FinalReport_EUC_PhI

Examining Options

to Enhance Common Understanding and

Strengthen End Use and

End User Control Systems to Address

Conventional Arms Diversion

UNIDIR RESOURCES

About UNIDIR

The United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR)—an autonomous

institute within the United Nations—conducts research on disarmament and security.

UNIDIR is based in Geneva, Switzerland, the centre for bilateral and multilateral

disarmament and non-proliferation negotiations, and home of the Conference on

Disarmament. The Institute explores current issues pertaining to the variety of

existing and future armaments, as well as global diplomacy and local tensions and

conflicts. Working with researchers, diplomats, government officials, NGOs and other

institutions since 1980, UNIDIR acts as a bridge between the research community and

governments. UNIDIR’s activities are funded by contributions from governments and

donor foundations.

Note

The designations employed and the presentation of the material in this publication do

not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Secretariat of

the United Nations concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area, or

of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries.

The views expressed in this publication are the sole responsibility of UNIDIR. They

do not necessarily reﬂ ect the views or opinions of the United Nations or UNIDIR’s

sponsors.

www.unidir.org

Table of Contents

Acknowledgements .............................................................................................................. iii

About the research team .................................................................................................. iv

Executive summary .............................................................................................................. v

Introduction: The harmonization of end use/r control systems

to prevent arms diversion ............................................................................................ 1

1. International attention on end use/r control systems ................................... 5

1.1. The findings and recommendations of UN experts

on arms embargoes: Evidence of diversion facilitated

by weak end use/r control systems .............................................................. 5

1.2. International calls to strengthen end use/r control systems ........... 24

1.3. Calls for international processes to strengthen

end use/r control systems .................................................................................. 30

1.4. Regional and multilateral processes to strengthen

end use/r control systems .................................................................................. 38

2. Key elements of an end use/r control system ................................................. 41

2.1. End use/r documentation ................................................................................... 42

2.2. Importer State responsibilities before export authorization ............ 51

2.3. Exporter State responsibilities before export authorization ............ 54

2.4. Post-delivery cooperation ................................................................................... 57

3. National end use/r control practices ..................................................................... 63

3.1. End use/r documentation requested

by export licensing authorities ......................................................................... 64

3.2. End use/r documentation provided by importer and end users .. 76

3.3. Post-delivery cooperation ................................................................................... 82

3.4. International cooperation and information exchange .......................... 86

4. Areas for harmonization/the development of

common understandings .............................................................................................. 87

4.1. Key areas for harmonization ............................................................................. 88

4.2. Potential areas for harmonization .................................................................. 99

5. Potential processes for the development of

common understandings .............................................................................................. 102

5.1. Lessons learned from multilateral efforts to harmonize

end use/r control systems ................................................................................. 102

5.2. Possible avenues for establishing common understanding on

and strengthening of end use/r control systems ................................. 105

6. Conclusions .......................................................................................................................... 109

References ................................................................................................................................. 112

Acronyms and abbreviations ........................................................................................... 122

iii

Acknowledgements

The Institute would like to thank all subject experts, diplomats, and other policymakers,

as well as industry representatives, who contributed their valuable inputs, time and

support to this project. UNIDIR is thankful to participants of the informal expert group

established for this project for their valuable inputs and support provided throughout

the year, including Christopher Chew, Katya Cortés Martínez (Mexican Ministry of

Foreign Affairs), Peter Danssaert, António Évora, Robert Goemmel, Helene Ferschner-

Hallwirth, Kai Kiessler, Patrick McCarthy, André Mittmann (Swiss State Secretariat for

Economic Affairs), Akiko Onodera, Cédric Poitevin, François Remue (World Customs

Organization), Judd Stitziel, Maryna Tsukanova and Brian Wood. The Institute also

acknowledges the support received at different stages from regional and sub-regional

organizations in the implementation of this project, including the Caribbean Community

Implementing Agency for Crime and Security, the League of Arab States Secretariat,

the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the South Eastern and

Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of the Small Arms and Light Weapons,

the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa, as well as

the Wassenaar Arrangement Secretariat.

This project is supported by the United Nations Trust Facility Supporting Cooperation

on Arms Regulation.

About the research team

The drafting of this study was undertaken by Paul Holtom, with research support from

Hardy Giezendanner. This project was managed by Himayu Shiotani.

Paul Holtom

Paul Holtom is a senior research fellow at the Centre for Trust, Peace and Social

Relations at Coventry University (UK). Prior to joining Coventry University, Paul was

a senior researcher at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)

from 2006 to 2013 and Director of SIPRI’s Arms Transfers Programme between 2009

and 2013. He has spent the past decade working with various governments, United

Nations agencies, international and regional organizations and non-governmental

organizations to conduct research into, and build capacity to address, the illicit trade

in, and uncontrolled proliferation of, conventional arms. This has included serving as the

consultant for the 2013 Group of Governmental Experts on the United Nations Register

of Conventional Arms and providing support for legislation, guidelines, document

templates and other measures relating to arms transfer controls.

Hardy Giezendanner

Hardy Giezendanner is a researcher at UNIDIR. He provides support to the Institute’s

conventional arms control projects, with focus on conventional arms trade. Prior to

joining UNIDIR, he worked from 2013 to 2014 for the United Nations Organization

Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Mission’s

Disarmament, Demobilization, Repatriation, Reintegration and Resettlement (DDRRR)

program in South Kivu, Eastern DRC. Hardy holds a master’s degree in International

Peace and Security Studies from the Institute for International Studies in Barcelona

and a bachelor’s degree in International Relations from the University of Geneva.

Himayu Shiotani

Himayu Shiotani is a Project Manager and researcher at UNIDIR. He is the focal

point and team lead on conventional arms control projects at UNIDIR, covering the

conventional arms trade, weapons and ammunition management in conflict settings,

practical application of global guidance documents and the issue of improvised

explosive devices. Prior to his work with UNIDIR, Himayu worked as a Research

Associate covering radiological materials threats and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation

Treaty at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies in Monterey, California.

Himayu holds a master’s degree in International Policy Studies, with a Certificate in

Nonproliferation Studies, from the Monterey Institute of International Studies.

Executive summary

The diversion of authorized conventional arms transfers, including small arms, poses a

persistent problem for security at the global, regional and national levels, and lies at

the heart of the illicit proliferation of arms. Evidence from diversion cases suggests that

differences between national end use/r control systems (in particular the content, format

and use of end use/r documentation), as well as a lack of common understandings of

definitions and information to be shared among relevant stakeholders, pose challenges

to efforts to tackle diversion.

States in United Nations forums have called for the examination of opportunities for

greater harmonization of end use/r control systems to make them more effective in

preventing diversion. Despite these repeated international calls, a global discussion

has not yet been convened to consider possible ways and approaches to strengthen

shared understanding and promote alignment in end use/r control systems. This

study responds to the various international calls to explore opportunities for greater

harmonization of end use/r control systems, with particular regard to end use/r

documentation, in order to strengthen efforts to prevent diversion. It seeks to address

two related objectives:

• Identify which aspects of national end use/r control systems could feasibly be

harmonized;

• Explore the feasibility of, and potential frameworks for, a process to strengthen

control systems and enhance cooperation to prevent diversion at the regional

and/or global levels.

The central hypothesis of the study is that:

Greater cooperation and alignment between States with regard to common

practices and procedures in end use/r control systems will enhance the ability of

relevant national stakeholders to more effectively identify and mitigate the risk of

arms being diverted from their intended end use/rs.

To this end, the study examines options and processes for a meaningful dialogue

on the harmonization of end use/r control systems. For the purposes of this study,

harmonization is defined as:

• Enhancing international cooperation;

• Where possible, working towards a common understanding of key terms; and

• Aligning standards, in particular key elements to be contained in end use/r

documentation and general principles for ensuring effective end use/r controls.

This study, via an analysis of cases of arms diversion investigated by United Nations

(UN) experts mandated to monitor UN sanctions, identifies a number of ways in which

weak end use/r control systems have been evaded to divert arms to unauthorized end

users, in particular targets of UN arms embargoes. Chapter 1 highlights the role played

by end use/r documentation in facilitating diversion in cases where:

• End use/r documentation is not authenticated by exporting States, and forgeries

are used to acquire export licences to divert arms;

• End use/r documentation is not verified by exporting States, with information

missing or which should prompt the exporting State to conduct a thorough

investigation of the proposed deal;

• Importing States do not have procedures for oversight and control of arms

imports;

• Assurances on end use or re-export are ignored by the importing State,

adherence to assurances is not monitored by the exporting State and actions are

not taken when reports of violations are presented to the exporting State and

international community; and

• High-ranking officials in importing States are willing to provide authentic end

use/r documentation to facilitate diversion to embargoed entities either en route

or by undertaking an unauthorized re-export after taking delivery of arms and

ammunition, for financial or strategic gains.

As a result of uncovering such misuse and corruption, UN experts have provided a

series of recommendations for preventing diversion and misuse in particular embargo

cases as well as recommendations for action at the global level. This study has focused

on three of the recommendations for action at the global level:

• An international standardized end user certificate;

• An international framework for exchanging information to assist in the

authentication and verification of end user certificates; and

• An international database of entities that violate end use/r assurances.

This study documents support for these proposals in various UN forums and reports

to address the illicit trade in small arms and in support of the Arms Trade Treaty

(ATT) process. However, the report also notes that despite a lack of open opposition

to these proposals, a global process has not been initiated to date to examine and

discuss them.

Chapter 2 defines an effective end use/r control system, drawing on work carried out

within frameworks provided by regional organizations and export control regimes to

share and elaborate on common minimum standards for end use/r documentation and

related practices to prevent diversion. The study draws extensively on best practice

guidelines and instruments developed by the European Union (EU), the Organization

for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the Wassenaar Arrangement, as

well as the work of the UN Coordinating Action on Small Arms (CASA) mechanism, in

identifying key elements for an effective end use/r control system.

The UNIDIR Survey and analysis in Chapter 3 shows that there are potentially good

foundations on which to develop an international process to consider the details of

end users, end use and items, as well as assurances on end use and re-export, to

be included in end use/r documentation. The chapter shows the different national

vii

approaches to exporting and importing conventional arms and the challenges to

developing a standardized end use/r document. It shows several areas in which

agreement could be reached and common understandings developed.

The UNIDIR Survey also found willingness by a significant group of States to exchange

end use/r documentation templates and checklists. The potential for this to be a

starting point for an international process has already been shown in the example

of the OSCE. While not all UNIDIR Survey respondents are ready to engage in other

exchanges to facilitate authentication and verification or examine post-delivery

cooperation measures, this could be part of a longer-term process.

The preliminary research into post-delivery controls and monitoring described in

Chapters 2 and 3 confirms the findings of earlier studies that showed the challenges

and limits to measures being undertaken at this stage of a transfer. However, this study’s

proposal to promote post-delivery ‘cooperation’ is yet to be tested. It is recommended

that further exploration be undertaken as there are some signs of States beginning to

examine options that could be captured under the post-delivery ‘cooperation’ heading.

Chapter 4 presents six areas for harmonization, which reflect proposals discussed with

the UNIDIR Expert Group, and which present the main findings of the UNIDIR Survey

and the research conducted for this study. The UNIDIR Expert Group considered the

experience of seeking to harmonize end use/r control systems via international and

regional organizations and export control regimes, and identified four key areas in

which opportunities for harmonization at the regional and/or global level are desirable

and could be feasible:

• Definition of key terms;

• Details of items, end use and end use/r to be provided to export control

authorities;

• Types of assurances to be provided by the end user/importer; and

• Role and functions of end use/r documentation.

A further two optional areas were identified as desirable but which merited further

study before being considered by States. Nevertheless, further consideration of these

areas would be welcome:

• Exchange of information and indicators for risk assessment; and

• Post-delivery cooperation.

The rationale for the harmonization of each area is provided, alongside an analysis of

relevant best practice guidelines discussed in Chapter 2 and national practices identified

in Chapter 3. Each section therefore presents available evidence that could be used as

the basis for consideration of harmonization as part of a multilateral process.

Chapter 5 presents three key lessons learned from efforts to develop common

understandings of end use/r control systems in export control regimes and regional

organizations:

• Take a step-by-step approach;

viii

• Understand opportunities and limitations of information sharing and international

cooperation; and

• Involve States that are not participating States of export control regimes and

Euro-Atlantic organizations.

These lessons inform the recommended potential processes for developing common

understandings, which are discussed in the second part of Chapter 5. The study

recognizes the ongoing work in international and regional organizations, as well as in

export control regimes, to strengthen end use/r control systems as a measure to address

the diversion of conventional arms. It seeks to promote regional and international

dialogue that involve a broad range of States and other important stakeholders, such

as industry, in consultations and the development of common understandings to

strengthen end use/r control systems. Three potential processes are recommended for

consideration to develop common understandings of end use/r control systems:

• UN;

• ATT;

• Regional approach.

The first two potential processes—the UN and the ATT—are international and potentially

global in scope. The third potential process could be a series of regional processes,

located in regions that do not host major arms exporters. All avenues could be pursued

in a complementary fashion.

The final chapter presents the main conclusions of the study. It highlights the

six potential options and three avenues for States to use to develop common

understandings of end use/r control systems.

Introduction: The harmonization of end use/r

control systems to prevent arms diversion

The diversion of authorized conventional arms transfers, including small arms, poses a

persistent problem for security at the global, regional and national levels, and lies at

the heart of the illicit proliferation of arms. Evidence from diversion cases suggests that

differences between national end use/r control systems (in particular the content, format

and use of end use/r documentation), as well as a lack of common understandings of

definitions and information to be shared among relevant stakeholders, pose challenges

to efforts to tackle diversion.

States in United Nations (UN) forums have called for the examination of opportunities

for greater harmonization of end use/r control systems to more effectively prevent

diversion. Despite these repeated international calls, a global discussion has not yet

been convened to consider possible ways and approaches to strengthen shared

understanding and promote alignment in end use/r control systems. This study responds

to the various international calls to explore opportunities for greater harmonization of

end use/r control systems, with particular regard to end use/r documentation, in order

to strengthen efforts to prevent diversion.

The study has two related objectives: First, to identify which aspects of national

end use/r control systems could feasibly be harmonized; and second, to explore the

feasibility of, and potential frameworks for, a process to strengthen control systems

and enhance cooperation to prevent diversion at the regional and/or global levels. It

seeks to offer options for States to have a meaningful dialogue on potential areas for

cooperation, shared understanding and possible alignment of measures to strengthen

end use/r control systems. The central hypothesis of the research project undertaken

for this study is that:

Greater cooperation and alignment between States with regard to common

practices and procedures in end use/r control systems will enhance the ability of

relevant national stakeholders to more effectively identify and mitigate the risk of

arms being diverted from their intended end use/rs.

Specifically, the study seeks to address the following key research question:

• How can States enhance shared understandings and cooperation to strengthen

their national end use/r control systems in a practical manner in order to

mitigate the risk of diversion to unauthorized end users and/or end uses?

Therefore, this project intends to provide:

• An analysis of key areas of national end use/r control systems that could be

aligned and/or subject to enhanced cooperation at the national, regional and/or

global levels;

• New ideas, avenues and potential areas for States to address challenges to, and

opportunities for, cooperation towards alignment of common end use/r control

practices and procedures;

• Targeted engagement with States that are not participating in the existing export

control regimes in order to promote a comprehensive and global approach to

strengthening the enforcement of end use/r controls to prevent diversion; and

• Identification of possible forums to further the discussion on international

cooperation and shared understandings of end use/r control at the regional and

global levels.

The study uses a wide variety of open source materials, including multilateral

instruments for strengthening end use/r control systems and research carried out by

internationally recognized experts in the field of arms trafficking and transfer controls.

The study also draws upon the results of a UNIDIR Survey on national end use/r control

systems and international cooperation and information exchanges, distributed to States

in June–October 2015. In addition, several meetings and events convened by UNIDIR in

2015 were used to explore assumptions and proposals relating to the aspects of the

end use/r control system to be harmonized, and potential international processes to

be utilized:

• Informal Expert Meeting: April 2015, Vienna, Austria

• Informal Industry Meeting: July 2015, Geneva, Switzerland

• Project presentation: August 2015, Cancun, Mexico

• Round-table on Menu of Options: October 2015, New York, USA.

A note on harmonization

This study unpacks some of the key challenges to, and opportunities for, fostering

common understanding of the key aspects of end use/r control systems that could

be harmonized. The project recognizes the difficulty of designing an end use/r

control system and the fact that it is not desirable to seek a one-size-fits-all model.

Therefore, this project defines ‘harmonization’ as:

• Enhancing international cooperation;

• Where possible, working towards agreement on common understanding of

key terms; and

• Aligning standards, in particular key elements to be contained in end use/r

documentation and general principles for ensuring effective end use/r

controls.

The project recognizes that greater cooperation and alignment between States

with regard to common practices and procedures in end use/r control systems

will enhance the ability of relevant stakeholders to more effectively identify and

mitigate the risk of arms being diverted.

A note on end use/r control systems

This report uses the term end use/r control systems and not the more common

terms ‘end user certificate’ or ‘end use certificate’. This is a conscious decision to

demonstrate that the research project and the report are not only interested in

the format and content of end use/r documentation but also in the processes of

certification, authentication and verification of such documentation and its role in

international cooperation to prevent diversion.

Outline of the study

Drawing upon the investigations of UN experts appointed to monitor the

implementation of UN sanctions, Chapter 1 of this study begins by providing various

examples of the way in which weakly enforced end use/r controls have contributed to

enabling the delivery of conventional arms and ammunition to entities subject to UN

sanctions for use in violations of international humanitarian and human rights law. It

also draws upon the recommendations made by UN experts to establish international

processes to explore ways to strengthen end use/r control systems. The chapter also

considers the way in which these recommendations were discussed and promoted

by States in UN General Assembly (UNGA) and Security Council (Security Council)

forums relating to UN sanctions but also the illicit trade in small arms and efforts to

conclude an arms trade treaty (ATT). The chapter concludes by noting progress made

in regional organizations and export control regimes to provide guidance to States on

strengthening end use/r controls and defining minimum elements to be contained in

end use/r documentation.

Chapter 2 provides an introduction to the main elements of an effective end

use/r control system, drawing upon best practice guidelines prepared by regional

organizations, the Wassenaar Arrangement and the UN Coordinating Action on Small

Arms (CASA) mechanism. It considers recommended details to be contained in end

use/r documentation with regard to the items to be transferred, end use, end users

and entities involved in the transfer, as well as unique identifiers for the document.

The assurances to be provided by the end user on use, re-transfer, re-export and post-

delivery cooperation are also discussed in this chapter. The way in which importing

and exporting States should utilize the documentation as part of their transfer control

systems, and the checks that should be made before authorizing an export, are also

addressed. The chapter concludes with consideration of methods for undertaking post-

delivery cooperation.

Chapter 3 presents the findings of the UNIDIR Survey that sought to gather information

on State practices with regard to the content and checks conducted on end use/r

documentation, as well as post-delivery cooperation and possibilities for international

information exchange on end use/r documentation. In addition, the chapter draws

upon an analysis conducted by UNIDIR of national reports on implementation of the

United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade

in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (PoA), the UNGA resolutions on

UN exchange of national legislation on the transfer of arms, military equipment and

dual-use goods and technology, available samples of end use/r documentation and

completed Arms Trade Treaty Baseline Assessment Project (ATT-BAP) surveys.

Chapter 4 contains four key areas in which opportunities for harmonization at the

regional and/or global level are desirable and could be feasible:

• Definition of key terms;

• Details of items and end use/r to be provided to export control authorities;

• Types of assurances to be provided by the end user/importer; and

• Roles and functions of end use/r documentation.

The chapter also draws attention to two other areas that would strengthen end use/r

control systems, but where further consultations and more time are likely to be required

to produce positive results:

• Exchange of information and indicators for risk assessment; and

• Post-delivery cooperation.

Chapter 5 begins by highlighting three lessons drawn from multilateral efforts to

harmonize end use/r control systems. The first lesson is based on the step-by-step

approach taken by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)

for strengthening end use/r controls and developing a template end user certificate

(EUC) for international transfers of small arms and light weapons (SALW). The second

lesson draws upon the experience of the Wassenaar Arrangement in information

exchange and efforts to establish guidelines for end use/r controls. The third lesson

notes that little attention has been paid to States that are not participating States

in export control regimes or Euro-Atlantic organizations on this issue, despite notable

interest in the issue in Africa, the Americas and Asia/Pacific. The chapter therefore also

examines three potential avenues for pursuing a global dialogue on the harmonization

of end use/r controls. The first option examined is that of the UN and in particular

the regular meetings to consider implementation of the PoA and the possibility of

a Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) being convened to consider the issue. The

second option is for a subsidiary working group of the ATT to examine the issue. The

third option is for regional organizations beyond the Euro-Atlantic to consider regional

approaches to strengthening end use/r control systems to prevent diversion.

The study concludes by highlighting the opportunities and challenges for exploring the

six options and three potential avenues for States to engage in a dialogue to develop

common understandings of end use/r control systems.

1. International attention on end use/r control

systems

This chapter notes how UN experts mandated to monitor Security Council

sanctions have provided a significant body of evidence on how end use/r controls

and documentation are evaded to enable the supply of arms and ammunition

to unauthorized end users subject to UN arms embargoes. It also presents the

recommendations made by UN experts to strengthen national end use/r controls

to prevent such diversion, paying particular attention to proposals for international

processes to establish common standards and harmonized end use/r control systems.

Several of these recommendations resonated with UN Member States in Security

Council and UNGA forums, which echoed the calls of the UN experts for greater

attention to be paid towards strengthening end use/r control systems for international

transfers of conventional arms, in particular SALW, and the potential for international

frameworks to be established to achieve this goal. In particular, this chapter records

the calls that focus on initiatives for harmonizing end use/r documentation and

elaborating methods for effective certification, authentication and verification of such

documentation, as well as proposals for enhanced international cooperation to address

diversion. The chapter concludes by examining developments in other multilateral

settings to establish guidance on end use/r control systems, in particular Euro-Atlantic

organizations and the Wassenaar Arrangement export control regime.

1.1. The findings and recommendations of UN experts on arms embargoes:

Evidence of diversion facilitated by weak end use/r control systems

‘End user verification is one of the most important instruments to prevent exported

arms and military equipment from reaching unauthorized persons and organizations’.

International attention on the need to strengthen end use/r control systems gained

prominence in the late 1990s as UN experts provided a series of well-documented

cases of diversion to embargoed non-State and State entities in Angola, Liberia

and Sierra Leone, which were facilitated by weak end use/r controls. The work of

subsequent UN experts appointed to monitor UN arms embargoes has contributed

further evidence on the various ways in which end use/r control systems are being

evaded. They also show that corrupt officials at various points along the end use/r

control chain can enable diversion. In particular, the findings highlight the risk of

diversion when end use/r documentation is neither authenticated nor verified by

exporting States. The findings also indicate that the risk of diversion is higher when

end use/r documentation is utilized in isolation from a comprehensive system to assess

risk and engage in international cooperation to prevent diversion. This section provides

examples provided by UN experts on the ways in which entities have sought to evade

end use/r controls. It concludes with a summary of the UN expert recommendations

1 Security Council, Report of the Team of Experts Appointed pursuant to Security Council resolution 1407

(2002), paragraph 1, concerning Somalia, UN document S/2002/722, 3 July 2002, para. 69.

addressed to the international community to strengthen end use/r controls and country-

specific recommendations for States that host entities subject to UN sanctions. To the

author’s knowledge this is the first study to provide such a comprehensive overview

of evidence and recommendations provided by UN experts. This is conducted in full

recognition of the fact that the high-risk cases that are investigated by UN experts with

limited resources represent only a fraction of diversion cases, and that there are many

diversion cases each year that do not involve entities targeted by UN embargoes.

UN experts repeatedly note that the variety of formats used for EUCs issued by

governments, let alone similar documents issued by non-State end users, poses

challenges for exporting States when assessing such documentation. Therefore, if an

exporting State treats the submission of end use/r documentation as an administrative

criterion and does not check the authenticity of the document or verify its contents,

such practices can facilitate diversion.

For example, the Monitoring Mechanism on

Angola Sanctions noted that many States lack a framework for managing arms imports

and that the issuing of EUCs can be the responsibility of the ministry of defence, but

that the format of an EUC can be ‘mere administrative correspondence on an official

letterhead paper containing no security features other than the official seal, coat of

arms and signature of the issuing authority’.

UN experts have shown that there are cases in which exporting States have not

checked the authenticity of end use/r documentation, and forged documents or copies

have been used to enable diversion. UN experts and independent researchers have

highlighted that end use/r documentation is regarded as an important element of an

application for an export licence, but that they can be produced in formats that are easy

to forge.

For example, UN experts monitoring the implementation of arms embargoes

on the Uniao Nacional Para a Independencia Total de Angola (UNITA) in Angola, on

Liberia and on the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone documented a

series of cases during 1995–2002 in which forged end user documentation naming the

armed forces of West African States as end users was successfully used to acquire an

export licence to transfer arms and ammunition to entities subject to UN sanctions/

arms embargoes. Guinean authorities informed the UN Panel of Experts monitoring

sanctions on Liberia that forged EUCs indicating the Guinean armed forces as the

end user were used by a company based in Guinea and various brokers to support

export licence applications for small arms, missiles, helicopters and cargo aircraft in

Eastern Europe to be delivered to Liberia in violation of the arms embargo.

The Panel

2 For example, see: Hugh Griffiths and Adrian Wilkinson, Guns, Planes and Ships: Identification and Disruption

of Clandestine Arms Transfers, South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small

Arms and Light Weapons, August 2007; Matt Schroeder, Helen Close and Chris Stevenson, “Deadly

Deception: Arms Transfer Diversion”, in Small Arms Survey 2008: Risk and Resilience, Cambridge University

Press, 2008, pp. 120–122.

3 Brian Wood and Peter Danssaert, Study on the Development of a Framework for Improving End-Use

and End-User Control Systems, United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs Occasional Papers No. 21,

December 2011, p. 5.

4 Security Council, Final report of the Monitoring Mechanism on Angola Sanctions, UN document

S/2000/1225, 21 December 2000, para. 30.

5 Security Council, Report of the Group of Experts submitted pursuant to Paragraph 9 of Security Council

resolution 1643 (2005) concerning Côte d’Ivoire, UN document S/2006/735, 5 October 2006, para. 30.

6 Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to Security Council resolution 1343 (2001),

paragraph 19, concerning Liberia, UN document S/2001/1015, 26 October 2001, paras 168 and 224–267.

The Guinean company also reportedly attempted to use a forged EUC naming the Namibian Ministry of

Defence as an end user. Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security

also found that a Ukrainian broker had created several unauthorized copies of an

EUC that had been signed by the Head of State of Côte d’Ivoire and authenticated

by the Ambassador of Côte d’Ivoire to the Russian Federation on 2 June 2000.

The

Ambassador of Côte d’Ivoire to the Russian Federation emphasized that while the

EUCs looked legitimate, it was clear that his signature was forged on the additional

copies. In another case reported by UN experts, a Belgrade-based company provided

forged end use/r documentation that identified the Nigerian Ministry of Defence as

the end user to support export licence applications, when the real end user was the

embargoed forces of Charles Taylor in Liberia.

The former Yugoslav export licensing

authorities granted two export licences based on these forged documents, suggesting

that insufficient attention was paid towards assessing their authenticity, and did not

check whether they complied with the Moratorium on the Importation, Exportation

and Manufacture of Light Weapons of the Economic Community of West African

States (ECOWAS). A forged EUC based on an original Burkina Faso EUC was also

found in connection with efforts to transfer ammunition to Côte d’Ivoire in violation of

UN sanctions.

The UN experts identified two EUCs that contained the same reference

number, date and signature of the Minister of Security of Burkina Faso for the purchase

of 450,000 rounds of ammunition and 200 RPG-7 rockets, and suspected that copies

were made of the original. Cases have also been noted by the UN experts on Iran in

which false EUCs have been presented in support of export licence applications. The

UN experts highlighted one case in which a crude copy of an EUC template available

on a government website has been used and brought to the attention of national

authorities by a private company.

Another example provided to the UN experts

involved intermediaries in third countries providing false EUCs to acquire items that

would be re-transferred to the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Yet, perhaps the most galling example of a diversion reported by UN experts that could

have been avoided with a simple check is the case in which an arms broker provided

an EUC from the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen to export licensing officials

in Poland, two years after the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen

had merged

with the Arab Republic of Yemen in May 1990 to form the Republic of Yemen.

Polish

authorities duly licensed the export of surplus arms for the non-existent country and

the arms were supplied to Croatia in violation of the UN arms embargo on the former

Yugoslavia. The Polish investigation concluded that:

Council resolution 1343 (2001), paragraph 19, concerning Liberia, UN document S/2001/1015, 26 October

2001, para. 253.

7 Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to Security Council resolution 1343 (2001),

paragraph 19, concerning Liberia, UN document S/2001/1015, 26 October 2001, paras 211–223.

8 Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts appointed pursuant to Security Council resolution 1408

(2002), paragraph 16, concerning Liberia, UN document S/2002/1115, 25 October 2002, paras 64–82.

9 Security Council, Report of the Group of Experts submitted pursuant to Paragraph 9 of Security Council

resolution 1643(2005) concerning Côte d’Ivoire, UN document S/2006/735, 5 October 2006, paras 30–34;

Security Council, Report of the Group of Experts submitted pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council

resolution 1708 (2006) concerning Côte d’Ivoire, UN document S/2006/964, 12 December 2006, paras

18–20.

10 Security Council, Final report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1929 (2010), UN

document S/2013/331, 5 June 2013, para. 117.

11 Security Council, Final report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1929 (2010), UN

document S/2013/331, 5 June 2013, para. 115.

12 Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts on Somalia pursuant to Security Council resolution

1425(2002), UN document S/2003/223, 25 March 2003, paras 41–48.

‘the official who authorized the export licence claimed that the documents did not

raise any doubts about their authenticity. At the time Polish authorities did not

check the veracity of foreign documents with their foreign embassies’.

UN experts have identified several ways in which the verification of information

provided by the end user or importing State should signal concerns for export licensing

authorities. The first way is to check whether the documentation lacks essential

information necessary for conducting a risk assessment—an unfortunately common

situation in which the information simply cannot be checked.

For example, the UN

experts on Sudan have noted that the signature on Sudanese-issued EUCs is ‘unclear’

and the EUCs ‘do not contain full information on the ammunition being transferred

[making] tracing, should it be necessary, all but impossible’.

Another example is

provided by the Angola Monitoring Mechanism. It identified several Togolese EUCs that

should have caused concern to Bulgarian export licensing authorities, as they were

written in English as well as French, and were issued on the same or on dates very

close together.

Burkina Faso EUCs feature in another case that should have raised

concerns. An EUC that named the Ministry of Defence of Burkina Faso as the sole end

user, and that had been signed by the Head of the presidential guard of Burkina Faso,

was used to acquire 68 tons of arms and ammunition from Ukraine in 1999, which

were then re-exported to Liberia and subsequently believed to have been used by the

RUF in Sierra Leone.

The Commander of the Economic Community of West African

States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) for Sierra Leone accused the President of Burkina

Faso of complicity in the diversion of the shipment to Liberia and its subsequent

transfer to the RUF in Sierra Leone in the first half of 1999.

Ukrainian authorities

stated that the seals on the EUC were authentic and that the ‘relevant documentation

did not contain any indication that the shipment was destined for re-export to any

other legal or natural person in any other third country’.

However, the fact that the

armed forces of Burkina Faso use NATO-standard weaponry should have been a

warning sign considering that the order placed with Ukraine was for former Warsaw

Pact ammunition. If the Ukrainian authorities had verified the information contained in

the EUC this would have led to greater caution on the part of the Ukrainian authorities

and could have prevented a transfer that was diverted to embargoed entities.

13 Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts on Somalia pursuant to Security Council resolution

1425(2002), UN document S/2003/223, 25 March 2003, para. 45.

14 Hugh Griffiths and Adrian Wilkinson, Guns, Planes and Ships: Identification and Disruption of Clandestine

Arms Transfers, South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light

Weapons, August 2007.

15 Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts on the Sudan established pursuant to resolution 1591

(2005), UN document S/2014/87, 11 February 2014, paras 65–66.

16 Security Council, Final report of the Monitoring Mechanism on Angola Sanctions, UN document

S/2000/1225, 21 December 2000, para. 34.

17 Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts appointed pursuant to Security Council resolution 1306

(2000), paragraph 19, in relation to Sierra Leone, UN document S/2000/1195, 20 December 2000, paras

203–211. The signature of the same individual was also on EUCs received by Romania between 1996 and

1999 that are believed to have been used by UNITA to procure arms. The individual ‘denied ever having

signed the documents; nor could he speculate as to who could have had access to documents with his

signature’. However, the Angola Monitoring Mechanism determined that the EUCs were authentic. (Security

Council, Final report of the Monitoring Mechanism on Angola Sanctions, UN document S/2000/1225, 21

December 2000, paras 48–49.)

18 Human Rights Watch (HRW), “HRW Letter to President Compaoré”, 28 March 2000, <http://www.hrw.

org/press/2000/03/burkina0330letter.htm>.

19 Security Council, Report of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 985 (1995)

concerning Liberia, UN document S/1999/1301, 31 December 1999.

Another set of challenges are present in cases where the importing State does not

have procedures for oversight and control in place. Libya currently represents an

extreme case in this regard, with UN experts highlighting the dangers of supplying

arms to Libya when the identities of end users are unclear and there is a lack of clarity

over the procurement authority with oversight of the fragmented security sector and

its arms imports.

In April 2013, the Chair of the Libya Sanctions Committee requested

Libya to create such a structure and use EUCs.

The Libyan authorities responded

by identifying the Military Procurement Department of the Ministry of Defence as the

only focal point for arms procurement for Libya, and providing information on the two

individuals authorized to sign EUCs for Libyan arms imports. However, UN experts

have received copies of end use/r documentation signed by individuals in the Libyan

Ministry of Defence other than the two named signatories that have been used to

attempt to procure over 42 million rounds of 7.62 x 39 mm ammunition and more than

65,000 assault rifles.

Therefore, the system established by the Libyan authorities was

not adhered to by exporters. For example, UN experts found that a contract signed on

18 December 2012 between a US-registered broker reportedly acting on behalf of the

Libyan Ministry of the Interior and a company registered in the United Arab Emirates

(UAE) for 15,000 pistols and 9 mm ammunition appeared to only have come to the

attention of Libyan authorities when an EUC was sent to the Libyan Embassy in the

UAE for approval.

