STATEMENT OF
GENERAL LAURA J. RICHARDSON
COMMANDER, UNITED STATES SOUTHERN COMMA
BEFORE THE 118
TH
CONGRESS
HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
12 MARCH 2024
ND
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Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Smith, and distinguished committee members,
United States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) celebrated its 60
th
anniversary this past
year. Since 1963, USSOUTHCOM, working alongside our Allies and partners, has advanced
security and stability throughout Latin America and the Caribbean. For 60 years, the brave men
and women of USSOUTHCOM have steadfastly devoted themselves to a cause greater than their
ownan Enduring Promise to the region – that in the face of tyranny, corruption, pandemic, and
natural disasters, the United States of America will always stand beside those who seek and
promote peace, prosperity, and the democratic ideals upon which they flourish.
Today, democracy and democratic values are under attack globally. The People’s
Republic of China (PRC) and Russia are strategic competitors who operate without regard for
international law or norms. They condone and perpetrate corruption, disinformation campaigns,
cybercrime, and human rights abuses that undermine the existing democratic political processes
of fragile democracies in Latin America and the Caribbean and bolster the authoritarian rule of
regimes in Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela.
Meanwhile, Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs) fuel violence and corruption
throughout the region, enriching themselves while undermining democracy and co-opting the
legitimate governance functions of our partners. They traffic drugs, weapons, persons, wildlife,
and a range of illicit items, leaving citizen and environmental insecurity, death, and instability in
their wake. TCOs bear direct responsibility for the mass quantities of drugs that continue to pose
a threat to American lives.
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In response, and as the 2022 National Security Strategy (NSS) outlines, we embrace the
opportunity to expand our partnerships and bolster “economic resilience, democratic stability,
and citizen security” throughout the region.
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Integrated Deterrence means leveraging all
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instruments of national power – diplomacy, information, military, and economics – and doing so
in concert with Allies, partners, non-governmental organizations, academia, and the private
sector. It’s what I call Team Democracy. Together, we must step forward and act with a greater
sense of urgency to outcompete our adversaries by providing alternatives to PRC-centric
solutions. We must remain the region’s most trusted defense and security partner. Our partners
need our help, and as one senior leader in the region recently told me, “When you need a rope to
grab, you aren’t necessarily looking to see who threw it.” We must be the ones throwing the
rope, not our Strategic Competitors.
The NSS recognizes the direct link between this region’s prosperity and security to that
of our own.
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Over my two-plus years in command, I have made it my priority to meet our
partners where they are - to hear and understand firsthand the issues and challenges they face.
I’ve learned that presence absolutely matters. If we want to win, we must be on the field.
USSOUTHCOM’s presence in the region builds the capacity of our partners, helps counter our
adversaries’ malign intent, and contributes to our homeland defense. The many challenges this
hemisphere faces are a Call to Action.
USSOUTHCOM’s strategy focuses on three lines of effort: Strengthening Partnerships,
Countering Threats, and Building our Team. We remain committed to coordinating,
collaborating, and synchronizing with our Allies, partners, U.S. Interagency, and Non-Federal
Entities to outcompete our Strategic Competitors, defeat the pervasive threats, and overcome the
challenges within the Western Hemisphere.
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Expanding Challenges in the Region
Strategic Competition with the People’s Republic of China
The United States and the PRC are engaged in geopolitical competition based on
opposing views of the value of the international rules-based order. The PRC, through the
Chinese Communist Party (CCP), seeks to supplant the United States as the world’s leading
economic and military power.
The PRC understands the importance of economics and the intertwined role of the
People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in achieving its Chinese Dream – the PRC reclamation of
China’s central role in world affairs. In Latin America and the Caribbean, USSOUTHCOM
recognizes the opportunity to collaborate with our partners, build their capacity, and increase
their resiliency to the pervasive challenges and threats they face. Conversely, the PRC is
exploiting a fragile security environment and taking advantage of the region’s need for economic
investment to gain influence and advance its malign agenda. The PRC knows that economic
power is a prerequisite for global military power and it is imperative that we view the PRC’s
economic activities, particularly in the Americas, as connected to their global political and
military desires.
With a population of 1.4 billion people, the PRC must look beyond their shores for the
resources to sustain both its large populace and consolidation of power at home. Latin America
and the Caribbean offer such resources. The PRC is laying claim to the abundant food, water,
and critical earth minerals found in the Western Hemisphere. This region is home to 31 percent
of the planet’s fresh-water resources and by 2028 will account for 25 percent of global
agriculture and fisheries exports.
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The PRC has not extended itself into the Western
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Hemisphere to offer win-win, high-quality investment - they have come to extract, and they
intend to gain access and influence by employing the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), a “natural
extension of the 21
st
Century Maritime Silk Road.”
Twenty-two of the 31 countries in the SOUTHCOM Area of Responsibility (AOR) are
now signatories to the BRI, which the PRC portrays as expanding economic, financial, and trade
opportunities. The PRC has now surpassed the United States as South America’s top trading
partner and is Central America’s second-largest trading partner.
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In 2002, PRC trade with
Latin America and the Caribbean was just $18 million; in 2022 it ballooned to $450 billion. That
number is expected to increase to $700 billion by 2035.
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But it’s not just access to resources that the PRC seeks with its investments; it’s the
furtherance of political and military objectives to increase isolation of Taiwan. Globally, only 12
countries recognize Taiwan, seven of which are in my AOR. PRC pressure to abandon existing
recognition is mounting and is often a precondition for investment. Last year, Honduras, home
to Joint Task Force-Bravo, cut diplomatic ties with Taiwan and signed onto the BRI.
The PRC is playing the “long game” with its development of dual-use sites and facilities
throughout the region. The PRC messages its investments as peaceful, but in fact, many serve as
points of future multi-domain access for the PLA and strategic naval chokepoints. These
investments include critical infrastructure such as deep-water ports, cyber facilities, and space
facilities. In Panama, PRC-controlled State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) continue to bid on
projects related to the Panama Canal – a global strategic chokepoint. Meanwhile, in Argentina,
another SOE is attempting to secure the rights to build dual-use maritime installations, which
would support sustainment and power projection in proximity to the Strait of Magellan, the
Drake Passage, and Antarctica. This would dramatically improve the PRC’s ability to access the
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Antarctic region and its fisheries and impact U.S. strategic mobility to an area reserved for peace
and science.
The PRC blueprint for development and subsequent dual-use of deep-water ports
elsewhere in the world is already a matter of public record.
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Here in the Western Hemisphere,
a Chinese SOE will be the first with majority ownership and control of a country’s port
infrastructure - the future $3.6 billion mega-port in Chancay, Peru. The port will serve as a PRC-
proclaimed “gateway from South America to Asia.
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To shape positive perceptions of both the PRC and the CCP, Beijing pours billions of
dollars into foreign information operations.
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Their approach includes information manipulation
using “propaganda and censorship, promoting digital authoritarianism, exploiting international
organizations and bilateral partnerships, pairing cooptation and pressure, and exercising control
of Chinese-language media.”
xv
A recent Department of State special report on the PRC notes,
“the PRC suppresses critical information that contradicts its desired narratives on issues such as
Taiwan, its human rights practices, the South China Sea, its domestic economy, and international
economic engagement.”
