. Such distancing should have taken the form of an
announcement by the company, for example, that it would take no further part
in the meetings (and therefore did not wish to be invited to them).
Application to this case
(617) It is demonstrated in the facts described in Section 4 of this Decision that the
undertakings subject to this Decision were involved in collusive activities
concerning CDT and CPT.
(618) As already indicated above (see Recitals (108) and (119)), the objective of the
anti-competitive arrangements was to fix prices in the CPT and CDT markets,
respectively. This was achieved through agreements on target prices, price
ranges, price increases and/or minimum prices (see for example Recitals (109),
(120), (144), (147)-(149), (151)-(155), (159)-(163), (165)-(170), (171), (173),
(191)-(192), (194), (195), (197)-(199), (205)-(206), (231), (234)-(237), (258),
(271), (274), (277), (289), (290), (292), (296), (299), (302), (329), (333), (337),
(352), (363), (364), (368)-(370), (372)-(377), (381)-(382), (384)-(386), (390)-
(391), (394)-(395), (398)-(401), (404), (407), (426)-(427), (437)-(439)). The
price agreements were subsequently monitored (see for example Recitals (146),
(149), (151), (161), (164), (166), (169), (193), (196), (200)-(201), (231), (237),
(271), (273), (274)-(278), (302), (328), (332), (337), (341), (342), (345), (346),
(348), (350), (353)).
(619) Moreover, in particular concerning CDTs, the arrangements consisted of
agreements relating to overall market shares and/or market shares relating to
particular customers (see for example Recitals (110), (217)-(221), (224), (240),
(266), (275), (297)-(299), (360), (370), (387), (407), (420)). These examples
show that explicit agreements on market shares were reached also regarding
CPTs. Regular monitoring of the agreed upon market shares took place (see for
instance Recital (223)).
(620) Additionally, in particular concerning CDTs, the arrangements consisted of
agreements regarding output restrictions in the course of meetings and other
contacts and auditing the compliance with the agreed upon restrictions. The aim
of the output restrictions was not only to reduce oversupply but also to achieve
the agreed upon target prices and market shares (see for example Recitals (111),
(161), (176)-(177), (180)-(182), (209), (210), (211)-(214), (216), (242)-(246),
(266)-(267), (271), (358), (424)-(426), (441)). These examples show that
explicit agreements on output limitation were reached also regarding CPTs. The
output limitation agreements were subject to monitoring (see for example
Recitals (179), (181), (183)-(184), (210), (246), (271), (273)).
See, for example, Case T-334/94 Sarrio SA v Commission, [1998] ECR II-1439, paragraph 118, Case
T–141/89 Tréfileurope Sales v Commission [1995] ECR II–791, paragraph 85; Case T–7/89 Hercules,
paragraph 232; Joined Cases T-25/95, T-26/95, T-30/95, T-31/95, T-32/95, T-34/95, T-35/95, T-36/95,
T-37/95, T-38/95, T-39/95, T-42/95, T-43/95, T-44/95, T-45/95, T-46/95, T-48/95, T-50/95, T-51/95,
T-52/95, T-53/95, T-54/95, T-55/95, T-56/95, T-57/95, T-58/95, T-59/95, T-60/95, T-61/95, T-62/95,
T-63/95, T-64/95, T-65/95, T-68/95, T-69/95, T-70/95, T-71/95, T-87/95, T-88/95, T-103/95 and T-
104/95, Cimenteries CBR and Others v Commission [2000] ECR II–491, paragraph 1389; Case T–
329/01 Archer Daniels Midland v Commission [2006] ECR II-3255, paragraph 247; and Case T–303/02
Westfalen Gassen Nederland NV v Commission [2006] ECR II-4567, paragraphs 138–139.