The Libyan Embassy sent a request to the company in February

2014 to terminate the deal as the Libyan Ministry of Interior had not authorized the

purchase. However, 1,500 pistols had already been delivered to the Libyan Supreme

Security Committee in Mitiga. An independent non-governmental organization tracking

illegal weapons in conflict zones, Conflict Armaments Research, found that at least one

of the pistols had been sold by a Supreme Security Committee officer to a jewellery

shop owner in Tripoli.

UN experts also identified exports to Libya that were diverted

after delivery.

Another reason for not relying solely on information provided by the importer, end user

and/or government official that certifies end use/r documentation is that these entities

might not intend to abide by the assurances on end use, location, or re-transfer due

to corruption or strategic interests. UN experts reported a case of concern with regard

to the end user using items for a purpose other than the declared end use relates to

the appearance in the 2012 military parade in North Korea of six transporter-erector

launchers, for which there is evidence to suggest that they were built on WS51200

trucks that had been supplied from China in 2011. China investigated the case and

presented an EUC that had been provided by the North Korean buyer in which the

‘Democratic People’s Republic of Korea Forestry Ministry […] certified that the six

20 Security Council, Final report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1973 (2011)

concerning Libya, UN document S/2014/106, 19 February 2014, para. 49.

21 Security Council, Final report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1973 (2011)

concerning Libya, UN document S/2014/106. 19 February 2014, para. 50.

22 Security Council, 2014, Final report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1973 (2011)

concerning Libya, UN document S/2014/106, 19 February 2014, para. 53.

23 Security Council, Final report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1973 (2011), UN

document S/2015/128, 23 February 2015, paras 125–131.

24 Security Council, Final report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1973 (2011), UN

document S/2015/128, 23 February 2015, para. 131.

25 Security Council, Final report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1973 (2011), UN

document S/2015/128. 23 February 2015, paras 135–148, and Annex 19, Transfers to the Ministry of Defence

(2012 to mid-2014), pp. 96–98.

units of the off-road trucks (WS51200) which were imported from [a Chinese import

and export company] are the vehicles for transporting the timbers in the Democratic

People’s Republic of Korea’.

The Panel therefore concluded that ‘[o]n the basis of the

information currently available, the Panel considers it most likely that the Democratic

People’s Republic of Korea deliberately breached the end user guarantee that it

officially provided to [the Chinese Import and Export Company] and converted the

WS51200 trucks into transporter-erector-launchers’.

Sudan is another State for which UN experts have questioned the reliability of

assurances contained in EUCs, and called upon States to monitor Sudanese

compliance with assurances.

As Table 1 shows, UN experts have repeatedly called

for exporting States to pay particular attention to Sudanese certification of EUCs and

compliance with assurances. For example, the UN Panel has documented that Su-25

ground attack aircraft were used in Darfur and that Sudan acquired 15 Su-25 from

Belarus between 2008 and 2010 ‘under a letter of guarantee by the Government

of Sudan that they would not be used in violation of resolution 1591 (2005)’.

The

Government of Sudan insisted that ‘in conformity with its rights as a sovereign State,

such aircraft are deployed based upon their limited-scale utilizations, such as guarding

troop convoys and movements in addition to [African Union/United Nations Hybrid

operations in Darfur] (UNAMID) and humanitarian non-government organization

convoys’.

The Panel took a different view, considering such a deployment without

prior authorization from the UN Sanctions Committee on Sudan to be a violation of

UN sanctions. The Panel also found evidence of S-8 air-to-ground missiles being used

in Darfur, which the Panel strongly believed were acquired from Belarus based upon

an EUC dated 11 November 2010 in which Sudan states that S-8 missiles will not be

used in contradiction of Security Council resolutions and a delivery control certificate

of 18 April 2011 certifying delivery of 3998 S-8DM and S-8KO missiles.

In addition, the

Panel observed Mi-24 attack helicopters in Darfur. The Russian Federation informed

the Panel it had supplied 44 Mi-24 to Sudan in 2005 and 2009, with an end user

undertaking that the helicopters would not be used in Darfur.

Sudan did not confirm

if the Mi-24s based in Darfur came from the Russian supplies of 2005 and 2009, but

the Panel suspects that the Mi-24s in Darfur are part of these consignments.

The UN

Panel of Experts maintains that Sudan has demonstrated a pattern of violations of UN

sanctions and end user assurances concluded with Belarus and the Russian Federation.

26 Security Council, 2013. Report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1874 (2013)

concerning Liberia, UN document S/2013/337, 11 June 2013, para. 54. A copy of the EUC is contained in

Annex XII of the report (p. 80).

27 Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1874 (2013) concerning

Liberia, UN document S/2013/337, 11 June 2013, para. 57.

28 Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts on the Sudan established pursuant to resolution 1591

(2005), UN document S/2011/111, 8 March 2011, para. 60.

29 Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts on the Sudan established pursuant to resolution 1591

(2005), UN document S/2011/111, 8 March 2011, para. 81; Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts

on the Sudan established pursuant to resolution 1591 (2005), UN document S/2013/79, 12 February 2013,

paras 60–63.

30 Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts on the Sudan established pursuant to resolution 1591

(2005), UN document S/2013/79, 12 February 2013, para. 62.

31 Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts on the Sudan established pursuant to resolution 1591

(2005), UN document S/2013/79, 12 February 2013, paras 48–50.

32 Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts on the Sudan established pursuant to resolution 1591

(2005), UN document S/2011/111, 8 March 2011, paras 85–87.

33 Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts on the Sudan established pursuant to resolution 1591

(2005), UN document S/2013/79, 12 February 2013, para. 72.

Although the Government of Sudan stated that such arms would not be used against

civilians, UN experts identified a case of Su-25 combat aircraft firing S-8 missiles at

a civilian convoy that they considered a violation of the ‘Protocol additional to the

Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949’.

As a result of disregard for EUC assurances,

the UN experts called for ‘more detailed and specific language’ to be included in

Sudanese-issued EUCs, which would:

• Be explicit on the Security Council provisions that ‘apply to the supply of

weapons systems and ammunition to the Government of Sudan’;

• Provide information on the lot or batch number of ammunition being supplied;

• Hold signatory individuals responsible for subsequent violations of Security

Council resolutions.

The UN experts included sample text that could be included in EUCs issued by Sudan:

‘We, the Ministry of Defence of the Government of the Sudan, hereby officially

certify that the goods supplied or purchased under the auspices of this end user

certificate will not be physically transferred to Darfur or used on aircraft operating

over the Darfur region in accordance with the provisions of paragraphs 7 and 8 of

Security Council resolution 1556 (2005), paragraph 7 of Security Council resolution

1591 (2005) and paragraph 10 of Security Council resolution 1945 (2010), as updated

in subsequent resolutions, unless approved in advance by the Security Council

Committee established pursuant to resolution 1591 (2005) concerning the Sudan’.

Security Council resolution 1945 of 14 October 2010 decided that all authorized arms

exports to Sudan ‘are made conditional upon the necessary end user documentation

so that States may ascertain that any such sale or supply is conducted consistent with

the measures imposed by those resolutions’.

A common element in arms embargo evasion, as documented by various UN experts,

is the willingness of States to provide authentic end use/r documentation to acquire

arms and then to re-export said arms to embargoed entities. The UN experts on Sierra

Leone found that arms were reaching the RUF despite the arms embargo imposed

on them, because of ‘the willingness of some countries to provide their end user

certificates and/or facilitate the safe passage of weapons through their territory’,

which has become clear in other cases too. For example, the UN experts on UNITA

documented the use by brokers acting on behalf of UNITA of authentic EUCs supplied

to the brokers by the then Zairian Government to be used to procure arms for UNITA.

The EUCs were reportedly supplied in exchange for money and diamonds from UNITA,

with arms arriving in Zaire before being re-transferred to UNITA.

34 Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts on the Sudan established pursuant to resolution 1591

(2005), UN document S/2014/87, 11 February 2014, paras 69–81.

35 Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts on the Sudan established pursuant to resolution 1591

(2005), UN document S/2014/87,11 February 2014, para. 67.

36 Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts on the Sudan established pursuant to resolution 1591

(2005), UN document S/2014/87, 11 February 2014, para. 68.

37 Security Council, UN document S/RES/1945 (2010), 14 October 2010, para. 10.

38 Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts appointed pursuant to Security Council resolution

1306 (2000), paragraph 19, in relation to Sierra Leone, UN document S/2000/1195, 20 December 2000,

para. 254.

39 Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts on Violations of Security Council Sanctions against UNITA,

UN document S/2000/203, 10 March 2000, para. 20.

In several cases, the importing State is the end user for some of the arms and

ammunition listed in the EUC, but it shares the order with an embargoed entity. For

example, Togo reportedly agreed to supply UNITA with EUCs after the overthrow

of President Mobutu in Zaire if it could keep a 20 per cent share of the arms and

ammunition listed on the EUC, with the other 80 per cent destined for UNITA.

The

UN experts contacted the governments of Belarus, Bulgaria, the Russian Federation

and Ukraine as part of its investigations into the misuse of Togolese EUCs for

supplying arms and ammunition to UNITA. Bulgaria reportedly received 18 Togolese

EUCs between 1996 and 1998, with US$14 million worth of SALW, ammunition, artillery

and Man-Portable Air Defence Systems (MANPADS) exported in relation to nine of

the EUCs.

Romania also reported exporting almost US$650,000 worth of SALW and

ammunition to Togo during 1996–1999. The Monitoring Mechanism on Angola Sanctions

determined that all 20 EUCs that were provided to export licensing authorities in

Bulgaria (18) and Romania (2) were forged.

However, Togolese authorities did admit

that an EUC that was issued in July 1997, and signed by the Togolese Army Chief of

Staff, was given to a UNITA representative and, it is believed, was used as the basis for

the 20 forgeries.

Despite the forgeries, the Monitoring Mechanism concluded that ‘all

events described concerning Togo could not have taken place without the consent or

complicity of authorities in the country’.

Another case relates to copies of an authentic EUC that a Ukrainian broker acquired

from a former Head of State of Côte d’Ivoire, who explained that he had agreed to use

the EUC not only to acquire arms for Côte d’Ivoire, but also for embargoed Liberia.

An arrangement was made by the Liberian Ambassador-at-large to split the shipment,

with some ammunition remaining in Côte d’Ivoire and most of the shipment being re-

exported to Liberia in violation of UN sanctions.

Therefore, an authentic EUC was

used to acquire arms for post-delivery onward diversion with the blessing of the Head

of State of the importing State.

The conflicts in Libya and the Syrian Arab Republic have provided several recent

cases in which Gulf Cooperation Council States appear to have procured conventional

arms and ammunition from South-Eastern Europe with the intention of re-exporting

the items to anti-Gaddafi forces in Libya and anti-Assad forces in the Syrian Arab

Republic, in the process not abiding by no re-export assurances contained in the EUCs

40 Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts on Violations of Security Council Sanctions against UNITA,

UN document S/2000/203, 10 March 2000, paras 32–35.

41 Security Council, Final report of the Monitoring Mechanism on Angola Sanctions, UN document

S/2000/1225, 21 December 2000, paras 32–33.

42 Security Council, Final report of the Monitoring Mechanism on Angola Sanctions, UN document

S/2000/1225, 21 December 2000, para. 49.

43 Security Council, Final report of the Monitoring Mechanism on Angola Sanctions, UN document

S/2000/1225, 21 December 2000, para. 43.

44 Security Council, Final report of the Monitoring Mechanism on Angola Sanctions, UN document

S/2000/1225, 21 December 2000, para. 56.

45 The Liberian Ambassador-at-large has denied his role in arms acquisitions for Liberia during the arms

embargo, but the Ukrainian broker also named him as acting on behalf of President Charles Taylor in arms

deals. Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to Security Council resolution 1343 (2001),

paragraph 19, concerning Liberia, UN document S/2001/1015, 26 October, paras 216–217. The Liberian

Ambassador-at-large’s activities are discussed in detail in: Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts

pursuant to paragraph 2 of Security Council resolution 549 (2004) concerning Liberia, UN document

S/2004/955, 6 December 2004, paras 88–91.

that supported the export licence applications.

UN experts documented in detail

how an Armenian-based broker used an EUC provided by a company based in the

UAE on behalf of the Government of the UAE to acquire two million 12.7 x 108 mm

ammunition rounds and 1,000 AK-47 assault rifles from Albanian surplus stocks via

a Ukrainian State-owned arms trading enterprise.

In February 2012, the UAE-based

company took delivery of 800,000 rounds of 12.7 x 108 mm ammunition on behalf

of the UAE and signed a delivery verification certificate (DVC).

The ammunition was

authorized to fly from Albania to Abu Dhabi International Airport but was instead

delivered to Benghazi. While the UAE was the authorized end user, it did not receive

the ammunition, nor has it provided the UN experts with any information regarding

the deal. Albania and Ukraine cooperated with the UN experts, with Ukraine providing

the EUC from the UAE that states that the items will be for the ‘own needs of the

United Arab Emirates’, with an assurance that:

‘The End user of the specific goods hereby confirm that the good, stated in clause 5,

will neither be used for any other purposes except stated in clause 7, nor transferred

to any other legal or natural person on the territory of the UAE, re-exported or

handed over to third countries without prior consent of the empowered authorities

of the Ukraine and UAE’.

In addition, Libya and the Syrian Arab Republic have clearly demonstrated cases in

which States are re-exporting arms in violation of re-export assurances given to the

original exporting State many years after receiving arms and ammunition. For example,

UN experts investigated a Swiss media report that showed Swiss-produced M80 7.62

x 51 mm ammunition being used by anti-Gadaffi forces in Libya, which had been

exported to the Qatar Armed Forces in 2009 under a non-re-export declaration.

Qatar denied that it had provided the items to anti-Gadaffi forces, but the recipients

informed the UN experts that it had received such items from Qatar.

Further evidence

of potential Qatari supplies to anti-Gadaffi forces emerged after UN experts identified

ammunition transferred from Pakistan to Qatar in the early 1980s.

Again it appears

that Qatar did not comply with the no re-export assurances made in the EUC it

supplied to Pakistan. The lack of cooperation with the UN experts in these cases

46 Paul Holtom, Irene Pavesi and Christelle Rigual, “Trade Update: Transfers, retransfers and the ATT”, in Small

Arms Survey 2014: Women and Guns, Cambridge University Press, 2014, pp. 119 and 126; Paul Holtom and

Christelle Rigual, “Trade Update: After the ‘Arab Spring’”, in Small Arms Survey 2015: Weapons and the

World, Cambridge University Press, 2015, pp. 92–111.

47 Security Council, Final report of the Panel of Experts Established pursuant to resolution 1973(2011)

concerning Libya, UN document S/2013/99, 9 March 2013, para. 81. Ukraine informed the UN experts that

the remainder of the order was delivered to the UAE in August 2011 and not to Libya. The UAE did not

confirm the delivery to the UN experts. Security Council, Final report of the Panel of Experts Established

pursuant to resolution 1973 (2011) concerning Libya, UN document S/2014/106, 19 February 2014. Annex V.

Update on previously reported transfers of ammunition to Libya organized by the United Arab Emirates,

pp. 81–82.

48 Security Council, Final report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1973 (2011)

concerning Libya, UN document S/2013/99, 9 March 2013, paras 77–97.

49 Security Council, Final report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1973 (2011)

concerning Libya, UN document S/2013/99, 9 March 2013, Annex VIII, End-user certificate Ukraine-United

Arab Emirates.

50 Security Council, Final report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council resolution

1973(2011) Concerning Libya, UN document S/2012/163, 20 March 2012, paras 97–102.

51 Security Council, Final report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1973 (2011)

concerning Libya, UN document S/2013/99, 9 March 2013, paras 62–66.

52 Security Council, Final report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1973 (2011)

concerning Libya, UN document S/2013/99, 9 March 2013, paras 67–70.

is of particular concern. Yet it is not clear in all cases whether the exporting States

that have cooperated with the UN experts have undertaken additional measures to

address the risk of diversion when exporting SALW and ammunition to the UAE. In the

case of Switzerland, however, it is known that several measures were introduced by

Swiss authorities in response to the conclusion that the UAE re-transferred grenades

that had been supplied from Switzerland in 2003 to Jordan in 2004 without Swiss

permission and that were then found in the Syrian Arab Republic in 2012. The Swiss

response included a temporary moratorium on arms exports to the UAE, making non-

re-export declarations legally binding, requiring all future EUCs to be signed by a high-

level government representative and including provisions on the right to conduct on-

site inspections in the country after any arms delivery,

as well as increased capacity

to conduct such post-shipment verifications.

Therefore, based upon patterns or particularly egregious incidents, UN experts

have recommended measures to strengthen end use/r control systems with regard

to particular States, but also for regions and at the international/global level.

Table 1 presents some of the recommendations. The table does not include various

recommendations regarding notification regimes attached to UN sanctions for arms

imports by State end users or recommendations for supporting the strengthening of

physical security and stockpile management in such States, although these are also

recommended by several UN experts as important measures to address diversion. The

recommendations are focused on measures that relate to end use/r documentation

and the related control system. The first set of recommendations are those aimed

at standards-setting on end use/r controls and documentation for the international

community, while the country-specific recommendations relate to particular arms

embargoes and measures to address the particular challenges posed by these

embargoes. The international recommendations, and the way in which they have

influenced discussions in UN forums on end use/r controls and documentation, are

discussed in more detail in the following sections.

53 Swiss State Secretariat for Economic Affairs (SECO), “Swiss Hand Grenades in Syria: Conclusion

of Investigations and Measures”, press release, 21 September 2012, <http://www.seco.admin.ch/

aktuell/00277/01164/01980/index.html?lang=en&msg-id=46075>; Swiss Federal Council (SFC), War

Material Ordinance of 25 February 1998 (Status as of 1 January 2013), document 514.511, 2013, <https://

www.admin.ch/opc/en/classified-compilation/19980112/index.html>.

54 Swiss State Secretariat for Economic Affairs (SECO), “Exportkontrolltagung 2015 - PSV” <http://www.

seco.admin.ch/themen/00513/00600/05641/index.html?lang=de>; Swiss Federal Council (SFC), War

Material Ordinance of 25 February 1998 (Status as of 1 January 2013), document 514.511, 2013, <https://

www.admin.ch/opc/en/classified-compilation/19980112/index.html>.

Table 1. UN experts on arms embargoes: Recommendations on end use/r controls and documentation

International

UN experts Year Recommendation

Afghanistan

(Taliban)

2001 ‘Legislation to enforce and strengthen controls on the movement of illicit arms and to respect sanctions regimes should

be adopted at the national level. If the necessary political will and institutions are in place, eventual measures could also

include the standardization of end-user certificates to make them harder to forge and misuse, and a more effective

system of marking and identifying weapons. Such national efforts should then be coordinated with similar measures at

regional and international levels’.

Afghanistan

(Taliban)

2001 ‘One important means of enforcing an arms embargo is to publish information concerning violations of end-user

certificate provisions, including names of companies, countries and individuals involved, as well as cases of unauthorized

re-transfer of weapons to third parties’.

Angola (UNITA) 2000 ‘The Panel noted the problem of the diversion of arms and military equipment from the declared end-user, and observed

that the current end-user certificate system that prevails in many countries is wholly inadequate to ensure against such

diversions. The Panel therefore recommends that all arms transfers by Government should provide for the mandatory

authentication and reconciliation of all end-user certificates, as well as the verification of stated undertakings contained

in those certificates. Consideration should be given as to the type of assistance that might be needed by Member States

in order to carry out end-user verifications, thereby eliminating the diversion of arms and military equipment in violation

of United Nations sanctions’.

Angola (UNITA) 2000 ‘Arms exporting countries should strengthen their systems pertaining to arms exports, in particular verifying the

authenticity and country of issuance of the relevant documents’.

Angola (UNITA) 2000 ‘The importation of arms should be subject to adequate legislation and should be managed through a mechanism

that can define clearly the responsibilities of all agencies and officials involved. Such system should include provisions

designating in person the officials authorized to sign end-user certificates’.

Angola (UNITA) 2000 ‘The format of end-user certificates necessary to legally acquire arms should be provided with a standard system of

support and a sufficient level of security to deter and/or prevent the forgery of such documents’.

555657585960

55 Security Council, Report of the Committee of Experts appointed pursuant to Security Council resolution 1333 (2000), paragraph 15 (a), regarding the monitoring of

the arms embargo against the Taliban and the closure of terrorist training camps in the Taliban-held areas of Afghanistan, UN document S/2001/511, 22 May 2001,

para. 35, pp. 8–9.

Security Council, Report of the Committee of Experts appointed pursuant to Security Council resolution 1333 (2000), paragraph 15 (a), regarding the monitoring of

the arms embargo against the Taliban and the closure of terrorist training camps in the Taliban-held areas of Afghanistan, UN document S/2001/511, 22 May 2001,

para. 39, p. 9.

Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts on Violations of Security Council Sanctions against UNITA, UN document S/2000/203, 10 March 2000, para. 55.

Security Council, Final report of the Monitoring Mechanism on Angola Sanctions, UN document S/2000/1225, 21 December 2000, para. 226.

Security Council, Final report of the Monitoring Mechanism on Angola Sanctions, UN document S/2000/1225, 21 December 2000, para. 227.

Security Council, Final report of the Monitoring Mechanism on Angola Sanctions, UN document S/2000/1225, 21 December 2000, para. 228.

International

UN experts Year Recommendation

Angola (UNITA) 2000 ‘Governments should consider putting in place systems to allow for the speedy exchange of information and verification

of the validity of end-user certificates through the designation of a contact authority in the arms exporting and

importing side or by any other way deemed appropriate’.

Liberia 2001;

2002

‘[U]rgently recommends the establishment of a United Nations working group to develop the modalities for a

standardized end-user certificate that would include the name, address and telephone number of the signing authority

for the Certificate, and name, address and telephone number and arms trading licence of the broker(s) involved’.

Liberia 2002 ‘Strongly recommends that a requirement to also submit copies of the end-user certificates [issued in support of arms

imports] become part of the procedure to obtain waivers for the importation of arms into West Africa [under the

ECOWAS moratorium]’.

Liberia 2004 ‘An international mechanism should be set up, in cooperation with ECOWAS member States, to harmonize and verify all

end-user certificates submitted for arms imports’.

Sierra Leone 2000 ‘A common standard and the management of a database on significant cases of smuggling and sanctions-busting in the

region could be developed by Interpol. The IWETS (International Weapons and Explosives Tracking System) programme

of Interpol could be used for the purpose of tracking the origin of the weaponry’.

Sierra Leone 2000 ‘Responsibility for the flood of weapons into West Africa lies with producing countries as well as those that trans-ship

and use them. The Security Council must find ways of restricting the export of weapons, especially from eastern Europe,

into conflict areas under regional or United Nations embargoes. “Naming and shaming” is a first step, but consideration

could be given to an embargo on weapons exports from specific producer countries, just as diamonds have been

embargoed from producer countries until internationally acceptable certification schemes have been developed’.

616263646566

61 Security Council, Final report of the Monitoring Mechanism on Angola Sanctions, UN document S/2000/1225, 21 December 2000, para. 229.

Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to Security Council resolution 1343 (2001), paragraph 19, concerning Liberia, UN document S/2001/1015,

26 October 2001, para. 308; Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts appointed pursuant to Security Council resolution 1408 (2002), paragraph 16,

concerning Liberia, UN document S/2002/1115, 25 October 2002, para. 101.

Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts appointed pursuant to Security Council resolution 1408 (2002), paragraph 16, concerning Liberia, UN document

S/2002/1115, 25 October 2002, para. 104.

Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to paragraph 22 of Security Council resolution 1521(2003) concerning Liberia, UN document S/2004/396,

1 June 2004, para. 59.

Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts appointed pursuant to Security Council resolution 1306 (2000), paragraph 19, in relation to Sierra Leone, UN

document S/2000/1195, 20 December 2000, para. 260.

Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts appointed pursuant to Security Council resolution 1306 (2000), paragraph 19, in relation to Sierra Leone, UN

document S/2000/1195, 20 December 2000, para. 262.

International

UN experts Year Recommendation

Sierra Leone 2000 ‘The World Customs Organization should be asked to share with the Security Council its views on creating adequate

measures for better monitoring and detection of weapons and related materiel to non-State actors and countries under

an arms embargo’.

Somalia 2003 ‘National procedures should also be developed to control the issuance and scrutiny of end-user certificates’.

Country-specific

UN experts Year Recommendation

Côte d’Ivoire 2009 ‘The Group reiterates the importance of States taking appropriate measures to sensitize their relevant Government

institutions to prevent the direct (and, in particular, the indirect) supply, sale or transfer of arms or any related materiel

to Côte d’Ivoire, in pursuance of paragraph 7 of resolution 1572 (2004). In this respect, the Group advises all States to

remain vigilant to the possibility that weapons, ammunition and related materiel, while transferred legally from one

State to another, may be retransferred in violation of the arms embargo. Before transferring weapons, including surplus

weapons, to a State in the region, the Group urges exporting States to consider carefully the willingness and ability of

the recipient State to take all necessary measures to prevent illicit retransfer, including the authenticity of its end-user

certificates’.

Côte d’Ivoire 2012 ‘The Group urges the Ivorian authorities to ratify the ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, Their

Ammunition and Other Related Materials. This should be considered a prerequisite for any lifting of the arms embargo,

in order to provide further control of the purchase of small arms and light weapons’.

Côte d’Ivoire 2012 ‘The Group recommends that, at the time of arrival of exempted arms and related materiel, as well as vehicles, in

Côte d’Ivoire, the Integrated Embargo Monitoring Unit and/or the Group of Experts must proceed with the physical

verification of items and related documentation before the recipient takes possession of the materials’.

6768 69 70 71

67 Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts appointed pursuant to Security Council resolution 1306 (2000), paragraph 19, in relation to Sierra Leone, UN

document S/2000/1195, 20 December 2000, para. 266.

Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts on Somalia pursuant to Security Council resolution 1425 (2002), UN document S/2003/223, 25 March 2003,

para. 187, p. 49.

69 Security Council, Report of the Group of Experts on Côte d’Ivoire pursuant to Paragraph 11 of Security Council resolution 1842 (2008), UN document S/2009/188,

8 April 2009, para. 130.

Security Council, Final report of the Group of Experts on Côte d’Ivoire pursuant to Paragraph 14 of Security Council resolution 1980 (2011), UN document S/2012/196,

14 April 2012, para. 224.

Security Council, Final report of the Group of Experts on Côte d’Ivoire pursuant to Paragraph 14 of Security Council resolution 1980 (2011), UN document S/2012/196,

14 April 2012, para. 226.

Country-specific

UN experts Year Recommendation

Côte d’Ivoire 2012 ‘The Group recommends that Member States take all necessary measures to ensure that any sale, supply, financing,

brokering, transit or delivery of vehicles for military use to Côte d’Ivoire be effected with the Committee’s prior

authorization, and in conformity with paragraph 9 of resolution 1980 (2011)’.

Côte d’Ivoire 2013;

2014

‘The Group recommends that Member States encourage their national companies not to export military materiel subject

to the sanctions regime to Côte d’Ivoire without having received confirmation for the notification and/or exemption

process’.

Liberia 2001 ‘[E]ach Member State that has procured or supplied arms on the basis of an end-user certificate mentioning the

[specifically identified] companies […] or individuals […], conduct a thorough investigation on the actual delivery and

end-use of the arms. The Panel recommends that the member States involved in any such transactions inform the

other State, party to these transactions and inform the Security Council Committees on Sierra Leone and Liberia on the

findings of their investigations’.

Liberia 2008 ‘The Security Council should decide that States given exemptions to export weapons for purposes outlined in its

resolution 1683 (2006) shall notify the Committee in advance of the consignment reaching the port of entry in Liberia so

as to allow for such inspection to take place before the consignment is transferred into storage’.

Libya 2013 ‘The Panel of Experts addresses the following recommendations to the Government of Libya:

(a) Urgently assign a focal point structure through which all security assistance procurement should be channelled;

(b) Ensure the use of end-user certificates for security equipment procured.

The end user of the firearms categories should assume responsibility for receiving, storing, recording and distributing

the equipment’.

7273 74 75 76

72 Security Council, Final report of the Group of Experts on Côte d’Ivoire pursuant to Paragraph 14 of Security Council resolution 1980 (2011), UN document S/2012/196,

14 April 2012, para. 227.

Security Council, Final report of the Group of Experts on Côte d’Ivoire pursuant to Paragraph 16 of Security Council resolution 2045 (2012), UN document

S/2013/228, 17 April 2013, para. 317. See also: Security Council, Final report of the Group of Experts on Côte d’Ivoire pursuant to Paragraph 19 of Security Council

resolution 2101(2013), UN document S/2014/266, 14 April 2014, para. 123.

Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to Security Council resolution 1343 (2001), paragraph 19, concerning Liberia, UN document S/2001/1015,

26 October 2001, para. 307. Names and companies have been redacted from this table.

Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts submitted pursuant to paragraph 1 of Security Council resolution 1819 (2008) concerning Liberia, UN document

S/2008/785, 17 December 2008, para. 216.

Security Council, Final report of the Panel of Experts Established pursuant to resolution 1973(2011) concerning Libya, UN document S/2013/99, 9 March 2013,

para. 282.

Country-specific

UN experts Year Recommendation

Libya 2014 ‘The Panel of Experts addresses the following recommendations to the Government of Libya to:

(a) Identify as a matter of urgency the procurement procedures of ministries or agencies other than the Ministry of

Defence that are currently in a position to procure lethal military materiel, and communicate to the Committee in a

timely manner the relevant focal points in those institutions;

(b) Keep the Committee up-to-date on the names and titles of the officials authorized to sign on behalf of the Military

Procurement Department of the Ministry of Defence;

signature of the relevant arms procurement focal point from the respective institution:

(i) For the Ministry of Defence, one signature from the Military Procurement Department and one from the Chief of Staff

(or equivalent) of the precise end user entity (navy, air defence, air force, border control or ground forces);

(ii) For other ministries or agencies that may procure lethal military materiel, one signature from the designated focal

point for arms procurement (see above) and one from the head of the precise end user entity’.

Libya 2014 ‘The Panel of Experts addresses the following recommendations to Member States:

(a) Those Member States intending to transfer lethal military materiel to Libya should give due consideration to the

requirements laid out in implementation assistance notice No. 2 of the Committee and provide the Committee with all

required documentation at the time of the initial notification of their intended transfer;

(b) Remind private actors selling arms and related materiel, including sports shooting equipment, that the export to

Libya of such items falls under the arms embargo, even if no export license is required under national laws;

the programmes and projects led by the Mine Action Service and its partners in Libya’.

Libya 2015 ‘To require prior approval by the Committee not only for the supply, sale or transfer of arms and related materiel,

including related ammunition and spare parts, but also for the supply of non-lethal military equipment, and the provision

of security-related training to Libya’.

777879

77 Security Council, Final report of the Panel of Experts Established pursuant to resolution 1973 (2011) concerning Libya, UN document S/2014/106, 19 February 2014,

para. 283.

Security Council, Final report of the Panel of Experts Established pursuant to resolution 1973 (2011) concerning Libya, UN document S/2014/106, 19 February 2014,

para. 285.

Security Council, Final report of the Panel of Experts Established pursuant to resolution 1973 (2011), UN document S/2015/128, 23 February 2015, para. 252,

recommendation 8.

Country-specific

UN experts Year Recommendation

Sierra Leone 2000 ‘Burkina Faso has recently recommended that the Security Council supervise a proposed mechanism that would

monitor all arms imports into its territory, and their use, for a period of three years. The Panel endorses this proposal.

The Panel also recommended that under such a mechanism, all imports of weapons and related matériel into Burkina

Faso over the past five years be investigated. The Panel further recommends that any State having exported weapons

during this period to Burkina Faso should investigate the actual end-use of these weapons, and report their findings to

the Security Council and to the Programme for Coordination and Assistance for Security and Development (PCASED)

established under the ECOWAS Moratorium’.

Sudan 2006;

2007

‘In its interim report to the Committee, the Panel recommended the development of an arms inventory as a way to

assist in monitoring the implementation of the arms embargo. Under the Ceasefire Commission, there is a verification

component which seeks to verify the positions and locations of the parties to the conflict. A verification component

for the arms embargo could be added to this process. It is recommended that this measure, if accepted, should be

undertaken as expeditiously as possible’.

Sudan 2006;

2007

‘In the context of the present arms embargo, it is recommended that countries, which conduct trade in military goods

and services with the Sudan implement a self-imposed requirement for end-use certification. The supplying State

would request the Government of the Sudan to provide an end-use certificate, which would state the destination of the

respective military goods and services. The Panel notes the potential risk that military goods and services exported to

the Sudan may be diverted to the embargoed States of the Darfur. By insisting on end-use certification, the Sudan’s

trading partners could play a more active role in ensuring that military goods which originate from their ports are not

diverted to Darfur. End-use certification could be more effective if these countries follow up with their own verification

checks, to trace goods that are at risk of being diverted into Darfur’.

808182

80 Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts appointed pursuant to Security Council resolution 1306 (2000), paragraph 19, in relation to Sierra Leone, UN

document S/2000/1195, 20 December 2000, para. 258.

81 Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to paragraph 3 of resolution 1591(2005) concerning the Sudan, UN document S/2006/65, 30

January 2006, para. 135. See also: Security Council, Second Report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to paragraph 3 of resolution 1591(2005) concerning

the Sudan, UN document S/2006/250, 19 April 2006, para. 57; Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1591(2005)

concerning the Sudan prepared in accordance with paragraph 2 of resolution 1665 (2006), UN document S/2006/795, 3 October 2006, para. 90; Security Council,

Report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1591(2005) concerning the Sudan prepared in accordance with paragraph 2 of resolution 1713

(2006), UN document S/2007/584, 3 October 2007, para. 120.

82 Security Council, Second Report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to paragraph 3 of resolution 1591(2005) concerning the Sudan, UN document

S/2006/250, 19 April 2006, para. 61. See also: Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1591(2005) concerning the Sudan

prepared in accordance with paragraph 2 of resolution 1665 (2006), UN document S/2006/795, 3 October 2006, para. 91; Security Council, Report of the Panel

of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1591(2005) concerning the Sudan prepared in accordance with paragraph 2 of resolution 1713 (2006), UN document

S/2007/584, 3 October 2007, para. 120.

Country-specific

UN experts Year Recommendation

Sudan 2006;

2007

‘The Panel also recommends that the Committee request Member States that trade with the Sudan to submit a prior

notification to the Committee. This information would also assist the Panel to better monitor and notify Member States

of goods that are reportedly diverted to Darfur’.