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Partnering with the PRC and agreeing to the terms of their funded projects leaves some of
our partners saddled with debt, exorbitant interest rates, and poorly constructed infrastructure
that worsens already dire environmental crises, as is the case with the hydro-power station at the
Coca Codo Dam in Ecuador. Some geologists argue that the dam has “so disrupted the Coca
River’s natural flow and accumulation of sediments” that it accelerated an erosion process that
would normally take thousands of years into five.
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The PRC’s resource extraction is not limited to land. Each year, the PRC subsidizes a
distant water fishing fleet of about 200 to 600 vessels operating near the Galapagos and other
coastal nations’ Exclusive Economic Zones in South America, often engaging in illegal,
unregulated, and unreported (IUU) fishing practices. This fleet often exhibits concerning fishing
behavior, with some vessels disabling AIS transponders. Illegal fishing in the western
hemisphere alone comes at a cost of approximately $2.7 billion annually in lost revenue.
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But it’s not just financial cost at play - it’s opportunity cost. Our partners’ constrained maritime
resources are being diverted away from fully engaging in other critical missions to take a leading
role in combating these environmental and economic crimes.
The PRC has also taken a keen interest in expanding its access and control of the space
domain, viewing it as the “ultimate high ground.”
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There are at least 10 PRC-linked space
facilities across five countries in the region, the most PRC space-enabling infrastructure outside
mainland China. Despite its public stance against the weaponization of space, the PLA continues
to invest and improve its military space capabilities, including a deep space station in Argentina,
providing the PLA with global space tracking and surveillance capabilities. These space-based
capabilities could translate into global military capabilities that could support the monitoring,
tracking, and targeting of our forces” and affect “conventional and nuclear targeting, ground-air-
sea operations, precision conventional strike capacities, and missile defense.”
xxii
As Latin American and Caribbean governments and their telecommunication industries
seek faster, cheaper, and more inclusive communication coverage, PRC SOEs or associated
entities, such as Huawei and ZTE, penetrate virtually every country through a mixture of
funding, equipping, or servicing core and radio access networks. Some partners have privately
told us about 'buyer's remorse' for allowing Huawei to set up 5G networks in their countries due
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to increased potential for PRC exploitation. Huawei has built and continues to build a robust
The PRC's control over Huawei, and its funding related to the deployment of
telecommunication networks, threatens our partners' national assets, sovereignty, and
freedoms.
xxiv
Huawei’s 5G infrastructure could contain backdoors that allow the Chinese
government to collect and centralize massive quantities of data and give Beijing the necessary
access to attack communications networks and public utilities. Ultimately, this could provide the
PRC with unrestricted access to information and other capabilities that can be used for
espionage, as coercive levers to gain unfair advantage, and to exert malign influence to achieve
its goals.
Huawei routinely violates local laws in countries where it operates. The U.S. Justice
Department has obtained an indictment against Huawei charging fraud, money laundering,
violating U.S. sanctions against Iran, and stealing trade secrets from its U.S. business partner, T-
Mobile. Huawei was linked to the theft of intellectual property from Cisco, and U.S. startup
CNEX sued Huawei and its deputy chairman alleging conspiracy to steal trade secrets. Huawei’s
opaque operational nature and “mysterious ownership structure, contribute to concerns about the
company’s operations and intentions.”
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As Federal Bureau of Investigation Director Wray has
publicly stated, the PRC is the greatest espionage threat that democracy has ever faced.
xxvi
The
scale of its informational theft is unprecedented.
network of 2G, 3G, 4G, and 5G mobile and internet infrastructure in the region. The company
has engaged with our partners for the last 15 years and invests significantly across 24 nations in
the AOR.
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Russia as an Acute Threat
It has been two years since Russia’s unprovoked and unlawful invasion of Ukraine.
Vladimir Putin’s assault has disrupted global supply chains, agricultural production, and energy
resources,which has slowed Latin America and the Caribbean’s recovery from the COVID-19
pandemic.
xxviii
Putin’s authoritarian hand serves as a model for and bolsters the authoritarian
regimes of Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela.
Within the AOR, Russia continues its attempts to frustrate United States goals and
interests, undermining democratic institutions and the rule of law, and props up problematic
regimes in exchange for strategic access and resources.
xxxii
xxix
Moscow is working hard to disrupt
relations between the United States and our partners to extoll the virtues of a multipolar world.
xxx
To do so, Russia employs a host of malign activities within the gray zone, including malicious
cyber activities, disinformation campaigns, and periodic high-level visits and military force
projection.
xxxi
Moscow and affiliated cybercriminal groups seek to destabilize democracies by targeting
public institutions and sensitive government frameworks, disrupting critical infrastructure, and
stealing information.
xxxiii
Recently, a Partner Nation fell victim to such an attack which targeted
dozens of institutions, including a key ministry.
Russian disinformation in the region is increasing in scope since Russia invaded
Ukraine.
xxxiv
The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defense, think tanks, and the
oligarchy guide the narratives employed by propagandists at state-controlled and regional media
providers such as Actualidad RT, Sputnik Mundo, and Telesur. These media outlets spread anti-
U.S. messaging across traditional and social media platforms to their millions of followers in
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Latin America and around the world.
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Their false media narratives commonly blame the
United States for creating a global food crisis and supporting Nazism in Ukraine, while
portraying the United States as a greedy and imperialist state concerned with maximum
extraction of the continent’s resources.
At the same time, Russia has been leveraging its diplomats and periodic military force
projection to maintain and gain regional influence. Last April, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey
Lavrov visited Brazil, Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela. The trip’s purpose was to increase
cooperation with the countries it views as critical to creating a multipolar world where Russia,
China, and others act as a counterbalance to the United States.
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xxxviii
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Lavrov again visited Brazil,
Cuba, and Venezuela at the end of February 2024. In January 2023, the Russian frigate Admiral
Gorshkov tested its strike capabilities in the Western Atlantic Ocean, running a computer
simulation on hypersonic missiles. Then, in July, the Russian Navy training ship Perekop
docked in Cuba for three days before making stops in Nicaragua and Venezuela. Russian
presence aims to prop up dictatorial regimes who share a common worldview, while expanding
authoritarian influence in the Western Hemisphere.
Transnational Criminal Organizations
TCOs remain the primary obstacle to lasting security and stability. Moreover, TCOs
imperil the security of the American people and the values at the heart of this hemisphere’s
democracies. USSOUTHCOM estimates that approximately 200 TCOs and four terrorist groups
are operating in the region, including Mexican cartels such as the Jalisco New Generation Cartel
and the Sinaloa Cartel. Through a combination of corruption and intimidation, and outright
attacks on government officials and institutions, TCOs undermine the rule of law and disrupt
legitimate governmental functions.
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The National Liberation Army (ELN), Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
People’s Army (FARC-EP), FARC-Segunda Marquetalia (FARC-SM), and Shining Path (SL)
are designated terrorist organizations that use criminal activities to fill their coffers. TCOs traffic
in weapons, drugs, persons, wildlife, gold and minerals, commodities, and counterfeit goods,
resulting in earnings of approximately $330 billion annually, five times the combined military
budgets of every nation in Latin America and the Caribbean. Consequently, TCOs are often
better funded, equipped, and manned than the security forces trying to fight them. They are
brutal and vicious, setting fire to public transportation, murdering innocent civilians, and
exerting control over significant swaths of urban and rural territories. In response, regional
militaries are increasingly called on to respond to this threat, further eroding democratic norms,
which in turn opens space that the PRC and Russia can exploit.
