
The general specification of the model we used, which is a quasi-reduced
form of the net effect of demand and supply factors on HECM take-up
rates, is as follows:
2
Y
it
= θ + α
i
+ γ
t
+ X
it
β + ε
it
.
Y is the dependent variable, the take-up rate, representing the ratio of
HECM originations to eligible senior homeowners in state (i) in year (t).
An eligible senior homeowner is an owner-occupied householder aged 65
or older.
3
Both α and γ control, respectively, for state-specific (but time-invariant)
and year-specific (but state-invariant) observable and unobserved factors.
1
See, for example, Chatterjee (2016), Haurin et al. (2016), Moulton et al. (2019), and
Shan (2011) in the list of selected studies at the end of this appendix.
2
Our model is similar to Haurin et al. (2016).
3
Unless indicated otherwise, we use age 65 or older instead of 62 or older to represent
eligible senior households because the data we used from the Integrated Public Use
Microdata Series National Historical Geographic Information System (IPUMS NHGIS) are
available at this level. Furthermore, the average age of new HECM borrowers has been
72 to 73 years old for the past decade, so the number of new borrowers between the ages
of 62 and 65 years old is probably limited. Shan (2011) used age 65 or older.
Appendix II: Description of and Results for
GAO’s Econometric Model of Home Equity
Conversion Mortgage Take-Up Rates
Model Specification
Appendix II: Description of and Results for
GAO’s Econometric Model of Home Equity
Conversion Mortgage Take-Up Rates
Page 78 GAO-19-702 Reverse Mortgages
They help to minimize omitted variable bias that could be caused by
excluding time-invariant or state-invariant variables. The latter, which are
year fixed-effects (that is, variables that change over time but are
constant across the states), would pick up average differences in take-up
rates over the years. These factors would include changes in HECM
program policies and market conditions over time, such as the exit of
large, well-known HECM lenders or investors. In general, using the year
fixed-effects precluded the estimation of the impact of variables that are
state-invariant (for example, interest rates).The state fixed-effects are
used to control for average differences in take-up rates across the states
(that is, variables that differ across the states but are constant over time).
These effects would include regulatory variations across states.
The vector X captures measured variables represented by demographic
and socioeconomic characteristics, housing market conditions, and
product features that vary across states and over time. Given that the
time-invariant and state-invariant factors would be accounted for by the
state fixed-effects and year fixed-effects, respectively, the measured
variables capture how changes in these variables within states (that is,
over time) could affect take-up rates. θ is the constant term.
ε, the regression error term, represents random and other unobserved
factors that could vary across the states and over time, such as random
changes in risk behavior of HECM borrowers and lenders. It also captures
errors due to misspecification and measurement.
The data sources for our analysis are as follows:
Census Bureau. The data include demographic, socioeconomic, and
housing characteristics in geographic areas. The data are from the
Integrated Public Use Microdata Series National Historical
Geographic Information System (IPUMS NHGIS) for 2000; 1-year
American Community Survey data from the American FactFinder for
20052009, and 1-year American Community Survey data from
IPUMS NHGIS for 20102016.
4
We interpolated the data for 2001
2004 using all data available for the other years: 2000 and 2005
4
For the IPUMS NHGIS data, see Steven Manson, Jonathan Schroeder, David Van Riper
and Steven Ruggles. IPUMS National Historical Geographic Information System: Version
13.0 [Database], Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 2018.
https://doi.org/10.18128/D050.V13.0.
Data Sources
Appendix II: Description of and Results for
GAO’s Econometric Model of Home Equity
Conversion Mortgage Take-Up Rates
Page 79 GAO-19-702 Reverse Mortgages
2016. All the data are for seniors aged 65 years or older and at the
state level.
Federal Housing Finance Agency. House price indexes at the state
level, 20002016.
Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
Federal Reserve Bank of New York Consumer Credit
Panel/Equifax: Mortgage debt balances of seniors 62 years or
older, state level, 20032016.
Survey of Consumer Finances: Triennial data on family net worth,
national level, 20002016.
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis’s Federal Reserve Economic
Data.
Consumer price index for all urban consumers, national level,
20002016.
Effective federal funds rate, national level, 20002016.
Federal Housing Administration (FHA). HECM loan-level data from
the Single Family Data Warehouse, available yearly, 2000–2017. The
data include when the loan was endorsed by FHA, property location,
appraised home value, and maximum claim amount.
The list of potential explanatory variables we used in the model is
provided below. The data are measured at the state level and are
available from 2000 through 2016 (unless indicated otherwise). Also, the
variables are for senior householders, aged 65 or older (unless indicated
otherwise).
5
All monetary values are in 2016 dollars using the Consumer
Price Index for All Urban Consumers. The data sources are indicated in
brackets (see the data sources above for details).