Sudan 2006;

2007

‘In its third report (S/2006/795, para. 91), the Panel recommended that countries which conduct trade in military goods

and services with the Sudan implement a self-imposed requirement for end-use certification. The Panel reiterates this

recommendation and recommends an enhancement to the proposed verification system for the end use of weapons

exported to the Sudan in the form of: (a) The immediate voluntary cessation of sales of arms and related materiel to

the Sudan by export countries where it can be proven that the end use of previous deliveries to the Government of

the Sudan has violated the arms embargo; (b) The imposition of targeted sanctions on leaders within SAF [Sudanese

Armed Forces] and the Ministry of Defence when arms and military equipment supplied with end-user certification have

proven to have been subsequently used in Darfur’.

Sudan 2011 ‘The Security Council should impose an obligation on any State selling or supplying military materiel to the Government

of the Sudan or the Government of Chad, after the eventual lifting of the respective embargoes, to make the sale or

supply of the materiel conditional on verifiable end-user and end-use documentation. Any such sale or supply should

also be conditional on the exporting State notifying the Committee and providing it with full details of the export

or transfer of materiel to either Government. The Security Council should impose these measures irrespective of

whether or not it imposes an embargo in relation to the Government of the Sudan and/or the Government of Chad, as

recommended in the two preceding paragraphs’.

Sudan 2013 ‘Require that States exporting military aircraft to the Government of the Sudan incorporate an electronic tracking

system in the platforms to ensure that they are not used in violation of resolution 1591 (2005). Furthermore, such

exporting States must report any such violations to the Committee. They should also cease, after violation, to provide

any technical support for those platforms and to provide new platforms to the Government of the Sudan’.

83848586

83 Security Council, Second Report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to paragraph 3 of resolution 1591(2005) concerning the Sudan, UN document

S/2006/250, 19 April 2006, para. 62. See also: Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1591(2005) concerning the Sudan

prepared in accordance with paragraph 2 of resolution 1665 (2006), UN document S/2006/795, 3 October 2006, para. 91; Security Council, Report of the Panel

of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1591(2005) concerning the Sudan prepared in accordance with paragraph 2 of resolution 1713 (2006), UN document

S/2007/584, 3 October 2007, para. 120.

84 Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1591 (2005) concerning the Sudan, UN document S/2008/647, 11 November

2008, para. 351.

85 Security Council. Report of the Panel of Experts on the Sudan Established pursuant to resolution 1591(2005), UN document S/2011/111, 8 March 2011, para. 206.

86 Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts on the Sudan established pursuant to resolution 1591 (2005), UN document S/2013/79, 12 February 2013,

para. 195(b).

Country-specific

UN experts Year Recommendation

Sudan 2013 ‘Consider whether there is a need for an additional layer of verification to be imposed upon exporting States, given

that the arms embargo is limited to the five states of Darfur and that there are numerous examples of cases in which

the Government of the Sudan has assured arms-exporting States that the equipment in question would not be used

subsequently in Darfur. The Panel is of the view that there is such a need. Accordingly, the Panel further recommends

that exporting States also be required to undertake physical verification of the presence of those assets on random

dates thereafter; [and] Consider whether it might be appropriate for a United Nations body to offer to undertake the

above-mentioned verification procedure’.

Sudan 2014 ‘The Panel recommends that the Committee: Issue an implementation assistance notice that urges and encourages

States not to sell or supply arms and related materiel of all types, including weapons and ammunition, military

vehicles and equipment, paramilitary equipment and spare parts, whether or not originating in their territories, to the

Government of the Sudan unless:

(i) The end-user certificate contains all the specific text […] “We, the Ministry of Defence of the Government of the

Sudan, hereby officially certify that the goods supplied or purchased under the auspices of this end-user certificate

will not be physically transferred to Darfur or used on aircraft operating over the Darfur region in accordance with the

provisions of paragraphs 7 and 8 of Security Council resolution 1556 (2005), paragraph 7 of Security Council resolution

1591 (2005) and paragraph 10 of Security Council resolution 1945 (2010), as updated in subsequent resolutions, unless

approved in advance by the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1591 (2005) concerning the

Sudan”;

(ii) The end-user certificate contains a full description by model/make/type

of materials being supplied, together with the appropriate serial, lot or batch number;

(iii) The signature, full name, appointment and full contact details of the authorizing individual are clearly visible on the

end-user certificate’.

Sudan 2014 ‘The Panel recommends that the Committee: […] Issue an implementation assistance notice that urges and encourages

States not to sell or supply spare parts for the Antonov An-26, An-30 and An-32 types of aircraft, whether or

not originating in their territories, to the Government of the Sudan unless an end-user certificate is supplied in

accordance with the recommendations made in the implementation assistance notice concerning end-user certificates

recommended above’.

878889

87 Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts on the Sudan established pursuant to resolution 1591 (2005), UN document S/2013/79, 12 February 2013, para.

195(c–d).

Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts on the Sudan Established pursuant to resolution 1591 (2005), UN document S/2014/87, 11 February 2014, paras 68

and 242(a).

Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts on the Sudan Established pursuant to resolution 1591 (2005), UN document S/2014/87, 11 February 2014, paras 68

and 242(b).

Country-specific

UN experts Year Recommendation

Sudan 2014 ‘The Panel recommends to the Security Council that: […] It specifically task the Panel with inspecting cargo prior to the

unloading of Government aircraft at the point of delivery in Darfur and, consequently, it urge the Government to provide

the Panel with unhindered access to undertake spot inspections, without prior notice’.

Sudan 2014 ‘The Panel recommends to the Committee that: […] It remind the Government of the Sudan of its responsibility under

paragraph 3 (a) (v) of resolution 1591 (2005) to request approval from the Committee for the movement of military

supplies and equipment into Darfur for internal security operations and strongly urge its full compliance in the future’.

9091

90 Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts on the Sudan Established pursuant to resolution 1591 (2005), UN document S/2015/31, 19 January 2015, para. 272(b).

91 Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts on the Sudan Established pursuant to resolution 1591 (2005), UN document S/2015/31, 19 January 2015, para. 273(b).

1.2. International calls to strengthen end use/r control systems

The findings and recommendations of the UN experts appointed to monitor UN arms

embargoes provided a number of important discussion points for the Security Council

and UNGA meetings convened to discuss UN sanctions, countries in conflict, small

arms, and international peace and security issues more generally. This section traces

the evolution of international calls to strengthen end use/r control systems since the

end of the cold war using the following open source materials:

• Official records of Security Council meetings;

• Security Council presidential statements;

• Security Council resolutions;

• Official records of meetings of the First Committee of the UNGA;

• UNGA resolutions;

• Relevant reports of UN groups and panels of governmental experts (GGEs and

PGEs);

• Reports of the United Nations Secretary-General on small arms;

• Meetings of the UN PoA;

• Preparatory materials and meetings of the ATT process.

An early example of calls in the UNGA to undertake measures to strengthen transfer

controls to prevent diversion is contained in UN General Assembly resolution 46/36H

on international arms transfers of 6 December 1991, which:

‘Urges Member States to ensure that they have in place an adequate body of laws

and administrative machinery for regulating and monitoring effectively their transfer

of arms, to strengthen or adopt strict measures for their enforcement, and to

cooperate at the international, regional and subregional levels to harmonize, where

appropriate, relevant laws, regulations and administrative procedures as well as their

enforcement measures, with the goal of eradicating the illicit arms trade’.

The UNGA resolution also requested the convening of national, regional and

international meetings and seminars to consider a range of issues relating to

international arms transfers, including ‘the development of internationally harmonized

laws and administrative procedures relating to official arms procurement and arms

transfer policies’ and for the Disarmament Commission to consider including the issue

of international arms transfers on its agenda.

The latter request led to deliberations

in the Disarmament Commission on a set of guidelines for international arms transfers,

which were presented in 1996.

The guidelines echoed the call in UNGA resolution

46/36H for States to ‘develop and enhance the application of compatible standards

in their legislative and administrative procedures for regulating the export and import

of arms’.

The guidelines provided recommendations for the establishment and

92 General Assembly, General and complete disarmament: International arms transfer, UN document A/

RES/46/36H, 6 December 1991, para. 4.

93 General Assembly, General and complete disarmament: International arms transfer, UN document A/

RES/46/36H, 6 December 1991, paras 8(c) and 10.

94 General Assembly, Guidelines for international arms transfers in the context of general assembly resolution

46/36 H of 6 December 1991. Report of the Disarmament Commission, UN document A/51/42, Annex 1, 22

May 1996, Annex 1, para. 26.

95 General Assembly, Guidelines for international arms transfers in the context of general assembly resolution

46/36 H of 6 December 1991. Report of the Disarmament Commission, UN document A/51/42, Annex 1, 22

May 1996, Annex 1, para. 36.

maintenance of national export and import licensing systems.

Of particular interest

for this study was the recommendation that ‘a requirement by the exporter for import

licences or verifiable end use/end user certificates for international arms transfers

is an important measure to prevent unauthorized diversion’.

For the next decade,

references to the use of authenticated and verifiable EUCs featured prominently in UN

reports on small arms.

The report of the 1997 PGE on small arms endorsed the application of the UN

guidelines and echoed the recommendations in those guidelines on effective transfer

controls, but it did not explicitly recommend the utilization of verifiable EUCs.

A recommendation for the use of authenticated EUCs as a measure to ‘prevent

unauthorized manufacture of and illicit trafficking in small arms and light weapons,

or their diversion to unauthorized recipients’ was included in the 1999 GGE report on

small arms.

Further, in 2007, the GGE on illicit brokering of SALW encouraged States

to put in place measures to prevent the forgery and misuse of EUCs and to validate

the authenticity of EUCs as well as international cooperation and information sharing

to authenticate EUCs used to procure SALW.

100

The 2001 UN Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its

Aspects (9–20 July 2001) addressed the issue of utilizing transfer controls to prevent

diversion. The Conference adopted the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and

Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (PoA),

which contained provisions that echoed the recommendations of UN guidelines on

transfer controls.

101

In particular, the PoA recommended that States at the national level:

‘Put in place and implement adequate laws, regulations and administrative procedures

to ensure the effective control over the export and transit of small arms and light

weapons, including the use of authenticated end user certificates and effective legal

and enforcement measures’.

102

As will be noted below, the PoA provides a framework that has not only established

provisions for establishing and maintaining national end use/r control systems, but also

facilitated the exchange of information on end use/r control systems, in particular end

use/r control documentation (see Chapter 3).

96 General Assembly, Guidelines for international arms transfers in the context of general assembly resolution

46/36 H of 6 December 1991. Report of the Disarmament Commission, UN document A/51/42, Annex 1,

22 May 1996, Annex 1, para. 26.

97 General Assembly, Guidelines for international arms transfers in the context of general assembly resolution

46/36 H of 6 December 1991. Report of the Disarmament Commission, UN document A/51/42, Annex 1,

22 May 1996, Annex 1, para. 33.

98 General Assembly. 1997. Report of the Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms, UN document

A/52/298, 27 August 1997, paras 79–80.

99 General Assembly, Report of the Group of Governmental Experts on Small Arms, UN document A/54/258,

19 August 1999, para. 113

100 General Assembly, Report of the Group of Governmental Experts established pursuant to General Assembly

resolution 60/81 to consider further steps to enhance international cooperation in preventing, combating

and eradicating illicit brokering in small arms and light weapons, UN document A/62/163, 30 August 2007,

paras 63(v–vi) and 55.

101 General Assembly, Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms

and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, UN document A/CONF.195/15, 20 July 2001.

102 General Assembly, Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms

and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, UN document A/CONF.195/15, 20 July 2001, Section II, para. 12.

Shortly before the adoption of the PoA, the UNGA adopted by resolution 55/255 of 31

May 2001 the Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms,

their Parts and Components and Ammunition (Firearms Protocol), which entered

into force on 3 July 2005. Unlike the PoA, the Firearms Protocol does not apply to

state-to-state transfers.

103

The Firearms Protocol obliges States Parties to ‘establish

and maintain an effective system of export and import licensing or authorization, as

well as of measures on international transit, for the transfer of firearms, their parts

and components and ammunition’.

104

Therefore, the Firearms Protocol contains similar

language to that contained in the UN guidelines and the PoA. The Firearms Protocol

does not explicitly refer to end use/r documentation, but does contain minimum

requirements for the information to be contained in licences or authorizations and

‘accompanying documentation’, as well as for measures to be taken to authenticate,

verify and validate ‘licensing or authorization documents’.

105

In addition, the Firearms

Protocol contains a provision for the importing State to confirm receipt of firearms,

their parts and components or ammunition to the exporting State, upon request.

106

Therefore, two UN instruments adopted in 2001 recommended end use/r controls for

SALW/firearms transfers.

The Secretary-General has issued eight reports on small arms over the last 16 years.

The first report, issued in September 1999, which was prepared with input from States

and consultations held in advance of the 2001 UN conference, noted that ‘traffickers

successfully use fraudulent documentation to move weapons’.

107

The second report,

issued in 2002, contained a recommendation addressed to the Security Council which

used similar language to that contained in the 1999 GGE report on small arms:

‘Recommendation 9: The Council should encourage States that have not

already done so to establish the necessary legislative or other measures,

including the use of authenticated end user certificates, to ensure effective

control over the export and transit of small arms and light weapons’.

108

This recommendation was repeated in the Secretary-General’s reports on small arms

of 2003 and 2006.

109

The issue of end use/r controls was a major focus of the 2008

Secretary-General’s report on small arms, in which it was recommended that:

103 General Assembly, Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, their Parts

and Components and Ammunition, adopted 31 May 2001, UN document A/RES/55/255, 8 June 2001,

Article 4(2).

104 General Assembly, Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, their Parts

and Components and Ammunition, adopted 31 May 2001, UN document A/RES/55/255, 8 June 2001,

Article 10(1).

105 General Assembly, Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, their Parts

and Components and Ammunition, adopted 31 May 2001, UN document A/RES/55/255, 8 June 2001,

Articles 10(3) and 10(5).

106 General Assembly, Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, their Parts

and Components and Ammunition, adopted 31 May 2001, UN document A/RES/55/255, 8 June 2001,

Article 10(4).

107 General Assembly, Report of the Secretary-General. Small arms, UN document A/54/404, 24 September

1999, para. 36, p. 9.

108 Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General. Small Arms, UN document S/2002/1053, 20 September

2002, p. 9. The 2003 report contained the same recommendation. Security Council, Report of the

Secretary-General. Small Arms, UN document S/2003/1217, 31 December 2003, para. 26, p. 6.

109 Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General. Small Arms, UN document S/2003/1217, 31 December

2003, para. 26, p. 6; Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General. Small Arms, UN document

S/2006/109, 17 February 2006, p. 13.

‘The Security Council may wish to consider encouraging States to significantly

enhance their efforts to verify end user certificates. They should develop an

international framework for the authentication, reconciliation and standardization of

end user certificates’.

110

The Secretary-General’s reports on small arms of 2011, 2013 and 2015 lack a specific

recommendation relating to EUCs, which may be due to expectations that the ATT

negotiations will address ‘the recommended improvement of end use verification by

States’.

111

The Security Council considered end use/r controls, and documentation in particular,

in meetings relating to the findings and recommendations of experts appointed by the

Secretary-General to monitor implementation of UN sanctions. The Security Council also

discussed end use/r controls and documentation in the context of meetings on small

arms, in particular discussions of the findings and recommendations of the Secretary-

General’s reports on small arms. For example, the Presidential Statement issued after

the October 2002 Security Council meeting on small arms reflected recommendation

9 of the Secretary-General’s report, urging States to establish effective national EUC

systems.

112

The language contained in the 2005 Security Council Presidential Statement

on small arms echoed recommendation 9 of the Secretary-General’s reports on small

arms of 2002 and 2003:

‘The Security Council further encourages Member States that have not already done

so to establish the necessary legislative or other measures, including the use of

authenticated end user certificates, to ensure effective control over the export and

transit of small arms and light weapons’.

113

The issue has not featured prominently in subsequent Presidential Statements and is

not explicitly contained in either Security Council resolution 2117 of 26 September 2013

or resolution 2220 of 22 May 2015 on small arms.

114

However, the issue of standardized

EUCs, and their authentication and verification, has been frequently referenced by

States in Security Council debates on small arms. During the 13 meetings on small arms

that have taken place between 2001 and 2015, 37 States have called for more work to

be undertaken to implement the Security Council recommendation on EUC of 2002

and 2005 or other EUC-related measures.

115

In addition, States speaking on behalf of the

110 Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General. Small Arms, UN document S/2008/258, 17 April 2008,

recommendation 11, p. 19.

111 Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General. Small Arms, UN document S/2011/255, 5 April 2011,

para. 76, p. 16.

112 Security Council, Statement by the President of the Security Council, UN document S/PRST/2002/30,

31 October 2002, pp. 1 and 2.

113 Security Council, Statement by the President of the Security Council, UN document S/PRST/2005/7,

17 February 2005, p. 2.

114 Security Council, UN document S/RES/2117 (2013), 26 September 2013; Security Council, UN document

S/RES/2220 (2015), 22 May 2015.

115 The following States have been recorded as intervening in a Security Council meeting on ‘small arms’ to call

for attention to be paid towards the use of EUCs: Algeria (2004), Angola (2004), Argentina (2002; 2005),

Australia (2005), Austria (2006), Belgium (2015), Benin (2004), Brazil (2008), Burkina Faso (2008), China

(2015), Colombia (2004; 2006), Congo (2006), Costa Rica (2004), Denmark (2005), France (2004),

Ghana (2006), Greece (2005; 2006), Guyana (2006), India (2002; 2004; 2005), Ireland (2002), Italy

(2008), Iraq (2015), Liechtenstein (2008), Luxembourg (2005), Mauritius (2002), Mexico (2005; 2008),

Nigeria (2003; 2010), Peru (2008), Republic of Korea (2005; 2006), Romania (2015), Russian Federation

(2002; 2003), Serbia (2015), South Africa (2004), Spain (2004; 2015), United Kingdom (2002), United

Republic of Tanzania (2005), United States of America (2004; 2005; 2008; 2015). In addition, several of

African Group, Caribbean Community (CARICOM), the EU and States of the Common

Market of the South (MERCOSUR) in the UNGA First Committee between 2003 and

2013 have echoed the recommendations contained in the UN guidelines, reports of

GGEs and the Secretary-General, and the Security Council Presidential Statements

on the use of authenticated end use/r documentation subject to authentication and

verification as part of an effective transfer control system to address diversion.

116

Côte

d’Ivoire and Indonesia have indicated in the UNGA First Committee that the PoA

includes provisions on strengthening end use/r controls,

117

while the Russian Federation

has called for the PoA framework to be better utilized to address issues relating to

end use/r documentation.

118

In its statement in the UNGA First Committee in October

2013, Brazil welcomed the adoption of the ATT but stated that it believed that the ATT

would have been:

‘stronger and more effective if it had established a clear prohibition on arms transfers

to unauthorized non-State actors and required end use/end user certificates for all

transfers, and if ammunition had been unequivocally included in the Treaty’s scope.

We look forward to filling those gaps in due time, within the review framework

provided by the ATT itself’.

119

Therefore, UN instruments have promoted the issue of utilizing end use/r control

systems and documentation to address the diversion of SALW into the illicit arms

these States spoke on behalf of groups of States such as the EU and the Rio Group. Security Council,

Small arms. 4623rd meeting of the Security Council, UN document S.PV.4623, 11 October 2002; Security

Council, Small arms. 4623rd meeting of the Security Council, UN document S.PV.4623 (Resumption 1),

11 October 2002; Security Council, Small arms. 4720th meeting of the Security Council, UN document

S.PV.4720, 18 March 2003; Security Council, Small arms. 4896th meeting of the Security Council, UN

document S.PV.4896, 19 January 2004 Security Council, Small arms. 4896th meeting of the Security

Council, UN document S.PV.4896 (Resumption 1), 19 January 2004; Security Council, Small arms. 5127th

meeting of the Security Council, UN document S.PV.5127, 17 February 2005; Security Council, Small

arms. 5127th meeting of the Security Council, UN document S.PV.5127 (Resumption 1), 17 February 2005;

Security Council, Small arms. 5390th meeting of the Security Council, UN document S.PV.5390, 20 March,

2006; Security Council, Small arms. 5390th meeting of the Security Council, UN document S.PV.5390

(Resumption 1), 20 March 2006; Security Council, Small arms. 5881st meeting of the Security Council, UN

document S.PV.5881, 30 April 2008; Security Council, Small arms. 5881st meeting of the Security Council,

UN document S.PV.5881 (Resumption 1), 30 April 2008; Security Council, Small arms. 6288th meeting

of the Security Council, UN document S.PV.6288, 19 March 2010; Security Council, Small arms. 7442nd

meeting of the Security Council, UN document S.PV.7442, 13 May 2015.

116 For examples of the statements regarding end use/r control systems and documentation on behalf of

regional groupings and organizations, see: Africa Group (General Assembly 58th session, First Committee

13th meeting, UN document A/C.1/58/PV.13, 22 October 2003, p. 8); CARICOM (General Assembly 58th

session, First Committee 5th meeting, UN document A/C.1/58/PV.5, 9 October 2003, p. 3; General

Assembly 59th session, First Committee 4th meeting, UN document A/C.1/59/PV.4, 7 October 2004,

p. 3); EU (General Assembly 58th session, First Committee 6th meeting, UN document A/C.1/58/PV.2,

6 October 2003, p. 10; General Assembly 58th session, First Committee 23rd meeting, UN document

A/C.1/58/PV.23. 6 November 2003, p. 2; General Assembly 59th session, First Committee 12th meeting,

UN document A/C.1/59/PV.12, 20 October, 2004, p. 9; General Assembly 60th session, First Committee

11th meeting, UN document A/C.1/60/PV.11, 13 October 2005, p. 3); and MERCOSUR (General Assembly

63rd session, First Committee 12th meeting, UN document A/C.1/63/PV.12, 20 October 2008, p. 18;

General Assembly 65th session, First Committee 13th meeting, UN document A/C.1/65/PV.13, 18 October

2010, p. 6; General Assembly 66th session, First Committee 16th meeting, UN document A/C.1/66/PV.16,

19 October 2011, p. 7).

117 General Assembly 66th session, First Committee 16th meeting, UN document A/C.1/66/PV.16, 19 October

2011, p. 16; General Assembly 65th session, First Committee 23rd meeting, UN document A/C.1/65/PV.23,

29 October 2010, p. 14.

118 General Assembly 63rd session, First Committee 14th meeting, UN document A/C.1/63/PV.14, 21 October

2008, p. 3.

119 General Assembly 68th session, First Committee 5th meeting, UN document A/C.1/68/PV.59, October

2013, p. 23.

trade during the late 1990s and early 2000s. More recently, emphasis has increasingly

been placed on the ATT as a mechanism for further addressing the issue. This is

perhaps not unsurprising given that in response to the request for States’ views on the

feasibility, scope and parameters of the ATT, 20 of the 101 States that provided views

to the Secretary-General during 2007–2008 made explicit reference to the importance

of EUCs, end use controls and/or end use verification for effective export controls as

part of an ATT framework.

120

China, Egypt, Norway and Germany also made reference

to the importance of EUC and mechanisms for exchanging and verifying information

on end use/rs in their national positions on the ATT, submitted in 2011.

121

Norway

explicitly stated that the ATT should contain provisions on end use/r documentation.

122

Therefore, in the preparations for the development of the ATT, and in line with the

expectations of the 2008 Secretary-General’s report on small arms, it was expected

that the ATT would address end use/r controls and documentation.

The ATT contains one explicit reference to end use/r documentation. Article 8(1)

obliges an ATT State Party to take measures to:

‘ensure that appropriate and relevant information is provided, upon request, pursuant

to its national laws, to the exporting State Party, to assist the exporting State Party

in conducting its national export assessment under Article 7. Such measures may

include end use or end user documentation’.

123

The information contained in such end use/r documentation is referenced in Article 7(1)

regarding the export assessment to be undertaken by exporting State authorities.

124

In addition, the ATT’s provisions on diversion in Article 11 include consideration being

given to measures to prevent diversions, including ‘examining parties involved in the

export, requiring additional documentation, certificates, assurances, not authorizing

the export or other appropriate measures’ and the exchange of information between

importing, transit, trans-shipment and exporting States Parties to mitigate the risk

of diversion.

125

Such information could include not only that contained within end

use/r documentation, but also information on measures to address diversion, such as

information on illicit actors, trafficking routes and corrupt practices.

126

Therefore, the

ATT potentially represents another framework within which recommendations on the

use of authenticated and verifiable end use/r documentation as part of end use/r

120 Argentina, Australia, Croatia, Denmark, El Salvador, Germany, Greece, India, Italy, Jamaica, Mali, Republic

of Korea, Romania, Senegal, Serbia, Seychelles, South Africa, Sweden, Togo and Turkey. General Assembly,

Report of the Secretary-General. Towards an arms trade treaty: establishing common international

standards for the import, export and transfer of conventional arms, UN document A/62/278 (Part I),

17 August 2007; General Assembly, Report of the Secretary-General. Towards an arms trade treaty:

establishing common international standards for the import, export and transfer of conventional arms, UN

document A/62/278 (Part II), 17 August 2007.

121 General Assembly, Report of the Secretary-General. The arms trade treaty, UN document A/66/166,

20 July 2011; General Assembly, Report of the Secretary-General. The arms trade treaty, UN document

A/66/166/Add.1, 19 September 2011.

122 General Assembly, Report of the Secretary-General. The arms trade treaty, UN document A/66/166,

20 July 2011, p. 17.

123 General Assembly, Arms Trade Treaty Annex to the Draft Decision Submitted by the President of the Final

Conference, UN document A/CONF.217/2013/L.3, 27 March 2013, Article 8(1).

124 General Assembly, Arms Trade Treaty Annex to the Draft Decision Submitted by the President of the Final

Conference, UN document A/CONF.217/2013/L.3, 27 March 2013, Article 7(1).

125 General Assembly, Arms Trade Treaty Annex to the Draft Decision Submitted by the President of the Final

Conference, UN document A/CONF.217/2013/L.3, 27 March 2013, Articles 11(1), 11(2) and 11(3).

126 General Assembly, Arms Trade Treaty Annex to the Draft Decision Submitted by the President of the Final

Conference, UN document A/CONF.217/2013/L.3, 27 March 2013, Articles 11(5), 13(2), 15(4) and 15(6).

control in an effective national transfer control system to address diversion are likely to

be discussed.

1.3. Calls for international processes to strengthen end use/r control systems

In addition to international calls for consistency in the form, content and scrutiny of

end use/r documentation issued and requested at the national level, there has been

significant consideration of steps that could be taken internationally to increase the

effectiveness of end use/r control systems. This study highlights three recommendations

that have been made between 1999 and 2015 by UN Member States, the UN Secretary-

General and/or national experts appointed by the Secretary-General to convene an

international process to explore:

• An international standardized end user certificate;

• An international framework for exchanging information to assist in the

authentication and verification of end user certificates; and

• An international database of entities that violate end use/r assurances.

In addition, this section will examine some of the calls to consider at least one of these

measures at a regional or subregional level.

Overall, this section notes that the focus on end use/r control systems was strongly

influenced by the findings and recommendations of UN experts mandated by the

Secretary-General to monitor implementation of UN sanctions, in particular arms

embargoes imposed on UNITA, Liberia, Sierra Leone and the Taliban. UN Member State

calls arguably reached their peak in the first half of the first decade of the twenty-first

century, while the focus on end use/r controls has since faded from UN meetings and

documents on small arms. This could be linked to an expectation that the issue of end

use/r control systems would be addressed in the context of the ATT.

127

1.3.1. Calls for an international standardized end user certificate

Analysis of some of the cases above highlighted the potential benefits of an international

standardized EUC in addressing forgeries and minimum required information.

128

While

recognizing that this measure alone will not prevent diversion, it has been promoted

as one measure that could contribute to such efforts. In reviewing records of meetings

of the Security Council and UNGA on small arms and UN arms embargoes, it has been

difficult to discern strong opposition to the proposal to establish a process to develop

an international standardized EUC. Yet, as will be demonstrated in this section, the

proposal has been repeated in UN forums since 1999 with little sign to date of such a

process being established.

127 Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General. Small Arms, UN document S/2011/255, 5 April 2011,

para. 76.

128 Amnesty International, Dead on Time—Arms Transportation, Brokering and the Threat to Human Rights,

London, 10 May 2006, p. 71; Hugh Griffiths and Adrian Wilkinson, Guns, Planes and Ships: Identification

and Disruption of Clandestine Arms Transfers, South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the

Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons, August 2007, p. 27.

The first clear recommendation for an international standardization of the form and

content of EUCs in a UN document can be found in the report of the Group of

Experts on Small Arms, which was published in August 1999.

129

In the same year, South

Africa recommended to the UN Secretary-General the development of an ‘international

standard for end user certificates’, in connection with discussions on the role of

the UN in collecting and disseminating information on the illicit small arms trade.

130

The September 1999 report of the Secretary-General on small arms also noted that

the issue of the UN playing a role in ‘developing practices and procedures to deter

counterfeiting and forgery of end user certificates’ had been raised during regional

consultations held in Peru and Togo in 1999.

131

The panels, groups and committees of experts appointed to monitor UN sanctions, in

particular arms embargoes, were strong proponents of the international standardization

of EUCs at the turn of the millennium. For example, in its report of May 2001, the

Committee of Experts monitoring the arms embargo against the Taliban recommended

that the standardization of EUCs at the national level should be coordinated with ‘similar

measures at regional and international levels’.

132

A strong and clear recommendation

for the international standardization of EUCs appeared in the October 2001 report of

the Panel of Experts appointed to monitor sanctions imposed on Liberia. The Panel

recommended the urgent:

‘establishment of a United Nations working group to develop the modalities for

a standardized End User Certificate that would include the name, address and

telephone number of the signing authority for the Certificate, and name, address,

telephone number and arms trading licence of the broker(s) involved’.

133

The recommendation for a working group was explicitly supported in the Security

Council meeting on Liberian sanctions in November 2001 by representatives from

Bangladesh, Belgium on behalf of the EU, Ireland, Jamaica and Ukraine.

134

Several days after the publication of the UN experts’ report on Liberia of October

2002, which repeated its recommendation to examine possibilities for the development

of a standardized EUC,

135

the Presidential Statement of the Security Council on small

arms recommended to ‘study the feasibility as appropriate in developing an end user

certificate system at the regional and global levels, as well as an information exchange

and verification mechanism’.

136

The issue of a standardized EUC was not an explicit

129 General Assembly, Report of the Group of Governmental Experts on Small Arms, UN document A/54/258,

19 August 1999, para. 105(g).

130 ‘South Africa’. General Assembly, Report of the Secretary-General. Small arms, UN document A/54/404,

24 September 1999, p. 30.

131 General Assembly, Report of the Secretary-General. Small arms, UN document A/54/404, 24 September

1999, para. 54.

132 Security Council, Report of the Committee of Experts appointed pursuant to Security Council resolution

1333 (2000), paragraph 15 (a), regarding the monitoring of the arms embargo against the Taliban and

the closure of terrorist training camps in the Taliban-held areas of Afghanistan, UN document S/2001/511,

22 May 2001, para. 35.

133 Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to Security Council resolution 1343 (2001),

Paragraph 19, concerning Liberia, UN document S/2001/1015, 26 October 2001, para. 27.

134 Security Council, The situation in Liberia. 4405th meeting of the Security Council, UN document S.PV.4405,

5 November 2001.

135 Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts appointed pursuant to Security Council resolution 1408

(2002), paragraph 16, concerning Liberia, UN document S/2002/1115, 25 October 2002, para 101.

136 Security Council, Statement by the President of the Security Council, UN document S/PRST/2002/30,

31 October 2002, pp. 1 and 2.

focus of the Security Council meetings of October 2002 on small arms, although the

representative of the United Kingdom (UK) was ‘sympathetic to the call for some

standardization of end user certificates’.

137

Nevertheless, the recommendation of the

October 2002 Presidential Statement on small arms to develop standardized EUCs

at the regional and global levels continued to be promoted by UN Member States

in meetings of the Security Council and UNGA in relation to small arms controls. For

example, four States from Africa (Benin,

138

Ghana,

139

Nigeria

140

and South Africa

141

), one

from the Americas (Peru

142

) and one from Europe (Liechtenstein

143

) followed up on the

recommendation of the Security Council Presidential Statement of 2002 to examine

the standardization of EUC in the Security Council meetings on small arms during

2004–2010. Similar calls were also made in UNGA First Committee meetings during

the period 2003–2011 by the Africa group,

144

145

and MERCOSUR.

146

One potential UN forum to examine the feasibility of standardization of EUCs, or

the modalities of end use/r control systems more broadly, is the PoA. The president

of the 2006 UN Conference to Review Progress Made in the Implementation of the

Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms

and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (RevCon) made a proposal ‘to request the

Secretary-General of the United Nations to undertake a United Nations study aimed

at developing common understandings on basic issues and options related to the

establishment of common standards and reliable systems for end user certification’.

147

The Small Arms Survey noted that although the issue of end user certification was

uncontroversial and broadly accepted, the RevCon did not conclude and adopt a final

report and therefore a proposal for a study on EUC was not forwarded to the UN

Secretary-General.

148

137 Security Council, Small arms. 4623rd meeting of the Security Council, UN document S.PV.4623, 11 October

2002, p. 20.

138 Security Council, Small arms. 4896th meeting of the Security Council, UN document S.PV.4896, 19 January

2004, p. 3.

139 Security Council, Small arms. 5390th meeting of the Security Council, UN document S.PV.5390, 20 March

2006, p. 21.

140 Security Council, Small arms. 6288th meeting of the Security Council, UN document S.PV.6288, 19 March

2010, p. 9.

141 Security Council, Small arms. 4896th meeting of the Security Council, UN document S.PV.4896, 19 January

2004, pp. 28–29.

142 Security Council, Small arms. 5881st meeting of the Security Council, UN document S.PV.5881 (Resumption 1),

30 April 2008, p. 10.

143 Security Council, Small arms. 5881st meeting of the Security Council, UN document S.PV.5881 (Resumption 1),

30 April 2008, p. 18.

144 General Assembly 58th session, First Committee 13th meeting, UN document A/C.1/58/PV.13, 22 October

2003, p. 8.

145 General Assembly 58th session, First Committee 6th meeting, UN document A/C.1/58/PV.2, 6 October

2003, p. 10; General Assembly 59th session, First Committee 12th meeting, UN document A/C.1/59/PV.12,

20 October, 2004, p. 9; General Assembly 60th session, First Committee 11th meeting, UN document

A/C.1/60/PV.11, 13 October 2005, p. 3.