Mexican criminal groups like the Sinaloa Cartel and Cartel Jalisco Nueva Generación
work with primarily PRC-based companies and brokers to source fentanyl, fentanyl precursors,
and pre-precursors, which are then mixed into both cocaine and counterfeit prescription
medications and trafficked into the United States, Mexico, Central America, and South
America.
xl
The result is the deadliest drug epidemic our country has ever faced and an ongoing
economic crisis throughout our neighborhoods. TCOs are killing hundreds of thousands of
Americans and draining valuable resources from struggling communities and states.
xli
xlii
Iran
Iran seeks to increase its ideological influence in Latin America with the support of
terrorist organizations such as Hizballah.
xliii
Using Spanish-language media, social networks,
and satellites, Iran’s National Ministry of Intelligence and Security is engaging in large-scale
psychological warfare to promote its interests in attacking the West and Latin America.
xliv
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Moreover, “Iran has moved from categorizing and tracking targets for possible attacks…to
launching plans, including the attempted assassination of Israeli businessmen in Colombia.”
xlv
Hizballah continues to leverage the Shi’a diaspora in Latin America to disrupt Western
objectives and surveil against enemies of the Iranian regime, to include targets with Jewish
heritage.
Additionally, this past year Iran completed a naval deployment that circumnavigated the
globe and included a port call in Brazil. Iran also delivered coastal defense missile patrol boats
to Venezuela.
Regional Humanitarian Crises
Irregular Migration. TCO-driven violence, economic desperation, political instability,
and climate change, are just a few of the cross-cutting challenges that are driving unprecedented
levels of irregular migration throughout the region. A significant number of these migrants are
from Venezuela, Ecuador, and Haiti, all home to both security and interconnected economic
challenges that drive migration. Additionally, a growing number of Chinese migrants are
moving through the AOR to the United States. In Fiscal Year (FY) 2023, U.S. Customs and
Border Protection (CBP) encountered approximately 24,314 Chinese migrants along the
Southwest Border, a 10-fold increase of migration from the previous fiscal year.
Panama’s Darien Region is a likely route to the north for those whose travel originates in
South America. Among the dense jungle, mountains, and swamps, TCOs, such as the Gulf Clan
and Tren de Aragua, facilitate smuggling operations, exploiting the most vulnerable. Migrants
are subjected to extortion, robbery, sexual violence, wild animals, and disease, among so many
other dangers. Nevertheless, hundreds of thousands are willing to brave these conditions, and
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the number of people passing through the Darien has more than doubled to 505,674 from FY
2022 to FY 2023.
Haiti. Nowhere is more indicative of the destabilizing effect of criminal groups than
Haiti, where gang violence has increased, overwhelming the capacity of the Haitian National
Police. Gangs recently coordinated attacks, control an estimated eighty percent of Port-au-Prince
and have a significant presence beyond it, dictating many aspects of daily life under their control,
including the ability to move freely, seek medical assistance, or attend school.
xlvii xlviii
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United Nations
Secretary-General Antonio Guterres recently cited a report that recorded the brutality of these
gangs, with 3,758 intentional killings between October 2022 and September 2023.
Exposure to severe disease, lack of food, potable water, and sanitation services are just a
few of the heartbreaking challenges resulting in the internal displacement of 200,000 Haitians.
xlix
Moreover, Haiti’s geographic location leaves 96 percent of its citizens on the precipice of
disaster – from earthquakes and hurricanes to flooding and mudslides.
l
Government agencies
lack the capacity and capability to mitigate and then subsequently respond to frequent
emergencies effectively. Political instability, unprecedented levels of violence, and tragic
poverty have resulted in increased irregular migration, with more than 70,000 Haitians
encountered at the United States Southwest Border in FY 2023.
USSOUTHCOM continues to support U.S. Government efforts promoting deployment of
a United Nations Security Council-authorized Multinational Security Support (MSS) mission in
Haiti. The MSS mission is to augment and build the capacity of the Haitian National Police to
maintain security and counter gangs.
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Nicaragua. The Ortega regime maintains an iron grip upon Nicaragua’s governmental
institutions and its people as it continues to engage in repressive attacks on human rights,
fundamental freedoms, and civil society.
li
Aligned in shared values and interests, Nicaragua and
the PRC remain engaged in negotiations on a free trade agreement with PRC Foreign Minister
Wang Yi.
lii
Additionally, the Ortega Regime openly supports Russia’s illegal invasion of
Ukraine and was the sole Latin American country to participate in 2022’s Russian Vostok war
games.
liii
Cuba. Food, medicine, fuel, electricity, and political freedom remain scarce in Cuba.
President Miguel Diaz-Canel and his government continue to repress and disproportionately
punish all forms of public dissent. According to reports, during the past two years, more than
400,000 Cubans have fled the island amid an economic crisis.
liv
Conditions on the island have
become so difficult that Russian exploiters have even lured Cuban citizens to join the Russian
military in its war against Ukraine.
lv
Both the PRC and Russia are taking advantage of the existing conditions within Cuba to
deepen cooperation across all elements of national power, with President Diaz-Canel
commenting during last summer’s BRICS Summit in South Africa that Cuban-Chinese relations
were at an all-time high.
lvi
On 6 November, President Xi Jinping met with Cuban Vice Prime
Minister Manuel Marrero Cruz in Beijing, affirming China’s willingness to support Cuba’s
defense of national sovereignty. Havana continues to assert its willingness to carry out the BRI
and strengthen ties. We remain focused on monitoring and assessing the PRC’s and Russia’s
malign activities on the island, including defense cooperation, military deployments, intelligence
collection, or any other activity that poses a threat to the United States – especially since these
activities are occurring just 90 miles from our shores.
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Venezuela. Nicolas Maduro presides over an unmitigated humanitarian disaster in
Venezuela, as his stewardship of Venezuela’s economy has worsened living conditions for
desperate Venezuelans who have limited access to food, water, and fuel, spurring many to
migrate.
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Recently, the authoritarian regime held a referendum to “claim sovereignty over the
oil- and mineral-rich” Essequibo region in Guyana. We are monitoring this issue and support
a diplomatic resolution. Maduro and his representatives have done little to stop drug trafficking
and human rights abuses.
lix
Extrajudicial killings, forced disappearances, torture, and
prosecution without due process have been undertaken by the security forces in Venezuela.
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Maduro representatives are responsible for the worst ecocide in the history of Venezuela.
lxii
Consequently, record numbers of Venezuelans are leaving their homes in search of a better life
more than 7.7 million Venezuelans have fled their country since 2013. Venezuelans are now the
primary migrant nationality from the SOUTHCOM AOR encountered at the United States
Southwest Border.
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Levers: Overcoming Threats and Challenges in the AOR
Today’s complex threats and challenges span all domains and the spectrum of conflict.
To counter and overcome them, we need an integrated, whole-of-society approach that leverages
all instruments of national power. The threats presented by the PRC today are substantially
different than those presented by the Soviet Union during the Cold War, where competition
centered on military capability.
lxv
Specifically, in Latin America and the Caribbean, the
Communist vision offered by the Soviets and their regional acolytes provided little to the
populace.
lxvi
Today’s PRC offers our partners the veneer of modernization – airports, railways,
deep-water ports, internet access, inexpensive technology, and available financing expeditiously.