Demographic and socioeconomic characteristics [Census
Bureau].
Fraction 75 years or older in occupied housing units.
6
5
These are households in which the head is 65 years or older.
6
The other group is those aged 65 to 74 years.
Factors That Could
Affect HECM Take-Up
Rates
Appendix II: Description of and Results for
GAO’s Econometric Model of Home Equity
Conversion Mortgage Take-Up Rates
Page 80 GAO-19-702 Reverse Mortgages
Fraction of senior householders who are married or those who are
unmarried females.
7
Fraction African American or Hispanic.
8
Fraction of individuals 65 years or older with high school
education or some college education, or with college, graduate, or
professional degree.
9
Fraction in the labor force: the ratio of the labor force (the
employed and the unemployed) to civilian noninstitutionalized
adult population (65 years or older).
Fraction in poverty.
Median household income (natural logarithm).
Ratio of family net worth of individuals 65 years or older to house
value. Net worth is measured as the difference between families
gross assets and liabilities using triennial data at the national level
[Federal Reserve Bank of New York]. House value is measured as
the ratio of aggregate house value to number of owner-occupied
housing units.
Housing market conditions.
House price changes [Federal Housing Finance Agency]:
10
o House price growth: 5-year intervals prior to the
observation.
7
The other group is unmarried males.
8
The other groups are non-Hispanic whites, Asians (including Native Hawaiians or other
Pacific Islanders), Native Americans and Alaska Natives, and those reporting other races
or two or more races.
9
The other group is those with no high school diploma.
10
House prices are likely to be endogenous in the model, which could produce biased and
inconsistent results; see, for example, Haurin et al. (2016). However, using instruments for
house prices to mitigate the endogeneity could be problematic since commonly used
measures of supply constraints for house prices tend to be correlated with omitted
demand-side variables such as productivity and amenities; see Davidoff (2016).
Therefore, we treated the house prices as exogenous.
Appendix II: Description of and Results for
GAO’s Econometric Model of Home Equity
Conversion Mortgage Take-Up Rates
Page 81 GAO-19-702 Reverse Mortgages
o House price volatility: standard deviation of annual house
price percent change in the 5 years prior to the
observation.
11
Effective federal funds rate (percent). [Federal Reserve Bank of
St. Louis]
Home equity per senior homeowner (natural logarithm), 1-year
lag. Home equity is measured as the aggregate house value of
owner-occupied housing units minus total mortgage debt. Total
mortgage debt comprises aggregate mortgage, home equity loan,
and home equity line of credit balances of individuals 62 or older
(20032016). [Census Bureau; Federal Reserve Bank of New
York/Equifax]
Ratio of individuals aged 62 or older with home equity loan to
senior homeowners, 1-year lag (20032016).
12
[Federal Reserve
Bank of New York/Equifax; Census Bureau]
Ratio of individuals aged 62 or older with home equity line of credit
to senior homeowners, 1-year lag (20032016).
13
[Federal
Reserve Bank of New York/Equifax; Census Bureau]
Fraction of owner-occupied housing units with ratio of selected
monthly housing costs to household income greater than or equal
to 35 percent.
14
[Census Bureau]
Product features.
FHA loan limit: proportion of HECM loans in a state and year for
which the appraised home value is more than the maximum claim
amount; that is, the FHA loan limit is binding. The maximum claim
11
We also included an interaction term between the house price growth and the standard
deviation of the house price changes. See a similar approach in Haurin et al. (2016).
12
Extracting home equity using home equity loans is likely to be endogenous in the model,
which could produce biased and inconsistent results. Because it is difficult to find
instruments for home equity loans that would not also affect the HECM take-up rate, we
also estimated the model excluding home equity loans as part of our robustness checks of
the validity of our results.
13
Extracting home equity using home equity lines of credit is likely to be endogenous in
the model, which could produce biased and inconsistent results. Because it is difficult to
find instruments that would not affect the HECM take-up rate, we also estimated the
model excluding this variable as part of our robustness checks of the validity of our
results.
14
The costs include payments for mortgages, real estate taxes, and various insurance,
utilities, and fuels.
Appendix II: Description of and Results for
GAO’s Econometric Model of Home Equity
Conversion Mortgage Take-Up Rates
Page 82 GAO-19-702 Reverse Mortgages
amount equals the minimum of the appraised home value and the
FHA loan limit.
15
[FHA]
Although we did not directly include other variables that could affect
HECM take-up rates in our model partly due to lack of data, we included
year fixed-effects and state-fixed effects to minimize omitted variables
problem associated with state-invariant variables and time-invariant
variables, respectively. These included several FHA policy changes to the
HECM program and behavioral and structural factors, as discussed
earlier in this report.