146 General Assembly 63rd session, First Committee 12th meeting, UN document A/C.1/63/PV.12, 20 October

2008, p. 18; General Assembly 66th session, First Committee 16th meeting, UN document A/C.1/66/PV.16,

19 October 2011, p. 7.

147 General Assembly. Working paper submitted by the President. Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat

and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects: A strategy for further

implementation, United Nations Conference to Review Progress Made in the Implementation of the

Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons

in All Its Aspects, New York, 26 June–7 July 2006, UN document A/CONF.192/2006/RC/WP.4, 29 June

2006, Section II, para. 31, p. 6.

148 Glenn McDonald, Sahar Hasan and Chris Stevenson, “Back to Basics. Transfer Controls in Global

Perspective”, in Small Arms Survey 2007: Guns and the City, Cambridge University Press, 2007, p. 123.

Nevertheless, the 2008 UN Secretary-General report on small arms devoted

considerable attention to the issue of international harmonization in relation to EUC,

drawing heavily upon the 2008 Small Arms Survey Yearbook.

149

In particular, the

report noted that there had been progress on end user certification and verification

in regional instruments, and also in various forums that focused on increased end user

verification and monitoring of international transfers of MANPADS.

150

The Secretary-

General therefore recommended the development ‘of an international framework

for authentication, reconciliation and standardization of end user certificates’.

151

The

recommendation has not been reproduced in subsequent UN Secretary-General’s

reports on small arms, although as noted above, UN Member States have continued to

note that this could be an area for further consideration at the international level via

the ATT.

Seven of 101 States that provided views on the feasibility, scope and parameters

of the ATT called for standardized formats or common minimum standards for

information to be contained in EUCs to be developed within the ATT framework.

152

Several States provided specific recommendations on how the ATT could contribute

to the development of standardized end use/r documentation. Serbia, for example

recommended that:

‘To the extent possible, the arms trade treaty should address concerns related

to end use misuse by paying due attention to the introduction of a binding

standardized form to be printed out on special paper containing a hologram for

all kinds of important documents required for the import, export or transfer of

conventional arms, such as end user certificates, international import certificates,

delivery verification certificates and other relevant certificates. Uniformity and

compatibility of these documents should ensure the necessary level of credibility of

the governmental authorities responsible for action in this field, even in States not

having a sufficiently developed legislation and institutional capacity’.

153

Mali and Togo provided a list of the elements that both States regarded as representing

the minimum necessary information to be contained in an EUC.

154

Therefore, deliberations

and negotiations leading towards the adoption of the ATT provided an outlet for

several proposals for standardized end use/r documentation. Recommendations for

international cooperation, and an international framework for exchanging information

for authenticating end use/r documentation, were also promoted within deliberations

149 Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General. Small Arms, UN document S/2008/258, 17 April 2008,

pp. 5–6.

150 Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General. Small Arms, UN document S/2008/258, 17 April 2008,

para. 35, p. 10, and para. 74, p. 19.

151 Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General. Small Arms, UN document S/2008/258, 17 April 2008,

recommendation 11, p. 19.

152 Australia, Croatia, Italy, Mali, Serbia, Seychelles, and Togo. General Assembly, Report of the Secretary-

General. Towards an arms trade treaty: establishing common international standards for the import, export

and transfer of conventional arms, UN document A/62/278 (Part I), 17 August 2007; General Assembly,

Report of the Secretary-General. Towards an arms trade treaty: establishing common international

standards for the import, export and transfer of conventional arms, UN document A/62/278 (Part II),

17 August 2007.

153 General Assembly, Report of the Secretary-General. Towards an arms trade treaty: establishing common

international standards for the import, export and transfer of conventional arms, UN document A/62/278

(Part II), 17 August 2007, p. 188.

154 General Assembly, Report of the Secretary-General. Towards an arms trade treaty: establishing common

international standards for the import, export and transfer of conventional arms, UN document A/62/278

(Part II), 17 August 2007, pp. 127 and 214.

on the ATT. It is still too early to assess whether such proposals will be examined

in the context of the ATT, but many of the States that proposed such initiatives are

States Parties to the ATT and therefore have an opportunity to make such proposals

in future Conferences of States Parties to the ATT.

1.3.2. Calls for an international framework for exchanging information to assist in the

authentication and verification of end user certificates

The calls for examining the possibility of developing standardized end use/r

documentation are not made in isolation but usually as part of a call for strengthening

national end use/r control systems. The recommendation for a standardized EUC is

often accompanied by a recommendation for an international framework or mechanism

for exchanging information to assist in the authentication and verification of EUCs;

most notably in the Security Council Presidential Statement of October 2002.

155

This

subsection focuses only on proposals for a framework for exchanging information

to assist in the authentication and verification of EUCs, and instances when States

have expressed support for such proposals. It is possible to consider general calls for

international cooperation and information exchange to prevent diversion, including

EUC-related cooperation and exchanges even if not expressly stated. However, such

generic calls are not included in this section.

In the context of a recommendation on addressing challenges faced by some States

in authenticating, reconciling and verifying end use/r documentation, the Panel

of Experts on violations of the Security Council sanctions against UNITA called for

consideration to be given to international cooperation and assistance to enable States

to carry out end user verifications.

156

One can infer from the Panel and the Monitoring

Mechanism that if certain export control agencies in Central and Eastern Europe had

checked with counterparts in the States named as end users in fraudulent end use

documentation, then the forgeries would have been detected and arms would not

have been diverted to UNITA. The final report of the Monitoring Mechanism on Angola

Sanctions recommended that:

‘Governments should consider putting in place systems to allow for the speedy

exchange of information and verification of the validity of end user certificates

through the designation of a contact authority in the arms exporting and importing

side or by any other way deemed appropriate’.

157

This proposal was supported by several of the Security Council members when

discussed in February 2001, with representatives of Mali, Norway, Togo and Ukraine

explicitly expressing support for a mechanism to facilitate international cooperation

to authenticate and verify EUCs.

158

A month earlier, in the Security Council meeting

on Sierra Leone in early January 2001, the UK also encouraged exporting States to

155 Security Council, Statement by the President of the Security Council, UN document S/PRST/2002/30,

31 October 2002, pp. 1 and 2.

156 Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts on Violations of Security Council Sanctions against UNITA,

UN document S/2000/203, 10 March 2000, para. 55, p. 21.

157 Security Council, Final report of the Monitoring Mechanism on Angola Sanctions, UN document

S/2000/1225, 21 December 2000, para. 229, p. 52.

158 Security Council, The situation in Angola. 4283rd meeting of the Security Council, UN document S.PV.4283,

22 February 2001.

query ‘suspect end user certificates with the countries concerned’.

159

In the October

2002 meeting on small arms the UK stated that it ‘would be prepared to consider

exchanging information on a more systematic, case-by-case, bilateral basis with others’

on EUCs.

160

It therefore fell short of the presidential call for the development of ‘an

information exchange and verification mechanism’.

Two sanctions panels reporting in 2003 proposed that States should eschew bilateral

and ad hoc approaches to cooperation and information sharing and consider

establishing international mechanisms to support the authentication of EUCs. First, the

April 2003 report of the Liberian Panel followed up its proposals for standardizing

EUCs with a recommendation for States to establish ‘an international mechanism for

harmonizing and verifying all end user certificates for weapons’.

161

Second, the March 2003 report of the Panel of Experts on Somalia proposed that

‘the United Nations create an Internet-based register of government officials—

including examples of their certified signatures—who are authorized to sign end user

certificates’.

162

These recommendations were not discussed in detail in the Security

Council during 2003, but representatives of Algeria and Colombia raised the issue of

creating mechanisms for information exchange and verification in relation to EUCs

during the January 2004 Security Council meeting on small arms.

163

It was also

reported that some States had shared copies of the EUC with the UN Department

for Disarmament Affairs (UNDDA) during this time in connection with reporting on

implementation of the PoA.

164

The copies were not made publicly available, in contrast

to legislation that States provided to the UNDDA. However, as will be shown in

Chapter 3, States have provided information on their end use/r control systems when

reporting on implementation of the PoA, and also in response to UNGA resolutions on

national legislation on the transfer of arms, military equipment and dual-use goods and

technology.

165

The 2006 PoA RevCon president also encouraged States to:

‘increase cooperation and the exchange of information to prevent the use of

unauthenticated end use documentation, including assistance upon request, in

monitoring, developing and strengthening effective end user certification processes

159 Security Council, The situation in Sierra Leone. 4264th meeting of the Security Council, UN document

S.PV.4264, 25 January 2001, p. 5.

160 Security Council, Small arms. 4623rd meeting of the Security Council, UN document S.PV.4623, 11 October

2002.

161 Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts appointed pursuant to paragraph 4 of Security Council

resolution 1458 (2003) concerning Liberia, UN document S/2003/498, 24 April 2003, para. 10, p. 8.

162 Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts on Somalia appointed pursuant to Security Council

resolution 1425 (2002), UN document S/2003/223, 25 March 2003, para. 187, p. 49.

163 Security Council, Small arms. 4896th meeting of the Security Council, UN document S.PV.4896, 19 January

2004, p. 30; Security Council, Small arms. 4896th meeting of the Security Council, UN document S.PV.4896

(Resumption 1), 19 January 2004, p. 18.

164 Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General. Small Arms, UN document S/2003/1217, 31 December

2003, paras 26 and 44, pp. 7 and 11. UNDDA today is the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs

(UNODA).

165 General Assembly resolutions 57/66 of 22 November 2002, 58/42 of 8 December 2003, 59/66 of

3 December 2004, 60/69 of 8 December 2005, 62/26 of 5 December 2007, 64/40 pf 2 December 2009,

66/41 of 2 December 2011, and 68/44 of 5 December 2013.

and investigations and prosecutions of import and export control violations in

accordance with their respective national constitutional and legal systems’.

166

The 2007 GGE on illicit brokering also encouraged information sharing and cooperation

to authenticate EUCs supplied by brokers in order to identify forgeries and falsifications,

thus preventing diversion.

167

As noted above, the 2008 Secretary-General’s report on

small arms followed up on such thinking with a recommendation for the development

of ‘an international framework for authentication, reconciliation and standardization

of end user certificates’.

168

Brazil, Liechtenstein and Mexico explicitly supported this

recommendation when discussing the report in the Security Council meeting on small

arms in 2008.

169

However, as with the proposal for standardizing EUCs, with which

this recommendation was often linked, it is at this time that an explicit call for EUC

information exchanges in UNGA and Security Council meetings that addressed small

arms stopped.

As noted above, the issue of end use/r controls and documentation became less of a

focus in UN discussions on small arms with the start of work on the ATT. And, just as

consideration of proposals for standardized end use/r documentation shifted from small

arms discussions to those on the ATT, so too did consideration of an intergovernmental

information exchange for authenticating and verifying end use/r documentation to be

developed over time in the ATT framework. Croatia declared, in regard to the feasibility,

scope and parameters of an ATT, that ‘[i]t is necessary to set up a universal end user

confirmation and secure the necessary database on the authority of the Member State

in charge of issuing permits, as a security measure against undesired re-export and

control of the flow of arms, to prevent them from falling into the hands of terrorists’.

170

As noted in Section 1.1, UN experts have made similar recommendations for States

emerging from conflict with limited capacity and infrastructure, which are not able to

exercise full control over their entire territory.

1.3.3. Calls for an international database of entities that violate end use/r assurances

During 2000–2001, the reports of experts monitoring three UN sanctions regimes

recommended the sharing of information on entities that violate arms embargoes,

including EUC provisions in particular. First, in its report of December 2000, the

Panel of Experts on Sierra Leone recommended that the development of ‘a common

standard and the management of a database on significant cases of smuggling and

166 General Assembly, Working Paper submitted by the President. Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat

and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects: A Strategy for Further

Implementation, United Nations Conference to Review Progress Made in the Implementation of the

Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons

in All Its Aspects, New York, 26 June–7 July 2006, UN document A/CONF.192/2006/RC/WP.4, 29 June

2006Section III, para. 5, pp. 7–8.

167 General Assembly, Report of the Group of Governmental Experts established pursuant to General Assembly

resolution 60/81 to consider further steps to enhance international cooperation in preventing, combating

and eradicating illicit brokering in small arms and light weapons, UN document A/62/163, 30 August 2007,

para. 55, p. 16.

168 Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General. Small arms, UN document S/2008/258, 17 April 2008,

recommendation 11, p. 19.

169 Security Council, Small arms. 5881st meeting of the Security Council, UN document S.PV.5881, 30 April

2008, pp. 18, 21 and 29.

170 General Assembly, Report of the Secretary General. Towards an arms trade treaty: establishing common

international standards for the import, export and transfer of conventional arms, UN document A/62/278

(Part I), 17 August 2007, p. 10.

sanctions busting in the region could be developed by Interpol’.

171

It also called for the

‘naming and shaming’ of entities that violate UN arms embargoes, with consideration

also for the option of ‘placing an embargo on weapons exports from specific producer

countries, just as diamonds have been embargoed from producer countries, until

internationally acceptable certification schemes have been developed’.

172

During the

Security Council meeting of January 2001 that discussed the Panel’s report, these

recommendations were not taken up.

Second, the May 2001 report of the Committee of Experts on the Taliban recommended

that an ‘important means of enforcing an arms embargo is to publish information

concerning violations of end user certificate provisions, including names of companies,

countries and individuals involved, as well as cases of unauthorized re-transfer of

weapons to third parties’.

173

In the June 2001 Security Council meeting on Afghanistan,

many States considered that the Committee’s recommendations on arms should be

discussed in the context of the upcoming July 2001 UN Conference on the Illicit Trade

in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, although the representative of

Mauritius took specific note of the recommendation for publishing information on EUC

violations.

174

Third, the October 2001 report of the Panel of Experts on Liberia followed up on

the two recommendations made above and ‘named and shamed’ several individuals

that were suspected of using fraudulent and forged EUCs to arrange the transfer of

arms to embargoed Liberia. In addition, the Panel requested that each State that had

been involved in an arms transfer involving EUCs naming these entities to ‘conduct a

thorough investigation on the actual delivery and end use of the arms’ and to share

their findings with other States involved in the transaction as well as the Security

Council Committees on Sierra Leone and Liberia.

175

The establishment of a database

was not recommended explicitly.

These proposals perhaps resonate with the ATT’s provisions on information exchanges

on illicit activities and actors involved in diversion, as contained in articles 11(5), 11(6),

13(2), 15(4), 15(5) and 15(6). Again, this is an issue that could be pursued within the

ATT framework, should interest exist among States Parties to the Treaty.

171 Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts appointed pursuant to Security Council resolution 1306

(2000), paragraph 19, in relation to Sierra Leone, UN document S/2000/1195, 20 December 2000, para.

37, p. 12.

172 Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts appointed pursuant to Security Council resolution 1306

(2000), paragraph 19, in relation to Sierra Leone, UN document S/2000/1195, 20 December 2000, para. 39.

173 Security Council, Report of the Committee of Experts appointed pursuant to Security Council resolution

1333 (2000), paragraph 15 (a), regarding the monitoring of the arms embargo against the Taliban and

the closure of terrorist training camps in the Taliban-held areas of Afghanistan, UN document S/2001/511,

22 May 2001, para. 39.

174 Security Council, The situation in Afghanistan. 4325th meeting of the Security Council, UN document

S.PV.4325, 5 June 2001, p. 12.

175 Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to Security Council resolution 1343 (2001),

paragraph 19, concerning Liberia, UN document S/2001/1015, 26 October 2001, para. 26.

1.4. Regional and multilateral processes to strengthen

end use/r control systems

Some regional organizations and multilateral export control regimes have drawn upon

national experience to develop a number of initiatives and instruments that seek to

establish common basic standards for effective end use/r control systems. As Table 2

shows, several Euro-Atlantic organizations and export control regimes that include

major arms exporters as members or participating States have been particularly active

in this regard. These initiatives and instruments include good practice guidelines for end

use/r control systems, checklists or templates for end user documentation (e.g. EUC or

end user statements) and related practices and information exchange mechanisms.

Table 2. Relevant regional and multilateral initiatives or instruments

for strengthening end use/r control systems

Organization Relevant end use/r control system initiative or instrument

European Union

(EU)

User’s Guide to Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP defining common

rules governing the control of exports of military technology and equipment

(2015)

Organization

for Security and

Cooperation in

Europe (OSCE)

Best practice guide on export control of small arms and light weapons

(2003)

Standard elements of end-user certificates and verification procedures for

SALW exports (2004)

Information Exchange with Regard to Sample Formats of End-User

Certificates and Relevant Verification Procedures (2008)

End User Certificate for Small Arms and Light Weapons (2010)

Regional Center

on Small Arms

(RECSA)

Best Practice Guidelines for the Implementation of the Nairobi Declaration

and Nairobi Protocol on Small Arms and Light Weapons (2010)

United Nations

Coordinating

Action on Small

Arms (UN CASA)

National controls over the international transfer of small arms and light

weapons (Module 03.20, International Small Arms Control Standards, 2014)

National controls over the end-user and end-use of internationally transferred

small arms and light weapons (Module 03.21, International Small Arms Control

Standards, 2014)

Wassenaar

Arrangement

(WA)

Elements for Objective Analysis and Advice Concerning Potentially

Destabilising Accumulations of Conventional Weapons (1998/2004/2011)

End-User Assurances Commonly Used: Consolidated Indicative List

(1999/2005)

Best Practices for Effective Enforcement (2000)

Best Practice Guidelines for Exports of SALW (2002/2007)

Elements for Export Controls of MANPADS (2003/2007)

Best Practices to Prevent Destabilising Transfers of SALW through Air

Transport (2007)

Best Practice Guidelines on Subsequent Transfer (Re-export) Controls for

Conventional Weapons Systems contained in Appendix 3 to the WA Initial

Elements (2011)

Elements for Controlling Transportation of Conventional Arms between Third

Countries (2011)

Introduction to End User/End Use Controls for Export of Military-List

Equipment (2014)

Chapter 2 reviews the recommendations contained in these instruments and best

practice guidelines for establishing an effective end use/r control system, in particular

the key elements for end use/r documentation. It is worth noting here, however, that

most of the initiatives have been undertaken by organizations in which European and

North American States are the main members or participating States. The impetus has

therefore primarily been from an exporting State perspective in terms of identifying

essential elements. Therefore, the guidance contained in these instruments and best

practice guidelines is directed towards States that have an arms industry and export

control system.

In particular, the initial attention paid to the need to strengthen end use/r control

systems and work carried out in this regard, have been in the Wassenaar Arrangement,

with a focus on the technical elements of such systems. For example, the Wassenaar

Arrangement’s End User Assurances Commonly Used: Consolidated Indicative List

represents the first attempt by a multilateral organization to present an indicative list

of elements to be included in end use/r documentation. The OSCE Best Practice Guide

on Export Controls and Standard Elements of End User Certificates and Verification

Procedures for SALW Exports both borrow heavily from the Wassenaar Arrangement’s

End User Assurances Commonly Used: Consolidated Indicative List. Guidance on best

practices in EUC contained in the EU’s User’s Guide similarly draws upon the work

of the Wassenaar Arrangement. Therefore, the diffusion of practices identified by the

Wassenaar Arrangement as ‘best practices’ in the field of end use/r control systems

at first glance appears limited to the Euro-Atlantic region in which the majority of

its participating States are located. However, the ISACS module on National Controls

over the End User and End Use of Internationally Transferred Small Arms and Light

Weapons and the Regional Centre on Small Arms (RECSA) Best Practice Guidelines

for the Implementation of the Nairobi Declaration and Nairobi Protocol on Small Arms

and Light Weapons both also draw upon the Wassenaar Arrangement’s End User

Assurances Commonly Used: Consolidated Indicative List, indicating the potential for

wider application beyond the Euro-Atlantic and major exporters. Chapter 3 of this

report also provides an opportunity to review the end use/r control system elements

of States outside the Euro-Atlantic area and compare their practices to those of the

Wassenaar Arrangement’s recommended best practices. Chapter 5 examines in more

detail some of the lessons learned from developing best practices and guidelines for

effective end use/r controls and documentation.

Overall, States that do not host significant arms production facilities, and are therefore

not considered to represent arms exporting States, have not been at the forefront of

developing guidance on strengthening and harmonizing end use/r controls. However,

as noted in the previous section, States from the Americas and sub-Saharan Africa

have called for greater harmonization of end use/r documentation. Coupled with

these calls, the Security Council in 2003 unanimously adopted resolution 1467 calling

upon ECOWAS States to introduce a standardized end user certificate’.

176

To the best

knowledge of this report’s author, this recommendation has not led to the development

of a standardized EUC in West Africa. Work has been carried out by the United Nations

Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the

Caribbean (UNLIREC) to develop a model EUC to serve as a reference point for Latin

176 Security Council, UN document S/RES/1467 (2003), 18 March 2003.

American States in strengthening their arms transfer controls and mitigate the risk

of conventional arms diversion. UNLIREC has also developed an end user statement

(EUS) template for private end users. The regional level represents an important

level at which work to strengthen and harmonize end use/r control systems should

be undertaken, with more attention warranted in regions outside the major exporting

States of Europe and North America.

2. Key elements of an end use/r control system

‘End User/End Use controls are put in place for exports of military equipment in

order to ensure that exported equipment is not diverted to unintended end users or

end uses, as the case may be. National systems for this purpose vary considerably,

as does the terminology used’.

177

National end use/r control systems and related documentation differ from State to

State, but the presentation of some form of end use/r documentation to support an

application for an export licence is established practice in most major arms exporters.

Certain national export licensing authorities produce their own EUCs and require that

exporters present them to the end user and consignee for signing and completion.

Other States rely upon documentation produced by the end user or consignee but

require that such documentation contain a required amount of information. In all cases

there are responsibilities for the competent authorities of both the exporting State

and the State in which the end user or consignee is located. Best practice guidelines,

expert analyses and the responses to the UNIDIR Survey on end use/r control systems

all stress the importance of end use/r documentation for informing export licence

application decision-making processes. However, the use of such documentation forms

only one part of a comprehensive assessment of the suitability of the end use and end

user of conventional arms, including SALW, against national transfer control criteria

that include the risk of diversion.

This chapter draws upon the best practice guidelines contained in Table 2 to provide

an overview of an effective end use/r control system. Based upon a review of these

materials, and related expert analysis, this chapter introduces recommended elements

and practices for:

• End use/r documentation;

• Importing State responsibilities;

• Exporting State responsibilities;

• Post-delivery cooperation.

Each section draws upon good practice guidelines that have been developed via

regional organizations, multilateral export control regimes and United Nations

Coordinating Action on Small Arms (UNCASA), where relevant, to introduce the issue.

Chapter 3 examines in more detail the extent to which the recommendations of best

practice guidelines examined in this chapter are utilized by UN Member States.

177 Wassenaar Arrangement, Introduction to End User/End Use Controls for Export of Military-List Equipment,

adopted in July 2014.

2.1. End use/r documentation

End use/r documentation ‘comprises documents whose purpose is to identify, authorize,

commit to certain undertakings and verify delivery’.

178

There is no single name for

end use/r documentation, with one study identifying the following names: “end user

certificate”, “end use certificate”, “end use statement”, “end use assurance” and “end

user undertaking”.

179

A distinction is usually made between end use/r documentation

covering arms transfers to State end users and for transfers to non-State end users

(e.g. commercial entities).

In cases where the recipient is a State entity (e.g. armed forces, police), the relevant

State authorities are generally expected to issue an end use/r document that is provided

to the exporter or relevant authorities in the exporting State. While there are different

names for this document, it is generally referred to as an ‘an end user certificate’—

sometimes ‘official end user certificate’.

180

This study therefore refers to State-issued

end use/r documentation as EUCs. The majority of international and regional efforts to

harmonize end use/r documentation have concentrated on State-issued EUCs. Several

best practice guidelines recommend that measures should be taken to prevent fraud,

forgery or modifications, such as using ‘an official form printed on banknote paper’ or

‘the official letterhead of the competent national authority’.

181

For transfers to non-State entities, there are a variety of documents that can be

provided to an exporter or relevant authorities in the exporting State to support an

export licence application:

• an import licence: issued by the relevant import control authorities in the

State in which the non-State consignee/end user is located, authorizing the

transfer of controlled items to a named non-State entity. The ISACS Module

03.20, National Controls over the International Transfer of Small Arms and Light

Weapons, recommends that an import authorization or licence should contain ‘at

a minimum’:

o ‘a unique import authorization number;

178 ‘6 End-user and end-use documentation’, United Nations Coordinating Action on Small Arms (UN CASA),

International Small Arms Control Standard (ISACS) 03.20: National Controls over the International Transfer

of Small Arms and Light Weapons, 17 June 2014, p. 3.

179 Brian Wood and Peter Danssaert, Study on the Development of a Framework for Improving End Use

and End User Control Systems, United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs Occasional Papers No. 21,

December 2011, pp. 5–6.

180 ‘6.2 End-user certificate’, United Nations Coordinating Action on Small Arms (UN CASA), International Small

Arms Control Standard (ISACS) 03.21: National Controls over the End User and End Use of Internationally

Transferred Small Arms and Light Weapons, 17 June 2014, pp. 3–5. See also: Mark Bromley and Hugh

Griffiths, End User Certificates: Improving Standards to Prevent Diversion, Stockholm International Peace

Research Institute (SIPRI), SIPRI Insights on Peace and Security 2010/3, pp. 2–5; Brian Wood and Peter

Danssaert, Study on the Development of a Framework for Improving End Use and End User Control

Systems, United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs Occasional Papers No. 21, December 2011, pp. 8–9.

181 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), “Best practice guide on export control of

small arms and light weapons”, in Handbook on Best Practices on Small Arms and Light Weapons, OSCE,

2003, p. 9; ‘6.2.4 Form an end-user certificate’, United Nations Coordinating Action on Small Arms (UN

CASA), International Small Arms Control Standard (ISACS) 03.21: National controls over the end-user and

end-use of internationally transferred small arms and light weapons, 17 June 2014, p. 4. Regional Centre on

Small Arms and Light Weapons (RECSA), Best Practice Guidelines for the Implementation of the Nairobi

Declaration and Nairobi Protocol on Small Arms and Light Weapons, RECSA, 2005, p. 23.

o the identity of the competent national authority issuing the authorization,

which can include the official stamp;

o the signature, printed name and position of the designated official of the

competent national authority issuing the authorization;

o the name and contact details of the recipient of the authorization;

o the date of issuance;

o the date of expiration;

o the name and contact details of the authorized end user;

o the authorized end use of the consignment; and

o a description of the consignment’.

182

• an international import certificate (IIC): ‘a standardized certificate accepted by

some States through bilateral or multilateral agreements, such as through the

North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Union, which is signed

and stamped by the importing Government’s authorities to confirm that the

importing Government is aware of, and does not object to, the proposed transfer

of arms or dual-use items to the commercial entity or individual’.

183

An IIC

represents an assurance by the importer not to divert, trans-ship or re-export the

items without an export licence or authorization from the relevant authority in

the importing State; or

• an end use/r statement (EUS): an end use/r document that is comparable to

a State-issued EUC in terms of content and assurances on end use and re-

export, but which is issued by the non-State entity that is importing the arms

or for which the arms are being imported. As noted above, there are a variety

of names for such documents, but this report follows the practice of using the

term EUS to refer to privately-issued end use/r documentation.

184

Best practice

guidelines also recommend that the EUS should either be printed on an official

form provided by the relevant national authority in the importing State or an

official letterhead of the entity that provides the EUS.

185

In general, it is recommended that the end use/r documentation should apply only to

the particular consignment identified in the documentation and should therefore not

be used for other deals. It should also be borne in mind that the details contained in

end use/r documentation can also be contained in other documents, such as contracts

182 ‘7.6 Form and content of import authorizations’, United Nations Coordinating Action on Small Arms (UN

CASA), International Small Arms Control Standard (ISACS) 03.20. National controls over the international

transfer of small arms and light weapons, 17 June 2014, pp. 18–19.

183 Brian Wood and Peter Danssaert, Study on the Development of a Framework for Improving End Use

and End User Control Systems, United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs Occasional Papers No. 21,

December 2011, p. 10.

184 ‘6.3 End-user statement’, United Nations Coordinating Action on Small Arms (UN CASA), International Small

Arms Control Standard (ISACS) 03.21: National Controls over the End User and End Use of Internationally

Transferred Small Arms and Light Weapons, 17 June 2014, pp. 6–8. See also: Mark Bromley and Hugh

Griffiths, End User Certificates: Improving Standards to Prevent Diversion, Stockholm International Peace

Research Institute (SIPRI), SIPRI Insights on Peace and Security 2010/3, , p. 5; Brian Wood and Peter

Danssaert, Study on the Development of a Framework for Improving End Use and End User Control

Systems, United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs Occasional Papers No. 21, December 2011, p. 9.

185 ‘6.3.2 Form of an end-user statement’, United Nations Coordinating Action on Small Arms (UN CASA),

International Small Arms Control Standard (ISACS) 03.21: National controls over the end-user and end-use

of internationally transferred small arms and light weapons, 17 June 2014, p. 6.

between the exporter and end user, which have a legal status as opposed to the

political status of an EUC.

2.1.1. Information contained in end use/r documentation

Several of the best practice guidelines agreed and adopted by regional organizations

and multilateral export control regimes to support harmonization of end use/r control

systems have a particular focus on the details/contents of State-issued EUCs. The

Wassenaar Arrangement Introduction to End User/End Use Controls for Export of

Military-List Equipment identified three types of information to be contained in end

use/r documentation:

• ‘A clear description of the materiel covered by the assurance, both quantity and

type (sometimes including a reference to a commercial contract number or order

number where sufficient detail is provided to definitively identify the materiel);

• A clear identification of the end user, end use, or both, whichever is relevant;

• Date of signature and a clear description of the entity providing the assurance’.

186

These types of information are recommended in the best practice guidelines developed

by the EU, ISACS, OSCE, RECSA and the Wassenaar Arrangement, as well as by non-

governmental experts. In most of these best practice guidelines, a distinction is made

between essential and optional details to be contained in EUCs. Table 3 summarizes

the recommended details/contents of State-issued EUCs.

As Table 3 shows, the elements identified in the Wassenaar Arrangement’s Introduction

to End User/End Use Controls for Export of Military-List Equipment are common

‘essential elements’ for almost all of the relevant best practice guidelines. In addition, it

is worth noting that OSCE and ISACS guidelines relating to SALW transfers recommend

the inclusion of a reference to the contract or purchase order and the date of issue

for the document, as well as the name, address and contact details of the government

agency that certifies the document. Information on any intermediaries involved in the

transfer is recommended as an optional element. The UNIDIR Expert Group concurred

with the recommendations outlined in these best practice guidelines, also noting that

it can be useful to include information not only on intermediaries but also the routes

to be used for shipping the controlled items.

187

However, consultations with industry

revealed that providing such information well in advance of the shipment can be a

considerable challenge due to contemporary transportation practices.

186 Wassenaar Arrangement, Introduction to End User/End Use Controls for Export of Military-List Equipment,

adopted in July 2014, p.2.

187 UNIDIR, Meeting Summary: Examining Options and Model for Harmonization of End Use/r Control Systems.

Informal Expert Group Meeting, Vienna, 22–23 April 2015, UNIDIR, June 2015, p. 6.

Table 3. Recommended details/contents of EUCs

Details/contents Recommendations contained in guidelines produced by:

European

Union (EU)

Wassenaar

Arrangement

(WA)

Organization

for

Co-operation

and Security in

Europe (OSCE)

International

Small Arms

Control Standards

(ISACS)

Regional

Centre on

Small Arms

(RECSA)

Essential elements

The details of the exporter (at least name, address and business

name)

XX X X

The details of the end use/r (at least name and address) X X X X X

Contract number or order reference and date - - X X

Country of final destination X X X X -

A description of the goods being exported (type, characteristics)

or reference to the contract concluded with the authorities of the

country of final destination

XX X X X

Quantity and/or value of the exported goods X X X X X

Signature, name and position of the end user’s representative X X X X -

The date of issue of the end user certificate X X X X -

Description of the end use of the goods X X X X X

Additional or optional elements

Full details, where appropriate, of any intermediaries involved in

the transfer

XX X - X

The name, address and contact details of the government agency

issuing the certificate

-X X

The date of expiration of the end user certificate - - X X

This is regarded as an optional element in the ISACS module and should be included if known.

This is regarded as an essential element in the ISACS module and RECSA guidelines.

This is regarded as an essential element in the ISACS module and OSCE best practices guidelines.

This is regarded as an essential element in the ISACS module.

Sources: Adapted from Mark Bromley and Hugh Griffiths, End User Certificates: Improving Standards to Prevent Diversion, Stockholm International

Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), SIPRI Insights on Peace and Security 2010/3, p. 4.

See also:

Council of the European Union, User’s Guide to Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP defining common rules governing the control of exports of

military technology and equipment, EU document 9241/09; United Nations Coordinating Action on Small Arms (UN CASA), International Small Arms

Control Standard (ISACS) 03.20: National Controls over the International Transfer of Small Arms and Light Weapons, 17 June 2014; United Nations

Coordinating Action on Small Arms (UN CASA), International Small Arms Control Standard (ISACS) 03.21: National Controls over the End User and End

Use of Internationally Transferred Small Arms and Light Weapons, 17 June 2014; Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), “Best

practice guide on export control of small arms and light weapons”, in Handbook on Best Practices on Small Arms and Light Weapons, OSCE, 2003,

pp. 53–54; Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), Forum for Security Co-operation. Decision No. 5/04: Standard Elements of

End User Certificates and Verification Procedures for SALW exports, OSCE document FSC/DEC/5/04, 17 November 2004; Regional Centre on Small

Arms and Light Weapons (RECSA), Best Practice Guidelines for the Implementation of the Nairobi Declaration and Nairobi Protocol on Small Arms and

Light Weapons, RECSA, 2005; Wassenaar Arrangement, End user assurances commonly used: consolidated indicative list, adopted in 1999, revised in

2005; Wassenaar Arrangement, Introduction to End User/End Use Controls for Export of Military-List Equipment, adopted in July 2014.

Although not all of the best practice guidelines recommend ‘unique identifiers’

for an EUC, research has highlighted that the lack of ministerial logos, address for

correspondence, or unique certification number should serve as a warning for export

licensing authorities when reviewing such end use/r documentation supplied in support

of an export licence application.

188

The ISACS module on end use/r controls therefore

recommends the inclusion of such identifiers in government-issued EUCs and privately-

issued EUSs (see Table 4 below).