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To counter, we must expand beyond our traditional mechanisms and increase American
economic investment in the region.
After more than two years in command, I am convinced that Economic Security is
National Security, and many of the challenges in the Americas are directly tied to a lack of
economic investment and opportunity. USSOUTHCOM’s support of initiatives like the
Americas Partnership for Economic Prosperity will mobilize high-standard investment in this
hemisphere into critical infrastructure and supply chains to expand economic prosperity and
opportunity. U.S. investment can enable regional competitiveness, bring transparency to the
construction of critical infrastructure, and provide alternatives to PRC SOEs within our
hemisphere.
Moreover, with support from the U.S. Government, U.S. companies need to raise their
profiles in the region and improve the branding of Team USA, both in messaging and
advertisement of what good quality U.S. investment brings to the Americas. U.S. companies
employ international environmental and labor standards, have strong anti-corruption measures,
invest in local communities, ensure the safety of their locally hired workers, and adhere to
principles of transparency – a stark contrast to the PRC and the disinformation narratives
perpetuated by Russia. Additionally, more legitimate job opportunities for local populations
diminish TCO support and reduce opportunities for corrupt practices. Economic Security is
National Security – as it drives global influence, prosperity, and reinforces other vital elements
of national power.
USSOUTHCOM, with our Allies, partners, U.S. Interagency, non-governmental
organizations, and the private sector, seamlessly campaigns across all domains to overcome the
many challenges to the Western Hemisphere. The safety of our homeland is directly linked to
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the resilience, stability, and security of our Latin American and Caribbean partners. As such,
USSOUTHCOM is laser-focused on Strengthening Partnerships and Countering Threats.
Strengthening Partnerships and Countering Threats
Strengthening partnerships means building trust and being present. Trust is an
investment and cannot be surged.
lxvii
Our alliances and partnerships are our greatest strategic
advantage. They are directly connected to the region’s collective ability to meet its evolving
security challenges. In the face of our adversaries’ pervasive malign influence, we continue to
substantively engage with our Partner Nations to build trust while maintaining our status as their
preferred partner. USSOUTHCOM does this through a pre-existing foundation of trust, mutual
respect for democratic values, and shared interests in cooperation and interoperability. Our
engagements, presence, and policies remain flexible, consistent, and responsive as we campaign
in strategic competition. Putting Integrated Deterrence into action, USSOUTHCOM works by,
with, and through our Allies and partners to improve Partner Nation capability, capacity, and
resilience. Every day we leverage Security Cooperation exercises, training, and education
activities to build trust.
Concurrently, cross-cutting threats and transboundary challenges put at risk sovereignty,
democratic values, and security. USSOUTHCOM aggressively counters threats through
campaigning and integrating deliberate multi-domain operations and exercises alongside our
Allies and partners. Team Democracy can deny our adversaries the ability to expand their
presence and influence and increases regional stability, security, and prosperity.
Security Cooperation. In a resource-constrained theater, USSOUTHCOM continues to
work with the U.S. Interagency and Allies to maximize efforts in exchanges, training, equipping,
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and exercises to build Partner Nation capabilities or capacities and to advance regional Partner
Nation interoperability. Building Partner Capacity Programs are the main lever for partner
engagement and provide meaningful opportunities to strengthen partnerships and develop
military capabilities. In FY 2024, we have planned 1,014 activities by, with, and through our
regional partners. We appreciate congressional support of this critical program and will continue
maximizing all resources to build our willing partners’ capacity.
The Security Cooperation funds provided by Congress are critical to delivering
equipment and capabilities to our partners, and these resources have significantly accelerated and
expanded the capacity of our efforts to counter the PRC, Russia, and TCOs. Key examples are
the contracts awarded to Ecuador and Peru for King Air Maritime Patrol Aircraft. These aircraft
will significantly enhance the Maritime Domain Awareness capability by illuminating the
current threat of IUU fishing and monitoring and detecting illicit maritime movements.
Department of State Security Assistance. Foreign Military Sales (FMS), Foreign
Military Financing (FMF), and Excess Defense Articles (EDA) programs increase
interoperability with our partners while supporting their security requirements. These programs
are critical tools to counterbalance PRC military engagement in the region. In December 2023,
the Chilean Air Force signed an FMS letter of acceptance for the modernization of their F-16
fleet. This modernization will increase the lifespan of their fleet by 15 years, provide NATO
interoperability, and continue to provide access, presence, and influence with a critical partner.
Our partners increasingly face a choice between seeking equipment and training from the U.S. or
our Strategic Competitors and other malign actors. The superior goods and strong relationships
built by our programs enable us to meet the needs of our partners in a timely manner while
outcompeting our adversaries.
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USSOUTHCOM executes the Department of State’s International Military Education and
Training (IMET) program that provides professional military education emphasizing
professionalism and democratic values to personnel from 28 countries in the region. In FY 2023,
our IMET allocation to our Partner Nations provided professional military education for
approximately 800 international students in U.S. schools. This opportunity to influence our
partners is important, as the personnel attending these schools often become senior military
leaders in their countries. Currently, three ministers of defense and 13 chiefs of defense have
attended IMET-funded courses at U.S institutions.
Additionally, regional educational institutions such as the William J. Perry Center for
Hemispheric Defense Studies and the Inter-American Defense College provide executive-level
education and help cultivate lasting relationships, improve regional understanding of U.S. policy,
and ensure the sustainability of U.S. Security Cooperation investments. These institutions’
influential alumni networks foster whole-of-hemisphere collaboration in resolving top security
and defense challenges in the Americas.
Joint Exercise Program. Our Joint Exercise Program continues to provide an outsized
return on investment to strengthen partnerships and interoperability among our Allies, partners,
U.S. Interagency, and Non-Federal Entities. Over 13,500 participants from 36 Nations were
integrated into our exercises this past year. I traveled to Colombia in July for the 64
th
annual
UNITAS, the world’s longest-running multinational maritime exercise. There, I saw firsthand
how 7,000 people from 27 countries across the globe collaborate, innovate, and experiment with
emerging technologies and naval concepts – including the integration and management of
unmanned systems to deter Malign State Actors and foster security and stability across the
global commons. Honing our warfighting skills has primacy in all we do.
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Last August, Australia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the
United States put Integrated Deterrence into action during Exercise SOUTHERN STAR, a
multi-lateral special operations exercise hosted throughout Chile that focused on countering
threat networks in the AOR. Through subject matter expert exchanges, tactical operations, and
command and control exercises, over 1,100 Chilean, 500 U.S. service members, and dozens of
Allies and partners came together to enable global collaboration and interoperability while
building Allied and Partner Nation capacity to conduct contingency operations.
USSOUTHCOM’s exercises CENTAM GUARDIAN and TRADEWINDS focus on
countering TCOs and bringing together the Department of State, Department of Justice, and the
Department of Homeland Security, along with our Allied and Partner Nation military and
security forces, to enhance readiness, domain awareness, interoperability, and intelligence and
information sharing.
Through training on Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Response (HA/DR), Human
Rights, and Women, Peace, and Security (WPS), these exercises not only provide year-long
engagement opportunities throughout the AOR but also serve as forums to enhance force
professionalism and underscore democratic principles.