We used a state as the geographic area instead of a smaller area, such
as ZIP code. The data on HECM originations are available at the
household (or family) level from FHA. However, the factors used in the
model (demographic and socioeconomic characteristics and housing
market conditions) are generally available at the state level or at the ZIP
code level from the Census Bureau and other sources. There are
advantages and disadvantages to using state-level or ZIP-code-level
data. Given the low HECM take-up rates (see fig. 7 earlier in this report),
using ZIP-code data would generally imply very low, if not zero, take-up
rates across a large number of ZIP codes, which would make it harder to
identify effects from our model. Also, not all of the data for the factors
used in the model are available for every ZIP code with a HECM
originationincluding the home equity extraction variableswhich would
lead to exclusion of some areas, resulting in potential sample-selection
bias. On the other hand, using ZIP code-level data could allow for more
heterogeneity in certain states, and certain variables such as house price
changes when measured at the ZIP code level could be closer to what
the homeowner experiences. We decided to use state-level data because
of our concern for potential sample-selection bias and the quality of data
at the ZIP code level, although using state-level data could limit
heterogeneity in the data across geographic areas.
16
15
We note that the FHA loan limit changed from a location-based threshold to a single
national threshold in 2008.
16
Haurin et al. (2016) used state-level data; Shan (2011) and Moulton et al. (2019) used
ZIP code-level data; and Chatterjee (2016), Warshawsky (2018), and the Department of
Housing and Urban Development (2015) used national data in their models of reverse
mortgage originations. See selected studies at the end of this appendix for full citations.
Appendix II: Description of and Results for
GAO’s Econometric Model of Home Equity
Conversion Mortgage Take-Up Rates
Page 83 GAO-19-702 Reverse Mortgages
We estimated panel data of state-year observations of the model
specified above using fixed-effects estimation.
17
Because of data
limitations with some of the key variableshome equity and home equity
extraction via loans or lines of creditand because we used a 1-year lag
of these variables, we estimated the model from 2004 through 2016. We
also excluded the District of Columbia, which was an outlier, with a take-
up rate that was 4.5 times the national average.
18
The list of the variables
we used and the estimation results are provided in tables 6 and 7,
respectively, at the end of this appendix. The standard fixed-effects
estimates are reported in column 1 (the base model) of table 7. We also
report fixed-effects estimates that account for spatial and temporal
dependence in columns 2 through 4column 2 estimates the base
model, column 3 excludes the variables for home equity extraction from
the base model, and column 4 excludes the year fixed-effects from the
base model. We focused on these estimates because spatial correlations
may be present as states are likely to be subject to both observable and
unobservable common disturbances, and failure to account for these
would yield inconsistent estimates of the standard errors.
Our econometric estimates indicated that several demographic and
socioeconomic characteristics and housing conditions are associated with
take-up rates, using data across states from 2004 through 2016. The
results discussed below, which are based primarily on the estimates in
column 2 of table 7, are statistically significant at the 10, 5, or 1 percent
levels or lower. Because the fixed-effects technique controls for the
effects of both observable and unobservable factors that vary across
states (but are time-invariant), the estimates of the measured effects are
for only within-state variations and the results are interpreted accordingly.
17
Because there could be spatial and temporal dependence of state-level aggregated
observations of take-up rates, we also used the Driscoll-Kraay (1998) covariance
estimator. This technique assumes an error structure that is heteroskedastic,
autocorrelated up to some lag, and possibly correlated between the groups (panels).
These standard errors are robust to general forms of cross-sectional (spatial) and
temporal dependence when the time dimension becomes large.
18
The high take-up rate for the District of Columbia is due to relatively low number of
senior owner-occupied housing units compared to the number of HECM originations. The
states with high take-up rates during the period of our study included California, Nevada,
and Utah, and those with low take-up rates included Iowa, North Dakota, and West
Virginia.
Description of
Estimation
Methodology and
Results
Factors Associated with
HECM Take-Up Rates
Appendix II: Description of and Results for
GAO’s Econometric Model of Home Equity
Conversion Mortgage Take-Up Rates
Page 84 GAO-19-702 Reverse Mortgages
House price changes. The interaction term for house price growth
and house price volatility is positive and significant at the 1 percent
level. This implies that within states, take-up rates were higher when
house price growth was large and when there was a history of house
price volatility compared to either relatively low house price
appreciation or stable house prices. This result is consistent with
senior homeowners using reverse mortgages to insure against house
price declines, which is supported by the positive and significant
effects of the house price volatility by itself.
19
On the other hand, the
weak significance of house price growth by itself (at the 10 percent
level) provides only modest support for senior homeowners using
reverse mortgages purely to extract home equity.
Home equity. Within states, take-up rates were higher when home
equity of senior homeowners was high, significant at the 1 percent
level.