It is notable that although the best practice guidelines contained in Table 3 focus

on State-issued EUCs, and there are recommendations for distinctions to be made

between EUCs and EUSs, ISACS recommends that the main contents of EUCs

and EUSs should be largely the same (see Table 4). The main differences relate to

government identifiers in an EUC which are understandably not to be found in an EUS

produced by a commercial entity. However, as will be shown in the section on the

responsibilities for importing States, ISACS recommends that the State that hosts the

non-State importer/consignee/end user should still certify the EUS.

Table 4. A comparison of the recommended details/contents

of EUCs and EUSs in ISACS

An EUC shall contain An EUS shall contain

a) identifiers of the certificate, including a) identifiers of the statement, including

1) a reference number unique to the issuing

government agency

1) a reference number unique to the issuer

of the statement

2) its date of issuance 2) its date of issuance

3) its date of expiration, which should not

exceed 2 years following the date of issuance

b) identifiers of the issuing government

agency, including

1) the name, address and contact details

(telephone, fax and email) of the government

agency issuing the certificate

2) the signature, printed name and position of

the authorized representative of the

government agency issuing the certificate

c) identifiers of the end user and end use,

including

b) identifiers of the end user and end use,

including

1) the name, address and contact details

(telephone, fax and email) of the end user

1) the name, address and contact details

(telephone, fax and email) of the end user

2) the signature, printed name and position

of the authorized representative of the end

user (if different from the government agency

issuing the certificate)

2) the signature, printed name and position

of the authorized representative of the end

user

3) a description of the end use 3) a description of the end use (which may

include commercial sale on the domestic

market)

188 Hugh Griffiths and Adrian Wilkinson, Guns, Planes and Ships: Identification and Disruption of Clandestine

Arms Transfers, South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light

Weapons, August 2007, p. 29.

An EUC shall contain An EUS shall contain

d) identifiers of the weapons, including

1) quantities,

2) makes,

3) models,

4) calibres,

c) identifiers of the weapons, including

1) quantities,

2) makes,

3) models,

4) calibres,

5) types (e.g. revolver, pistol, rifle, sub-machine

gun, light machine gun, heavy machine gun,

grenade launcher, mortar, anti-aircraft gun, anti-

tank gun, anti-tank rocket system, anti-tank

missile system, anti-aircraft missile system (e.g.

MANPADS), etc.), and

5) types (e.g. revolver, pistol, rifle, sub-

machine gun, light machine gun, heavy

machine gun, grenade launcher, mortar,

anti-aircraft gun, anti-tank gun, anti-tank

rocket system, anti-tank missile system,

anti-aircraft missile system (e.g. MANPADS),

etc.), and

6) actions (e.g. manual, semi-automatic or

automatic. If a weapon has a selective fire

capability, the highest capability, automatic

being the highest, should be indicated)

6) actions (e.g. manual, semi-automatic or

automatic. If a weapon has a selective fire

capability, the highest capability, automatic

being the highest, should be indicated)

If known at the time of issuance, an end user

certificate should contain

If known at the time of issuance, an end

user statement should contain

f) identifiers of the exporter, including e) identifiers of the exporter, including

1) the country of export 1) the country of export

2) the name, address and contact details

(telephone, fax and email) of the exporter

2) the name, address and contact details

(telephone, fax and email) of the exporter

g) the contract or purchase order

number

f) the contract or purchase order number

h) the value of the consignment g) the value of the consignment

Source: United Nations Coordinating Action on Small Arms (UN CASA), International Small

Arms Control Standard (ISACS) 03.21: National Controls over the End User and End Use of

Internationally Transferred Small Arms and Light Weapons, 17 June 2014, pp. 4–8.

2.1.2. Assurances on end use, end user and re-export

In addition to details on the items being transferred, end user and end use, best

practice guidelines also provide recommendations on assurances relating to end use

and re-export. The Wassenaar Arrangement Introduction to End User/End Use Controls

for Export of Military-List Equipment frames EUC assurances as negative or positive:

• ‘The exporting country government’s limitation on end user and/or end use,

expressed as a negative assurance (for example no transfer or re-export without

the exporting country government’s prior consent), or alternatively

• The exporting country government’s limitation on end use and/or end user,

expressed as a positive assurance (for example “for national military use”, or “for

integration” into a specified larger product. For production technology, a positive

end user requirement could be linked to a location or legal entity)’.

189

189 Wassenaar Arrangement, Introduction to End User/End Use Controls for Export of Military-List Equipment,

adopted in July 2014, p.2.

The Wassenaar Arrangement Introduction further notes that the assurances contained

in an EUC are of a political nature: an agreement between the exporting and importing

governments. Such assurances can also be contained in ‘commercial contracts

enforceable under national law’.

190

Therefore, commercial contracts can also play a role

in end use/r control systems. Table 5 shows the range of options presented in best

practice guidelines on assurances relating to end use, end user and re-export to be

included in an EUC.

The only common essential element for all of the best practice guidelines relates to

an undertaking or assurance that the items will only be used by the declared end user

for the declared end use. Although all guidelines recommend an optional provision

prohibiting re-export, there are different options on the conditions that States should

include in end use/r documentation on re-export. For example, the EU user’s guide,

OSCE best practice guidelines on export controls for SALW and the Wassenaar

Arrangement’s End User Assurances Commonly Used Consolidated Indicative List note

three types of re-export clause:

• Prohibition of re-export;

• Prohibition of re-export unless approval has been received from the original

exporting State that re-export is permitted under certain conditions, such as

authorization from the export licensing authorities of the State in which the end

user/importer is located; or

• An assurance that re-export will only take place after authorization has been

received from the export licensing authorities of the original exporting State.

There are several other recommendations for optional assurance elements in the best

practice guidelines. For example, all but the RECSA guidelines note that States can

seek a commitment from the importer to provide the export licensing authority with

confirmation of delivery of the items, most commonly in the form of a DVC, which

will be discussed further below. Commitment could also be sought for the exporting

State to carry out on-site inspections to ensure that the items are still held by the

declared end user and used in accordance with provisions on end use and location of

end use. As will be noted below, and as has been highlighted in various analyses, there

are questions regarding the extent to which exporting States conduct monitoring of

compliance with assurances on end use and re-export.

191

190 Wassenaar Arrangement, Introduction to End User/End Use Controls for Export of Military-List Equipment,

adopted in July 2014, p.2.

191 See for example: Hugh Griffiths and Adrian Wilkinson, Guns, Planes and Ships: Identification and Disruption

of Clandestine Arms Transfers, South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small

Arms and Light Weapons, August 2007; Paul Holtom, Irene Pavesi and Christelle Rigual, “Trade Update:

Transfers, retransfers and the ATT”, in Small Arms Survey 2014: Women and Guns, Cambridge University

Press, 2014, pp. 108–143; Glenn McDonald, “Who’s buying? End User Certification”, in Small Arms Survey

2008: Risk and Resilience, Cambridge University Press, 2008, pp. 154–181.

Table 5. Recommended assurances to be contained in an EUC

Assurance Recommendations contained in guidelines produced by:

European

Union (EU)

Wassenaar

Arrangement

(WA)

Organization for

Co-operation

and Security in

Europe (OSCE)

International

Small Arms

Control Standards

(ISACS)

Regional

Centre on

Small Arms

(RECSA)

Essential elements

An undertaking, where appropriate, that the goods being exported will not be

used for purposes other than the declared use

XX X X X

An undertaking that the declared end user will the ultimate recipient of the

goods being exported

-- X X X

Additional or optional elements

A clause prohibiting re-export of the goods covered in the certificate X X X X

A commitment by the importer to provide the exporting state with a delivery

verification on request

XX X X -

Certification that the goods will be installed at the premises of the end user or

will be used only by the end user

-X - X -

Agreement by the importer/end user to allow on-site verification - X - X -

Assurance from the importer/end user that any re-exports will only be carried

out under the authority of the importer’s/end user’s export licensing authorities

-X - X

An undertaking from the importer/end user not to divert or relocate the goods

covered by the end use certificate/statement to another destination or location

in the importing country

-X - X

This is regarded as an essential element in the ISACS module and RECSA guidelines.

Sources: Adapted from Mark Bromley and Hugh Griffiths, End User Certificates: Improving Standards to Prevent Diversion, Stockholm International Peace Research

Institute (SIPRI), SIPRI Insights on Peace and Security 2010/3, p. 4. See also: Council of the European Union, User’s Guide to Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP

defining common rules governing the control of exports of military technology and equipment, EU document 9241/09; United Nations Coordinating Action on Small

Arms (UN CASA), International Small Arms Control Standard (ISACS) 03.20: National Controls over the International Transfer of Small Arms and Light Weapons, 17 June

2014; United Nations Coordinating Action on Small Arms (UN CASA), International Small Arms Control Standard (ISACS) 03.21: National Controls over the End User

and End Use of Internationally Transferred Small Arms and Light Weapons, 17 June 2014; Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), “Best practice

guide on export control of small arms and light weapons”, in Handbook on Best Practices on Small Arms and Light Weapons, OSCE, 2003, pp. 53–54; Organization

for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), Forum for Security Co-operation. Decision No. 5/04: Standard Elements of End User Certificates and Verification

Procedures for SALW exports, OSCE document FSC/DEC/5/04, 17 November 2004; Regional Centre on Small Arms and Light Weapons (RECSA), Best Practice

Guidelines for the Implementation of the Nairobi Declaration and Nairobi Protocol on Small Arms and Light Weapons, RECSA, 2005; Wassenaar Arrangement, End

user assurances commonly used: consolidated indicative list, adopted in 1999, revised in 2005; Wassenaar Arrangement, Introduction to End User/End Use Controls for

Export of Military-List Equipment, adopted in July 2014.

ISACS recommends that an EUS should contain similar assurances to those contained

in an EUC, while recognizing that in the case of an EUS the items could be re-sold in

the country of destination in the case of firearms being delivered to an authorized gun

dealer, as shown in Table 6.

Table 6. A comparison of the recommended assurances

for EUCs and EUSs in ISACS

An EUC shall contain An EUS shall contain

e) explicit undertakings that d) explicit undertakings that

1) the declared end user will be the ultimate

recipient of the weapons

1) the declared end user will be the ultimate

recipient of the weapons (notwithstanding

the fact that they may be commercially

sold on the domestic market);

2) the declared end use will be the ultimate

use of the weapons

2) the declared end use will be the final use

of the weapons

3) the weapons will not be re-exported

• under any circumstances,

• without prior, written authorization from the

original exporting State,

• without prior, written notification to the

original exporting State, or

• if the weapons are intended for commercial

sale in the importing State, without due

export authorization

An EUC should contain undertakings An EUS should contain

i) to provide the exporting State with a

delivery verification certificate upon receipt

of the small arms or light weapons by the

authorized end user

h) an undertaking to provide the exporter

with a delivery verification certificate upon

receipt by the authorized end user of the

imported small arms or light weapons

An EUC may contain undertakings

j) to allow the exporting State to check on the

end use of the small arms or light weapons as

a confidence-building measure

k) that end use will be limited to, or will

exclude, a specific geographic location (or

specific locations) within the importing State

Source: United Nations Coordinating Action on Small Arms (UN CASA), International Small

Arms Control Standard (ISACS) 03.21: National Controls over the End User and End Use of

Internationally Transferred Small Arms and Light Weapons, 17 June 2014, p. 5.

2.2. Importer State responsibilities before export authorization

Most of the focus in best practice guidelines is on the content of the documentation and

practices to be undertaken in the exporting State. There are some recommendations

in research and in the OSCE best practice guidelines for States when importing SALW.

The most detailed information is contained in the ISACS module, which deals with end

use/r controls for SALW destined for either State or non-State end users. Therefore,

this section draws heavily upon these sources when discussing the certification of

documents, assisting exporting States in determining the authenticity of EUCs, and

international cooperation more broadly.

2.2.1. Importer responsibilities for State end users

Irrespective of whether end use/r documentation is based on a template produced by

the exporting State or issued by the importing State, the government of the importing

State has a key role to play in the end use/r control process. This is because it is

expected that the EUC will be signed and stamped by a government entity in the

importing State.

192

ISACS recommends that the EUC should be issued by a ‘competent

authority of the importing State’, with the number of government agencies permitted

to issue an EUC kept to a minimum.

193

Furthermore, the number of officials authorized

to sign and stamp—a form of certification of authenticity of the document—should be

kept to a minimum and should ideally be limited to senior government officials at the

minister or deputy minister level. Further, the OSCE best practice guidelines and the

ISACS module recommend that importing States consider taking measures to prevent

forgery, copying and fraudulent use by issuing the EUC on an official government form

or with a letterhead on banknote paper, which is difficult to forge.

194

The UNODA study on EUCs has recommended another method for assuring export

licensing authorities that an EUC is authentic, which is to utilize the Apostille

Certificate process. Under this process, if the importing State is a party to the

Hague Convention, ‘the legally appointed State authority in the buyer’s or importer’s

country may authenticate or legalize the EUC with the prescribed Apostille Stamp of

the Convention’.

195

In addition to the Apostille Stamp, an Apostille Certificate will be

attached to the EUC containing information on:

• country of issue;

• who has signed the document;

• the capacity in which the person signed the document;

• details of any seal on the document;

• place of issue;

• date of issue;

• issuing authority;

• Apostille Certificate number;

192 Hugh Griffiths and Adrian Wilkinson, Guns, Planes and Ships: Identification and Disruption of Clandestine

Arms Transfers, South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light

Weapons, August 2007, pp. 28–29.

193 ‘6.2.3 Issuing Agencies’, United Nations Coordinating Action on Small Arms (UN CASA), International Small

Arms Control Standard (ISACS) 03.21: National Controls over the End User and End Use of Internationally

Transferred Small Arms and Light Weapons, 17 June 2014, p. 4.

194 ‘6.2.4 Form of an end-user certificate’, United Nations Coordinating Action on Small Arms (UN CASA),

International Small Arms Control Standard (ISACS) 03.21: National Controls over the End User and End

Use of Internationally Transferred Small Arms and Light Weapons, 17 June, p. 4; OSCE. 2003. ‘Best practice

guide on export control of small arms and light weapons’. Handbook on Best Practices on Small Arms and

Light Weapons. Vienna: OSCE, p. 9

195 Brian Wood and Peter Danssaert, Study on the Development of a Framework for Improving End Use

and End User Control Systems, United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs Occasional Papers No. 21,

December 2011, p. 27.

• stamp of issuing authority; and

• signature of representative of issuing authority.

196

In the main, importing States should seek to provide the information requested by the

export licensing authorities in the exporting State and take appropriate measures to

reassure these authorities of the legitimacy of the transfer. It is also worth considering

the maintenance of a register of issued EUCs, to help facilitate international cooperation

and institutionalize processes. In addition, providing information to other States on

national points of contact regarding EUC, and in particular a regularly updated list of

individuals authorized to sign EUCs, could also be considered.

2.2.2. Importer responsibilities for non-State end users

As noted above, an EUS differs from an EUC in that it is not issued by the State

but by a non-State end user/importer. As noted in the ISACS module, it is expected

to contain the same type of information as contained in a State-issued EUC with

regard to details of items, end use and end user, as well as assurances on end use

and re-export. The OSCE best practice guidelines recommend that an EUS should be

‘validated’ by the importing State authorities or that an additional document, such as

an import licence, should be provided to show that the non-State importer/end user

has received permission from the relevant government authorities in the importing

State to import the controlled items.

197

ISACS also recommends that the importing State should be involved in providing

assurances or guarantees regarding non-State imports. Where the OSCE best practice

guidelines recommend that an EUS should be ‘validated’ by the importing State

authorities, ISACS recommends that the EUS should be ‘certified’ by the importing

State authorities. For ISACS, this means that the EUS is ‘stamped and signed (or

otherwise certified) by a competent authority of the importing State’.

198

As with the

EUC, it is recommended that the number of State authorities authorized to certify

an EUS should be limited in number and that the number of officials authorized to

sign an EUS should also be limited. ISACS outlines an ideal certification process that

is comparable in some respects to the process for authentication and verification of

EUCs and EUSs by exporting State licensing authorities, which will be outlined below.

First, the government officials authorized to certify an EUS will check the authenticity

of the EUS, ensuring it is on the letterhead paper of the importing non-State entity

or end user. For example, the EUS could be compared with previous EUS received

from the importing non-State entity or end user to ensure consistency. Second, the

accuracy of the information contained in the EUS will be checked. Third, the bona fide

(i.e. the trustworthiness, acting in good faith) of the importer/end user will be checked

to ensure that the importer/end user:

196 Brian Wood and Peter Danssaert, Study on the Development of a Framework for Improving End Use

and End User Control Systems, United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs Occasional Papers No. 21,

December 2011, p. 27.

197 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), “Best practice guide on export control of

small arms and light weapons”, in Handbook on Best Practices on Small Arms and Light Weapons, OSCE,

2003, p. 9.

198 ‘6.3 End-user statement’, United Nations Coordinating Action on Small Arms (UN CASA), International

Small Arms Control Standard (ISACS) 03.21: National Controls over the End User and End Use of

Internationally Transferred Small Arms and Light Weapons, 17 June 2014, p. 6.

• exists, and is therefore a ‘legal person’;

• does not have a criminal record;

• has not been involved in illegal activities, in particular not in relation to arms;

• is legally entitled to import and/or receive the items, e.g. has a permit to import

and/or receive conventional arms.

199

If the relevant authorities in the importing State are satisfied that the EUS is authentic,

that the information contained in the EUS is accurate, and that the importer/end user

is a legitimate entity that is permitted to import and/or receive the conventional arms

described in the EUS, then the EUS is certified with the following information:

• an official stamp or seal and the name, address and contact details (telephone,

fax and e-mail) of the competent national authority;

• an unique certification number;

• the date of certification; and

• the date of expiration of the EUS, which should not exceed two years from the

date of certification.

200

These measures are intended to reassure the export licensing authority in the exporting

State that the relevant authorities in the importing State are aware of the proposed

import and do not oppose it. The information provided by the certification can also be

used by the exporting State to carry out its own checks, not only on the end user but

also with the certifying authority. Although this process is recommended in ISACS, as

will be shown in Chapter 3, it is not universally adhered to.

2.3. Exporter State responsibilities before export authorization

Best practice guidelines provide more information on the processes to be undertaken

by export licensing authorities regarding end use/r controls than for importing State

authorities. As noted above, end use/r documentation is an important component

of an export licence application. The end use/r documentation form and contents

provide information for the risk assessment conducted by export licensing authorities

when considering an export licence application. First, the end use/r documentation is

authenticated. This consists of the exporting State authorities checking ‘the authenticity

of the signature, the capacity in which the person certifying the document has acted

and, where appropriate, the identity of the seal or stamp which it bears’.

201

To assist

in this process, the exporting State’s diplomatic mission in the prospective importing

State could carry out or play a role in the assessment. For example, it may act as

liaison with the relevant authorities in the importing State to confirm that the end

199 ‘6.3.3 Certification procedure (for an EUS)’, United Nations Coordinating Action on Small Arms (UN

CASA), International Small Arms Control Standard (ISACS) 03.21: National Controls over the End User and

End Use of Internationally Transferred Small Arms and Light Weapons, 17 June 2014, p. 6.

200 ‘6.3.5 Content of a certified end-user statement’, United Nations Coordinating Action on Small Arms (UN

CASA), International Small Arms Control Standard (ISACS) 03.21: National Controls over the End User and

End Use of Internationally Transferred Small Arms and Light Weapons, 17 June 2014, pp. 7–8.

201 Brian Wood and Peter Danssaert, Study on the Development of a Framework for Improving End Use

and End User Control Systems, United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs Occasional Papers No. 21,

December 2011, p. 10.

use/r documentation was issued by the State in the case of an EUC or certified by

the State in the case of an EUS.

202

Authentication of the end use/r documentation

is undertaken to ensure that the document is not a forgery. The OSCE best practice

guidelines recommend that exporting States should provide sufficient resources and

training to relevant staff to enable the identification of false documentation.

203

shown in Chapter 1, there are cases in which arms and ammunition shipments were

diverted to entities subject to UN sanctions which export licensing authorities may

have been able to prevent by conducting authentication of end use/r documentation.

Some analysts have expressed concern that for some end use/r control systems the

authentication of end use/r documentation appears to be regarded as the only check

to be carried out before proceeding to issue an export licence.

204

While the document

may pass the test of being authentic, this is not the only type of check that exporting

State’s licensing authorities are expected to undertake of end use/r documentation.

As shown in Chapter 1, even when presented with authentic end use/r documentation,

‘the provider of that end use/user certificate may be acting as an undeclared agent

in acquiring arms to then divert them to a proscribed and/or unauthorized end

user’.

205

Therefore, if the end use/r control system is to take measures to effectively

prevent diversion and misuse, it is necessary to subject the information contained in

the end use/r documentation to scrutiny. The process of checking the accuracy of

information contained in end use/r documentation is referred to as verification. Non-

governmental experts have argued that ‘a lack of sufficient end user verification is the

greatest expediting factor for illicit delivery’, while thorough verification processes are

the ‘most effective method’ of identifying diversion attempts.

206

In general, a thorough

risk assessment will subject information contained in the end use/r documentation

to a verification process that includes a cross-check with intelligence and databases

held in the exporting State, lists of sanctioned entities, as well as with open source

information. In addition, requesting information from the importing State and sharing

information with transit and transhipment States and other stakeholders (e.g. arms

exporting companies and shipping companies) can also help to reduce the risk of

diversion.

207

A first check is to ensure that the end use/r documentation contains all of the

information that the export licensing authorities request to be presented in end use/r

documentation that accompanies an export licence application. The UNIDIR Expert

202 Glenn McDonald, “Who’s buying? End User Certification”, in Small Arms Survey 2008: Risk and Resilience,

Cambridge University Press, 2008, p. 162; Brian Wood and Peter Danssaert, Study on the Development of a

Framework for Improving End Use and End User Control Systems, United Nations Office for Disarmament

Affairs Occasional Papers No. 21, December 2011, p. 26.

203 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), “Best practice guide on export control of

small arms and light weapons”, in Handbook on Best Practices on Small Arms and Light Weapons, OSCE,

2003, p. 9.

204 Matt Schroeder, Helen Close and Chris Stevenson, “Deadly Deception: Arms Transfer Diversion”, in Small

Arms Survey 2008: Risk and Resilience, Cambridge University Press, 2008, p. 129.

205 Brian Wood and Peter Danssaert, Study on the Development of a Framework for Improving End Use

and End User Control Systems, United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs Occasional Papers No. 21,

December 2011, p. 28.

206 Hugh Griffiths and Adrian Wilkinson, Guns, Planes and Ships: Identification and Disruption of Clandestine

Arms Transfers, South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light

Weapons, August 2007, p. 27

207 Council of the European Union, User’s Guide to Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP defining

common rules governing the control of exports of military technology and equipment, EU document

COARM 172, CFSP/PESC 393, endorsed by the Council (Foreign Affairs) on 20 July 2015, p. 9.

Group on end use/r control systems noted that a warning sign in such cases is the

absence of required information in the end use/r documentation.

208

The second step

is to check that the information provided in the end use/r documentation is reliable

and can be verified. Each of the details identified in Section 2.1.1 can be checked or

verified to give the export licensing authority confidence that the proposed transfer is

legitimate and will not be subject to diversion or arms misuse after delivery.

209

A useful

starting point for this is usually to check the bona fide of the prospective end user/

consignee to ensure that it is a legitimate entity and a reliable recipient of the items to

be transferred.

210

Checks can be undertaken on whether the entity has been involved

in illicit activities or corrupt practices in the past:

• Is there a good record of abiding by assurances on use and re-export?

• Are the items a good fit for the end user?

• Does the end user already utilize such items or have such items in its inventory?

• Is the quantity of an appropriate level for the relevant security forces?

A warning sign might be that the proposed transfer involves 7.62 mm ammunition

but it is known that the end user’s inventory consists of SALW that fire 5.56 mm

ammunition. Further investigation in such cases could be warranted.

211

Are the items

appropriate for the end user? Related to this issue is whether the declared end use

is appropriate for the items. Is a submarine appropriate for the national defence of a

landlocked State? In addition, does the end user and/or importing State have a good

record with regard to non-proliferation and have in place the necessary infrastructure

and procedures for limiting the risk of unauthorized re-transfer, theft or diversion? Are

there entities involved in the transfer chain that pose a risk with regard to corruption

and/or diversion? Several best practice guidelines can provide assistance with regard

to the types of questions to pose when examining information contained in an end

use/r document. The questions contained in the EU user’s guide and the Wassenaar

Arrangement’s Elements for Objective Analysis and Advice concerning Potentially

Destabilising Accumulations of Conventional Weapons are both particularly useful

resources in this regard.

212

International instruments and agreements, including the PoA, the Firearms Protocol

and the ATT, recommend international cooperation and information exchanges as

mechanisms for supporting verification processes. While most best practice guidelines

recommend utilizing the resources of relevant agencies in the exporting State (e.g.

customs, law enforcement, justice, intelligence and defence), States can also use

208 UNIDIR, Meeting Summary: Examining Options and Model for Harmonization of End Use/r Control Systems.

Informal Expert Group Meeting, Vienna, 22–23 April 2015, UNIDIR, June 2015.

209 ‘6.4.3 Verification’, United Nations Coordinating Action on Small Arms (UN CASA), International Small

Arms Control Standard (ISACS) 03.21: National Controls over the End User and End Use of Internationally

Transferred Small Arms and Light Weapons, 17 June 2014, p. 8.

210 Wassenaar Arrangement, Introduction to End User/End Use Controls for Export of Military-List Equipment,

adopted in July 2014, p.2.

211 Hugh Griffiths and Adrian Wilkinson, Guns, Planes and Ships: Identification and Disruption of Clandestine

Arms Transfers, South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light

Weapons, August 2007, p. 37.

212 Council of the European Union, User’s Guide to Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP defining

common rules governing the control of exports of military technology and equipment, EU document

COARM 172, CFSP/PESC 393, endorsed by the Council (Foreign Affairs) on 20 July 2015, p. 9; Wassenaar

Arrangement, Elements for Objective Analysis and Advice Concerning Potentially Destabilising

Accumulations of Conventional Weapons, approved at the Wassenaar Arrangement Plenary, 3 December

1998.

intergovernmental information exchange mechanisms at the international level (such

as INTERPOL’s EU-funded online Illicit Arms Records and Tracing Management System

(iARMS)), the regional level, and also bilateral consultations.

213

In addition, the ATT, PoA and Firearms Protocol encourage exporting States to share

information with transit and transhipment States on transfers that will pass through

their territory. However, providing such information when transportation routes can

change presents a significant challenge for exporting States. Nevertheless, it should

also be borne in mind that States seeking to exercise transit and transhipment controls

rely on advance information to expedite legitimate shipments, as well as assistance in

identifying suspicious shipments.

The UNIDIR Expert Group on end use/r control systems and the informal consultations

with key arms industry stakeholders in July 2015 also stressed the importance of

cooperation with trusted partners in arms industry.

214

Significant arms producers and

exporters in many countries are now expected to have internal compliance programmes

in place that can conduct preliminary risk assessments and work towards ensuring that

the requirements of the export licensing authority are fulfilled when making an export

licence application. Therefore, industry plays an important role in seeking to ensure

that all of the required information is contained in the end use/r documentation and

other requested documents. It is also assumed that industry knows the recipient and

will also have undertaken due diligence checks to ensure that its bona fide is in order,

as demonstrated by the case of an exporter bringing to the attention of export control

authorities a forged EUC used by the Islamic Republic of Iran.

215

2.4. Post-delivery cooperation

In Table 5, reference is made to the inclusion of optional provisions on confirmation of

delivery or on-site inspections. Such measures fall under the broad heading of ‘post-

delivery controls’ or ‘post-delivery monitoring’. For the purposes of this study, the term

‘post-delivery cooperation’ is utilized, drawing upon recommendations from the UNIDIR

Expert Group, which considered that ‘cooperation’ is the most appropriate description

for post-delivery processes because they require the active participation of importing

and exporting States and non-State actors where involved.

216

While best practice guidelines request provisions in end use/r documentation relating

to assurances on use and re-export, such guidelines include the possibility of engaging

in post-delivery cooperation within a fixed time period in end use/r control systems.

For example, the EU user’s guide notes that ‘[w]hereas the emphasis of export controls

213 Council of the European Union, User’s Guide to Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP defining

common rules governing the control of exports of military technology and equipment, EU document

COARM 172, CFSP/PESC 393, endorsed by the Council (Foreign Affairs) on 20 July 2015, pp. 123–125;

‘6.4.4 Sources of information and timeframe’, United Nations Coordinating Action on Small Arms (UN

CASA), International Small Arms Control Standard (ISACS) 03.21: National Controls over the End User and

End Use of Internationally Transferred Small Arms and Light Weapons, 17 June 2014, p. 9.

214 UNIDIR, Meeting Summary: Examining Options and Model for Harmonization of End Use/r Control Systems.

Informal Expert Group Meeting, Vienna, 22–23 April 2015, UNIDIR, June 2015.

215 Security Council, Final report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1929 (2010), UN

document S/2013/331, 5 June 2013, para. 153.

216 UNIDIR, Meeting Summary: Examining Options and Model for Harmonization of End Use/r Control Systems.

Informal Expert Group Meeting, Vienna, 22–23 April 2015, UNIDIR, June 2015.

remains on the pre-licensing phase, post-shipment control can be an important

supplementary tool to strengthen the effectiveness of national arms export control’.

217

As Chapter 3 will show, few States currently utilize post-delivery cooperation practices

to ensure that end users abide by assurances contained in end use/r documentation

or contracts. Therefore, ‘there is a strong chance that any diversion that does occur

will go undetected. Unless the diversion is revealed by other means, nothing prevents

the State from approving further exports to the same end user’.

218

Assurances on end

use and re-export are under a ‘declaration of honour’, which may ultimately result in

action taken against those involved in diversion. In addition, information regarding

diversion may be shared among major exporting States through information exchange

mechanisms.

Post-delivery cooperation measures are sometimes adopted in cases involving the

transfer of particularly sensitive items (e.g. MANPADS) or for State end users that

are subject to provisions in Security Council resolutions regarding post-conflict arms

supplies.

219

This section considers three of the main forms of post-delivery cooperation

discussed in best practice guidelines:

• Delivery confirmation or verification;

• Routine and ad hoc post-delivery checks; and

• Investigation into reports of diversion/unauthorized re-transfer.

2.4.1. Delivery confirmation and verification

End use/r documentation can contain an obligation for the importer/consignee/end

user to provide the exporter, who in turn provides it to the export licensing authority

with documentation confirming delivery and/or receipt of the conventional arms by

the authorized end user or representative. The most common form of documentation

for confirming delivery is a DVC.

220

The DVC is written proof, certified by a competent

authority in the importing State and most often customs, that the authorized end user

has received the items covered by the export licence and end use/r documentation.

This document therefore reassures the export licensing authorities that the items

have not been diverted since leaving the exporting State. It is therefore a measure for

addressing diversion en route to the end user from the exporting State.

ISACS provides guidance on the process for issuing a DVC for SALW transfers and

also recommended contents.

221

With regard to the process, ISACS recommends that

only a limited number of competent authorities should be authorized to issue a DVC,

217 Council of the European Union, User’s Guide to Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP defining

common rules governing the control of exports of military technology and equipment, EU document

COARM 172, CFSP/PESC 393, endorsed by the Council (Foreign Affairs) on 20 July 2015, p. 9.

218 Glenn McDonald, “Who’s buying? End User Certification”, in Small Arms Survey 2008: Risk and Resilience,

Cambridge University Press, 2008, p. 174.

219 Brian Wood and Peter Danssaert, Study on the Development of a Framework for Improving End Use

and End User Control Systems, United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs Occasional Papers No. 21,

December 2011, p. 11.

220 Brian Wood and Peter Danssaert, Study on the Development of a Framework for Improving End Use

and End User Control Systems, United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs Occasional Papers No. 21,

December 2011, p. 11.

221 ‘7.2 Delivery verification’, United Nations Coordinating Action on Small Arms (UN CASA), International Small

Arms Control Standard (ISACS) 03.21: National Controls over the End User and End Use of Internationally

Transferred Small Arms and Light Weapons, 17 June 2014 pp. 11–13.

ideally the customs administration. ISACS places the responsibility for arranging the

issuing of a DVC in the first instance with the end user, which should request the

customs administration or other relevant authority to issue a DVC after taking receipt

of the conventional arms delivery. It is then for the customs administration to verify the

relevant documentation on the import and if satisfied issue a DVC to the authorized

end user. The end user then provides the exporter with the DVC, and the exporter

in turn provides the DVC to the export licensing authorities. As for SALW, ISACS

recommends that this process should take no more than 30 days following the end

user’s receipt of the arms. The informal consultations with industry in July 2015 and

the UNIDIR Expert Group indicated that in practice this process can take months, and

there are occasions when a DVC is not issued, despite repeated requests.

Best practice guidelines for end use/r documentation make reference to the possibility

of issuing a DVC for SALW, but do not provide information on the recommended

contents of such documents. ISACS indicates that the following elements should be

contained in a DVC issued by the competent authorities of the importing State:

• ‘a unique identifying number;

• the name, address and contact details (phone, fax and e-mail) of the exporter;

• the name, address and contact details (phone, fax and e-mail) of the authorized

end user;

• the import authorization number;

• the bill of lading/air waybill number;

• the consignment’s: place of arrival (name of port), date of arrival, and means of

arrival (including descriptors of the ship, aircraft or other carrier as they appear

in the bill of lading/air waybill);

• a description of the consignment, including:

o the contract or purchase order number;

o quantities;

o makes;

o models;

o calibres;

o types (e.g. revolver, pistol, rifle, sub-machine gun, light machine gun, heavy

machine gun, grenade launcher, mortar, anti-aircraft gun, anti-tank gun, anti-

tank rocket system, anti-tank missile system, anti-aircraft missile system (e.g.

MANPADS), etc.); and

o actions (e.g. manual, semi-automatic or automatic. If a weapon has a

selective fire capability, the highest capability, automatic being the highest,

should be indicated);

• the stamp/seal of the customs administration or other competent authority of

the importing State;

• a certification by the customs administration or other competent authority of

the importing State that the authorized end user has taken possession of the

consignment;

• the date of certification; and

• the signature, printed name and position of the authorized representative of

the customs administration or other competent national authority making the

certification’.

222

The DVC is also subject to authentication and verification by the export licensing

authorities in the original exporting State to ensure that the document is not a forgery

or does not contain false information. The DVC is a limited means of post-delivery

cooperation because it does not help to limit unauthorized re-transfers or a change in

end use/r.