Theater Maintenance Partnership Initiative. The Theater Maintenance Partnership
Initiative (TMPI) builds partner capacity from the tactical level (operator maintenance) to the
operational level (Ministry of Defense logistics and sustainment functions). Maintenance and
sustainment are hard for our U.S. military, and TMPI invests in our partners by teaching and
building a culture of maintenance readiness. TMPI is a seven-year program and will build
capacity through education by establishing nine Maintenance Centers of Excellence in the AOR.
It will also address maintenance requirements of U.S.-provided defense articles our partners
21
utilize. Fostering an integrated approach to logistics, TMPI will improve readiness and readiness
reporting so that Allied and Partner Nations can visualize materiel readiness, apply resources,
communicate challenges, and request needed support. Additionally, USSOUTHCOM is working
to create Multinational Logistics Courses to promote NATO standardization, Life Cycle
Management, and the conduct of logistics at the Operational and Strategic levels. TMPI will
enhance interoperability, self-sufficiency, and resiliency among Allies and partners, leading to
sustainable readiness improvements that increase regional stability.
CONTINUING PROMISE. This past year, from August to September, the USNS
BURLINGTON and 120 crewmembers embarked upon a 52-day humanitarian assistance (HA),
readiness building, and goodwill mission that touched Colombia, Grenada, Panama, and Trinidad
and Tobago. This evolution marked the 13
th
CONTINUING PROMISE mission to the AOR
since 2007 – a joint military and civilian effort that provides expeditionary medical care,
veterinary care, training, and subject matter expert exchanges with our Partner Nations. While
CONTINUING PROMISE missions typically feature the USNS COMFORT hospital ship,
which is currently undergoing maintenance, the mission relied on the USNS BURLINGTON as
the deploying platform. The “fast, flexible, and maneuverable” ship served as a proof of concept
for transporting personnel and equipment in support of regional disaster relief and humanitarian
operations.
lxviii
During the mission, CONTINUING PROMISE personnel delivered medical care to 6,100
patients, administered 950 vaccinations, dispensed 8,750 prescriptions, and repaired $500,000
worth of Partner Nation medical equipment. Additionally, U.S. Navy Seabees led construction
and engineering projects benefiting schools, hospitals, and local communities. The
CONTINUING PROMISE mission is a critical soft power asset that creates and sustains an
22
immeasurable amount of goodwill from our partners and their people, offsetting PRC influence
in the region while building the legitimacy and capacity of our Partner Nations.
Key Leader Engagements. The importance of maintaining and cultivating relationships
with senior leaders within my AOR cannot be overstated. Since taking command in October
2021, I have been to the region 48 times, visited 17 countries, and conducted over 150 Key
Leader Engagements with Allied and Partner Nation ministers and chiefs of defense.
Additionally, I have met with 17 heads of state, three vice presidents, and three prime ministers.
These engagements and the enduring Congressional and Staff Delegations to the region assist in
establishing and successfully executing our shared security objectives while generating mutual
trust and understanding. Moreover, they reinforce diplomacy and U.S. Interagency initiatives.
After many discussions with the region’s leaders, it remains apparent that our partners need our
assistance in combatting their many challenges.
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) continues
to provide vital support to the USSOUTHCOM AOR by executing an extremely diverse program
that not only builds infrastructure and capacity, but also ensures that considerations for
environmental sustainability, climate resiliency, and at-risk indigenous populations, are factored
into their projects. Wherever we have a USACE effort, we are facilitating presence and access.
USACE currently has activities in 17 countries within the AOR and has some form of full-time
presence in eight of them. For example, they are managing large construction efforts in
Colombia and Peru, providing humanitarian assistance projects in Guatemala and Belize, and
executing technical assistance in agreements with the Dominican Republic, Brazil and Ecuador.
USACE builds projects in support of our exercises, incorporates work with Allies and the U.S.
Interagency, executes exchanges with partners having complex engineering challenges, and
23
works to select contractors internal to that country or region to enable investment in the local
economy. The quality work and the transparent nature in which they do business are providing
National Guard State Partnership Program. 2023 marked the 30
th
anniversary of the
State Partnership Program and 30 years of the National Guard assisting our Partner Nations’
military and security forces to build capacity and meet ever-evolving security challenges.
USSOUTHCOM has the largest State Partnership Program of all the Combatant Commands,
spanning 30 countries. Since 2010 our program has completed 3,629 events, with 426 events
completed in FY 2023 and another 328 planned for FY 2024. Improving regional
interoperability and the readiness of both Partner Nations and U.S. forces to respond to crises
and threats, the State Partnership Program is instrumental in the conduct and success of not only
our operations, but also our enduring relationships throughout the region.
Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Response. Regional geography and climate
change leave our Partner Nations vulnerable to extreme weather events and natural disasters.
Before, during, and after a catastrophe, we stand shoulder-to-shoulder with our partners to
provide assistance. USSOUTHCOM engages regularly with our Partner Nations, encouraging
and assisting them to take the necessary steps toward preparedness, mitigation, and resiliency. In
FY 2023, USSOUTHCOM completed 256 HA and three Humanitarian Mine Action (HMA)
projects in 29 countries.
HA activities address the basic needs of civilian populations and build partner capacity
by improving Partner Nation disaster preparedness and risk reduction, health, education, basic
an environmentally conscious and more technically sound alternative to outcompete the PRC.
These projects, programs, and Integrated Deterrence efforts increase our regional
competitiveness, facilitate interoperability, and build Partner Nation resilience.
24
infrastructure, and HMA activities. Over the last year, USSOUTHCOM planned and conducted
25 medical civic-action projects, constructed or renovated nine medical and dental clinics and 14
schools, executed 18 projects to provide potable water to towns and villages, and constructed and
equipped four Emergency Operations Centers/Disaster Relief Warehouses. Moreover, we
conducted 22 projects to provide local firefighters with equipment, radios, and personal
protective equipment during the outbreak of wildland forest fires in Chile. Of note,
USSOUTHCOM conducted 18 projects to support the governments of Colombia and Panama in
their efforts to provide humanitarian services to mitigate the suffering of migrants in the Darien
region. These projects demonstrate our commitment to building Partner Nation capacity and
meeting humanitarian needs, while simultaneously increasing the United States’ access,
visibility, and influence in a time of strategic competition throughout the region.
Countering PRC Malign Efforts. The PRC is America’s pacing threat; countering their
aggression and malign influence requires a whole-of-society approach. USSOUTHCOM
continues to coordinate with non-governmental organizations, the private sector, academia, and
the U.S. Interagency, including both the Department of State and the Department of Commerce,
to source U.S. and Allied solutions as alternatives to PRC offerings in critical infrastructure,
cyber, and telecommunications. By methodically identifying and synchronizing separate
initiatives, from building cyber capability to exposing PRC malign activities, we can strengthen
critical infrastructure to improve our collective ability to operate in the face of the PRC’s multi-
domain threats.
The PRC is working overtime to expand its network of port access and space
infrastructure. As such, we remain focused on building our relationships and interoperability
with our partners and Allies through sustained Security Cooperation engagement and investment.
25
Moreover, we continue to illuminate and expose the malign intent and dual-use nature of PRC
infrastructure and space sites. Information sharing with our partners paints a vibrant portrait of
the PRC’s past, present, and future steps to undercut our partners’ sovereignty while expanding
theirs. Armed with the facts and U.S. and Allied investment alternatives, our partners are better
able to make informed decisions regarding engagement with the PRC.