Fractions of senior homeowners with a home equity loan or
home equity line of credit. Within states, take-up rates were higher
when the fractions of senior homeowners with a home equity loan or
home equity line of credit were high, significant at the 1 percent and
10 percent levels, respectively. Because these loans were
outstanding as of the prior year, it is likely that borrowers used
HECMs to pay them off.
20
Fraction of owner-occupied housing units with ratio of housing
costs to household income greater than or equal to 35 percent.
Within states, take-up rates were higher when the ratio of housing
costs to household income was high, significant at the 1 percent level.
Fractions of seniors with high school or college education. Within
states, take-up rates were higher when the fractions of seniors with
high school or college education were high, significant at the 1
percent and 10 percent levels, respectively.
21
Median household income. Within states, take-up rates were higher
when incomes of senior households were high, significant at the 5
percent level.
19
See Haurin et al. (2016) for similar results.
20
See, for example, Redfoot et al. (2007) in the list of selected studies at the end of this
appendix.
21
The results are consistent with Shan (2011).
Appendix II: Description of and Results for
GAO’s Econometric Model of Home Equity
Conversion Mortgage Take-Up Rates
Page 85 GAO-19-702 Reverse Mortgages
Fraction of senior households who were married. Within states,
take-up rates were lower when the fraction of married senior
households was high, significant at the 10 percent level.
Fraction of homes in states with binding FHA loan limit. Although
the effect was generally not statistically significant, the effect of the
FHA loan limit on take-up rates was negative.
We estimated other specifications of our model to test the robustness and
reasonableness of our results. The alternative specifications, described
below, yielded estimates similar to those of our original model.
We estimated the model excluding the variables for home equity loans
and home equity lines of credit, which are alternative channels of
home equity extraction, because they could be endogenous (see
column 3 of table 7).
We estimated the model excluding the year fixed-effects (see column
4 of table 7).
We estimated the model using the number of senior housing units
(instead of senior homeowners) within a state to normalize the
number of HECMs in order to account for nonhomeowners who might
become homeowners.
We note the following caveats and limitations of our study:
We were not able to include some factors that could affect HECM
take-up rates, including FHA program policy changes and behavioral
and structural factors previously discussed in this report.
Some of our estimates could be different if we used areas smaller
than a state as the units of observation, such as ZIP codes or
counties.
The estimates represent the average effects for all states and for all
periods we analyzed, but the effects could differ for specific states or
specific periods. Our analysis pertains to the period that we analyzed
and may not be generalizable to other periods.
Robustness Tests,
Caveats, and Limitations
of Our Econometric
Analysis
Appendix II: Description of and Results for
GAO’s Econometric Model of Home Equity
Conversion Mortgage Take-Up Rates
Page 86 GAO-19-702 Reverse Mortgages
Table 6: Descriptive Statistics, List of Variables Used in Regression Analysis, 20042016
Variables Mean
Median
Standard
deviation
Minimum
Maximum
Take-up rates
0.003
0.003
0.002
0.000
0.015
House price growth (5-year interval prior to the observation)
0.105
0.091
0.222
-0.531
0.866
House price volatility (5-year standard deviation prior to the
observation)
0.039
0.028
0.032
0.005
0.204
Interaction: House price growth and house price volatility
0.004
0.001
0.015
-0.067
0.083
Fraction of homes in states with binding Federal Housing
Administration mortgage loan limit
0.125
0.075
0.131
0.000
0.702
Fraction of owner-occupied housing units with ratio of selected
housing costs to income greater than or equal to 35 percent
0.206
0.197
0.051
0.099
0.371
Fraction with high school education or some college education
0.573
0.573
0.049
0.459
0.686
Fraction with college, graduate, or professional degree
0.214
0.210
0.051
0.102
0.373
Fraction in labor force
0.167
0.164
0.027
0.088
0.261
Fraction in poverty
0.109
0.103
0.025
0.041
0.206
Median household income (natural logarithm)
10.545
10.526
0.148
10.201
11.062
Ratio of family net worth to individuals to house value
1.074
1.032
0.386
0.310
2.245
Fraction married
0.442
0.444
0.028
0.355
0.543
Fraction unmarried females
0.398
0.399
0.029
0.324
0.463
Fraction African American
0.069
0.051
0.073
0.000
0.287
Fraction Hispanic
0.033
0.013
0.053
0.000
0.299
Fraction 75 years or older in occupied housing units
0.463
0.463
0.041
0.319
0.584
Home equity per senior homeowner (natural logarithm), 1-year lag
12.043
11.967
0.395
11.355
13.258
Ratio of individuals 62 or older with HELOAN to senior
homeowners, 1-year lag 0.025
0.022 0.016
0.000
0.109
Ratio of individuals 62 or older with HELOC to senior
homeowners, 1-year lag 0.246
0.251 0.112
0.018
0.530
Effective federal funds rate (percent)
1.367
0.175
1.792
0.089
5.019
Legend: HELOAN=Home equity loan. HELOC=Home equity line of credit.