2.4.2. Routine or ad hoc post-delivery checks

Routine or ad hoc post-delivery checks to address misuse after delivery or post-

delivery diversion can take various forms. In cases where an on-site inspection is used

as a post-delivery measure, it tends to be for particularly sensitive items or in cases

where the export licensing authorities consider it necessary to monitor the end use

and end user due to a heightened risk of diversion perhaps because of limited physical

security and stockpile management capacities.

223

As noted in Table 3, best practice guidelines contain recommendations for optional

provisions for post-shipment inspections for inclusion in end use/r documentation or

contractual documentation.

224

The inspection could consist of a physical inspection

and inventory check in the location at which the items are kept and maintained or by

reviewing records of holdings.

225

It has been noted that States rarely undertake routine

on-site inspections and therefore the provisions contained in end use/r documentation

relating to on-site inspections tend to be utilized on an ad hoc basis, in particular

following an allegation or report of misuse, diversion or an unauthorized re-transfer

(see below).

226

The UNIDIR Expert Group noted the challenges relating to costs and capacity for

exporting States to conduct post-shipment on-site inspections. It was also noted that

it can be a challenge to secure the permission of importing States to include provisions

for on-site inspections in contractual agreements or end use/r documentation.

227

ISACS

notes that inspections could be undertaken by officials of the exporting State (e.g. a

dedicated unit or the defence attaché of the exporting State’s diplomatic mission in

the importing State) or contractors hired by the exporting State from an independent

222 ‘7.2.4 Content of a delivery verification certificate’, United Nations Coordinating Action on Small Arms (UN

CASA), International Small Arms Control Standard (ISACS) 03.21: National Controls over the End User and

End Use of Internationally Transferred Small Arms and Light Weapons, 17 June 2014, pp. 12–13.

223 Brian Wood and Peter Danssaert, Study on the Development of a Framework for Improving End Use

and End User Control Systems, United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs Occasional Papers No. 21,

December 2011, p. 11.

224 Wassenaar Arrangement, Introduction to End User/End Use Controls for Export of Military-List Equipment,

adopted in July 2014, p. 2.

225 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), How to Guide: Small Arms and Light Weapons

Legislation, UNDP Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (Geneva), July 2008, p. 79.

226 Glenn McDonald, “Who’s buying? End User Certification”, in Small Arms Survey 2008: Risk and Resilience,

Cambridge University Press, 2008, p. 163.

227 UNIDIR, Meeting Summary: Examining Options and Model for Harmonization of End Use/r Control Systems.

Informal Expert Group Meeting, Vienna, 22–23 April 2015, UNIDIR, June 2015.

entity that both exporting and importing States are willing to accept.

228

The UNIDIR

Expert Group concurred with the ISACS guidance that other entities can support end

use monitoring after delivery, noting that the importing State could perform post-

delivery checks. It was recognized that this could be a confidence-building measure

that would not incur the challenges of extraterritorial application of national transfer

control legislation. Another option discussed by the UNIDIR Expert Group is to liaise

with a company that has exported conventional arms. In many cases the company will

be involved in providing technical assistance, maintenance and repairs for several years

after delivering a complete system. The absence of such post-delivery maintenance

arrangements could be regarded in some cases as cause for concern if the importing

State does not possess the facilities or experience to undertake overhauls or

maintenance in-country. However, during the informal consultations with industry,

several participants noted that while they can bring to the attention of the export

licensing authorities discrepancies between the number of conventional arms delivered

and those serviced in subsequent years, there was an insistence that post-delivery

cooperation and monitoring should not be added to the responsibilities of producers

and exporters but should remain with States.

2.4.3. Investigation into reports or allegations of diversion or unauthorized re-transfer

Regional instruments and best practice guidelines do not provide guidance on possible

responses to reports or allegations of misuse, diversion or an unauthorized re-transfer,

but there has been increased attention towards measures that can be undertaken in

such circumstances following the “Arab Spring”.

229

The Small Arms Survey identified

three approaches that an exporting State can undertake for such investigations:

• The exporting State could undertake a unilateral investigation;

• The exporting State and importing State could undertake a joint investigation;

• An independent team could be appointed, acceptable to both the exporting and

importing States.

230

The South East and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms

(SEESAC) has provided a toolkit for addressing unauthorized re-export or re-transfer

of arms and ammunition that includes a section on responding to violations of re-

export or re-transfer restrictions.

231

The toolkit recommends the following steps to

be undertaken when a report or allegation of a diversion is presented to the original

exporting State:

228 ‘7.3.2 Inspectors’, United Nations Coordinating Action on Small Arms (UN CASA), International Small

Arms Control Standard (ISACS) 03.21: National Controls over the End User and End Use of Internationally

Transferred Small Arms and Light Weapons, 17 June 2014, pp. 12–13.

229 Paul Holtom, Irene Pavesi and Christelle Rigual, “Trade Update: Transfers, retransfers and the ATT”, in Small

Arms Survey 2014: Women and Guns, Cambridge University Press, 2014, pp. 108–143.

230 Paul Holtom, Irene Pavesi and Christelle Rigual, “Trade Update: Transfers, retransfers and the ATT”, in Small

Arms Survey 2014: Women and Guns, Cambridge University Press, 2014, pp. 126–127.

231 South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons

(SEESAC), Toolkit for Addressing Unauthorized Re-Export or Re-Transfer of Arms and Ammunition, SEESAC,

June 2014, pp. 25–27. See also the research report: South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for

the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SEESAC), Addressing Unauthorized Re-Export or Re-

Transfer of Arms and Ammunition, SEESAC, June 2014.

• Establish clear lines of responsibility for coordinating and managing the

investigation and responding to the report or allegation;

• Communicate information to relevant stakeholders in the exporting State (e.g.

parliament and media) and partner States;

• Request information from the end user regarding the items reported or alleged

to have been diverted, re-exported or re-transferred;

• Suspend or annul export licences concerning the end user and/or importing

State;

• Place restrictions on future exports to the end user and/or importing State;

• Share information on the investigation and its results with other States.

232

Therefore, tentative steps are being taken to codify the different responses that

States have undertaken to allegations of diversion. While such responses usually

entail investigations by the relevant law enforcement agencies in the exporting State,

international cooperation is also often a critical element for resolving the allegation.

Furthermore, sharing information on the investigation and its results with other

exporters via regional organizations or export control regimes is an important outcome.

232 South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons

(SEESAC), Toolkit for Addressing Unauthorized Re-Export or Re-Transfer of Arms and Ammunition,

SEESAC, June 2014, pp. 24–26.

3. National end use/r control practices

This chapter draws upon several sources of information to provide an overview of

national end use/r control practices, in particular those relating to the form, content

and practices for utilizing end use/r documentation. The primary source of information

for this chapter is the UNIDIR Survey on harmonization of end use/r control systems.

The Survey consists of 29 questions that seek information on end use/r documentation,

checks and post-delivery cooperation, and international cooperation and information

exchange possibilities. The Survey was distributed to UN Member States via the

Permanent Missions to the United Nations in Geneva and New York starting in June

2015. States were requested to return their completed Surveys by 1 September

although Surveys were received and accepted until the end of October 2015. As of 30

October 2015, 41 completed Surveys had been received. Table 7 contains a list of the

respondent States, organized by region: Africa (5 respondents); Americas (6), Asia (10),

Europe (18) and Oceania (2).

233

Twenty-two of these States are participating States

of the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-

Use Goods and Technologies. This chapter presents the aggregated data from these

Surveys and some anonymized examples of national practice contained in completed

UNIDIR Surveys. The chapter therefore relies on information provided by States. It does

not draw conclusions on the effectiveness of the implementation of these measures.

Table 7. UNIDIR Survey respondents: Regional breakdown

Africa (5) Americas (6) Asia (10) Europe (18) Oceania (2)

Burkina Faso

Mali

Three

participating

States

requested

to withhold

name of

country

Dominican Republic

Five participating

States requested to

withhold name of

country

India

Japan

Malaysia

Philippines

Qatar

Republic of

Korea

Turkey

Three

participating

States

requested to

withhold name

of country

Austria

Croatia

Czech Republic

France

Germany

Hungary

Montenegro

Romania

Russian Federation

Serbia

Spain

Sweden

Switzerland

The former Yugoslav

Republic of Macedonia

Ukraine

United Kingdom

Two participating

States requested to

withhold name of

country

Australia

New Zealand

233 For the purpose of this study, the regional classification of UN Member States according to the United

Nations Statistics Division is used.

In addition, UNIDIR has analysed information contained in national reports on PoA

implementation concerning EUC and post-delivery cooperation, information provided

by States in response to the UNGA resolutions on UN exchange of national legislation

on the transfer of arms, military equipment and dual-use goods and technology

and completed ATT-BAP Surveys.

234

Where relevant, aggregated data from 85 PoA

national reports for 2012–2015 and examples of practices in the 24 submissions to

the UNGA resolutions on UN exchange of national legislation on the transfer of arms,

military equipment and dual-use goods and technology between 2012 and 2015 and

63 completed ATT-BAP Surveys are used. Samples of end use/r documentation have

also been utilized, along with information contained in expert analyses, to inform this

chapter of the study.

235

3.1. End use/r documentation requested by export licensing authorities

Of the 41 respondents to the UNIDIR Survey, five did not complete responses for

questions regarding the information sought in end use/r documentation and the

processes for authentication, verification and risk assessment before authorizing an

export of conventional arms. These respondents, three of which are located in Africa,

one from the Americas and one from Asia, explained that their State did not export

conventional arms and therefore did not consider questions on the role of end use/r

documentation in export authorization processes to be relevant.

The first question in the Survey asked: ‘When your State considers authorizing the

export of conventional arms, including small arms and light weapons, do you require the

applicant to submit end use/end user documentation to the relevant national authorities

as part of the application process?’ Thirty-two States (78 per cent) responded that

they require end use/r documentation to be submitted as part of an export licence

process, with an additional three States reporting that there are exceptions. Of this

total of 35 respondents, 18 are from Europe, nine from Asia, four from the Americas,

two from Africa and two from Oceania. With regard to the exceptions, one EU Member

State noted that an EUC is not required for exports to other EU Member States and

‘like-minded States and/or member States of multilateral export control regimes’. This

corresponds with the results of UNIDIR’s analysis of national reports on implementation

of the PoA during 2012-2015, which found that 66 (78 per cent) of the 85 reporting

States require an EUC from an importing State prior to authorizing an SALW export.

236

More than half of these States are European (35), followed by 10 African States, 10

Asian States, eight States from the Americas and two States from Oceania. All 22

234 General Assembly resolutions 57/66 of 22 November 2002, 58/42 of 8 December 2003, 59/66 of 3

December 2004, 60/69 of 8 December 2005, 62/26 of 5 December 2007, 64/40 pf 2 December 2009,

66/41 of 2 December 2011, and 68/44 of 5 December 2013. ATT-BAP surveys can be found online at:

<http://www.armstrade.info>.

235 Mark Bromley and Hugh Griffiths, End User Certificates: Improving Standards to Prevent Diversion,

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), SIPRI Insights on Peace and Security 2010/3;

Hugh Griffiths and Adrian Wilkinson, Guns, Planes and Ships: Identification and Disruption of Clandestine

Arms Transfers, South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and

Light Weapons, August 2007; Glenn McDonald, “Who’s buying? End User Certification”, in Small Arms

Survey 2008: Risk and Resilience, Cambridge University Press, 2008, pp. 154–181; Brian Wood and Peter

Danssaert, Study on the Development of a Framework for Improving End Use and End User Control

Systems, United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs Occasional Papers No. 21, December 2011.

236 Analysis of responses to Question 6.5a in the UN PoA reporting tool, <http://www.poa-iss.org/

NationalReport/NationalReports.aspx>.

participating States of the Wassenaar Arrangement that responded to the Survey

require end use/r documentation before issuing an export licence.

The second question in the Survey asked if a State provided a template or checklist

of elements that must be included in end use/r documentation to the applicant.

Thirty-four respondents (83 per cent) stated that they provide a template or checklist

containing the required details on end use/r, items, entities involved in the transfer,

unique identifiers and assurances on use/r and re-export. The regional breakdown is the

same as for question 1, but with only 16 European respondents providing a checklist or

template, and two European States responded that they would do so with exceptions.

Graph 1 provides an overview of the responses by States that request particular details

to be included in end use/r documentation.

Graph 1. UNIDIR Survey results:

Requested details to be contained in end use/r documentation

Source: UNIDIR Survey, 2015.

The results of the UNIDIR Survey on details to be contained in end use/r documentation

are therefore largely comparable with UNIDIR’s PoA national report analysis, and earlier

analysis of major exporting States’ end use/r documentation.

237

Graph 2 provides

information from the 64 national reports published during 2012–2015 on the contents

of end use/r documentation. In both the UNIDIR Survey and analysis of PoA national

reports, it is clear that details on the items, end user, exporter and date of issue are

required by almost all States. There are no significant differences between regions

regarding the details requested.

The data also indicate that details regarding the contract or order reference number,

intermediaries involved in the transfer and identifiers for the certifying importing State

authority are not uniformly requested. Several respondents to the UNIDIR Survey

highlighted that while certain details are not required in end use/r documentation, this

information is supplied in support of an export licence application but not in end use/r

documentation. For example, two of the respondents that do not require the details

of the contract number or order reference and date in the end use/r documentation,

require copies of the contract to be provided as part of the application. Just over half

of the respondents (23 States responding yes or with exceptions) require an official

letterhead of the competent authority to be included in the end use/r documentation,

12 of which are from Europe, five from Asia, three from the Americas, two from

Oceania and one from Africa. A slightly higher number (25 States responding yes

or with exceptions) require the name and contact details, signature or stamp of

the competent authority in the importing State. However, even in cases where a

respondent has indicated that such details are required, comments have been provided

to indicate that this is not mandatory and that such end use/r documentation will

still be accepted in support of an export licence application. Therefore, there is a gap

between recommended details and what is accepted in practice. This reflects the

assumption of the Small Arms Survey that:

‘On paper, it appears the norms, instruments and systems needed to combat

diversion are in place among the world’s leading exporting States. Yet whether

and how this framework translates into effective action remains unclear in the vast

majority of cases’.

238

The other main types of information to be contained in end use/r documentation are

positive or negative assurances provided by the end user/importer regarding the end

use, end user and re-export of the items to be transferred. Thirty-two respondents (78

per cent) require a statement that the declared end user will be the ultimate end user

of the conventional arms being exported, with 28 (68 per cent) requiring a statement

that the conventional arms will not be used for purposes other than the declared use.

Two of the respondents that provided a negative answer to this question address the

issue in a different manner, seeking a commitment to use the conventional arms only

as indicated in the end use/r documentation.

237 Brian Wood and Peter Danssaert, Study on the Development of a Framework for Improving End Use

and End User Control Systems, United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs Occasional Papers No. 21,

December 2011, pp. 34–35.

238 Glenn McDonald, “Who’s buying? End User Certification”, in Small Arms Survey 2008: Risk and Resilience,

Cambridge University Press, 2008, p. 174.

Graph 2. UNIDIR analysis of PoA national reports, 2012–2015:

Elements in an end user certificate

Source: UNIDIR analysis of UN PoA national reports, 2012-2015.

A high number of respondents require a statement on re-export to be included in end

use/r documentation. Graph 3 shows the options most commonly utilized by States

seeking assurances on re-export. There is a clear preference for re-export to only be

undertaken following authorization by the original exporting State, with only three

respondents indicating that they seek assurances that an end user will not re-export

under any circumstances. One respondent indicated that it generally applies the ‘no

re-export under any circumstances’ clause to ‘exports of manufacturing technology for

conventional arms, including SALW and ammunition’. Respondents indicated several

other clauses on re-export or re-transfer that are sometimes included in end use/r

documentation:

• ‘If exports are destined to resellers, additional limitations could be imposed,

such as an obligation to sell the goods exclusively in the internal market of the

country of destination to end users that accept in writing the commitments of

the EUCs signed by the reseller’;

• ‘The end user undertakes/commits to integrate the materials in its proper

productions and not to sell or transfer to a third entity in the recipient State

without the agreement of the [exporting State] Government (in this case,

the signature of the Certificate does not pose an obstacle to re-export of

productions in which the materials have been integrated)’;

• ‘A statement is required that the goods will not be re-exported or otherwise

re-sold or transferred if it is known or suspected that they are intended or likely

to be used for weapon of mass destruction purposes; and that the goods will

not be re-exported or otherwise re-sold or transferred to a destination subject

to UN, EU or OSCE embargo where that act would be in breach of the terms of

that embargo’.

Fourteen respondents indicated that they utilize additional assurances in end use/r

documentation for exports of MANPADS, with a further 21 respondents noting that

exceptions can be made in some cases. Six respondents indicated that they produce

or could export MANPADS, and that they would apply provisions contained in the

Wassenaar Arrangement Elements for Export Controls of MANPADS when exporting

MANPADS. Additional assurances on secure storage, handling, transportation and use

would not have to be included in the end use/r documentation, but would be assessed

by the export authorities. Two respondents indicated that on-site verification could be

requested, in line with the provisions contained in the Wassenaar Arrangement Elements

for Export Controls of MANPADS. Special provisions are also foreseen by three States

in relation to exports of SALW. One State requires in its end use/r documentation for

transfers of SALW, ammunition and hand grenades ‘the formulation that these goods

will not be used in an offensive manner against the civilian population’.

Graph 3. UNIDIR Survey results: Requested assurances on re-export

to be contained in end use/r documentation

Source: UNIDIR Survey, 2015.

UNIDIR’s analysis of information on re-export assurances contained in PoA national

reports indicates that 57 out of 85 (68 per cent) reporting States will only permit a

re-export of SALW with prior approval, with 20 States permitting re-export only with

prior notification to the original exporting State from the re-exporting State.

239

Eight

of the 21 States that require only prior notification before re-export are African group

States, six from Europe, three from the Americas and three from Asia.

The UNIDIR Survey also sought information on the role that end use/r documentation

plays in an effective end use/r control system and any challenges faced in using end

use/r documentation in an export licensing risk assessment. As noted in Chapters

1 and 2, it is recommended that export licensing authorities scrutinize end use/r

documentation, authenticating the document and verifying its contents to prevent

diversion. Sixteen respondents explicitly indicated that the provision of end use/r

documentation is a necessary requirement for receiving an export licence. One

respondent echoed the best practice guidelines discussed in Chapter 2 and stressed

that ‘the thorough examination of end use/end user is considered crucial for prevention

of diversion’. Ten respondents indicated that diplomatic channels are utilized for the

authentication of the document and verifying its contents as part of a comprehensive

risk assessment, with embassies cited in several cases as playing a key role in this

process. Six States mentioned national intelligence services also supporting this

process. Four States referred to open source information available online as a method

for checking the details contained in end use/r documentation. Another respondent

indicated that it maintains a watch list of entities that are not considered reliable arms

trading entities or recipients, and would check the information contained in end use/r

documentation against the watch list. Other indicators of concern could include:

• unfamiliar end user;

• incomplete or suspect supporting documentation;

• scanty or derogatory background information or end use description;

• reticence or evasiveness by applicant or purchasing agent;

• payment in cash or at above-market rates;

• unfamiliarity of end users with the product or its use;

• end user declines customary associated services (e.g. installation, warranty,

spares, repair);

• commodity indicators: excessive or inconsistent with needs or inventory,

in demand by embargoed countries, especially sensitive (e.g. night vision,

unmanned aerial vehicles, missile-related, high calibre);

• and geographic/shipment indicators: unfamiliar intermediary, unusual routing,

trans-shipment through multiple countries or companies, countries, cities, or

ports of concern, free trade zones, vague or suspicious delivery locations (e.g.

P.O. box), shipping /packaging instructions, designation of freight forwarders as

foreign consignees or end users, foreign intermediate consignees (e.g. trading

companies, freight forwarders, export companies) with no apparent connection

to the end user.

239 Analysis of responses to Question 6.6 in the UN PoA reporting tool, <http://www.poa-iss.org/

NationalReport/NationalReports.aspx>.

At the same time, several respondents echoed the sentiments below that end use/r

documentation and scrutiny represents only one aspect of effective export controls:

‘End user documentation plays an important role as part of the risk assessment

process when deciding on export licence applications. Such documentation may

give valuable information about the entities and persons involved in the transaction,

as well as being a confirmation of their willingness to abide by export control rules

and procedures. However, it must be emphasized that it is just one aspect of the

risk assessment; no form or amount of documentation can prevent illicit activity’.

Eighteen respondents (44 per cent) to the UNIDIR Survey reported that they face

challenges in verifying information contained in end use/r documentation, including:

• The lack of reliable or verifiable information in the end use/r documentation;

• Changing circumstances in the country of import or changes regarding the

declared end user;

• Complexity of supply chains;

• The lack of cooperation with the relevant authorities in the country of import;

• Cooperation with entities involved in the transfer;

• Difficulties in identifying the competent authorities and authorized signatories

(e.g. in both recipient countries and third party/transit States);

• Lack of resources (e.g. diplomatic representations in recipient countries);

• Lack of familiarity with end use/r control procedures and requirements,

misperceptions with regard to checks and compliance inquiries.

One option that can help with authentication and verification is to keep records of

end use/r documentation received as part of export licence applications and check

subsequent licence applications to the same end user or importing State against

previous documents. Graph 4 shows the results of the UNIDIR Survey regarding record-

keeping practices. All 35 of the respondents that require end use/r documentation

to be submitted as part of an export licence application keep records of end use/r

documentation received. Twenty-eight of these respondents require export licence

applicants to keep records. Five respondents stated that they keep such records

for 10 years, with one respondent keeping the records for up to 10 years, another

for five years and one for at least 15 years for conventional arms and 20 years for

SALW. Most respondents that provided such additional information noted that end

use/r documentation is kept with all documents submitted in relation to an export

licence application, with hard and electronic copies maintained. The time period that

exporters are required to maintain records varies from five years to indefinitely, with

some respondents noting that they undertake checks on exporter records.

Graph 4. UNIDIR Survey results: End use/r documentation record-keeping

Source: UNIDIR Survey, 2015.

Twenty-five respondents (61 per cent) stated that they carry out measures to prevent

the forgery or misuse of end use/r documentation. In comparison, 54 States (64 per

cent) declared in their PoA national reports that they do so. Examples of measures to

prevent forgery provided in the UNIDIR Survey include:

• Authentication by embassies located in the importing State;

• Original end use/r documentation, certified/legalized by a public notary;

• Anti-forgery elements included in the document, such as printing on ‘special

paper and numbered individually’;

• Authentication or legalization using the Apostille of the Hague Convention, if the

[importing] country belongs to the same.

While best practice documents have long recommended that end use/r documentation

submitted in support of an export licence application should be an original document,

several States utilize electronic means for export licence applications and therefore

the UNIDIR Survey asked if States continue to require original documents or accept

electronic copies. Graph 5 shows that 29 States (70 per cent) continue to require

original copies with 15 States (36 per cent) willing to accept electronic copies. Two

States noted that while they are willing to accept electronic copies for the export

licence application, original end use/r documentation can be requested.

Graph 5. UNIDIR Survey results:

Hard copy or electronic copy of end use/r documentation?

Source: UNIDIR Survey, 2015.

3.2. End use/r documentation provided by importer and end users

The first questions in the UNIDIR Survey’s section on import authorization asked if

the importing State issues end use/r documentation for State end users and certifies

end use/r documentation for non-State end users. Graph 6 shows that 30 respondents

(73 per cent) issue end use/r documentation for State end users with different

Ministries often responsible depending on the end user. Five respondents stated that

they issue an IIC in such cases. Twenty-five respondents (61 per cent) certify end

use/r documentation for non-State end users (e.g. arms producing companies, private

security companies), with five respondents indicating that IICs are utilized in such cases.

While four of the respondents from the Americas issue end use/r documentation for

State end users, only one respondent in the region certifies end use/r documentation

for non-State end users. The available data do not allow for such a comparison to be

made on this issue in other regions.

Graph 6. UNIDIR Survey results: Importing State issuing

and certifying end use/r documentation

Source: UNIDIR Survey, 2015.

Section 3.1 demonstrated that many exporting States have templates and checklists

that outline the expected contents of end use/r documentation. The UNIDIR Survey

therefore sought to examine to what extent templates and checklists are utilized by

importing States, and to what extent States provide end use/r documentation based on

their own national checklist or template. Graph 7 shows that 28 responding States (68

per cent) utilize a checklist or template provided by exporting States when importing

conventional arms and 21 responding States (51 per cent) utilize their own checklist

or template. One respondent noted that in its experience ‘the end user certificates

supplied by exporting States may differ from one-another in details, but the information

contained is almost identical’. Several respondents noted that exporting States can

insist on the use of an end use/r document format they provide. In general, it appears

to be a case-by-case decision on whether to use a template provided by the exporting

State or end use/r documentation prepared in the importing State.

Graph 7. UNIDIR Survey results:

Use of exporting or importing State checklist or template

Source: UNIDIR Survey, 2015.

Graph 8 shows that the pattern for details and assurances contained in end use/r

documentation issued by importing States overlaps with the required details outlined

in Section 3.1. Several respondents referred to the fact that most of the items contained

in Graph 8 are included in the IIC. Two respondents noted standards developed at

the subregional level regarding the content of end use/r documentation. One African

respondent indicated that the following additional assurances are contained in its end

use/r documentation:

• Taking into account the international humanitarian and international human rights

law record/engagement of the recipient country;

• As part of the combat against illicit traffic in arms.

The record-keeping practices for States importing conventional arms are comparable to

the practices utilized when exporting, with a similar range of years for record-keeping.

Graph 8. UNIDIR Survey results: Details and assurances contained

in end use/r documentation issued by importing States

Source: UNIDIR Survey, 2015.

3.3. Post-delivery cooperation

Chapter 2 noted that best practice guidelines include post-delivery cooperation

practices for end use/r control systems as an optional element, or a practice to be

pursued only for particularly sensitive items, destinations and/or end users. The

UNIDIR Survey reflects the assumption that post-delivery cooperation is not a standard

practice. Graph 9 shows that 17 UNIDIR Survey respondents (42 per cent) require the

importer/end user to provide evidence that conventional arms have been delivered

to the authorized end user, with 16 respondents requiring such a commitment to be

included in their end use/r documentation. However, three respondents indicated that

other mechanisms are utilized for requesting confirmation of delivery. For example,

one respondent indicated that a requirement for a DVC can be included in the export

licence.

Twenty-five survey respondents (61 per cent) provide evidence of delivery to the

relevant authorities in the exporting State when requested. Seven respondents explicitly

stated that they provide a DVC upon request. This indicates that 25 respondents are

willing to provide confirmation of delivery to the 17 respondents that request such

confirmation. Again, the UNIDIR Survey did not reveal major differences between

the regions regarding willingness to provide such information, with roughly half of

respondents from Africa, the Americas and Europe willing to provide confirmation

of delivery. The share of respondents from Asia and Oceania willing to provide such

confirmation is higher.

Only six respondents require the inclusion of a commitment by the end user to agree

to on-site verification by the exporting State, with a further three States sometimes

utilizing this option for ‘sensitive cases’. States were not asked if they would consider

undertaking post-delivery cooperation, but one respondent noted that it lacked the

‘capacity to undertake such verification’. There remains an opportunity to explore the

range of post-delivery cooperation measures further.

Graph 9. UNIDIR Survey results: Seeking and providing confirmation of delivery

Source: UNIDIR Survey, 2015.

The UNIDIR analysis of PoA national reports indicates that States would be more open

to pursuing post-delivery cooperation with regard to SALW compared to conventional

arms more generally. Graph 10 shows that 39 States (46 per cent) reporting under

the PoA require a DVC when exporting SALW, with 34 States (40 per cent) verifying

or seeking to authenticate DVCs. Forty-two (49 per cent) States are willing to grant

the right to the exporting State to conduct a physical check at the point of delivery.

Around two-thirds of these States are European, although nine African States request

and check DVCs when exporting SALW. The PoA national report template does not

seek additional information on physical checks at a later date.

Graph 10. UNIDIR analysis of PoA national reports, 2012–2015:

Post-delivery cooperation

Source: UNIDIR analysis of UN PoA national reports, 2012-2015.

3.4. International cooperation and information exchange

The question in the UNIDIR Survey which received the highest number of positive

responses was ‘Would your State be willing to share template(s) of national end use/r

documentation with other States?’ Thirty-nine States (95 per cent) responded positively

to this question. This is therefore a positive signal for actors interested in examining

the possibility of exploring recommendations to pursue a mechanism to facilitate

the exchange of templates to support authentication of end use/r documentation, as

recommended by the Monitoring Mechanism on Angola Sanctions and the Panel of

Experts on Liberia.

240

Twelve respondents already make their end use/r documentation

templates publicly available online, with one respondent declaring that it has made

this document publicly available via the Wassenaar Arrangement website.

241

Two more

respondents are willing to provide templates and signatures on request. In addition, as

noted in Chapter 5, OSCE participating States have shown that such an exchange can

be undertaken as a first step towards developing an EUC template.

All but three States provided information on the ministry or government agency that

certifies, authenticates and issues end use/r documentation, where applicable, in their

UNIDIR Survey responses. However, the number of respondents willing to provide

other States with information on entities authorized to certify and authenticate end

use/r documentation, in line with the recommendation of the Panel of Experts on

Somalia, to facilitate the process of authenticating end use/r documentation, was

lower with 29 States (70 per cent) willing to participate in such an exchange and eight

States unwilling to participate.

242

One State did recommend ‘a publicly available list of

competent authorities empowered to sign the end use/r documentation’.

Nevertheless, the UNIDIR Survey results point towards a willingness among a number of

States to examine the potential for intergovernmental information exchanges between

States in relation to strengthening end use/r control systems.

240 Security Council, Final report of the Monitoring Mechanism on Angola Sanctions, UN document

S/2000/1225, 21 December 2000, para. 229; Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts appointed

pursuant to paragraph 4 of Security Council resolution 1458 (2003) concerning Liberia, UN document

S/2003/498, 24 April 2003, para. 10, p. 8.

241 Twelve States have made sample EUCs, or links to sample EUCs, available on the Wassenaar Arrangement

website: Australia, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark (for dual-use items), Hungary, Republic of Korea,

Romania, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, and the United Kingdom. Wassenaar Arrangement,

Participating States, <http://www.wassenaar.org/participating-States>.

242 Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts on Somalia pursuant to Security Council resolution 1425

(2002), UN document S/2003/223, 25 March 2003, para. 187, p. 49.

4. Areas for harmonization/the development of

common understandings

This chapter presents six areas for harmonization that reflect proposals discussed with

the UNIDIR Expert Group, and which reflect the main findings of the UNIDIR Survey

and the research conducted for this study. The UNIDIR Expert Group considered a

range of areas in which the development of common understandings, alignment and

cooperation in end use/r control systems could contribute to addressing the diversion

of conventional arms.

243

The group reviewed the various initiatives and instruments

that seek to establish common basic standards for effective end use/r control systems,

as outlined in Table 2 in Chapter 1. These initiatives and instruments include good

practice guidelines for end use/r control systems, checklists or templates for end user

documentation (e.g. an EUC or EUS) and related practices and information exchange

mechanisms. The UNIDIR Expert Group considered the experience of seeking to

harmonize end use/r control systems via international and regional organizations

and export control regimes and identified four key areas in which opportunities for

harmonization at the regional and/or global level is desirable and could be feasible. A

further two optional areas were identified as desirable but which merited further study

before being considered by States in an international process. Nevertheless, further

consideration of these areas would be welcome. The four areas in which a process for

developing common understandings, alignment and cooperation could be feasible are:

• Definition of key terms;

• Details of items, end use and end use/r to be provided to export control

authorities;

• Types of assurances to be provided by the end user/importer; and

• Role and functions of end use/r documentation.

The two areas where challenges exist but that merit further consideration because of

their potentially significant contribution to efforts to address diversion are:

• Exchange of information and indicators for risk assessment; and

• Post-delivery cooperation.

This chapter reviews each of the key potential areas for harmonization of end use/r

control systems. The rationale for the harmonization of the particular area is provided,

alongside an analysis of relevant best practice guidelines discussed in Chapter 2 and

national practices identified in Chapter 3. Each section therefore presents available

evidence that could be used as the basis for consideration of harmonization as part of

a multilateral process.

243 UNIDIR, Meeting Summary: Examining Options and Model for Harmonization of End Use/r Control Systems.

Informal Expert Group Meeting, Vienna, 22–23 April 2015, UNIDIR, June 2015.

4.1. Key areas for harmonization

As demonstrated by Chapters 1 and 2, Euro-Atlantic organizations and export control

regimes provide considerable guidance for each of the four key areas identified in

this chapter. However, UNIDIR’s research has shown that not all participating States

in these organizations and regimes adhere to the recommended practices, and more

importantly, such practices are not diffused beyond these States. This section outlines

the basis for future work in this area.

4.1.1. Definition of key terms

The UNIDIR Expert Group on end use/r control systems recommended that a

good starting point for considering aspects of national end use/r control systems

to harmonize is to identify key concepts and terminology and present commonly

understood meanings. The next step would be for States to share and compare

national understandings of these different key concepts and terminologies and work

towards achieving shared understanding. The UNODA study on end use/r control

systems also called for an international process to be undertaken to harmonize

definitions of key terms.

244

The study provided several definitions which could be used

for such purposes. Subsequently, the ISACS glossary and the Wassenaar Arrangement’s

Introduction to End User/End Use Controls for Exports of Military-List Equipment also

provide definitions of some of the key terms and the way in which some terms are

used interchangeably reflecting the plurality of options currently used in some cases.

This study presents several key terms and concepts that could be considered in an

international process and presents definitions offered by multilateral best practice

guidelines and research on end use/r control systems. Table 8 presents a comparison

of definitions for key terms contained in end use/r documentation or relating to end

use/r control systems. It highlights commonalities and some of the processes for

which more than one name is utilized. The purpose of Table 8 is to identify areas

where consensus could be achieved and where there is a need for greater clarity. It is

expected that agreement on a number of key terms can be reached with relative ease

due to work that has already been undertaken in this area. For example, the definitions

for various forms of end use/r documentation appear to be clear—EUC, EUS and IIC—

and there is agreement on the authentication and verification processes in the ISACS

module and the UNODA study on EUCs. Yet, several key terms are not defined in all of

the best practice guidelines and other guidance referenced in this study.

244 Brian Wood and Peter Danssaert, Study on the Development of a Framework for Improving End Use

and End User Control Systems, United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs Occasional Papers No. 21,

December 2011.

Table 8. Comparison of the definitions of key terms

Key term ISACS Wassenaar

Arrangement

UNODA study Small Arms Survey

Documentation

End user

and end use

documentation

[…] documents whose purpose

is to identify, authorize, commit

to certain undertakings and

verify delivery to end-users of

internationally transferred small

arms or light weapons.