We will WIN this strategic competition by emphasizing and seizing upon our strengths.
A global network of Allies and partners guided by democratic values and principles gives the
United States an unrivaled advantage over the PRC. We continue to campaign across all
domains and the conflict spectrum while instituting Integrated Deterrence into all our activities,
operations, and investments. By doing so, USSOUTHCOM demonstrates its commitment to the
region, forges stronger partnerships, and enhances regional resilience, stability, and security
across the Western Hemisphere.
Countering Russian Malign Influence. We remain postured for competition with
Russia through the coordination and application of information-related capabilities. Russian
malign activities are ever present, and the associated fallout continues to plague the region.
USSOUTHCOM’s approach empowers our partners and exposes Russian disinformation and
malign activity to limit its reach and effectiveness.
Our Allies and partners support efforts that impose costs on Russia, and this past year, we
have successfully collaborated with partners to counter Russian malign activities occurring in the
information environment. Additionally, we continue to work with our partners to exchange
Soviet-era equipment for newer NATO-interoperable, U.S.-made equipment in the future. We
must continue to coordinate and collaborate expeditiously with our partners, especially when
assisting them in replacing antiquated equipment and maintaining operational readiness. The
26
stakes are too high; we cannot allow Strategic Competitors or other malign actors to fulfill the
needs of our partners due to self-imposed inefficiency.
Countering TCOs. Utilizing a whole-of-government effort, Joint Interagency Task
Force-South (JIATF-South) monitors both the air and maritime domains in our region to detect
deadly drugs and contraband headed toward the shores of the United States. In FY 2023, this
statutorily directed mission saved 3,030 American lives and resulted in the disruption of 361
illegal smuggling events, including the disruption of almost 308 metric tons of cocaine and 78
metric tons of marijuana, with a combined wholesale value of $7.7 billion. Additionally,
evidence and information gathered from these disruptions assist U.S. Interagency and
international law enforcement in prosecution efforts that further degrade TCOs.
Our Partner Nations continue to be critical enablers in countering TCO smuggling
operations. In coordination with JIATF-South, our Partner Nations have participated in 79.5%
percent of operations, resulting in the removal of 240.675 metric tons of cocaine routed toward
the United States. The success of these operations relies upon Partner Nation collaboration,
which we systematically nurture and support throughout our routine military-to-military
engagements, training, and exercises. A key investment in this shared fight is the contracted
Ship Special Mission (SSM), an afloat forward staging base embarking Partner Nation Navy and
Coast Guard interceptor teams, extending their reach hundreds of miles offshore where TCOs
traffic their illicit commodities. In FY 2023, the SSM embarked teams from six Partner Nations
in the Pacific, Caribbean, and Atlantic Oceans while conducting nine separate counter-TCO
operations. Our partners operating from the SSM seized over 12 metric tons of cocaine and 10
thousand pounds of marijuana, with a combined street value of approximately $500 million.
27
U.S.-led, multinational counternarcotics operations ultimately result in our partners
taking the lead on their own operations, as Peru recently did during Operation MAR DE GRAU.
This operation showcased the value of Integrated Deterrence and resulted in 2.897 metric tons of
cocaine seized or disrupted in three separate cases. This level of success is directly tied to
continued U.S. investment in training and equipping our military and security partners.
Moreover, USSOUTHCOM works hand-in-hand with the Department of Treasury to
counter malign actors’ ability to generate, store, move, and use funds. This includes revenue
from corruption, drugs, weapons, human trafficking, and illegal trade in natural resources and
wildlife. During the past year, USSOUTHCOM supported Treasury’s designation of Los
Huistas, who facilitated the importation of precursor chemicals from China to manufacture
methamphetamines, as a Drug Trafficking Organization.
Notwithstanding our significant achievements over the decades in this mission space,
there is still more to do, especially in support of efforts to combat TCOs who directly threaten
the democratic stability of the region. As U.S. resources against this threat decline, we will
continue to innovate by re-examining and creatively leveraging current authorities and
unconventional tools, like contract assets, commercial data, and artificial intelligence and
machine learning. We are also working to better align counternarcotics efforts with our larger
campaign focus on strategic competition, such as supporting U.S. law enforcement efforts to
sever state-crime alliances related to illicit finance, cybercrime, and the use of proxies.
Confronting Climate Change. Climate change and environmental degradation reduce
military readiness by expanding requirements and diminishing resources. This AOR is
disproportionately affected by extreme weather events and natural disasters, conditions that
impact the region’s access to food, water, healthcare, and energy. El Niño and other naturally
28
occurring phenomena are exacerbated by elevated surface temperatures, which dry out soil and
render farmland less productive, further contributing to irregular migration. This weather pattern
also results in less rainfall in Central America and Northern South America, which affects the
water levels required to operate critical infrastructure such as the Panama Canal, through which
five percent of global commerce passes through annually. Low water levels have limited the
number of vessels able to transit each day, at a time when global shipping is further challenged
by threats in the Red Sea.
Alongside our Partner Nations, USSOUTHCOM builds resiliency and increases capacity
to respond to extreme weather events and environmental disasters by holding subject matter
expert exchanges and incorporating energy and climate security scenarios into our major
exercises. We also leverage an integrated approach with the Pacific Disaster Center in Hawaii
and other civilian partners, who facilitate HA/DR training and assessments with our Partner
Nations.
USSOUTHCOM is executing a program to assist partners in the Western Hemisphere to
provide training to defense and security partners in how to plan against, prepare for, and respond
to climate contingencies, leveraging data-driven decision making and analytic tools. The
program will fund additional bilateral and multilateral research on climate security in the
Western Hemisphere. In 2024, USSOUTHCOM will co-host sub-regional symposia and a
region-wide Capstone Conference on addressing the impacts of climate change. The program’s
goal is to catalyze regional collaboration and response mechanisms leading to climate-resilient
outcomes.
Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing. The increasing urgency to address the
severity of the economic, human, and environmental consequences of IUU fishing and associated
29
labor abuses continues to grow throughout the globe. President Biden has cited IUU fishing as
In partnership with other U.S. Government initiatives, USSOUTHCOM is promoting a
whole-of-society effort to better use commercial data, analytics, and emerging technology to
improve maritime domain awareness. Through Enhanced Domain Awareness, a secure,
unclassified, virtual environment, we provide partners with a consolidated, near real-time picture
of IUU fishing activities, trends, and reports that contribute to counter-IUU fishing operations as
well as other issues such as migration, human trafficking, and illegal mining.
lxxii
Our decisive
actions are a bulwark against unsustainable PRC resource extraction. Simultaneously, they
reduce lost Partner Nation revenues and impede the ability of our adversaries to engage in
nefarious activities in the region. Countering IUU fishing is one more way to bolster our
partners national and economic security.
Cyber. Cyber is an all-encompassing domain that links every facet of society, including
defense. The interconnectedness of the cyber domain continues to grow exponentially with
emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence. This means cybersecurity and cyber
defense are challenges confronting more than just information technology specialists. These
difficulties span the full spectrum of government and society, from presidents to average
citizens. Successful plans for countering adversary activities in the cyber domain require
one of the greatest threats to the world’s oceans.
lxix
It contributes to the “collapse or decline of
fisheries that are critical to the economic growth, food systems, and ecosystems” of our Partner
Nations.
lxx
Additionally, it canundermine port and maritime security, as criminal elements
may use similar trade routes, landing sites, and vessels…for trafficking arms, migrants, drugs,
and other contraband.”
lxxi
30
allocating increased resources and integrating whole-of-government solutions to deliver the
required support quickly and in sufficient quantity.