Source: GAO analysis of data from Census Bureau, Federal Housing Administration, Federal Housing Finance Agency, Federal Reserve Bank of New York Consumer Credit Panel/Equifax, Federal
Reserve Bank of New York Survey of Consumer Finances, and Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. | GAO-19-702
Note: Data are for all the states and for the period from 2004 through 2016. We excluded the District
of Columbia because it is an outlier.
Appendix II: Description of and Results for
GAO’s Econometric Model of Home Equity
Conversion Mortgage Take-Up Rates
Page 87 GAO-19-702 Reverse Mortgages
Table 7: Fixed-Effects Regression Estimates of HECM Take-Up Rates, 20042016
Measured variables
(1)
Uncorrected
standard errors
a
(2)
Driscoll-
Kraay
standard errors
b
(3)
Driscoll-
Kraay
standard errors
c
(4)
Driscoll-
Kraay
standard errors
d
House price growth (5-year interval prior to the
observation)
0.0027***
(0.0008)
0.0027*
(0.0014)
0.0022
(0.0015)
0.0012
(0.0017)
House price volatility (5-year standard deviation
prior to the observation)
0.0117***
(0.0024)
0.0117***
(0.0028)
0.0120***
(0.0030)
0.0083**
(0.0039)
Interaction term: House price growth and house
price volatility
0.0359***
(0.0068)
0.0359***
(0.0072)
0.0397***
(0.0081)
0.0486***
(0.0114)
Fraction of homes in states with binding Federal
Housing Administration mortgage loan limit
-0.0030***
(0.0009)
-0.0030
(0.0021)
-0.0028
(0.0020)
-0.0030
(0.0021)
Fraction of owner-occupied housing units with
ratio of selected monthly housing costs to income
greater than or equal to 35 percent
0.0113**
(0.0036)
0.0113***
(0.0035)
0.0131***
(0.0038)
0.0152***
(0.0045)
Fraction with high school education or some
college education
0.0199***
(0.0038)
0.0199***
(0.0044)
0.0214***
(0.0041)
0.0148***
(0.0048)
Fraction with college, graduate, or professional
degree
0.0132**
(0.0067)
0.0132***
(0.0047)
0.0163***
(0.0043)
-0.0137*
(0.0069)
Fraction in labor force
-0.0097*
(0.0053)
-0.0097
(0.0075)
-0.0072
(0.0073)
-0.0063
(0.0071)
Fraction in poverty
-0.0033
(0.0054)
-0.0033
(0.0077)
-0.0026
(0.0079)
-0.0050
(0.0121)
Median household income (natural logarithm)
0.0036*
(0.0020)
0.0036**
(0.0014)
0.0036**
(0.0014)
0.0055***
(0.0017)
Ratio of family net worth to house value
-0.0012*
(0.0007)
-0.0012
(0.0013)
-0.0010
(0.0013)
0.0008
(0.0010)
Fraction married
-0.0110*
(0.0063)
-0.0110*
(0.0065)
-0.0072
(0.0060)
-0.0162***
(0.0046)
Fraction unmarried females
0.0019
(0.0076)
0.0019
(0.0110)
0.0023
(0.0111)
-0.0026
(0.0064)
Faction African American
-0.0053
(0.0083)
-0.0053
(0.0104)
-0.0047
(0.0110)
-0.0217*
(0.0114)
Fraction Hispanic
0.0020
(0.0109)
0.0020
(0.0100)
-0.0004
(0.0114)
-0.0002
(0.0135)
Fraction 75 years or older in occupied housing
units
0.0033
(0.0044)
0.0033
(0.0045)
0.0007
(0.0031)
0.0192***
(0.0051)
Home equity per senior homeowner (natural
logarithm), 1-year lag
0.0025***
(0.0006)
0.0025***
(0.0009)
0.0027***
(0.0009)
0.0031***
(0.0009)
Appendix II: Description of and Results for
GAO’s Econometric Model of Home Equity
Conversion Mortgage Take-Up Rates
Page 88 GAO-19-702 Reverse Mortgages
Measured variables
(1)
Uncorrected
standard errors
a
(2)
Driscoll-
Kraay
standard errors
b
(3)
Driscoll-
Kraay
standard errors
c
(4)
Driscoll-
Kraay
standard errors
d
Ratio of individuals 62 or older with HELOAN to
senior homeowners, 1-year lag
0.0094***
(0.0035)
0.0094***
(0.0017)
na
0.0158***
(0.0023)
Ratio of individuals 62 or older with HELOC to
senior homeowners, 1-year lag
0.0046**
(0.0018)
0.0046*
(0.0026)
na
0.0098***
(0.0027)
Effective federal funds rate (percent)
na
na
na
3.77e-5
(5.69e-5)
Constant
-0.0757***
(0.0227)
-0.0757***
(0.0267)
-0.0800***
(0.0258)
-0.1025***
(0.0231)
Year fixed-effects
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
State fixed-effects
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
(Within) R-squared
0.80
0.80
0.79
0.73
Prob > F
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
Number of observations
650
650
650
650
Legend: n/a=not applicable; HELOAN=Home equity loan; HELOC=Home equity line of credit.