NOTE Includes end-user

certificates, end-user statements

and delivery verification

certificates; and, under

certain conditions, import

authorizations and International

Import Certificates […].

-- -

End user

certificate (EUC)

[…] an official document,

issued by a competent national

authority of the importing State,

that identifies a government

agency of the importing State

as the ultimate recipient of an

international transfer of small

arms or light weapons.

[…] is a clear certified undertaking of a

purchaser/importer that any arms transferred

from the exporting country is for its sole

lawful use and that the arms are not destined

for transfer or re-export to any other entity

or State, without the prior written consent of

the relevant authority in the exporting State.

Such consent has to be obtained from the

relevant arms export authority in terms of the

applicable legislation and procedures of the

exporting State prior to the authorization to

export. The end-use/user certificate should

be an original document and the information

pertaining to the arms on the end-use/user

certificate should correspond with the order(s)

from the purchaser/importer regarding the

specific transaction of the arms. It should

include an official stamp and / or seal legalizing

(authenticating) the end-use/user certificate

by the appointed Government authority in the

buyer/importer’s country indicating that it is an

authentic document.

A document provided by the

end-user in the importing

country (…) containing details

of the goods being exported,

their quantity and the parties

involved in the transaction (…).

It may also specify the end use

of the goods and contain an

undertaking on the part of the

end user not to re-export the

goods without the approval

of the or notification to the

exporting state.

Key term ISACS Wassenaar

Arrangement

UNODA study Small Arms Survey

International

import certificate

(IIC)

[…] is a standardized certificate accepted by

some States through bilateral or multilateral

agreements, such as through the North Atlantic

Treaty Organization and the European Union,

which is signed and stamped by the importing

Government’s authorities to confirm that the

importing Government is aware of, and does

not object to, the proposed transfer of arms

or dual-use items to the commercial entity or

individual. An IIC constitutes an undertaking by

the importer (whether consignee or purchaser)

to import the arms or dual-use items into the

country of destination without diversion or

trans-shipment elsewhere, and not to re-export

the items without an export licence from the

relevant authority in the country of importation.

It is also an assurance from the Government of

the importing country that it will control any

subsequent export of these goods. It may also

require the importer to obtain proof of delivery

of the arms through a delivery verification

certificate.

Issued by the government of the

importing State [indicating it] is

aware of and has no objections

to the import of specified items

and quantities of controlled

goods. The importer obtains

the IIC and provides it to the

exporter.

End use/r

statement (EUS)

[…] a document issued by a

private end-user that provides

assurances regarding the

end user and end use of

internationally transferred small

arms or light weapons.

[A certified end-user statement]

has been stamped and signed

(or otherwise certified) by a

competent authority of the

importing State.

[…] is an affidavit that a purchaser/

importer, whether a Government agency

or private entity, must submit in order to

acknowledge that goods will not be re-sold or

used for purposes other than those for which

they are intended.

Signed and stamped by the

commercial importer. Any

retransfer restrictions that they

contain apply to the commercial

importer.

Key term ISACS Wassenaar

Arrangement

UNODA study Small Arms Survey

Delivery

verification

certificate (DVC)

[…] document, certified by

customs or other competent

authority of the importing State,

confirming that internationally

transferred small arms or light

weapons have been received by

the authorized end-user.

- […] is a document used to prove that the arms

have been effectively transferred and delivered

to the end user or consignee in the importing

State.

A document provided by the

government of the importing

state that confirms the

controlled goods have been

delivered or arrived in the

importing state. The importer

applies for the DVC and is

required to provide evidence

that the delivery has taken

place, such as a bill of lading,

airway bill or a form endorsed

by the customs authority of the

importing state.

Elements/Activities

End use […] the ultimate application of

internationally transferred small

arms or light weapons.

[…] could be integration

of a component or

subsystem into a larger

end product.

Stated end use is the information provided in

the end-use certificate on the intended use of

the notified commodity (e.g., spare part for ...,

incorporation in ..., use as ...). If it is a supply to a

project, the name of the project would normally

be indicated.

[Indication of] how the end user

intends to use the items being

exported.

Authentication […] checking if end-user

and end-use documentation

has been forged, altered or

otherwise illegally tampered

with […]

- [or legalization] is the formality by which the

authorities of the exporting State certify the

authenticity of the signature, the capacity in

which the person certifying the document has

acted and, where appropriate, the identity of

the seal or stamp which it bears.

Certification - - - -

Verification […] checking that the contents

of end-user and end-use

documentation is accurate […]

- […] is the process by which the authorities

of the exporting State check the accuracy

of the information contained in an end-use/

user certificate, especially regarding the risk of

diversion and the end user.

Assurances

(undertaking)

[…] commitment to

circumscribe, limit or specify

the use of imported small arms

or light weapons, or to rule out

certain uses […]

-- -

Key term ISACS Wassenaar

Arrangement

UNODA study Small Arms Survey

Re-export The export of goods from the

State that previously imported

them, without further processing

or transformation of the

imported goods.

-- -

Actors/Entities

End User

(ultimate

consignee)

[…] the ultimate recipient of an

international transfer of small

arms or light weapons.

[…] may be a national

government, national

military forces,

or other national

authorities such as

police, customs or

paramilitary forces (…)

companies that provide

security services.

Industrial end-users are

increasingly common

when components

or subsystems are

exported.

- Person or entity in the importing

state that ultimately receives

and uses the transferred items.

Importer - - […] is the party who makes an import

declaration—or on whose behalf a customs

clearing agent or other authorized person

makes the import declaration. This may include

a person who has possession of the arms or to

whom the arms are consigned.

Consignee

(foreign

consignee)

[…] person (natural or legal) who

is the intended recipient of a

consignment.

- […] the party to which arms are addressed. A recipient of the transferred

goods. The consignee can be

the end user or an ‘intermediate’

consignee that assists in the

delivery to the end user.

Exporter - - […] is the party who makes, or on whose behalf

the export declaration is made, and who is the

owner of the arms or has

similar right of disposal over them at the time

when the declaration is accepted.

Key term ISACS Wassenaar

Arrangement

UNODA study Small Arms Survey

Consignor […] person (natural or legal) who

sends a consignment (e.g. via a

delivery service).

- […] is the shipper of the arms as stipulated in

the transport contract by the party ordering

transport.

Exporting state

(country of

origin)

- - - The state that is responsible for

authorizing the export.

Importing state

(country of final

destination;

final destination

country; recipient

country)

- - - The state in which the end user

is located.

Foreign

intermediate

parties

- - - Entities involved in the

transaction such as freight

forwarders, customs brokers,

agents or representatives, and

arms brokers.

Sources: Glenn McDonald, “Who’s buying? End User Certification”, in Small Arms Survey 2008: Risk and Resilience, Cambridge University Press,

2008, pp. 154–181; Sarah Parker, “Devils in diversity: Export controls for military small arms”, in Small Arms Survey 2009: Shadows of War, Cambridge

University Press, 2009, p. 64; Wassenaar Arrangement, Introduction to End User/End Use Controls for Export of Military-List Equipment, adopted in

July 2014; United Nations Coordinating Action on Small Arms (UN CASA), International Small Arms Control Standard (ISACS) 01.20: Glossary of Terms,

Definitions and Abbreviations, 30 June 2015; Brian Wood and Peter Danssaert, Study on the Development of a Framework for Improving End Use and

End User Control Systems, United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs Occasional Papers No. 21, December 2011, pp. 7–12.

4.1.2. Details of items, end use and end use/r to be provided

to export control authorities

Much of the discussion in the UNIDIR Expert Group on end use/r control systems

related to the fact that there has been significant work carried out to establish

recommended contents for end use/r documentation. Chapter 2 discussed the best

practice guidelines that identify essential elements for EUCs. Information on items, end

use, end users and entities involved in the international transfer of conventional arms is

recognized as important for informing assessments of the risk of diversion conducted

by export control authorities. The findings of this study indicate a consensus in Euro-

Atlantic organizations and export control regimes on the types of information that are

regarded as the minimum requirement to be provided to export control authorities.

Table 3 in Chapter 2 shows that existing good practice guidelines on end use/r

documentation for conventional arms and SALW highlight the same items as essential

elements for end use/r documentation; and there is also agreement on some of

the optional elements to include in such documents. Multilateral efforts to agree on

essential elements in end use/r documentation have thus far been primarily restricted

to a limited number of States that are either members or participating States in export

control regimes or the EU and OSCE. The UNODA study on EUCs noted that many

significant arms exporters already include the ‘essential’ and ‘optional elements’ of

good practice guidelines in their national requirements for end user certificates or

document templates.

245

The analysis of the UNIDIR Survey contained in Chapter 3

of this study shows that several elements are required as part of the contents for

end use/r documentation in support of an export licence application not only in the

Euro-Atlantic area, but also in some States in Africa, the Americas, Asia and Oceania.

However, the available evidence indicates that this is not evenly spread in these

regions. The UNIDIR Survey also revealed that while many exporting States provide a

checklist or template of elements to include in end use/r documentation, not all States

use such templates when importing conventional arms. Some States have developed

their own templates, which do appear to correspond largely with the requirements

laid out in best practice guidelines. Therefore, it seems sensible to bring importing and

exporting States together to compare and discuss the contents of their national end

use/r documentation. Could a checklist or template end use/r document be developed

at the international level?

Many States request or provide the recommended details outlined in best practice

guidelines discussed in Chapter 2, with the majority of respondents to the UNIDIR

Survey and States reporting under the PoA requiring the following information to be

included in end use/r documentation:

• Unique identifier;

o Date of issue of the end use/r documentation;

• Information on the items;

o Description of the conventional arms being exported (type, characteristics);

o Quantity;

245 Brian Wood and Peter Danssaert, Study on the Development of a Framework for Improving End Use

and End User Control Systems, United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs Occasional Papers No. 21,

December 2011, p. 31.

• Information to be provided on the end use/r;

o State of final destination;

o Details of the end user (at least name and address);

o Description of the end use of the conventional arms;

• Information to be provided on entities involved in the transfer;

o Details of the exporter (at least name and address);

o Signature, name, position and address of the end user’s representative/

importer/consignee.

The information represents a solid basis on which to explore opportunities for

agreement on the minimum elements to be contained in end use/r documentation. It

should not, however, preclude States from seeking to include additional information

as recommended in best practice guidelines or for particularly sensitive items, end

users or destinations. For example, it could be recommended that if information is not

requested on intermediaries involved in the transfer in other supporting documents, it

should be included in the end use/r documentation.

One of the issues discussed in the UNIDIR Expert Group related to the question: ‘Is it

necessary to consider minimum contents for particular types of items?’ The Group noted

that one of the reasons given for States to provide a variety of end use/r documentation

templates is that different types of information or assurances are required for risk

assessments for different types of controlled items. Some in the UNIDIR Expert Group

raised the possibility of focusing attention on end use/r documentation for SALW

only, and not dealing with other conventional arms. This reflects to some degree the

fact that, as noted in Chapter 3, some States already seek additional information for

transfers of SALW and MANPADS. The Wassenaar Arrangement has also developed

‘Best Practice Guidelines for Exports of SALW’ and ‘Elements for Export Controls of

MANPADS’, while many of the guidelines referred to in Chapter 2 are specifically for

end use/r documentation and controls relating to SALW. Therefore, one of the issues

to be considered by a potential international process would be to determine whether

harmonization of end use/r control systems should relate to SALW only. At the same

time, some members of the UNIDIR Expert Group expressed interest in examining

opportunities to reduce the number of template documents offered for use, because

exporting and importing States and end users can find the process of identifying the

correct document confusing. This point was also emphasized in informal consultations

with representatives of the arms industry. This led to discussion on seeking to agree

on minimum contents for end use/r documentation for all controlled items. As will be

noted in Chapter 5, the scope of the items to be covered will be influenced by the

forum in which the international process takes place.

As noted in Chapter 2, most of the existing guidance on end use/r documentation

contents relates to documentation to be provided for State end users. Another reason

given for States to provide a variety of end use/r documentation templates is that

distinctions are made between end use/r documentation provided for end users that

are government security forces and those that are commercial arms producers, arms

dealers, private security companies or other non-State end users. This is therefore

another area in which it could be worth considering whether to focus attention. For

example, ISACS provides provisions to be included in end use/r documentation for non-

State end users. However, as shown in Table 4, ISACS recommends that export licence

applicants seeking to deliver SALW to non-State end users should provide the same

details on item, end use and entities involved in the transfer as for a State end user.

The only differences relate to the identifiers to be provided by government authorities.

Therefore, is it necessary to consider developing a separate set of ‘minimum’ elements

for non-State end users?

4.1.3. Types of assurances to be provided by the end user/importer

The UNIDIR Expert Group on end use/r control systems, the UNIDIR Survey, and the

PoA national report analysis show that it is common and accepted practice to seek

assurances relating to end use, end user, re-export and post-delivery cooperation

before authorizing the export of conventional arms, including SALW. However, as

shown by Chapter 3, the type of assurances utilized by States varies depending on the

items or type of end use, end user or destination. Therefore, an international process

could seek agreement on the inclusion of clear language relating to assurances in such

areas, perhaps utilizing language already provided for in best practice guidelines. The

findings presented in Chapter 3 show that a variety of options for assurances could

be regarded as acceptable, with the applicant for the export licence responsible for

securing the assurances. Therefore, one could envisage four sets of assurances that

could be utilized in end use/r documentation or other documentation, such as a

commercial contract, for:

• Assurance on use of items in accordance with declared end use;

• Assurance that the end user will be the ultimate recipient and will not divert or

relocate the conventional arms;

• Assurances relating to re-export;

• Assurances on confirmation of delivery or post-shipment inspections.

The UNIDIR Survey indicates that assurances on end use and end user diversion are

common and acceptable assurances for both exporting and importing States. However,

a wider dialogue on this issue is obviously necessary to ensure that this view holds for

States that did not participate in the Survey and are not participating States in Euro-

Atlantic organizations or export control regimes. It could be envisaged, for example,

that ATT States Parties may seek to include assurances that recipients use the

imported items in accordance with international humanitarian and human rights law,

and that the items are not used directly or indirectly in war crimes, genocide, violation

of UN Security Council resolutions, international agreements on terrorism, transnational

organized crime, acts of gender-based violence or violence against women and

children, in accordance with Articles 6 and 7 of the ATT.

With regard to assurances on re-export, the findings indicate that a variety of assurances

are utilized. In several cases, States noted that they use all of the assurances on re-

export provided for in the UNIDIR Survey, depending on items and/or end use/r and

destination. The OSCE EUC template, for example, recommends that States include

provisions on re-export, but offers different options for the language to be included in

the provision.

However, it is perhaps too ambitious to seek agreement on when a particular provision

for re-export will be utilized. For example, as noted in Chapter 3, one State seeks a

‘no re-export under any circumstances’ provision when exporting technology to enable

the production of SALW and ammunition. Could the use of such a provision in such

cases be universalized? As a first step, and building upon the UNIDIR Survey, it could

be possible for States to share their general practice of when particular provisions

are utilized. This is likely to reveal that some States might require only notification to

the original exporting State if the State seeking to re-export conventional arms is a

participating State in an export control regime or is an ATT State Party. It could be

agreed that particularly stringent assurances could be included on re-export in cases

involving MANPADS or for States that are subject to UN Security Council restrictions

with regard to arms procurement. Again this is an area in which the Wassenaar

Arrangement has also provided guidance that could be utilized further.

In addition to the provision of assurances, it is also worth reflecting on the competent

authority that agrees to abide by them. It is generally expected—although not always

followed in practice—that a high-level government official of the importing State or a

representative of the end user will provide assurances on end use, and that the export

control authorities will take the assurances into account in their risk assessment. It

is recognized that this is an important area for cooperation and building trust and

confidence between the governments of the exporting and importing States. It is also

recognized that this can be a particularly challenging issue for agreement and trust.

This brings us on to the fourth key area.

4.1.4. Roles and functions of end use/r documentation

Chapter 2 outlined the recommendations contained in best practice guidelines on

the roles and responsibilities for importing and exporting States with regard to roles

and functions of end use/r documentation in national end use/r control systems. The

OSCE best practice guide and ISACS module provide some guidance on the role

and function of end use/r documentation. For example, ISACS Module 03.21, National

controls over the end user and end use of internationally transferred small arms and

light weapons, draws upon good practice guidelines developed within regional and

international organizations and export control regimes for SALW, to provide guidance

on roles for government agencies in importing States (verification of the bona fide of

the end user and permission to import the items, as well as certification of end use/r

documentation) and government agencies in the exporting State (authentication of

the end use/r documentation and verification of its contents as one part of a broader

risk assessment). The UNIDIR Expert Group recommended that an international

exchange of national practice and understanding could further help to strengthen the

effectiveness of end use/r documentation in preventing diversion.

The UNIDIR Survey showed that not all States issue and certify end use/r documentation

when importing conventional arms. Independent research and investigations

conducted by experts appointed to monitor implementation of UN arms embargoes

have noted that even when importing States issue end use/r documentation for arms

procurement by armed forces or the ministry of defence, the documents can omit

essential information, be easy to forge, alter and can be utilized for facilitating illicit

arms transfers, as noted in Chapter 1.

246

The UNIDIR Expert Group also considered that

it can be useful to centralize the process for issuing end use/r documentation. While

some States have put in place centralized licensing systems to control transfers of

arms, this is not the situation in all States. For example, there can be one government

agency responsible for authorizing imports of small arms for civilians and a separate

government agency responsible for authorizing imports of small arms for government

end users (e.g. armed forces, police). In addition, it can be useful to have a limited

number of officials who are authorized to sign and certify end use/r documentation.

Therefore, an international process on harmonizing end use/r control systems could

seek to understand and address the challenges for States in providing end use/r

documentation that fulfils the essential elements as recommended by best practice

guidelines and the minimum recommended details that could be developed as part of

the international process.

A second area in which States could take steps to prevent diversion by non-State actors

would be to establish standards and verification processes for end use/r documentation,

IICs and import licences for non-State end users.

247

As Chapter 3 showed, a high share

of UNIDIR Survey respondents do not certify end use/r documentation for non-State

end users, and it is not clear whether authorizations are provided for import via other

mechanisms that can assure exporting States that steps have been taken within the

importing State to examine the bona fide of the end user or importer. In the cases

of both State and non-State end users, and in line with the emphasis on cooperation

in international instruments and agreements on arms transfers (e.g. PoA, Firearms

Protocol, ATT), a State that is seeking to import conventional arms should assist the

exporting States to facilitate legitimate international arms transfers.

Multilateral best practice guidelines and expert analyses emphasize that the exporting

State has the greatest responsibility with regard to end use/r controls, because

‘exporting States have more tools at their disposal for detecting, preventing and

deterring diversions that occur at the point of embarkation and in transit than at the

point of delivery or post-delivery’.

248

Exporting States are charged with undertaking

careful scrutiny of the end use/r documentation, in particular its authentication and

the verification of its contents as part of a broader risk assessment process before

authorizing the export of conventional arms. A number of respected analysts have

stressed that ‘rigorous and thorough’ checks are the most effective defence against

diversion.

249

246 Hugh Griffiths and Adrian Wilkinson, Guns, Planes and Ships: Identification and Disruption of Clandestine

Arms Transfers, South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light

Weapons, August 2007, p. 29.

247 Mark Bromley and Hugh Griffiths, End User Certificates: Improving Standards to Prevent Diversion,

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), SIPRI Insights on Peace and Security 2010/3,

p. 13.

248 Matt Schroeder, Helen Close and Chris Stevenson, “Deadly Deception: Arms Transfer Diversion”, in Small

Arms Survey 2008: Risk and Resilience, Cambridge University Press, 2008, p. 123.

249 Mark Bromley and Hugh Griffiths, End User Certificates: Improving Standards to Prevent Diversion,

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), SIPRI Insights on Peace and Security 2010/3, p.

15; Hugh Griffiths and Adrian Wilkinson, Guns, Planes and Ships: Identification and Disruption of Clandestine

Arms Transfers, South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light

Weapons, August 2007, p. 27; Glenn McDonald, “Who’s buying? End User Certification”, in Small Arms

Survey 2008: Risk and Resilience, Cambridge University Press, 2008, p. 155; Matt Schroeder, Helen Close

and Chris Stevenson, “Deadly Deception: Arms Transfer Diversion”, in Small Arms Survey 2008: Risk and

Resilience, Cambridge University Press, 2008, p. 123; Brian Wood and Peter Danssaert, Study on the

As noted in Chapters 2 and 3, States have established procedures for authenticating

and checking end use/r documentation, but are willing to share information on the

challenges that are faced in these processes. An international process that facilitates

a discussion among States on the information required to be included in end use/r

documentation, why this information is required and how it will be used can help to

address these challenges and those faced by States importing conventional arms.

In addition, an international process can examine and if possible clarify the roles of

other key stakeholders in the transfer process, such as arms producers, brokers

and dealers, and those entities involved in transportation. This can help to identify

possible mechanisms for facilitating cooperation, in particular the exchange of relevant

information prior to the transfer.

4.2. Potential areas for harmonization

The two potential areas that merit further research before being considered by an

international process on the harmonization of end use/r control systems are discussed

below. Both issues contain some elements that could be part of a global discussion in

the near future, with some elements requiring considerable research and confidence-

building between States, before consideration can be given to their adoption at the

global level.

4.2.1. Exchange of information and indicators for risk assessment

A critical aspect of end use/r control systems is the ability of the export licensing

authorities to conduct a thorough assessment of the risk of diversion for each

proposed transfer. The four key areas described above address different aspects of

the information on items, end use/r and transfer that are to be used when seeking to

answer the following questions:

• Is there a significant risk that the items could be misused?

• Is the end user trustworthy? And what of the other entities involved in the

transaction?

• Is there a significant risk that the items could be diverted?

For many States, it can be useful to receive information from other States and external

sources to help in conducting a thorough risk assessment. In some cases, it could

be useful for risk assessment indicators and guidance on sources of information to

be shared between States. The UNIDIR Survey indicates that an exchange of end

use/r documentation templates could be feasible as a first step in an international

process to harmonize end use/r control systems. This exchange could help to inform

deliberations on common minimum details of items, end use, end users and exporters

to be included in harmonized end use/r documentation and assurances on end use/

end users, as well as for post-delivery cooperation. This exchange could also help

with authentication processes. The UNIDIR Survey shows that securing agreement on

establishing an exchange of information on agencies authorized to issue, certify and

Development of a Framework for Improving End Use and End User Control Systems, United Nations Office

for Disarmament Affairs Occasional Papers No. 21, December 2011, p. 22.

100

authenticate end use/r documentation (as has been recommended by both States and

UN experts) would be welcomed by some States, but that not all States would be

willing to participate. Such an exchange has been recommended by both States and

UN Experts. A first step could be to propose a voluntary exchange of information.

Independent research analysts have proposed such exchanges of end use/r

documentation, risk indicators and relevant information for authentication and

verification of documentation as part of a wider risk assessment process.

250

The UNIDIR

Expert Group on end use/r control systems considered the possibility of sharing

information on risk indicators. It is only proposed as a possible area for international

discussion because the UNIDIR Expert Group revealed uncertainties on the utility

of such information exchanges and the willingness of States to share valuable but

sensitive information for other States’ risk assessment processes. Some States may be

willing to share such information, and therefore a voluntary exchange of risk indicators

could be proposed as part of an international process. The development of guidelines

could be also considered, building on regional developments.

4.2.2. Post-delivery cooperation

For many States, responsibility for an arms export ends when it leaves the exporting

State’s territory. In such cases, the exporting State is confident that the risk of diversion

has been assessed as part of a comprehensive risk assessment before issuing an export

authorization or licence. Chapter 1 suggests that this approach is not always sufficient

for preventing diversion. Good practice guidelines developed by international and

regional organizations and export control regimes refer to post-delivery cooperation

measures as worth considering for particularly sensitive items, destinations and/or end

users. The UN experts given the task of monitoring the implementation of sanctions,

and also research institutes, strongly recommend the development and use of measures

to facilitate cooperation and information sharing, such as:

• Confirmation of receipt of items (e.g. DVCs);

• Record-keeping by recipients of controlled items;

• Notifying, in a timely manner, relevant authorities in exporting States on loss or

theft of controlled items;

• Abiding by assurances on re-export, whichever options are utilized;

• On-site inspections of the location of end use by the relevant authorities in the

importing State and/or through cooperation between the relevant authorities in

the importing and exporting States.

One of the means to mitigate the risk of end users not abiding by assurances and

undertakings is to put in place mechanisms to enable cooperation between the

relevant authorities in the exporting State and the end user and/or relevant authorities

in the importing State to increase confidence and ensure that follow-on deliveries

are possible.

251

The UNIDIR Expert Group considered the possibility of reframing

250 Mark Bromley and Hugh Griffiths, End User Certificates: Improving Standards to Prevent Diversion,

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), SIPRI Insights on Peace and Security 2010/3,

p. 13.

251 Glenn McDonald, “Who’s buying? End User Certification”, in Small Arms Survey 2008: Risk and Resilience,

Cambridge University Press, 2008, p. 163; Ilhan Berkhol and Virginie Moreau, Post-Export Controls on

101

the terminology used from post-delivery controls or monitoring to post-delivery

cooperation, as cooperation between relevant authorities in the exporting State,

the end user and relevant authorities in the importing State can help to reassure all

parties to the transfer. For some in the UNIDIR Expert Group, this better reflected the

intentions of existing national programmes that examined the post-delivery phase of

an arms transfer. The experts explained that they considered cooperation in the post-

delivery phase as a means to build confidence and trust.

The results of the UNIDIR Survey and PoA national report analysis indicate that further

examination of procedures for delivery confirmation could be considered as part of

an international process on harmonizing end use/r control systems. However, broader

mechanisms for post-delivery cooperation are still in very limited use. Nevertheless,

a number of States are already utilizing or examining the option of post-delivery

cooperation, including on-site checks. Therefore, beginning a dialogue on post-delivery

cooperation might find a more favourable audience today than when researchers began

to promote the issue several years ago and met resistance from exporting States

that stressed that a rigorous pre-licensing risk assessment is sufficient for preventing

diversion. Good arguments have been developed to address concerns that post-delivery

cooperation can be expensive for exporting States. For example, the Small Arms

Survey has noted that such cooperation tends to be used primarily in cases presenting

greater diversion risks, and therefore robust risk assessments before authorizing arms

exports remain but additional tools and greater cooperation with importing States

are utilized.

252

The more significant challenge is in relation to concerns by importing

States that such post-delivery cooperation equates to monitoring and a violation of

the national sovereignty of the importing State. However, this should be regarded as

presenting a challenge to creative options for facilitating post-delivery cooperation

rather than an obstacle to all prospects for success in this area. For example, as noted

in Chapter 2, one could envisage opportunities for confidence-building between States

in which importing States performed post-delivery checks and shared this information

with relevant authorities in exporting States, e.g. reporting on missing items.

Arms Transfers. Delivery Verification and End Use Monitoring, Group for Research and Information on

Peace and Security (Brussels), GRIP Report 2009/4, p. 6; Brian Wood and Peter Danssaert, Study on the

Development of a Framework for Improving End Use and End User Control Systems, United Nations Office

for Disarmament Affairs Occasional Papers No. 21, December 2011, pp. 57–58.

252 Glenn McDonald, “Who’s buying? End User Certification”, in Small Arms Survey 2008: Risk and Resilience,

Cambridge University Press, 2008, p. 173.

102

5. Potential processes for the development of

common understandings

This chapter considers potential avenues for States to engage in a dialogue to explore

the possibility of developing common understandings of end use/r control systems.

The first part of the chapter considers three key lessons that the study has drawn from

efforts to develop common understandings of end use/r control systems in export

control regimes and regional organizations. These lessons inform the recommended

potential processes for developing common understandings, which are discussed

in the second part of the chapter. Three potential processes are recommended for

developing common understandings of end use/r control systems. The first two

potential processes—the UN and the ATT—are international and potentially global in

scope. The third potential process could be a series of regional processes, located in

regions that do not host major arms exporters. A key feature of this chapter is to

consider mechanisms to enable contributions to the international process from States

that have not been party to multilateral considerations of end use/r control systems.

5.1. Lessons learned from multilateral efforts

to harmonize end use/r control systems

As shown in Chapter 1, international calls for harmonization of end use/r control

systems have been frequent during the last two decades. Table 9 shows several Euro-

Atlantic organizations and export control regimes that have been particularly active in

this regard and that include major arms exporters as members or participating States.

These initiatives and instruments include good practice guidelines for end use/r control

systems, checklists or templates for end user documentation and related practices

and information exchange mechanisms. These processes present useful lessons for

harmonizing end use/r control systems. This section highlights three key lessons for a

future multilateral process:

• Take a step-by-step approach;

• Understand opportunities for and limitations of information sharing and

international cooperation; and

• Involve States that are not participating States of export control regimes and

Euro-Atlantic organizations.

103

Table 9. Examples of types of multilateral efforts

to harmonize or establish common standards

Regional or multilateral

organization

Guidelines

for end use/r

control system

Exchange of

end use/r

documents

Checklist or

template for

end use/r

documentation

Information

sharing

mechanism

European Union (EU)

X-XX

Organization for Security and

Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)

XXX-

United Nations Coordinating

Action on Small Arms (UN

CASA), ISACS

X-X-

Wassenaar Arrangement (WA)

X-XX

5.1.1. Step-by-step approaches: The OSCE experience

The OSCE provides a useful example of a step-by-step approach towards voluntary

harmonization of end use/r documentation for SALW transfers. Its experience could

serve as the basis for an international process or other regional developments in

establishing good practices for end use/r control systems to prevent diversion. The

first step in the OSCE case was the development by government experts of a best

practice guide on export controls, which listed details and assurances to be contained

in EUCs, and recommendations on format and certification, authentication and

verification processes.

253

Drawing upon this guidance, the participating States of the

OSCE adopted a politically binding decision in the Forum on Security Cooperation

(FSC) in November 2004 that outlined the standard elements to be contained in EUCs

and verification procedures for SALW exports.

254

In order to assess the implementation

of the decision, OSCE participating States adopted another politically binding decision

in the FSC in November 2008, which arranged for an intergovernmental information

exchange of national EUCs and relevant verification procedures.

255

The next stage in

the OSCE process consisted of the development of an informal EUC template, which

was based on the adopted elements as well as the best practice guide and existing

national practices.

256

The template serves as a checklist as well as a potential basis

for end use/r documentation for States that do not have a template or checklist. The

UNIDIR Expert Group considered the OSCE experience as a potentially useful method

253 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), “Best practice guide on export control of

small arms and light weapons”, in Handbook on Best Practices on Small Arms and Light Weapons, OSCE,

2003.

254 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), FSC Decision 5/04: Standard Elements

of End-User Certificates and Verification Procedures for SALW Exports, OSCE document FSC.DEC/5/04,

17 November 2004.

255 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), Forum for Security Cooperation. Decision

No. 12/08. Information Exchange with Regard to Sample Formats of End User Certificates and Relevant

Verification Procedures, OSCE document FSC.DEC/12/08, 12 November 2008.

256 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), End User Certificate for Small Arms

and Light Weapons, an electronic template developed by the OSCE and the Stockholm International

Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) for end user certificates for the export of small arms and light weapons,

28 September 2011, <http://www.osce.org/fsc/83178?download=true>.

104

for moving forward with harmonization in other regions, but also for a potential

approach to a global mechanism.

5.1.2. Understanding opportunities and limitations of information sharing and

international cooperation: The case of the Wassenaar Arrangement

The types of information that are recommended to be shared among participating

States of the Wassenaar Arrangement as part of the general information exchange

on risks associated with transfers of conventional arms could provide inspiration

for a regional or global system to assist with end use/r checks. For example, the

Wassenaar Arrangement Best Practices to Prevent Destabilising Transfers of SALW

through Air Transport encourages the voluntary exchange of information about

exporters, air carriers and agents that do not comply with national transfer controls,

as well as ‘cases of transit or transhipment by air of SALW that may contribute to

a destabilizing accumulation or be a potential threat to security and stability in the

region of destination’.

257

An information exchange is likely to play a critical role in the

realization of end use/r control harmonization. In this regard, the UNIDIR Expert Group

noted some of the challenges to sharing information on diversion or misuse at the

international level and the need for legal agreements on exchange of information. It

was also noted that some States prefer to conclude bilateral arrangements or limited

multilateral agreements, rather than broad multilateral arrangements.

Furthermore, although the Wassenaar Arrangement has made a significant contribution

to the development of good practice standards in this area, it also serves as a useful

example of where the limits for what can be achieved in a multilateral setting on

this issue rest. The Wassenaar Arrangement has made a significant contribution to

the development of good practice standards on end use/r controls, as evidenced by

Tables 2 and 19. However, the UNIDIR Expert Group noted that while the participating

States of the Wassenaar Arrangement have considered the issue of end use/r controls

for many years, it has been challenging to secure consensus on mandatory elements.

For example, although the Wassenaar Arrangement’s participating States adopted an

Introduction to End user/End use Controls for Export of Military-List Equipment in July

2014, this was because the participating States could not yet agree on the adoption

of Elements or Guidelines on the issue. Therefore, there are technical and political

challenges to the harmonization of end use/r control system understandings among

some of the world’s largest arms exporters. The difficulties in establishing a global

process should not be underestimated.

5.1.3. The need to involve States that are not major arms exporters

One of the key topics of discussion among the UNIDIR Expert Group was the fact that

States that do not participate in export control regimes or the EU and OSCE have not

been sufficiently involved in the development of end use/r control system standards.

The ISACS module 03.21 on end use/r control is to be distinguished from the other

efforts because it is also the result of engagement with States that have not thus far

257 Wassenaar Arrangement, Best Practices to Prevent Destabilising Transfers of SALW through Air Transport,

adopted in December 2007, para. 2.4.

105

contributed to the development of good practice guidelines and documentation for

strengthening and harmonizing end use/r control systems. This principle opens up the

possibility not only of pursuing a multilateral process through the UN or among ATT

States Parties on the issue of the harmonization of end use/r control systems, but it

could be useful for regional groupings and organizations in Africa, the Americas, Asia

and Oceania to consider end use/r control problems.