We support our partners’ advancement of their defensive cyber capabilities and develop
cyber resiliency through cybersecurity defense training, software, and equipment with the Joint
Combatant Command Cyber Assistance Teams – USSOUTHCOM’s cyber quick reaction force –
and Defend Forward Operations. Latin America suffered about 12 percent of global cyber-
attacks even though it only accounts for eight percent of the world’s population.
lxxiii
Over the
last year, Team Democracy came together to help a requesting Partner Nation recover from a
massive Malign State Actor-supported cyberattack against government ministries that resulted in
over $10 million in losses. We successfully leveraged internal and external resources through
multiple engagements to support recovery and fortify their cyber resiliency. As a result, this
partner pursued telecommunications solutions that conform to the Budapest Convention on
Cybercrime and eliminated certain Malign State Actors from competition.
Competing in the Information Space. Democracy’s adversaries continue to flood the
information space with disinformation, seeking to advance their malign narratives and agendas
upon the “smokeless battlefield.”
lxxiv
USSOUTHCOM’s information operations team works
tirelessly to shape pro-U.S. and pro-democracy narratives that “tell our story” and highlight the
truthful, positive outcomes in the region from our collective efforts. By synchronizing and
coordinating with our Allies, partners, and the U.S. Interagency, we aggressively pierce the
information space to expand our partnerships, underscore the enduring value of human rights and
the rule of law, and retain the offensive in exposing and countering the harmful activity and
disinformation generated by the PRC, Russia, and other malign actors.
31
Agile Processes. The window to seize the strategic initiative is now. We must continue
to innovate and support our partners at the speed of relevance. Our adversaries work in an
authoritarian system that is not checked by transparent processes or accountability, offering our
partners equipment, services, and education on an expedited basis. Our status as the preferred
partner is jeopardized by bureaucratic inefficiencies that result in overpromising and
underdelivering. Our Strategic Competitors fill this void.
The United States must use all the instruments of national power to propel innovation and
operate at the cutting edge of technology. Through collaboration with academic and private
industry partners, this command seeks to take innovative technologies from a controlled
laboratory environment to a permissive practical application environment, establishing the
USSOUTHCOM AOR as an innovation hub. In October, U.S. Naval Forces Southern
Command/U.S. Fourth Fleet held its Hybrid Fleet Campaign Event, hosting 47 Department of
Defense Commands, 10 foreign partners, and 18 industry partners to foster innovation and
experimentation to inform the Unmanned Campaign and Hybrid Fleet. Over the course of the
week, unmanned systems were evaluated in advanced kill chains, contested operations,
survivability, and sustainment at sea. Additionally, USSOUTHCOM has focused on striking
bilateral agreements with our Partner Nations to mutually advance military technologies so that
we can work together quickly to create new beneficial capabilities.
I have made it a priority to integrate tomorrow’s technology into our operations and
exercises today. Continued investment and advancements in the areas of robotics, cyber
technology, and artificial intelligence and machine learning will overmatch our adversaries and
assist the region’s democracies to emerge as global leaders in science and technology.
32
Coast Guard Support. The U.S. Coast Guard remains a key partner and enabler of
USSOUTHCOM’s priorities and missions. The U.S. Coast Guard maintains unique authorities
and capabilities, which, in coordination with the Joint Force, our Allies, and Partner Nations,
disrupt TCOs, IUU fishing, terrorism, and irregular migration. Moreover, they support
USSOUTHCOM Theater Security Cooperation initiatives and conduct a variety of lifesaving and
HA mission support across the region by delivering critical aid in the wake of a disaster. Jointly
with the U.S. Army, the U.S. Coast Guard, as part of the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative -
Technical Assistance Field Team, bolsters the capabilities of Caribbean Partner Nations’
maritime assets in support of regional security and counter-trafficking while simultaneously
displacing PRC influence. As always, USSOUTHCOM can faithfully rely on the U.S. Coast
Guard to ensure the safety, security, and stewardship of the region’s waters.
lxxv
Building Our Team People First
People execute the strategy.
lxxvi
USSOUTHCOM continues to invest in its people to
Build Our Team. With their trust being the foundation of our profession, the health, safety, and
welfare of our people remains paramount. USSOUTHCOM maintains a professional atmosphere
that offers educational opportunities, leverages broad expertise, and fosters diverse and
innovative thought to generate solutions to the dynamic problem set in the Americas.
Housing, Cost of Living Allowance, and Locality Pay. Service members, civilians,
contractors, and their families are the heart and soul of USSOUTHCOM. Our success is tied to
the welfare of our team. While South Florida is the geographic gateway to the Americas, living
and working in the area has many economic challenges that have affected our command,
especially as it relates to the cost of housing. Through the hard work of the Office of the
Secretary of Defense and the Department of the Army, along with the support of federal and
33
state officials and local leaders, we have physically broken ground on the USSOUTHCOM
privatized housing project and expect phased completion between the summers of 2026 and
2027. This project will house nearly 200 service members and their families.
Our service members and civilian teammates continue to be negatively impacted by the
rising cost of living in the South Florida area. Miami has recently been identified by U.S. News
& World Report as the fourth most expensive city in the United States, with a 5.7 percent
increase in basic goods and services and a 10.1 percent increase in rent of primary residence over
the course of CY 2023 - while car insurance rates in Florida have increased 55 percent over the
2023 national average.
lxxvii lxxviii lxxix
lxxx
USSOUTHCOM remains in contact with state and
federal officials, including the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Department of the
Army, as well as policymakers, to voice concerns and advocate on behalf of our team.
Joint Interagency Task Force-South Resiliency. JIATF-South is currently spread across
four buildings that are 70-plus years old and do not meet requirements to support their important
mission. Design for a new and consolidated facility will be completed in July 2024. We
appreciate the continued support as we look to build a resilient facility for this critical mission of
our nation.
Women, Peace, and Security. USSOUTHCOM’s WPS program promotes women’s
meaningful participation, leadership, and engagement in decision-making at all levels throughout
the AOR. USSOUTHCOM integrates gender perspectives within our operations, activities, and
investments to maximize the talents of women in the force through their recruitment, retention,
training, and advancement. In May 2023, USSOUTHCOM and 14 Partner Nations gathered in
Colombia for the 6
th
Senior Enlisted Leader Women, Peace, and Security Seminar. With over
300 in-person and 1000 remote attendees, this three-day seminar featured panel discussions,
34
working group sessions, and a forum to highlight the professional growth, capability, and
integrity of women filling the Senior Enlisted Leader ranks.
Through our ongoing WPS engagements, we build the capacity of our Partner Nations
and better enable their military and security forces to engage with local populations, gain gender
perspectives, and better assess the needs of all the citizens they proudly serve. I have made it a
priority to incorporate WPS events into all my travel within the region, hosting events this past
year in Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Panama, Peru, Paraguay, and
Uruguay – showcasing the power of example. Our partners continue to make historic strides. In
Colombia, the first female naval officer was promoted to the rank of Rear Admiral and the first
72 female Marines graduated from Infantry boot camp. In Uruguay, the Uruguayan Senate
approved, for the first time, the promotion of three female military officers to the rank of Colonel
this past September. Women play an important role in increasing readiness and sustaining
regional stability, security, and prosperity, and so we must redouble our efforts to integrate and
institutionalize Women, Peace, and Security initiatives internally and among all our partners.