***, **,
and * represent coefficients that are statistically
significant at 1 percent, 5 percent, or 10 percent or less, respectively.
Source: GAO analysis of data from Census Bureau, Federal Housing Administration, Federal Housing Finance Agency, Federal Reserve Bank of New York Consumer Credit Panel/Equifax, Federal
Reserve Bank of New York Survey of Consumer Finances, and Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. | GAO-19-702
Note: Data are for all the states and for the period from 2004 through 2016. We excluded the District
of Columbia because it is an outlier. In this report we define Home Equity Conversion Mortgage
(HECM) take-up rates as the ratio of originations to the number of owner-occupied housing units of
seniors in a state, unless otherwise indicated. The measured variables are the variables used in the
model, except the state fixed-effects and the year fixed-effects.
a
We estimated the model using the xtregcommand in the Stata statistical software. It does not
account for spatial or temporal dependence of the observations.
b
We estimated the model using the Driscoll-Kraay (1998) fixed-effects covariance estimator, which
accounts for spatial and temporal dependence. This technique assumes an error structure that is
heteroskedastic, and we assumed a one-period autocorrelation. We used the xtscccommand in
Stata.
c
We estimated the model using the Driscoll-Kraay (1998) fixed-effects covariance estimator. We
excluded the variables that represented other channels of home equity extraction because they could
be endogenous.
d
We estimated the model using the Driscoll-Kraay (1998) fixed-effects covariance estimator. We
excluded the year fixed-effects.
Appendix II: Description of and Results for
GAO’s Econometric Model of Home Equity
Conversion Mortgage Take-Up Rates
Page 89 GAO-19-702 Reverse Mortgages
To help develop our HECM take-up rate model, we consulted the
following studies.
22
1. Banks, James, Richard Blundell, Zoe Oldfield, and James P. Smith.
Housing Price Volatility and Downsizing in Later Life.National
Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 13496. Cambridge,
Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research, October 2007.
Accessed April 30, 2019. http://www.nber.org/papers/w13496.
2. Chatterjee, Swarn. Reverse Mortgage Participation in the United
States: Evidence from a National Study. International Journal of
Financial Studies, vol. 4, no. 5 (2016): pp. 110.
3. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. Reverse Mortgages: Report
to Congress. Washington, D.C.: June 28, 2012.
4. Davidoff, Thomas. Reverse Mortgage Demographics and Collateral
Performance. February 25, 2014. Accessed November 19, 2018.
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2399942.
5. Davidoff, Thomas. Supply Constraints Are Not Valid Instrumental
Variables for Home Prices Because They Are Correlated With Many
Demand Factors.Critical Finance Review, vol. 5, no. 2 (2016): pp.
177206.
6. Davidoff, Thomas, Patrick Gerhard, and Thomas Post. Reverse
Mortgages: What Homeowners (Don’t) Know and How It Matters.
October 24, 2016. Accessed November 19, 2018,
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2528944.
7. Driscoll, John C., and Aart C. Kraay. Consistent Covariance Matrix
Estimation with Spatially Dependent Panel Data.Review of
Economics and Statistics, vol. 80 (1998): pp. 549560.
8. Golding, Edward, and Laurie Goodman, To Better Assess the Risk of
FHA Programs, Separate Reverse and Forward Mortgages.Urban
Wire (blog), Urban Institute. November 29, 2017. Accessed August
14, 2019. https://www.urban.org/urban-wire/better-assess-risk-fha-
programs-separate-reverse-and-forward-mortgages.
9. Goodman, Laurie, Karan Kaul, and Jun Zhu. What the 2016 Survey of
Consumer Finances Tells Us about Senior Homeowners. Washington,
D.C.: Urban Institute, November 2017.
22
See Warshawsky (2018) for a list of studies and a critical review of the academic and
professional literature on reverse mortgages.