5.2. Possible avenues for establishing common understanding on and

strengthening of end use/r control systems

This study recognizes the ongoing work in international and regional organizations,

as well as in the export control regimes, to strengthen end use/r control systems as

a measure to address the diversion of conventional arms. Therefore, the study does

not propose that States embark on a process that simply replicates work that has

already been undertaken, but rather that they explore the potential for options and

avenues to widen the number of stakeholders involved in the international arms trade

in efforts to strengthen end use/r control systems. In particular, the study seeks to

promote regional and international dialogue that involves a broad range of States and

other important stakeholders, such as industry, in consultations and the development

of common understandings to strengthen end use/r control systems. The following

questions need to be considered when exploring possible avenues for supporting

States in their efforts to strengthen end use/r control systems:

• What existing processes—e.g. UN, ATT or regional—could be utilized to facilitate

inclusive and comprehensive dialogue?

• Can all three processes be utilized at the same time or could there be

sequencing?

• Which regions should be the focus if a regional approach is considered?

This section presents three possible avenues that could be utilized to promote and

engage in a global dialogue to strengthen end use/r controls. The list of possible

avenues here is not exhaustive as there are other existing processes which may be

useful for States in carrying such dialogue forward. However, the three options

presented represent the most appropriate avenues at present.

5.2.1. United Nations

As demonstrated in Chapter 1, many States have raised and discussed in the UNGA

and Security Council the need to strengthen end use/r control systems and called

for exploring options for standardization of documentation and enhanced international

cooperation. A UN process represents a clear option for undertaking an international

dialogue on end use/r control systems. As shown in Chapter 3, UN Member States have

already provided information when reporting on implementation of the PoA and in

response to the UNGA resolution on the national legislation on the transfer of arms,

military equipment and dual-use goods and technology. To some degree, therefore,

an exchange of information on the contents of national end use/r documentation and

some related practices has already taken place between States. The UNIDIR Survey has

demonstrated that States may now be willing to go further and provide samples of

106

templates or checklists. Therefore, perhaps an explicit request for such documentation

could be included in the next UNGA resolution on the exchange of national legislation

on the transfer of arms, military equipment and dual-use goods and technology.

UNGA resolution 46/36H of December 1991 included a request to the Secretary-

General from UN Member States for assistance:

‘upon request and within available resources, in holding meetings and seminars

at the national, regional and international levels, as pertinent, with a view to: [...]

Promoting the development of internationally harmonized laws and administrative

procedures relating to official arms procurement and arms transfer policies’.

258

Further, should interest exist, States could examine whether the issue of end use/r

control systems with regard to SALW transfers could be a theme of a PoA Biennial

Meeting of States or Meeting of Governmental Experts. As noted in Chapter 4, there

are some States that are interested in exploring the strengthening of end use/r control

systems with SALW transfers being the main focus. Given the provisions on EUCs in

the PoA, it would seem a suitable venue for pursuing a global dialogue on end use/r

controls for SALW transfers. However, as noted in Chapter 1, a proposal was made

during the preparations for the 2006 PoA RevCon for a GGE to be convened on the

issue of EUCs, but the proposal was not adopted despite the fact that there seemed

to be acceptance of the concept.

259

This study recognizes that the timing of the initiation of such a dialogue is critical. The

UNIDIR Expert Group discussed the potential for initiating a UN process that could be

adopted globally by all UN Member States and bring together significant importers

and exporters into a single forum, such as a GGE. It was noted that if a GGE were to

be considered, it would require significant support by UN Member States. It would also

benefit from guidance on the issues to be addressed and current practices, such as

end use/r documentation. UNIDIR’s Survey represents a good start in this regard. A

GGE convened to consider harmonizing end use/r control systems to address diversion

and misuse could present a report on the understandings reached on key terms,

concepts and the process for strengthening end use/r controls, as well as areas of

contention. The report could provide guidance on next steps to be undertaken within

the PoA framework or other forums. The report could also contain a checklist or end

use/r documentation template as an annex. A recommendation to develop guidelines

on certification and issuing of EUCs, as well as authentication and verification, could

also be considered.

5.2.2. Arms Trade Treaty

Chapter 1 noted that the issue of end use/r documentation and controls faded from the

PoA framework, the Secretary-General’s reports and Security Council statements on

small arms, once negotiations for an ATT got under way. Therefore, several members

of the UNIDIR Expert Group noted that if the ATT has subsidiary bodies that address

operational issues relating to its provisions, in particular addressing diversion and

258 General Assembly, General and complete disarmament: International arms transfers, UN document,

A/RES/46/36H, 6 December 1991, para. 8(c).

259 Glenn McDonald, Sahar Hasan and Chris Stevenson, “Back to Basics. Transfer Controls in Global

Perspective”, in Small Arms Survey 2007: Guns and the City, Cambridge University Press, 2007, p. 123.

107

promoting international cooperation, then harmonizing end use/r control systems could

be a particularly useful topic for consideration. At the same time, several experts noted

that some significant players in the international arms trade are neither signatories nor

States Parties to the ATT. Yet, the ATT still provides a useful forum for consideration

of this topic, and it would be a significant benefit to international efforts to address

diversion if ATT States Parties and signatories contributed to an international process

to harmonize end use/r control systems. As with the UN process, the ATT provides a

forum in which States that are not major exporters or participating States of export

control regimes can also share experience, practice and understandings on end use/r

control systems.

The ATT is a new instrument but it could make an important contribution to the

issue of strengthening the risk assessment and cooperative elements of end use/r

control systems to address diversion. In particular the harmonization of end use/r

documentation could be addressed via a working group in accordance with Articles 5,

7, 8 and 11. The group could request the exchange of documentation and practices to

inform consultations in a manner comparable to the OSCE step-by-step approach. It is

also conceivable that a group of experts in an ATT working group could develop good

practice guidelines on end use/r controls, including common understandings, essential

and desirable elements, assurances, and guidance on roles and functions. As with the

UN process, a template end use/r document or checklist could be drafted and offered

for use on a voluntary basis for States.

5.2.3. Regional process

The UNIDIR Expert Group reflected on the positive experience of Euro-Atlantic regional

and export control regime efforts to consider the harmonization of end use/r control

systems. The option of supporting consideration of end use/r control systems among

groups of States that have not given the issue significant attention to date, but which

have developed instruments or mechanisms for addressing diversion concerns, is

therefore also worth considering. One could foresee the possibility for the sharing of

regional experiences in this regard too.

Regional initiatives in Latin America and the Caribbean, as well as in sub-Saharan

Africa—led by CARICOM, ECOWAS, the Southern African Development Community

and the parties to the Nairobi Protocol—provide useful forums for further consideration

of the issue. As noted in Chapter 1, the Security Council has in the past recommended

that ECOWAS States consider the development of a standardized EUC, and several

States in the subregion participated in the UNIDIR Survey. This could be an issue to be

pursued within the framework of the ECOWAS Convention. The fact that the RECSA

guidance for implementation of the Nairobi Protocol also addresses the contents of

EUCs could also be used as the basis for consultations in East Africa. Such regional

processes could take place in coordination with other international processes, such as

those listed above. It is also worth reflecting on whether these States should consider

the harmonization of end use/r controls systems only for SALW transfers or for

conventional arms more broadly.

The progress made in step-by-step processes in Euro-Atlantic organizations to

harmonize end use/r control systems, in particular documentation, provides a

108

potentially useful model for other regions to consider.

260

Elements of the processes

described above, which have been utilized within the OSCE on this issue already, could

prove useful. Therefore, as above, a first step could be the exchange of documentation

and practices, which could then be subject to a comparative study and analysis. As in

the OSCE, a step-by-step process could be developed to deliver similar outcomes to

the OSCE or those outlined above.

The proposed next phase of UNIDIR’s project on the harmonization of end use/r

control systems envisages a series of regional meetings to consider existing practices

in Africa, the Americas and the Asia-Pacific. The meetings are intended to contribute

to potential global processes, but could also have spin-off effects for the regions or

subregions that will participate in UNIDIR meetings.

260 Mark Bromley and Hugh Griffiths, End User Certificates: Improving Standards to Prevent Diversion,

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), SIPRI Insights on Peace and Security 2010/3,

p. 13.

109

6. Conclusions

This study sought to address two related objectives:

• Identify which aspects of national end use/r control systems could feasibly be

harmonized;

• Explore the feasibility of, and potential frameworks for, a process to strengthen

control systems and enhance cooperation to prevent diversion at the regional

and/or global level.

To this end, the study has presented six options that States could consider as part

of a meaningful dialogue on potential areas for cooperation, shared understanding

and alignment of measures to strengthen end use/r control systems. It also provides

recommendations on three different forums for undertaking an international dialogue,

noting potential outcomes. All proposals are predicated on the study’s central

hypothesis that:

Greater cooperation and alignment between States with regard to common

practices and procedures in end use/r control systems will enhance the

ability of relevant national stakeholders to more effectively identify and

mitigate the risk of arms being diverted from their intended end use/rs.

A key finding of the study is the challenge of utilizing the word ‘harmonization’

to promote an international process on end use/r control systems. However, via

consultations with the UNIDIR Expert Group and the results of the UNIDIR Survey and

analysis of reports on the PoA, the research team found that the three elements of the

definition could be feasibly pursued via an international process on end use/r controls:

• Enhancing international cooperation;

• Where possible, working towards agreement on common understanding of key

terms; and

• Aligning standards, in particular key elements to be contained in end use/r

documentation and general principles for ensuring effective end use/r controls.

Therefore, while an international process to harmonize end use/r controls is unlikely

to find traction, one that seeks to enhance international cooperation, forge common

understandings and align standards has potential.

The UNIDIR Survey and analysis in Chapter 3 shows that there are potentially good

foundations on which to develop an international process to consider agreement on

details of end user, end use and items, as well as assurances on end use and re-

export, to be included in end use/r documentation. In particular, it shows several areas

in which agreement could be reached and common understandings developed. The

UNIDIR Survey also found willingness by a significant group of States to exchange end

use/r documentation templates and checklists. The potential for this to be a starting

point for an international process has already been shown in the example of the

110

OSCE. The evidence presented in this study points towards potentially productive and

positive results for the definition of key terms and details of items and end use/r to

be provided to export control authorities and types of assurances to be provided by

the end user/importer. This reflects the fact that much of the attention on end use/r

control systems has focused upon the contents of end use/r documentation requested

by exporting States as part of the application for a licence to export controlled items.

However, efforts have also been undertaken by regional and international organizations,

as well as export control regimes, to elaborate on the roles of such documentation in

end use/r control systems, in particular for risk assessment. This is a crucial aspect of

a discussion on effective end use/r control systems, as Chapter 1 has shown that the

provision of end use/r documentation is insufficient if not subjected to authentication

and verification as part of a comprehensive risk assessment to prevent diversion.

For many States, it can be useful to receive information from other States and external

sources to help conduct a thorough risk assessment. In some cases, it could be useful

for risk assessment indicators and guidance on sources of information to be shared

between States. UNIDIR’s Survey and research revealed hesitancy on the part of some

States to share valuable but sensitive information. Other States indicated that they

are ready to engage in exchanges to facilitate authentication and verification. It is

anticipated that opportunities to engage in an exchange of information and indicators

for risk assessment will present themselves as part of a longer-term process to

strengthen end use/r control systems.

The preliminary research into post-delivery controls and monitoring shown in Chapters

2 and 3 confirms the findings of earlier studies on the challenges and limits of measures

being undertaken at this stage of a transfer. However, this study’s proposal to examine

the potential for greater cooperation between the relevant authorities in the exporting

State and the end user to increase confidence and ensure that follow-on deliveries are

possible as part of a shift from post-delivery controls to post-delivery cooperation is

yet to be tested. It is recommended that further exploration be undertaken as there are

some signs of exporting States other than the United States of America beginning to

examine options that could be captured under the post-delivery ‘cooperation’ heading.

Switzerland is one example and Germany is another.

The study does not express a preference regarding the avenue that States could take

to explore the development of common understandings of end use/r control systems.

It finds merits and challenges in each of the options presented. For example, while a

United Nations process could involve all UN Member States, the most likely route will

be via the PoA process and therefore focused on SALW and not all conventional arms.

Conversely, an Arms Trade Treaty process has the benefits of broad scope in terms

of arms covered, but will not involve all UN Member States. Nevertheless, one could

envisage the issue of end use/r controls being examined by experts in both UN and

ATT forums and therefore the study does not believe it is necessary to close either

route yet. The progress made in step-by-step processes in Euro-Atlantic organizations

to harmonize end use/r control systems, in particular on documentation, provides a

potentially useful model for other regions to consider. Regional processes for States

that are not in export control regimes and outside the Euro-Atlantic area could be

initiated by an exchange of views, practices and documentation which could then be

subject to a comparative study and analysis. Such processes could be undertaken in

111

formal or informal settings and would strengthen and complement UN and/or ATT

processes. One could envisage that UN, ATT and/or regional processes could result in

the development of:

• Good practice guidelines on end use/r controls, including common

understandings, essential and desirable elements, assurances, and guidance on

roles and functions; and/or

• An EUC document template or checklist.

112

References

Amnesty International, Dead on Time—Arms Transportation, Brokering and the Threat

to Human Rights, London, 10 May 2006, <https://www.amnesty.org/download/

Documents/.../act300072006en.pdf>.

Ilhan Berkhol and Virginie Moreau, Post-Export Controls on Arms Transfers. Delivery

Verification and End Use Monitoring, Group for Research and Information on

Peace and Security (Brussels), GRIP Report 2009/4.

Mark Bromley and Hugh Griffiths, End User Certificates: Improving Standards to Prevent

Diversion, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), SIPRI Insights

on Peace and Security 2010/3.

Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), ECOWAS Convention on

Small Arms and Light Weapons, Their Ammunition and Other Related Materials,

Abuja, Nigeria, 14 June 2006.

Council of the European Union, User’s Guide to Council Common Position 2008/944/

CFSP defining common rules governing the control of exports of military

technology and equipment, EU document 9241/09.

Council of the European Union, User’s Guide to Council Common Position 2008/944/

CFSP defining common rules governing the control of exports of military

technology and equipment, EU document COARM 172, CFSP/PESC 393, endorsed

by the Council (Foreign Affairs) on 20 July 2015.

Hugh Griffiths and Adrian Wilkinson, Guns, Planes and Ships: Identification and

Disruption of Clandestine Arms Transfers, South Eastern and Eastern Europe

Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons, August 2007.

Paul Holtom, Irene Pavesi and Christelle Rigual, “Trade Update: Transfers, retransfers

and the ATT”, in Small Arms Survey 2014: Women and Guns, Cambridge University

Press, 2014, pp. 108–143.

Paul Holtom and Christelle Rigual, “Trade Update: After the ‘Arab Spring’”, in Small

Arms Survey 2015: Weapons and the World, Cambridge University Press, 2015,

pp. 84–123.

Human Rights Watch (HRW), “HRW Letter to President Compaoré”, 28 March 2000,

<http://www.hrw.org/press/2000/03/burkina0330letter.htm>.

Glenn McDonald, Sahar Hasan and Chris Stevenson, “Back to Basics. Transfer Controls

in Global Perspective”, in Small Arms Survey 2007: Guns and the City, Cambridge

University Press, 2007, pp. 116-43.

Glenn McDonald, “Who’s buying? End User Certification”, in Small Arms Survey 2008:

Risk and Resilience, Cambridge University Press, 2008, pp. 154–181.

113

Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), “Best practice guide on

export control of small arms and light weapons”, in Handbook on Best Practices

on Small Arms and Light Weapons, OSCE, 2003.

Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), Forum for Security

Co-operation. Decision No. 5/04: Standard Elements of End User Certificates

and Verification Procedures for SALW exports, OSCE document FSC/DEC/5/04,

17 November 2004.

Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), Forum for Security

Cooperation. Decision No. 12/08. Information Exchange with Regard to Sample

Formats of End User Certificates and Relevant Verification Procedures, OSCE

document FSC.DEC/12/08, 12 November 2008.

Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), End User Certificate for

Small Arms and Light Weapons, an electronic template developed by the OSCE

and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) for end user

certificates for the export of small arms and light weapons, 28 September 2011,

<http://www.osce.org/fsc/83178?download=true>.

Sarah Parker, “Devils in diversity: Export controls for military small arms”, in Small Arms

Survey 2009: Shadows of War, Cambridge University Press, 2009, pp. 60-105.

Regional Centre on Small Arms and Light Weapons (RECSA), Best Practice Guidelines

for the Implementation of the Nairobi Declaration and Nairobi Protocol on Small

Arms and Light Weapons, RECSA, 2005.

Matt Schroeder, Helen Close and Chris Stevenson, “Deadly Deception: Arms Transfer

Diversion”, in Small Arms Survey 2008: Risk and Resilience, Cambridge University

Press, 2008, pp. 112–153.

Swiss State Secretariat for Economic Affairs (SECO), “Swiss Hand Grenades in Syria:

Conclusion of Investigations and Measures”, press release, 21 September 2012,

<http://www.seco.admin.ch/aktuell/00277/01164/01980/index.html?lang=en&msg-

id=46075>.

South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and

Light Weapons (SEESAC), Addressing Unauthorized Re-Export or Re-Transfer of

Arms and Ammunition, SEESAC, June 2014.

South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and

Light Weapons (SEESAC), Toolkit for Addressing Unauthorized Re-Export or Re-

Transfer of Arms and Ammunition, SEESAC, June 2014.

Swiss Federal Council (SFC), War Material Ordinance of 25 February 1998 (Status as of

1 January 2013), document 514.511, 2013, <https://www.admin.ch/opc/en/classified-

compilation/19980112/index.html>.

United Nations Coordinating Action on Small Arms (UN CASA), International Small

Arms Control Standard (ISACS) 03.20: National Controls over the International

Transfer of Small Arms and Light Weapons, 17 June 2014.

114

United Nations Coordinating Action on Small Arms (UN CASA), International Small

Arms Control Standard (ISACS) 03.21: National Controls over the End User and

End Use of Internationally Transferred Small Arms and Light Weapons, 17 June

2014.

United Nations Coordinating Action on Small Arms (UN CASA), International Small Arms

Control Standard (ISACS) 01.20: Glossary of Terms, Definitions and Abbreviations,

30 June 2015.

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), How to Guide: Small Arms and Light

Weapons Legislation, UNDP Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (Geneva),

July 2008.

General Assembly, General and complete disarmament: International arms transfer, UN

document A/RES/46/36H, 6 December 1991.

General Assembly, Guidelines for international arms transfers in the context of general

assembly resolution 46/36 H of 6 December 1991. Report of the Disarmament

Commission, UN document A/51/42, Annex 1, 22 May 1996.

General Assembly, Report of the Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms, UN

document A/52/298, 27 August 1997.

General Assembly, Report of the Group of Governmental Experts on Small Arms, UN

document A/54/258, 19 August 1999.

General Assembly, Report of the Secretary-General. Small arms, UN document

A/54/404, 24 September 1999.

General Assembly, Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in

Firearms, their Parts and Components and Ammunition, adopted 31 May 2001, UN

document A/RES/55/255, 8 June 2001.

General Assembly, Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the

Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, UN document

A/CONF.195/15, 20 July 2001.

General Assembly 58th session, First Committee 6th meeting, UN document A/C.1/58/

PV.2, 6 October 2003.

General Assembly 58th session, First Committee 5th meeting, UN document A/C.1/58/

PV.5, 9 October 2003.

General Assembly 58th session, First Committee 13th meeting, UN document A/C.1/58/

PV.13, 22 October 2003.

General Assembly 58th session, First Committee 23rd meeting, UN document A/C.1/58/

PV.23. 6 November 2003.

General Assembly 59th session, First Committee 4th meeting, UN document A/C.1/59/

PV.4, 7 October 2004.

115

General Assembly 59th session, First Committee 12th meeting, UN document A/C.1/59/

PV.12, 20 October, 2004.

General Assembly 60th session, First Committee 11th meeting, UN document A/C.1/60/

PV.11, 13 October 2005.

General Assembly, Working Paper submitted by the President. Programme of Action

to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light

Weapons in All Its Aspects: A Strategy for Further Implementation, United Nations

Conference to Review Progress Made in the Implementation of the Programme

of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and

Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, New York, 26 June–7 July 2006, UN document

A/CONF.192/2006/RC/WP.4, 29 June 2006.

General Assembly, Report of the Secretary-General. Towards an arms trade treaty:

establishing common international standards for the import, export and transfer

of conventional arms, UN document A/62/278 (Part I), 17 August 2007.

General Assembly, Report of the Secretary-General. Towards an arms trade treaty:

establishing common international standards for the import, export and transfer

of conventional arms, UN document A/62/278 (Part II), 17 August 2007.

General Assembly, Report of the Group of Governmental Experts established pursuant

to General Assembly resolution 60/81 to Consider Further Steps to Enhance

International Cooperation in Preventing, Combating and Eradicating Illicit Brokering

in Small Arms and Light Weapons, UN document A/62/163, 30 August 2007.

General Assembly 63rd session, First Committee 12th meeting, UN document A/C.1/63/

PV.12, 20 October 2008.

General Assembly, General Assembly 63rd session, First Committee 14th meeting, UN

document A/C.1/63/PV.14, 21 October 2008.

General Assembly 65th session, First Committee 13th meeting, UN document A/C.1/65/

PV.13, 18 October 2010.

General Assembly 65th session, First Committee 23rd meeting, UN document A/C.1/65/

PV.23, 29 October 2010.

General Assembly, Report of the Secretary-General. The arms trade treaty, UN

document A/66/166, 20 July 2011.

General Assembly, Report of the Secretary-General. The arms trade treaty, UN

document A/66/166/Add.1, 19 September 2011.

General Assembly, Report of the Secretary-General. The arms trade treaty, UN

document A/66/166, 20 July 2011.

General Assembly 66th session, First Committee 16th meeting, UN document A/C.1/66/

PV.16, 19 October 2011.

116

General Assembly, Arms Trade Treaty Annex to the Draft Decision Submitted by the

President of the Final Conference, UN document A/CONF.217/2013/L.3, 27 March

2013.

General Assembly 68th session, First Committee 5th meeting. A/C.1/68/PV.5, 9 October

2013.

UNIDIR, Meeting Summary: Examining Options and Model for Harmonization of End

Use/r Control Systems. Informal Expert Group Meeting, Vienna, 22–23 April 2015,

UNIDIR, June 2015.

Security Council, Report of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to

resolution 985 (1995) concerning Liberia, UN document S/1999/1301, 31 December

1999.

Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts on Violations of Security Council

Sanctions against UNITA, UN document S/2000/203, 10 March 2000.

Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts appointed pursuant to Security Council

resolution 1306 (2000), paragraph 19, in relation to Sierra Leone, UN document

S/2000/1195, 20 December 2000.

Security Council, Final report of the Monitoring Mechanism on Angola Sanctions, UN

document S/2000/1225, 21 December 2000.

Security Council, The situation in Sierra Leone. 4264th meeting of the Security Council,

UN document S.PV.4264, 25 January 2001.

Security Council, The situation in Angola. 4283rd meeting of the Security Council, UN

document S.PV.4283, 22 February 2001.

Security Council, Addendum to the final report of the Monitoring Mechanism on

Sanctions Against UNITA, UN document S/2001/363, 18 April 2001.

Security Council, Report of the Committee of Experts appointed pursuant to Security

Council resolution 1333 (2000), paragraph 15 (a), regarding the monitoring of the

arms embargo against the Taliban and the closure of terrorist training camps in

the Taliban-held areas of Afghanistan, UN document S/2001/511, 22 May 2001.

Security Council, The situation in Afghanistan. 4325th meeting of the Security Council,

UN document S.PV.4325, 5 June 2001.

Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to Security Council resolution

1343 (2001), paragraph 19, concerning Liberia, UN document S/2001/1015,

26 October 2001.

Security Council, The situation in Liberia. 4405th meeting of the Security Council, UN

document S.PV.4405, 5 November 2001.

Security Council, Report of the Team of Experts appointed pursuant to Security

Council resolution 1407 (2002), paragraph 1, concerning Somalia, UN document

S/2002/722, 3 July 2002.

117

Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General. Small Arms, UN document

S/2002/1053, 20 September 2002.

Security Council, Small arms. 4623rd meeting of the Security Council, UN document

S.PV.4623, 11 October 2002.

Security Council, Small arms. 4623rd meeting of the Security Council, UN document

S.PV.4623 (Resumption 1), 11 October 2002.

Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts appointed pursuant to Security

Council resolution 1408 (2002), paragraph 16, concerning Liberia, UN document

S/2002/1115, 25 October 2002.

Security Council, Statement by the President of the Security Council, UN document

S/PRST/2002/30, 31 October 2002.

Security Council, Small arms. 4720th meeting of the Security Council, UN document

S.PV.4720, 18 March 2003.

Security Council, UN document S/RES/1467 (2003), 18 March 2003.

Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts on Somalia pursuant to Security

Council resolution 1425 (2002), UN document S/2003/223, 25 March 2003.

Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts appointed pursuant to paragraph

4 of Security Council resolution 1458 (2003) concerning Liberia, UN document

S/2003/498, 24 April 2003.

Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General. Small Arms, UN document

S/2003/1217, 31 December 2003.

Security Council, Small arms. 4896th meeting of the Security Council, UN document

S.PV.4896, 19 January 2004.

Security Council, Small arms. 4896th meeting of the Security Council, UN document

S.PV.4896 (Resumption 1), 19 January 2004.

Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to paragraph 22 of Security

Council resolution 1521(2003) concerning Liberia, UN document S/2004/396,

1 June 2004.

Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to paragraph 2 of Security

Council resolution 1549 (2004) concerning Liberia, UN document S/2004/955,

6 December 2004.

Security Council, Small arms. 5127th meeting of the Security Council, UN document

S.PV.5127, 17 February 2005.

Security Council, Small arms. 5127th meeting of the Security Council, UN document

S.PV.5127 (Resumption 1), 17 February 2005.

118

Security Council, Statement by the President of the Security Council, UN document

S/PRST/2005/7, 17 February 2005.

Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to paragraph

3 of resolution 1591(2005) concerning the Sudan, UN document S/2006/65,

30 January 2006.

Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General. Small Arms, UN document

S/2006/109, 17 February 2006.

Security Council, Small arms. 5390th meeting of the Security Council, UN document

S.PV.5390, 20 March, 2006.

Security Council, Small arms. 5390th meeting of the Security Council, UN document

S.PV.5390 (Resumption 1), 20 March 2006.

Security Council, Second Report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to

paragraph 3 of resolution 1591(2005) concerning the Sudan, UN document

S/2006/250, 19 April 2006.

Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution

1591(2005) concerning the Sudan prepared in accordance with paragraph 2 of

resolution 1665 (2006), UN document S/2006/795, 3 October 2006.

Security Council, Report of the Group of Experts submitted pursuant to paragraph 9

of Security Council resolution 1643 (2005) concerning Côte d’Ivoire, UN document

S/2006/735, 5 October 2006.

Security Council, Report of the Group of Experts submitted pursuant to paragraph 2 of

Security Council resolution 1708 (2006) concerning Côte d’Ivoire, UN document

S/2006/964, 12 December 2006.

Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution

1591(2005) concerning the Sudan prepared in accordance with paragraph 2 of

resolution 1713 (2006), UN document S/2007/584, 3 October 2007.

Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General. Small Arms, UN document

S/2008/258, 17 April 2008.

Security Council, Small arms. 5881st meeting of the Security Council, UN document

S.PV.5881, 30 April 2008.

Security Council, Small arms. 5881st meeting of the Security Council, UN document

S.PV.5881 (Resumption 1), 30 April 2008.

Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1591

(2005) concerning the Sudan, UN document S/2008/674, 11 November 2008.

Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts submitted pursuant to paragraph 1

of Security Council resolution 1819 (2008) concerning Liberia, UN document

S/2008/785, 17 December 2008.

119

Security Council, “Threat posed to international peace by uncontrolled trade in small

arms cannot be overemphasized, Security Council told as it holds day-long debate

on issue”, press release, 30 April 2008, <http://www.un.org/press/en/2008/sc9316.

doc.htm>.

Security Council, Report of the Group of Experts on Côte d’Ivoire pursuant to Paragraph

11 of Security Council resolution 1842 (2008), UN document S/2009/188, 8 April

2009.

Security Council, Final report of the Group of Experts on Côte d’Ivoire pursuant to

Paragraph 11 of Security Council resolution 1842(2008), UN document S/2009/521,

9 October 2009.

Security Council, Small arms. 6288th meeting of the Security Council, UN document

S.PV.6288, 19 March 2010.

Security Council, UN document S/RES/1945 (2010), 14 October 2010.

Security Council. Report of the Panel of Experts on the Sudan Established pursuant to

resolution 1591(2005), UN document S/2011/111, 8 March 2011.

Security Council, Final report of the Panel of Experts Established pursuant to Security

Council resolution 1973 (2011) concerning Libya, UN document S/2012/163,

20 March 2012.

Security Council, Final report of the Group of Experts on Côte d’Ivoire pursuant to

Paragraph 14 of Security Council resolution 1980 (2011), UN document S/2012/196,

14 April 2012.

Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General. Small Arms, UN document

S/2011/255, 5 April 2011.

Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts on the Sudan established pursuant to

resolution 1591 (2005), UN document S/2013/79, 12 February 2013.

Security Council, Final report of the Panel of Experts Established pursuant to resolution

1973(2011) concerning Libya, UN document S/2013/99, 9 March 2013.

Security Council, Final report of the Group of Experts on Côte d’Ivoire pursuant to

Paragraph 16 of Security Council resolution 2045 (2012), UN document S/2013/228,

17 April 2013.

Security Council, Final report of the Panel of Experts Established pursuant to resolution

1929 (2010), UN document S/2013/331, 5 June 2013.

Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts Established pursuant to resolution 1874

(2009), S/2013/337, 11 June 2013.

Security Council, UN document S/RES/2117 (2013), 26 September 2013.

Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts on the Sudan Established pursuant to

resolution 1591 (2005), UN document S/2014/87, 11 February 2014.

120

Security Council, Final report of the Panel of Experts Established pursuant to resolution

1973 (2011) concerning Libya, UN document S/2014/106, 19 February 2014.

Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts Established pursuant to resolution 1874

(2009), UN document S/2014/147, 6 March 2014.

Security Council, Final report of the Group of Experts on Côte d’Ivoire pursuant to

Paragraph 19 of Security Council resolution 2101(2013), UN document S/2014/266,

14 April 2014.

Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts on the Sudan Established pursuant to

resolution 1591 (2005), UN document S/2015/31, 19 January 2015.

Security Council, Final report of the Panel of Experts Established pursuant to resolution

1973 (2011), UN document S/2015/128, 23 February 2015.

Security Council, Small arms. 7442nd meeting of the Security Council, UN document

S.PV.7442, 13 May 2015.

Security Council, UN document S/RES/2220 (2015), 22 May 2015.

Security Council, Final report of the Group of Experts on Côte d’Ivoire pursuant to

Paragraph 27 of Security Council resolution 2153 (2014), UN document S/2015/252,

13 April 2015.

Wassenaar Arrangement, Elements for Objective Analysis and Advice Concerning

Potentially Destabilising Accumulations of Conventional Weapons, approved at the

Wassenaar Arrangement Plenary, 3 December 1998.

Wassenaar Arrangement, Best Practices for Effective Enforcement, adopted in

December 2000.

Wassenaar Arrangement, End user assurances commonly used: consolidated indicative

list, adopted in 1999, amended in 2005.

Wassenaar Arrangement, Best Practice Guidelines for Exports of SALW, adopted in

December 2002, amended in December 2007.

Wassenaar Arrangement, Elements for Export Controls of MANPADS, adopted in

December 2003, amended in December 2007.

Wassenaar Arrangement, Best Practices to Prevent Destabilising Transfers of SALW

through Air Transport, adopted in December 2007.

Wassenaar Arrangement, Best Practice Guidelines on Subsequent Transfer (Re-export)

Controls for Conventional Weapons Systems contained in Appendix 3 to the WA

Initial Elements, adopted in December 2011.

Wassenaar Arrangement, Introduction to End User/End Use Controls for Export of

Military-List Equipment, adopted in July 2014.

121

Brian Wood and Peter Danssaert, Study on the Development of a Framework for

Improving End Use and End User Control Systems, United Nations Office for

Disarmament Affairs Occasional Papers No. 21, December 2011.

122

Acronyms and abbreviations

ATT Arms Trade Treaty

ATT-BAP Arms Trade Treaty Baseline Assessment Project

CARICOM Caribbean Community

DVC delivery verification certificate

ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States

EU European Union

EUC end user certificate

EUS end user statement

FSC Forum on Security Cooperation (OSCE)

GGE Group of Governmental Experts

IIC international import certificate

INTERPOL International Criminal Police Organization

ISACS International Small Arms Control Standards

MANPADS Man-Portable Air Defence Systems

MERCOSUR Mercado Común del Sur (Southern Common Market)

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

OSCE Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe

PGE panel of governmental experts

PoA United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and

Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All

Its Aspects

RECSA Regional Centre on Small Arms

RevCon United Nations Conference to Review Progress Made in the

Implementation of the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat

and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in

All Its Aspects

RUF Revolutionary United Front (Sierra Leone)

SALW small arms and light weapons

SECO Swiss State Secretariat for Economic Affairs

SEESAC South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of

Small Arms and Light Weapons

SFC Swiss Federal Council

UAE United Arab Emirates

UN United Nations

UNCASA United Nations Coordinating Action on Small Arms

UNDDA United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs

UNDP United Nations Development Programme

123

UNGA United Nations General Assembly

UNIDIR United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research

UNITA Uniao Nacional Para a Independencia Total de Angola (UNITA)

UNODA United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs

Security Council United Nations Security Council

WA Wassenaar Arrangement

UNIDIR RESOURCES

Examining Options to Enhance Common Understanding and

Strengthen End Use and

End User Control Systems to Address Conventional Arms Diversion

This study responds to the various international calls to explore opportunities for

greater harmonization of end use/r control systems, with particular regard to end use/r

documentation, in order to strengthen efforts to prevent diversion of conventional

arms.

The study has two related objectives: First, to identify which aspects of national

end use/r control systems could feasibly be harmonized; and second, to explore

the feasibility of, and potential frameworks for, a process to strengthen end use/r

control systems and enhance cooperation to prevent diversion at the regional and/

or global levels. It uses a wide variety of materials, including multilateral instruments

for strengthening and use/r control systems, research carried out by internationally

recognized experts, as well as the results of a UNIDIR Survey on national end use/r

control systems and international cooperation and information exchanges, distributed to

States in June-October 2015. Several meetings and events convened by UNIDIR in 2015

were used to explore assumptions and proposals relating to aspects of the end use/r

control system to be harmonized, and potential international processes to be utilized.

This study offers a number of options for States to have a meaningful dialogue on

potential areas for cooperation, shared understanding and possible alignment of

measures to enhance common understanding and strengthen end use/r control systems

to address conventional arms diversion.