Total Force. The trends in the Latin America and Caribbean region require a total force
approach that maximizes the integration and strong relationships between the National Guard,
Active Component, and Reserve forces. This approach is exemplified by the Navy Reserve Joint
Intelligence Operations Center 0174, whose reserve sailors supported the intelligence and
evidentiary package that led to sanctioning action on Pingtan Marine Enterprise, Ltd., along with
eight other affiliated entities involved in IUU fishing. Our Reserve Component is integrated into
our daily operations, including staffing our Joint Operations Center, planning and participating in
joint exercises, and managing the State Partnership Program.
35
What Resources Does USSOUTHCOM Need?
In this region, a small investment – whether in time, physical resources, funding, or
collaboration – goes a long way. We don’t have to outspend the PRC to outcompete, but we
must be present on the field and deliver at the speed of relevance. This requires having a timely
budget – continuing resolutions are disruptive to U.S. and Partner Nation efforts to defend
against threats. The PRC and Russia are already here in the Western Hemisphere; time is of the
essence.
Security Cooperation. USSOUTHCOM has adopted a proactive approach to identify
opportunities to expedite delivery of equipment from Security Cooperation and Security
Assistance programs. The command maintains frequent communication with all Security
Cooperation stakeholders to anticipate or recognize factors that might generate delays on FMS,
FMF, and Section 333 cases. We then engage with the organizations involved at a senior level to
ensure all teams pre-emptively take actions to mitigate risk and accelerate deliveries to build
necessary partner capacity to address mutual security threats. We appreciate Congress’ support
for USSOUTHCOM’s security cooperation activities, as these engagements are our main lever in
maintaining strong partnerships that help us edge out the PRC in the region.
Intelligence. Congress has also supported innovative pilot programs that increase
domain awareness in the theater. Given the Department’s demand for and limited availability of
exquisite Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance assets, USSOUTHCOM aims to
mitigate our ranking priority in the collection posture with Commercial Imagery. Commercial
Imagery bypasses the task-saturated national system and provides expedited, relevant, and
unclassified data that has proved crucial during a recent high-profile Haitian Kidnap for Ransom
incident, increased irregular migration, and in monitoring the malign behavior of PRC, Russia,
36
and Iran as tension in the region continues to rise. We also rely heavily on intelligence gained
through the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Section 702 authorities. Without a reauthorization
of Section 702, we would lose significant domain awareness and insight into the threats and
challenges in our own hemisphere.
Technology and Innovation. I have made it a priority to integrate tomorrow’s
technology into our operations and exercises today. Continued investment and advancements in
the areas of robotics, cyber technology, artificial intelligence and machine learning will
overmatch our adversaries and assist the region’s democracies to emerge as global leaders who
feed and fuel the world. Additionally, we must improve our information networks, cybersecurity
posture, and interoperability. Improving our networks enhances situational awareness,
accelerates decision-making, and ensures communication readiness across all echelons and with
mission partners operating throughout the USSOUTHCOM AOR. Investments in Mission
Partner Environment and Combined Joint All-Domain Command and Control will underwrite
these and future objectives. Moreover, continued Congressional support of exercises in the
Western Hemisphere will ensure the United States’ ability to evaluate cutting-edge technologies
in operationally relevant environments. These activities operationally refine future warfighting
capabilities and accelerate technologies for deployment to meet military requirements.
USSOUTHCOM’s operational experimentation helps transition research and development from
concept to implementation across all Combatant Commands and domains and, in the end,
strengthens Integrated Deterrence and Team Democracy.
Ambassadors. The United States has nine posts operating without an Ambassador, our
number one diplomat who coordinates and synchronizes Team USA’s in-country ground game.
These absences are a national security issue and send the message to our Partner Nations that
37
they are not a priority to the United States at a time when the PRC continues to elevate its
presence throughout the Western Hemisphere. The Senate could take action on the five WHEM
nominees for Ambassadorial positions that have already been sent to Congress.
Economic Engagement in the Region. USSOUTHCOM is aware of multiple legislative
efforts to encourage economic engagement and investment in the countries of the Western
Hemisphere. National security rests on economic security, and any increases in economic
opportunities for the countries and people of this neighborhood will mitigate many of the
challenges we face as a hemisphere. If people have jobs to sustain their families, they will be
less likely to consider illegally migrating to the United States for opportunities or working with
the TCOs to make ends meet. If governments in the region have the option to work with U.S. or
other Western companies, they are less likely to choose to work with the PRC. Legislative
efforts that responsibly incentivize U.S. and Western investment in the region could greatly add
to a whole-of-society approach to national security.
Beijing Convention. Ratification of the Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts
Relating to International Civil Aviation, otherwise known as the Beijing Convention, would
expand our ability to cooperate with Partner Nations for the prevention and prosecution of
certain criminal activities, including certain criminal uses of civil aviation.
Naval Small Craft Instruction and Technical Training School. We appreciate
Congress’ support of the Naval Small Craft Instruction and Technical Training School
(NAVSCIATTS) in FY 2024 and look forward to working closely with the Department of the
Navy, U.S. Special Operations Command, and Congress to keep this important facility
operational for years to come. The rivers and littorals are critical pathways in securing the
38
hemisphere, and NAVSCIATTS is uniquely positioned to train our Partner Nations on how to
secure this domain as it has for the past 54 years, training 13,000 personnel from 123 countries.
Conclusion
This is a Call to Action! Our adversariesmalign actions and intent, coupled with the
numerous transboundary threats, are a growing challenge – replicating the first and second island
chain – to our homeland. USSOUTHCOM, alongside our Allies and partners, stands ready to
defend the democratic values, ideals, and institutions that will continue to enable this vibrant
region to feed and fuel the world. Through Integrated Deterrence and utilizing all instruments of
national power, we will ensure that the safety, security, and prosperity of Latin America and the
Caribbean endure for this generation and all those to come.
39
i
Congressional Research Service, China Primer: Illicit Fentanyl and China’s Role, IF 10890, Barrios, Ricardo; Lawrence, Susan V., and Rosen,
Liana W., Congressional Research Digital Collection, September 28, 2023, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10890.
ii
“The Biden-Harris Administration’s National Security Strategy.” The White House, 12 Oct. 2022, p. 12, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2022/10/Biden-Harris-Administrations-National-Security-Strategy-10.2022.pdf
iii
Id. at 40.
iv
“World Water Day: Latin America Leads in Water Management but Inequalities in Access Remain.” World Bank,
https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2013/03/22/world-water-day-latin-america-achievements-challenges.
v
Latin America and the Caribbean will account for more than 25% of global agricultural exports by 2028, says FAO - Brazilian-American
Chamber of Commerce (brazilcham.com)
vi
Wang Yi, “The Belt and Road Initiative Becomes New Opportunity for China-Latin America Cooperation,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the
People’s Republic of China, September 18, 2017
vii
“Belt and Road in Latin America: A Regional Game Changer?” Atlantic Council, 9 Oct. 2019, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-
research-reports/issue-brief/belt-and-road-in-latin-america-a-regional-game-changer/.
viii
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