Selected Studies
Appendix II: Description of and Results for
GAO’s Econometric Model of Home Equity
Conversion Mortgage Take-Up Rates
Page 90 GAO-19-702 Reverse Mortgages
10. Haurin, Donald, Chao Ma, Stephanie Moulton, Maximilian Schmeiser,
Jason Seligman, and Wei Shi. Spatial Variation in Reverse
Mortgages Usage: House Price Dynamics and Consumer Selection.
Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, vol. 53 (2016): pp.
392417.
11. Integrated Financial Engineering, Inc. Appendix E: HECM Demand
Model” in HECM Demand Model Actuarial Review of the Federal
Housing Administration Mutual Mortgage Insurance Fund HECM
Loans For Fiscal Year 2015. Prepared at the request of the
Department of Housing and Urban Development. November 16, 2015.
12. Kaul, Karan, and Laurie Goodman. Seniors’ Access to Home Equity:
Identifying Existing Mechanisms and Impediments to Broader
Adoption. Washington, D.C.: Urban Institute, February 2017.
13. Lucas, Deborah. Hacking Reverse Mortgages.(Working paper,
October 26, 2015). Accessed June 14, 2019.
http://mitsloan.mit.edu/shared/ods/documents/?DocumentID=4596.
14. Mayer, Christopher J., and Katerina V. Simons. Reverse Mortgages
and the Liquidity of Housing Wealth.Journal of the American Real
Estate and Urban Economics Association, vol. 22, no. 2 (1994): pp.
235255.
15. Mummolo, Jonathan, and Erik Peterson. Improving the Interpretation
of Fixed Effects Regression Results.Political Science Research and
Methods, vol. 6 (2018): pp. 17.
16. Moulton, Stephanie, Donald R. Haurin, and Wei Shi. An Analysis of
Default Risk in the Home Equity Conversion Mortgage (HECM)
Program.Journal of Urban Economics, vol. 90 (2015): pp. 1734.
17. Moulton, Stephanie, Cazilia Loibl, and Donald Haurin. Reverse
Mortgage Motivations and Outcomes: Insights from Survey Data.
Cityscape: A Journal of Policy Development and Research, vol. 19,
no. 1 (2017): pp. 7397.
18. Moulton, Stephanie, Samuel Dodini, Donald Haurin, and Maximilian
Schmeiser. SeniorsHome Equity Extraction: Credit Constraints and
Borrowing Channels.May 20, 2019. Accessed August 12, 2019.
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2727204.
19. Nakajima, Makoto, and Irina A. Telyukova. Reverse Mortgage Loans:
A Quantitative Analysis.The Journal of Finance, vol. 72, no. 2
(2017): pp. 911949.
20. Redfoot, Donald L., Ken Scholen, and S. Kathi Brown. Reverse
Mortgages: Niche Product or Mainstream Solution? Report on the
Appendix II: Description of and Results for
GAO’s Econometric Model of Home Equity
Conversion Mortgage Take-Up Rates
Page 91 GAO-19-702 Reverse Mortgages
2006 AARP National Survey of Reverse Mortgage Shoppers.
Washington, D.C.: December 2007.
21. Shan, Hui. Reversing the Trend: The Recent Expansion of the
Reverse Mortgage Market.Real Estate Economics, vol. 39, no. 4
(2011): pp. 743768.
22. Warshawsky, Mark J. Retire on the House: The Possible Use of
Reverse Mortgages to Enhance Retirement Security. The Journal of
Retirement, vol. 5, no. 3 (2018): pp. 1031.
Appendix III: Reported Home Equity
Conversion Mortgage Termination Reasons
Page 92 GAO-19-702 Reverse Mortgages
Table 8: Reported Home Equity Conversion Mortgage (HECM) Termination Reasons, Number and Percentage of Loans, Fiscal
Years 20142018
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
Total
Termination
reason Number Percent
Number
Percent Number
Percent Number
Percent Number
Percent Number
Percent
Death
7,078
31
11,953
32
31,826
40
20,727
34
15,899
29
87,483
34
Default
(failure to meet
occupancy or
residency
requirements)
297
1
2,562
7
13,549
17
7,206
12
5,317
10
28,931
11
Default
(unpaid
property
charges)
109
0
622
2
2,360
3
3,055
5
4,387
8
10,533
4
Default
(failure to keep
the property in
good repair)
19
0
36
0
87
0
37
0
33
0
212
0
Repaid
5,438
24
5,099
14
4,999
6
5,119
8
2,054
4
22,709
9
Refinanced
2,282
10
3,947
10
4,211
5
5,450
9
4,414
8
20,304
8
Borrower
conveyed title
or moved
1,282
6
1,555
4
2,493
3
1,533
3
1,220
2
8,083
3
Unknown
6,192
27
11,945
32
20,459
26
17,662
29
21,634
39
77,892
30
Total
22,697
100
37,719
100
79,984
100
60,789
100
54,958
100
256,147
100
Source: GAO analysis of Federal Housing Administration data for the HECM program. | GAO-19-702
Note: Due to rounding, some columns may not sum to 100 percent.
Appendix III: Reported Home Equity
Conversion Mortgage Termination Reasons
Appendix IV: Reported Home Equity
Conversion Mortgage Terminations and
Defaults
Page 93 GAO-19-702 Reverse Mortgages
Table 9: Reported Home Equity Conversion Mortgage Terminations and Defaults,
by State, Number and Percentage of Loans, Fiscal Years 20142018
State
Number of
terminated loans
Percentage of
terminated loans
Number of loans
terminated as a
result of a default
Defaults as a
percentage of
terminated loans
AK
171
0.1
19
11
AL
2388
0.9
577
24
AR
1476
0.6
421
29
AZ
7934
3.1
1,470
19
CA
49322
19.3
3,134
6
CO
6695
2.6
404
6
CT
3939
1.5
824
21
DC
1809
0.7
23
1
DE
857
0.3
143
17
FL
31243
12.2
6,654
21
GA
4,658
1.8
909
20
HI
925
0.4
21
2
IA
981
0.4
189
19
ID
1,603
0.6
231
14
IL
7,993
3.1
1,833
23
IN
2,813
1.1
673
24
KS
1,047
0.4
267
26
KY
1,234
0.5
222
18
LA
2,464
1
478
19
MA
5,675
2.2
655
12
MD
6,971
2.7
1,418
20
ME
1,025
0.4
142
14
MI
6,911
2.7
2,453
36
MN
2,947
1.2
562
19
MO
3,594
1.4
1,011
28
MS
1,097
0.4
261
24
MT
673
0.3
63
9
NC
4,428
1.7
830
19
ND
128
0
6
5
NE
726
0.3
119
16
NH
1,188
0.5
233
20
NJ
8,906
3.5
1,297
15
NM
1,227
0.5
227
19
Appendix IV: Reported Home Equity
Conversion Mortgage Terminations and
Defaults
Appendix IV: Reported Home Equity
Conversion Mortgage Terminations and
Defaults
Page 94 GAO-19-702 Reverse Mortgages
State
Number of
terminated loans
Percentage of
terminated loans
Number of loans
terminated as a
result of a default
Defaults as a
percentage of
terminated loans
NV
3,474
1.4
504
15
NY
10,852
4.2
783
7
OH
4,658
1.8
1,182
25
OK
1,899
0.7
463
24
OR
5,269
2.1
620
12
PA
8,654
3.4
1,729
20
PR
734
0.3
179
24
RI
941
0.4
198
21
SC
2,656
1
405
15
SD
250
0.1
23
9
TN
3,646
1.4
661
18
TX
17,693
6.9
2,401
14
UT
3,059
1.2
211
7
VA
6,813
2.7
1,245
18
VI
4
0
0
0
VT
294
0.1
43
15
WA
6,903
2.7
657
10
WI
2,407
0.9
460
19
WV
528
0.2
111
21
WY
365
0.1
32
9
Total
256,147
100
39,676
15
Source: GAO analysis of Federal Housing Administration Home Equity Conversion Mortgage program data. | GAO-19-702
Note: For the purposes of this analysis we consider defaults as loans that are due and payable
because the borrower has not paid property charges, met occupancy or residency requirements, or
maintained the home.
Appendix V: Comments from the Department
of Housing and Urban Development
Page 95 GAO-19-702 Reverse Mortgages
Appendix V: Comments from the Department
of Housing and Urban Development
Appendix V: Comments from the Department
of Housing and Urban Development
Page 96 GAO-19-702 Reverse Mortgages
Appendix V: Comments from the Department
of Housing and Urban Development
Page 97 GAO-19-702 Reverse Mortgages
Appendix V: Comments from the Department
of Housing and Urban Development
Page 98 GAO-19-702 Reverse Mortgages
Appendix VI: Comments from the Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau
Page 99 GAO-19-702 Reverse Mortgages
Appendix VI: Comments from the Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau
Appendix VII: GAO Contact and Staff
Acknowledgments
Page 100 GAO-19-702 Reverse Mortgages
Alicia Puente Cackley, (202) 512-8678 or cack[email protected]
In addition to the contact named above, Steve Westley (Assistant
Director), Beth Faraguna (Analyst in Charge), Steven Campbell, William
Chatlos, Holly Hobbs, John Karikari, Matthew Levie, Risto Laboski, Marc
Molino, Jennifer Schwartz, Tyler Spunaugle, and Khristi Wilkins made key
contributions to this report.
Appendix VII: GAO Contact and Staff
Acknowledgments
GAO Contact
Staff
Acknowledgments
(102931)
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